Political economy and economic impacts of climate policy [Elektronische Ressource] : a quantitative analysis of international emissions trading and environmental taxation / vorgelegt von Niels Anger

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Informations

• Publié par: carl_von_ossietzky_universitat_oldenburg
• Publié le: 01 janvier 2009
• Nombre de lectures: 18
• Langue: Deutsch
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

Political Economy and Economic Impacts of Climate Policy
A Quantitative Analysis of International Emissions Trading
and Environmental Taxation

Von der
Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg
– Fakultät II für Informatik, Wirtschafts- und Rechtswissenschaften –
genehmigte

DISSERTATION

zur Erlangung des Grades eines
Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften (Dr. rer. pol.)

vorgelegt von
Niels Anger
geboren am 12. September 1977 in Erlangen

Referent:
Prof. Dr. Christoph Böhringer
Koreferent:
Prof. Dr. Heinz Welsch

Einreichung der Dissertation: 27. September 2008
Tag der Disputation: 26. März 2009 I

Kurzzusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation analysiert die politische Ökonomie und die ökonomischen
Auswirkungen der Klimapolitik. Die Arbeit zeigt, dass die Ausgestaltung marktbasierter
Instrumente des Klimaschutzes durch das Verhalten von politischen Entscheidungsträgern
begründet werden kann, die ihre politische Unterstützung maximieren. So kann die
Berücksichtigung von Präferenzen sektoraler Interessengruppen in klimapolitischen
Entscheidungen ökonomische Ineffizienzen verursachen, die sich etwa in einer sektoralen
Differenzierung von Umweltsteuern oder einer asymmetrischen Ausstattung von
Teilbereichen der Volkswirtschaft mit handelbaren Emissionsrechten äußern. Die
Ausgestaltung klimapolitischer Instrumente spielt ihrerseits eine entscheidende Rolle für die
ökonomischen Effekte der Klimapolitik. Die Dissertation zeigt, dass der ökonomische Nutzen
einer internationalen Verknüpfung von Emissionshandelssystemen in Industrieländern von
der sektoralen Abdeckung der Systeme sowie der Stringenz der Zuteilung von
Emissionsrechten abhängt. Die Ermöglichung regional flexibler Emissionsreduktionen, etwa
durch den Zugang zu Vermeidungsoptionen in Entwicklungsländern, verbessert zudem die
Aussichten für eine kosteneffiziente und ambitionierte zukünftige Klimapolitik substantiell.

Abstract
This thesis presents a political economy analysis and an economic impact assessment of
climate change policy. It shows that the design of market-based instruments of climate policy
can be explained by the behavior of environmental regulators who maximize their political
support. The consideration of preferences of sectoral interest groups in regulatory decisions
can induce economic inefficiencies in terms of a sectoral differentiation of environmental
taxes or an asymmetric allocation of tradable emissions permits to parts of the economy. In
turn, the design of climate policy instruments plays a decisive role for the associated
economic impacts. The thesis shows that the economic benefits of linking domestic emissions
trading schemes of industrialized nations depend on the sectoral scope of these schemes and
the stringency of allowance allocation. Establishing regional flexibility of emissions
reductions, e.g. via the access to carbon abatement options in developing countries, further
improves the prospects for a cost-efficient and ambitious implementation of future climate
policy. II

Acknowledgements
This dissertation was accomplished during my occupation as a research fellow at the Centre
for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim. I would like to express my appreciation
to a number of persons without whom this thesis would not have been possible. First of all I
am grateful to Christoph Böhringer, who introduced me to the quantitative economic analysis
of climate change policy and provided invaluable scientific advice and guidance for the
dissertation. I would like to particularly thank Heinz Welsch for the supervision of the
dissertation and his valuable suggestions, as well as Andreas Löschel, head of the ZEW
department “Environmental and Resource Economics, Environmental Management” for his
scientific support and the facilitation of a dynamic working environment. Many colleagues at
the ZEW have supported the thesis with helpful comments and suggestions: Tim Hoffmann,
Victoria Alexeeva-Talebi, Astrid Dannenberg, Henrike Koschel, Andreas Lange, Tim
Mennel, Ulf Moslener, Ulrich Oberndorfer, Bodo Sturm, Carsten Vogt and Andreas Ziegler.
Parts of this dissertation were completed during a research visit at the Graduate School of
Business, Columbia University, New York. I would therefore like to thank Geoffrey Heal for
his scientific advice and the opportunity to participate in an inspiring international research
environment.
I am grateful for comments and suggestions of participants at annual congresses of the
European Economic Association, the Verein für Socialpolitik, the European and International
Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, the International Association for
Energy Economics, the European Public Choice Society, the Monte Verità Conference on
Sustainable Resource Use and Economic Dynamics and the Spring Meeting of Young
Economists. In particular, I would like to thank the participants of the workshops of the Ph.D.
network on International Climate Policy and the Research Committee “Environmental and
Resource Economics” of the Verein für Socialpolitik for helpful discussions and interesting
encounters. Financial support from the European Commission, the German Federal Ministry
of Education and Research, the German Federal Environment Agency, the German Academic
Exchange Service and the Deutsche Bundesbank is gratefully acknowledged.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents, my sister and Esther who were always at my side
with so much support and advice.
Contents III

Contents

1 Introduction........................................................................................................................ 2

Part I: Political Economy of Climate Policy …………………………………………………9

2 The Political Economy of Environmental Tax Differentiation: Theory and Empirical
Evidence.......................................................................................................................... 10
2.1 A political-economy model of differentiated environmental taxes ............................ 13
2.1.1 Political interests...............................................................................................14
2.1.2 The determinants of tax differentiation............................................................. 16
2.1.3 Explaining the lobby power of sectors.............................................................. 18
2.2 Regression analysis of the German environmental tax reform................................... 22
2.2.1 Data and variables............................................................................................. 22
2.2.2 Econometric approach......................................................................................24
2.2.3 Determinants of environmental taxation........................................................... 25
2.2.4 The determinants of lobby power ..................................................................... 29
2.3 Conclusions................................................................................................................. 30
2.4 Appendix..................................................................................................................... 32
2.4.1 List of tables...................................................................................................... 32
2.4.2 Impacts of lobbying on equilibrium profits ...................................................... 40
2.4.3 Regression diagnostics and robust estimation .................................................. 42
3 Public Interest vs. Interest Groups: Allowance Allocation in the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme .............................................................................................................. 45
3.1 Theoretical framework................................................................................................47
3.1.1 The political equilibrium................................................................................... 49
3.1.2 Efficiency and distributional implications of lobbying .................................... 52
3.2 Empirical analysis for Germany ................................................................................. 54
3.2.1 Data and variables............................................................................................. 55
3.2.2 Methodology.....................................................................................................58
3.2.3 Estimation results..............................................................................................60
3.3 Conclusions................................................................................................................. 65
3.4 Appendix..................................................................................................................... 68
3.4.1 Theoretical framework: Firm behavior............................................................. 68
3.4.2 Empirical analysis: The CREDITREFORM database...................................... 69
3.4.3 List of tables......................................................