Conditions for the return of displaced persons from the European Union

European Commission Secretariat-General

Description

Final report
Social policy

Sujets

• Return migration
• Eritrea
• Sri Lanka
• Sociologie, société et politique

Informations

• Publié par: EUROPEAN-COMMISSION-SECRETARIAT-GENERAL
• Nombre de lectures: 8
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

CONDITIONS FOR THE RETURN OF DISPLACED
PERSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION
Final report
EUROPEAN niOCUMENTDII COMMISSION
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ι· nnpniiFnnnnp This report has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Commission. The opinions expressed
by the authors do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Commission.
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet.
It can be accessed through the Europa server (http://europa.eu.int).
Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication.
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1998
ISBN 92-828-3337-2
© European Communities, 1998
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
Printed in Belgium Conditions for the Return of Displaced Persons
from the European Union
Final Report
Richard Black, Khalid Koser, Martha Walsh
10 November 1997
Sussex Centre for Migration Research UNIVERSITY OF
Centre for the Comparative Study of
Culture, Development and the Environment (CDE) \&LW
University of Sussex
Arts C
Falmer
Brighton BN1 9QN
tel: [phone] (χ 3394) SUSSEX
fax:[phone]
AT BRIGHTON
e-mail: [e-mail] CONTENTS
Executive Summary 1
I. Introduction 6
Recent immigration to the European Union
The rise of 'temporary protection' 7
Repatriation 9
Structure of this report 11
II. Methods and sources2
Documentary research
Field visits to EU member states
Field visit to Bosnia3
Field visits to Eritrea and Sri Lanka4
Follow up field visits
III. Policy on return to Bosnia-Herzegovina 15
Typology of return programmes6
Criteria for inclusion in return schemes9
Current policy debates on return 20
IV. Assessing the success of assisted return: perspectives from Bosnia 2
Assistance to returne for re-integration4
Area reconstruction8
Problems encountered upon return 31
V. Assessing the success of assisted return:
perspectives from EU member states7
States' evaluations of assisted return:
Austria, Germany and the Netherlands
A framework for assessing assisted return:
the host country perspective 41
The costs of assisted return:
Austria, Germany and the Netherlands2
A framework for assessing the costs of assisted return 44
VI. Two comparative case studies: Eritrea and Sri Lanka7
Assisted return to Eritreadn to Sri Lanka 56
VII. Assessing the conditions for return: information and monitoring 63
Information for refugees 6n for host countries5
Misinformation and mistrust8
VIII. Conclusion 71
Debate on the numbers returning 7
Assessing different types of return3
Directions for policy
Appendix A: List of References9
Appendix B: Field Visit Schedules 80 x C: List of Respondents
Appendix D: GlossaryEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Over half a million Bosnians have been displaced to countries of the European Union.
Most of them were initially granted 'temporary protection', although many now have, or
are likely to receive, permanent residence status. In 1997 to date, approximately 75,000
Bosnians have also been assisted to return to Bosnia from the EU under organized
schemes, and further returns are expected in 1998. This report provides an inventory
of, and then assesses existing policy on return from EU member states to Bosnia. It
evaluates the implementation of return from a variety of perspectives, and it draws
policy lessons for future return to Bosnia and other post-conflict countries. The report
also includes information gleaned from comparative case studies of assisted return
from the EU to Eritrea and Sri Lanka.
2. Numerous return programmes exist which are targeted at Bosnians currently living
within EU member states. This report provides a typology of these return programmes,
based on organisational responsibility (state, international organisation, non­
governmental organisation) and type of assistance prioritised (return, reintegration,
reconstruction and information provision).
3. The report finds that there is often a lack of co-ordination of assisted return schemes
both across EU member states, and in some cases within individual states. This is
reflected in different criteria for inclusion in schemes (some targeted at professionals,
others at unemployed, or the elderly, some specifically excluding the elderly or
vulnerable), as well as different 'philosophies' of return (at its most extreme, the balance
of 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' return, but encompassing a range of different incentives
offered to return).
4. Closer evaluation of specific assisted return schemes reveals divergent perspectives
between host governments, the government of the country of origin, international and
non-governmental organizations and returnees themselves on the overall 'success' of
these schemes. Key debates concern the role of both cash and legal 'incentives' to
return; the relative importance of shelter and/or employment in promoting successful
reintegration, and the extent to which area reconstruction schemes contribute to
successful return.
5. Our report finds no firm evidence that additional cash incentives increase propensity to
return, although these may be appreciated by returnees seeking to reconstruct their
livelihoods in Bosnia. Large cash payments to individuals also risk creating tensions
between returnees and those who remained through the war. 6. There is conflicting evidence on whether the threat of forced return (notably the
withdrawal or non-renewal of residence papers and notice to leave the country) has
been an incentive to 'voluntary' return. Evidence from German Länder shows no
correlation between return rates and policies to promote forced return. However,
interviews with returnees in Bosnia suggest the threat of forced return is a factor in
decision making, and even call into question whether much voluntary return in such
circumstances can genuinely be viewed as voluntary. Frequently, individuals and
families have chosen to leave quietly rather than suffer the indignity of being deported.
7. Both shelter and employment are clearly important issues for returnees to Bosnia,
reflecting the destruction of property during the war, and the collapse of then
economy. Although some important initiatives are taking place, in both cases, our
research suggests that it may be better to promote schemes which improve housing
and employment conditions in areas to which people may return - thus creating the
'conditions for return' - rather than targeting schemes on a fixed percentage of
returnees as beneficiaries.
8. In addition to housing and employment, other significant problems faced by returnees in
Bosnia include problems of reintegration in home communities (including social
problems not connected to ethnicity or religion); the presence of landmines, and the
imposition of 'war taxes' in certain areas.
9. In addressing priority issues for reconstruction, 'municipality twinning' programmes have
an important potential role to play, particularly if these are geared towards capacity
building of Bosnian local authorities, and utilize a 'participatory' approach. Nonetheless,
important political constraints remain to such schemes.
10. This report calls into question the notion that the total number of returnees (or the
number relative to start-of-year targets) should be the sole or main criterion for member
state governments in assessing the success of assisted return schemes. A number of
governments were found to apply other criteria, including the number of returnees
relative to the 'target' population (which is usually accepted to be much lower than the
total Bosnian population); the contribution of assisted return to an overall 'suite' of
durable solutions, and the 'moral' success which some states feel they have achieved
by avoiding forced return.
11. The financial costs of assisted return are also of importance to member state
governments. A framework for assessing these costs is developed, which highlights the
lower cost implications of mobilising an existing return infrastructure, compared to
developing designated programmes specifically for Bosnian return; but also a wide variation in costs associated with these latter programmes. Specifically, the relationship
between numbers of returnees and unit costs is unclear, with evidence showing that
larger schemes can be both cheaper or more expensive, depending on other
circumstances.
12. Schemes which simply fund the return journey itself are clearly cheaper than
reintegration schemes, whilst both are cheaper per returnee than area reconstruction
schemes. However, the first two types of scheme would appear to have a number of
potential 'hidden' costs, whereas the latter may have several important 'hidden' benefits.
Moreover, a cost per returnee calculation is clearly less appropriate for schemes not
directly aimed at promoting return.
13. Lessons from the comparative experience of skilled return to Eritrea suggest that return
programmes need to define target populations in order to en