Outsourcing in the presence of imperfect markets [Elektronische Ressource] / Jan König

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Informations

• Publié par: freie_universitat_berlin
• Publié le: 01 janvier 2010
• Nombre de lectures: 6
• Langue: English

Extrait

OUTSOURCING IN THE PRESENCE
OF IMPERFECT MARKETS



Diplom-Volkswirt Jan König
geboren in Gardelegen



Inauguraldissertation
zur Erlangung des akademischen Titels
Doctor rerum politicarum

vorgelegt am Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
an der Freien Universität Berlin


















Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Ronnie Schöb
Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Walter Ried




Tag der Disputation: 29. Januar 2010



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wrote this thesis while working at the Chair of Public Economics at the Otto-von-
Guericke-Universität Magdeburg and the Freie Universität Berlin.

First, I would like to thank my academic teacher Ronnie Schöb for his guidance
during the last years and for the discussions of my thesis. I also wish to thank Walter
Ried for giving me the chance to work in the academic area, and of course, for being
my second advisor.
I am also indebted to my colleagues Andreas Knabe, Caterina Liesegang, Clemens
Hetschko, Katharina Jenderny and Sven Wehke for commenting and discussing my
work and clarifying major and minor questions. I would also like to thank Cordula
Arlinghaus-Budimir and Sabine Wolf for proofreading and helping me to organize
my work at the chairs and thereby reducing the administrative burden. It was a
pleasure to work with these wonderful people, not only because the academic
discussions were very fruitful, but also because of the pleasantly friendly and private
atmosphere that made it very easy for me.

The chapters concerning the relationship of profit sharing and outsourcing are joint
work with Erkki Koskela from the University of Helsinki. It has been very
productive to work with him and I am greatly profited from his experience. Thus, I
thank him and the Department of Economics at Helsinki University for their great
hospitality.

I would never have been able to finish this thesis without the help from my family
and friends. Especially, I would like to thank my parents and brothers, and also my
best friends Markus and Nico, who believed in me all the time. They helped me to
never lose the sight of reality. Last but not least, I thank Katrin for listening,
reading, correcting, tolerating my interests and needs and ignoring all of my
peculiarities. You are my rock and your love balances me and provides the power to
focus and finish this thesis.




Jan König

[ I ]
 
Contents

LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... V
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. V
PART I: MOTIVATION AND OUTLINE ......................................................................... 1
1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 2
1.1 Definition, Motives, Risks and Theory ............................................................... 2
1.1.1 Definition and Synonyms .................................................................................... 2
1.1.2 Determinants, Motives and Risks5
1.1.3 Theories of Explaining Outsourcing ..................................................................... 9
1.2 Aim of the Analysis ............................................................................................ 12
1.3 The Role of Profit Sharing in a Dual Labour Market with Flexible
Outsourcing ................................................................................................................ 14
1.4 Can Committed Profit Sharing Lower Flexible Outsourcing? ......................... 15
1.5 Outsourcing Motives, Competitiveness and Taxation ...................................... 16
1.6 Welfare Effects of Strategic Outsourcing in a Duopolistic Market ................. 17
1.7 Preliminary Conclusion ..................................................................................... 18
PART II: OUTSOURCING IF LABOUR MARKETS ARE IMPERFECT ......................... 20
2. THE ROLE OF PROFIT SHARING IN A DUAL LABOUR MARKET WITH
FLEXIBLE OUTSOURCING ......................................................................................... 21
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 22
2.2 Basic Framework ................................................................................................ 25
2.3 Labour Demand, Outsourcing Decision and Employee Effort ......................... 26
2.3.1 Labour Demand and Outsourcing ...................................................................... 26
2.3.2 Effort Formation and Direct Employment Effects for High-Skilled Workers ...... 29
2.4 Low-Skilled Wage Formation and Employment Effects .................................. 35
[ II ]
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks .......................................................................................... 40
Appendices ................................................................................................................. 41
3. CAN COMMITTED PROFIT SHARING LOWER FLEXIBLE OUTSOURCING? 44
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 45
3.2 Basic Framework ................................................................................................ 47
3.3 Optimal Outsourcing and Labour Demand ....................................................... 47
3.4 Wage and Effort Formation by a Monopoly Labour Union ............................. 49
3.4.1 Wage and Effort Determination ......................................................................... 49
3.4.2 Committed Profit Sharing .................................................................................. 54
3.5 Concluding Remarks .......................................................................................... 56
Appendix .................................................................................................................... 57
PART III: OUTSOURCING IN OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS ....................................... 59
4. OUTSOURCING MOTIVES, COMPETITIVENESS AND TAXATION ............... 60
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 61
4.2 Related Literature ............................................................................................... 64
4.3 Basic Model ......................................................................................................... 66
4.3.1 Stage II: Cournot-Equilibrium ....................................................................... 68
4.3.2 Stage I: Optimal Production Mode ................................................................ 70
4.4 Government Interaction .................................................................................... 76
4.4.1 Production Costs Effect ..................................................................................... 77
4.4.2 Taxation Effect .................................................................................................. 81
4.5 Reversed Motivation .......................................................................................... 83
4.6 Concluding Remarks 89
Appendices ................................................................................................................. 90
5. WELFARE EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING IN A DUOPOLISTIC
MARKET ........................................................................................................................ 96
[ III ]
 
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 97
5.2 Related Literature ............................................................................................... 98
5.3 Basic Model ....................................................................................................... 100
5.3.1 Stage II: Output Decision ................................................................................. 102
5.3.2 Stage I: Outsourcing Decision .......................................................................... 106
5.4 Production Choice and Welfare ...................................................................... 111
5.4.1 Welfare Indicator ............................................................................................ 111
5.4.2 Welfare Comparison ........................................................................................ 112
5.5 Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................ 125
Appendix .................................................................................................................. 126
PART IV: SUMMARY ................................................................................................. 129
6. CONCLUSION ...............................................