Resolute readings of later Wittgenstein and the challenge of avoiding hierarchies in philosophy [Elektronische Ressource] / Stefan Giesewetter. Betreuer: Hans Julius Schneider

Stefan Giesewetter

Sujets

• Philosophie

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• Publié par: universitat_potsdam
• Publié le: 01 janvier 2011
• Nombre de lectures: 20
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

Resolute Readings of Later Wittgenstein and
the Challenge of Avoiding Hierarchies in Philosophy
Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophie (Dr. phil.)
vorgelegt der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Potsdam
von
Stefan Giesewetter
geb. 20.1.1969 in Hamburg
Potsdam 2011 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License:
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Published online at the
Institutional Repository of the University of Potsdam:
URL http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2011/5702/
URN urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-57021
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-57021 2
Table of Contents
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 4
1. The Idea of a Resolute Reading of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy ........................ 11
1.1 The Basic Challenge................................................................................................. 12
1.2 The Readings of Robert Brandom and Crispin Wright............................................ 14
1.3 The Reading of Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker..................................................... 23
1.4 Resolute Readings of Later Wittgenstein: A First Overview................................... 29
1.5 The Resolute Reading of James Conant................................................................... 47
1.6 The Resolute Reading of Martin Gustafsson ........................................................... 63
1.7 The Resolute Reading of Oskari Kuusela ................................................................ 79
1.8 Summary .................................................................................................................. 91
2. The Rule-Following Problem ........................................................................................ 98
2.1 The Rule-Following Paradox in the Investigations.................................................. 99
2.2 Saul Kripke’s and Crispin Wright’s Solutions....................................................... 106
2.3 The Role of Customs, Practice, and Institutions.................................................... 114
2.4 Use on Two Logical Levels ................................................................................... 123
2.5 John McDowell’s Dissolution of the Rule-Following Paradox ............................. 135
2.6 Summary ................................................................................................................ 137
3. Baker and Hacker on the Significance of the Rule-Following Remarks for the
Dissolution of Any Philosophical Problem......................................................................... 143
3.1 Baker and Hacker on Rule-Following and Practice ............................................... 144
3.2 Baker and Hacker on the Role of Rules in Dissolving Philosophical Problems.... 147
3.3 Baker and Hacker on the Role of the Rule-Following Remarks............................ 152
3.4 The Inconsistency Within Baker and Hacker’s Account ....................................... 158
3.5 The Role of the Rule-Following Remarks for Wittgenstein’s Philosophy ............ 164
3.6 Summary ................................................................................................................ 169
4. Resolute Readings and the Challenge of Avoiding Hierarchies in Philosophy ...... 174
4.1 Gustafsson on the Significance of the Rule-Following Problem ........................... 175
4.2 Kuusela on the Role of the Remarks on Meaning and Use.................................... 190
4.3 Kuusela’s View Leads into a Regress .................................................................... 200
4.4 Global Remarks on Meaning and Use 211
4.5 The Non-Foundational Role of the Remarks on Meaning and Use ....................... 218
4.6 Summary ................................................................................................................ 2213
Conclusion............................................................................................................................. 227
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 237
Deutsche Zusammenfassung ................................................................................................ 2464
1Introduction
This dissertation is concerned with an issue related to the so-called “resolute reading”
2of the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The term “resolute reading” has evolved as a label for
the readings of Wittgenstein’s work which have been advanced by Cora Diamond, James Co-
3nant, Michael Kremer, Thomas Ricketts, and others . An earmark of these readings is that
they all take Wittgenstein’s primary goal – in his early as well as in his later work – to be that
of introducing ways of dissolving philosophical problems. In this view, a philosophical prob-
lem concerning a certain topic is seen as a seeming contradiction between, on the one hand,
how we think things concerning this topic must be, and, on the other hand, how we perceive
these things to really be. Dissolving such a philosophical problem then means to come to see
that this contradiction was merely apparent. This involves coming to see that our idea of how
things must be was founded on an illusion – an illusion induced through our misunderstanding
the forms of expression which we had used in formulating our apparent contradiction. Once
such a contradiction has been exposed as based on such an illusion, resolute readers hold, the
problem falls away, and the task of philosophy is finished. For resolute readers, bringing out
this aspect of Wittgenstein’s philosophy means to reject readings of Wittgenstein which put
the main focus on purported claims of his concerning topics in the philosophy of language –
topics such as how language hooks on to the world or what the necessary preconditions of
language use are. As resolute readers take it, Wittgenstein concerns himself with language
and meaning, not because he wishes to give any theoretical answer to the question “How does
linguistic meaning come into being?”, but because his proposed ways of dissolving philo-
sophical problems involve asking ourselves whether the linguistic forms of expression which
we call upon in formulating our philosophical problems really have the sort of meaning that
we imagine them to have. Connected to this is another earmark of resolute readings: Not only

1 I wish to express my deepest thanks to Hans Julius Schneider. Without his continuous and generous support,
this dissertation project would not have been possible. Also, our joint seminar on Wittgenstein with the opportu-
nity to introduce resolute readings was of great value for the present project. Moreover, this dissertation project
owes greatly to the most generous support of James Conant. His untiring encouragement, the opportunity to
thoroughly discuss my ideas, his utterly helpful advice concerning how to organize them, and, most importantly,
the opportunity to spend a year as a Visiting Graduate Student at the University of Chicago, were of crucial sig-
nificance for the success of the present project. Lastly, I wish to thank the participants of the Contemporary Phi-
losophy and the Wittgenstein Workshops of the University of Chicago for their valuable comments on previous
versions of Chapter 3.
2 The label “resolute” for these kinds of readings is first due to Thomas Ricketts. It has been first used in print by
Warren Goldfarb in his “Metaphysics and Nonsense: On Cora Diamond’s The Realistic Spirit” (1997)
3 These other resolute readers include: Alice Crary, Ed Dain, Piergiorgio Donatelli, Juliet Floyd, Warren Gold-
farb, Logi Gunnarsson, Rupert Read, Matt Ostrow, and Ed Witherspoon. Although Margaret Anscombe could5
do these readings reject the idea that Wittgenstein were concerned with providing an answer
to the question “How does linguistic meaning come into being?”, but furthermore, these
readings insist that Wittgenstein’s proposed ways of dissolving philosophical problems may
not be taken as themselves depending on any theoretical answer to the question “How does
linguistic meaning come into being?” According to resolute readers, the main question with
which Wittgenstein was concerned throughout his philosophical career was this: How to
achieve the aim of putting forward a way of dissolving philosophical problems – which way
involves asking ourselves what we mean by our words – without making any claims about the
essence of language and meaning?
Most of the discussion of resolute readings has focused on how to read Wittgenstein’s
4 5Tractatus, or on how to conceive the relation of the Tractatus to Wittgenstein’s later work.
However, some resolute readers have discussed the main question – How can the aim of put-
ting forward a way of dissolving philosophical problems without making any claims about the
essence