Objectifs politiques et contraintes institutionnelles dans les décisions de politique monétaire : analyse économétrique du cas français (1973.03-1993.12) . - article ; n°3 ; vol.46, pg 869-878

Christian Aubin, Jean-Dominique Lafay

Description

Revue économique - Année 1995 - Volume 46 - Numéro 3 - Pages 869-878
Political goals and institutional constraints in monetary policy making : an empirical application to the french case (1973.03 - 1993.12)
This paper tries to evaluate the weight of political influences in French monetary policy choices for the period preceding the implementation of the independence law for the Central Bank (January 1994). The analysis is based on a positive politico-economic model describing the bargaining process between the government and the Central Bank. Empirical estimates show that, at least for the interest rate instrument, political considerations have significantly influenced monetary policy choices for the period preceding the adhesion to the European Monetary System. Afterwards, institutional constraints have strongly reduced the possibilities for political manipulation.
Political goals and institutional constraints in monetary policy making : an empirical application to the french case (1973.03 - 1993.12)
This paper tries to evaluate the weight of political influences in French monetary policy choices for the period preceding the implementation of the independence law for the Central Bank (January 1994). The analysis is based on a positive politico-economic model describing the bargaining process between the government and the Central Bank. Empirical estimates show that, at least for the interest rate instrument, political considerations have significantly influenced monetary policy choices for the period preceding the adhesion to the European Monetary System. Afterwards, institutional constraints have strongly reduced the possibilities for political manipulation.
10 pages
Source : Persée ; Ministère de la jeunesse, de l’éducation nationale et de la recherche, Direction de l’enseignement supérieur, Sous-direction des bibliothèques et de la documentation.

Sujets

• Sociologie, société et politique

Informations

• Publié par: REVUE_ECONOMIQUE
• Publié le: 01 janvier 1995
• Nombre de lectures: 15
• Langue: Catalan

Extrait

Monsieur Christian Aubin

Monsieur Jean-Dominique Lafay

Objectifs politiques et contraintes institutionnelles dans les

décisions de politique monétaire : analyse économétrique du

cas français (1973.03-1993.12) .

In: Revue économique. Volume 46, n°3, 1995. pp. 869-878.

Abstract

Political goals and institutional constraints in monetary policy making : an empirical application to the french case (1973.03 -

1993.12)

This paper tries to evaluate the weight of political influences in French monetary policy choices for the period preceding the

implementation of the independence law for the Central Bank (January 1994). The analysis is based on a positive politico-

economic model describing the bargaining process between the government and the Central Bank. Empirical estimates show

that, at least for the interest rate instrument, political considerations have significantly influenced monetary policy choices for the

period preceding the adhesion to the European Monetary System. Afterwards, institutional constraints have strongly reduced the

possibilities for political manipulation.

Résumé

Political goals and institutional constraints in monetary policy making : an empirical application to the french case (1973.03 -

1993.12)

This paper tries to evaluate the weight of political influences in French monetary policy choices for the period preceding the

implementation of the independence law for the Central Bank (January 1994). The analysis is based on a positive politico-

economic model describing the bargaining process between the government and the Central Bank. Empirical estimates show

that, at least for the interest rate instrument, political considerations have significantly influenced monetary policy choices for the

period preceding the adhesion to the European Monetary System. Afterwards, institutional constraints have strongly reduced the

possibilities for political manipulation.

Citer ce document / Cite this document :

Aubin Christian, Lafay Jean-Dominique. Objectifs politiques et contraintes institutionnelles dans les décisions de politique

monétaire : analyse économétrique du cas français (1973.03-1993.12) . In: Revue économique. Volume 46, n°3, 1995. pp. 869-

878.

http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/reco_0035-2764_1995_num_46_3_409700