Tutorial 4 - Poland - Handout - Draft 1

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**********WAR TO COLD WATUR TORIAL 4 3rd November, 2005 A BITTER FORETASTE: POLAND, 1941 -19441941 INTRODUCTION Jun Germany invades the Soviet Charith will contrast Wilsonian Union. Universalism with ’Spheres of Influence’ Jul Polish-Soviet Agreement. and argue that the former was never a Aug Polish-Soviet Military workable strategy. Mark will consider Agreement. how this applies specifically to Poland, 1942 and use the Anglo-US differences over Mar Sikorski visits United States to Poland to illustrate this. Finally, Nick will gain American support for not use an analysis of American domestic political attitudes to explain the repeated settling territorial disputes unti references to such a principled foreign after the war. policy. May Anglo-Soviet Treaty. July Soviets arrest and charge Polish WHY POLAND MATTERS delegates with espionage. Historiography: “Western betrayal” • Why did America and Britain allow Nov Collapse of plans for Polish-the USSR to take over Eastern Czechoslovak confederation. Europe? West was tricked by Stalin; 1943 underestimated Soviet superpower Jan Soviets withdraw citizenship for expansionism (orthodox eg. Collective security – western idea those of Polish origin from Raack). • Self-determination and Soviet ...

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• Publié par: Phoim
• Nombre de lectures: 19
• Langue: English

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WAR TO COLD WARTUTORIAL 4November, 2005 3rd A BITTER FORETASTE: POLAND, 1941-1944

1941 Jun Germanyinvades the Soviet  Union. Jul Polish-SovietAgreement. Aug Polish-Soviet Military  Agreement. 1942 Mar Sikorskivisits United States to American support for not gain territorial disputes until settling the war. after May Anglo-Soviet Treaty. July Sovietsarrest and charge Polish  delegateswith espionage. Nov Collapseof plans for Polish- confederation. Czechoslovak 1943 Jan Sovietswithdraw citizenship for  thoseof Polish origin from Poland. Eastern Apr Discoveryof Katyn massacre  andseverance of Polish-Soviet  diplomaticrelations. Jul GeneralSikorski dies in plane off Gibraltar and is crash by Stanislaw replace  Mikolajczyk. Nov TeheranConference. DecTreaty. Soviet-Czechoslovak 1944 Jan RedArmy enters Poland.  Pro-SovietPolish National established. Council Jun Mikolajczykvisits the United  States. Jul PolishNational Committee of  Liberationestablished. Aug Mikolajczykvisits Soviet Union meets with Stalin and and Warsaw Uprising. P.N.C.L.; Oct Warsawinsurgents surrender. Nov Polishcabinet rejects  Mikolajczykproposal to  concedeto Soviet territorial Mikolajczyk resigns demands. is replace by Tomasz and  Arciszewski. Decaccepts P.C.N.L. as Stalin government in provisional  Poland.

INTRODUCTION Charith will contrast Wilsonian Universalism with ’Spheres of Influence’ and argue that the former was never a workable strategy. Mark will consider how this applies specifically to Poland, and use the Anglo-US differences over Poland to illustrate this. Finally, Nick wi use an analysis of American domestic political attitudes to explain the repeate references to such a principled foreign policy.

WHY POLAND MATTERS Historiography: “Western betrayal” · Why did America and Britain allow the USSR to take over Eastern Europe? * West was tricked by Stalin; underestimated Soviet expansionism (orthodox eg. Raack). * OR West sacrificed Poland to ensure Soviet cooperation in post war world. Our argument: · US decision-makers realised that trying to implement a Wilsonian world order was never going to work. · The FDR administration publicly talked up Atlantic Charter principles because of domestic considerations.

WILSONIANISM vs. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

Theory · Spheres of influence caused war. · Atlantic Charter principles * Self-determination * Open markets * Collective security Practice · Western powers already had their own spheres of influence * Atlantic Charter clause: “with due respect for their existing obligations”. * See Gobbet A. · “Power politics” not limited to great powers: see Gobbet B · A Wilsonian world order appeared to benefit America most. * Open markets - US economic

A.Ivan Maisky, Soviet Ambassador to London, reads a statement at the Allied conference proclaiming Russia’s agreement with the Atlantic Charter - 28/9/1941.(From Gardner,Spheres of influence, p. 103). “Considering that the practical application of these principles will necessarily adapt itself to the circumstances, needs and historic peculiarities of particular countries, the Soviet Government can state that a consistent application of these principles will secure the most energetic support on the part of the Government and peoples of the Soviet Union.” B.State Department memo about General Sikorski’s plans for post-war Poland, prepared for Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles - 9/12/1942. (From Terry,Poland’s place in Europe, p. 303). “The proposals presented by General Sikorski set forth a point of view greatly at variance with the basic principles we have adopted as the real general war aims included in such documents as the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations. An examination of the several documents now presented

THE POLISH QUESTION AND STRATEGIC BALANCE · Carving up of Poland in Nazi-Soviet Pact meant Soviets wanted a return to situation before the Nazi invasion. Already had aim of taking eastern parts of Poland. · U.S. non-involvement as a full belligerent from the start of Soviet participation meant it could not act as a strategic counter to Soviet power, even until 1944 when it achieved a mass deployment in Europe. Britain was relatively weak and so could not do so. · British need for Soviet military participation against Germany resulted in an overly concessionary policy towards the Soviet Union over Poland, so that the Soviet Union would not pursue a separate peace with Germany.

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 · Geographically, extremely difficult to strategically support a policy towards shows that they cover reparations, war United States, even if it was Poland. Had to rely on diplomatic guilt, frontier pretensions, occupation, ideologically opposed, had to be persuasion, which was insufficient as military booty, land and sea bases, et pragmatic and accept Stalin’s demands Churchill and Roosevelt needed Soviet cetera, all in the spirit of extreme unless the strategic situation allowed participation, which Stalin knew. nationalism, with only a mild suggestion otherwise. British could only support Polish forces · of Poland’s own plans for international British and U.S. policy coincided through air power and so they collaboration.” therefore as they both put the remained consistently weak and unable maintenance of Grand Alliance to oppose the Red Army. harmony before secondary concerns Progress of Red Army into Eastern · such as the Polish Question. Churchill Europe meant negotiation of territory was not heavily influenced by the fact became largely academic. that Poland’s defence was the reason · Had Churchill and Roosevelt not put ANGLO-US DIFFERENCES Britain was in the war in the first place. off Polish Question until the end of the Overall, argument is that Anglo- Both Churchill and Roosevelt were · war, a deal could have been reached American differences over the Polish more concerned with post-war that the Soviets would feel more question were minimal. U.S. generally harmony, even from early on in the obliged to accept, despite the Red deferred to a British lead over the issue war. Army presence in Poland. · given the supposed British superior Both Churchill and Roosevelt therefore · Realisation that Red Army would knowledge and expertise of European agreed to postpone post-war planning control Poland possibly led to greater diplomacy. for as long as possible to prevent a rift efforts from Churchill to argue the case · United States entered the war after the in the Grand Alliance. It was Stalin’s for a Balkans invasion route into insistence on territorial gains from Soviet Union and so, whilst involved in Europe to counter the Soviets, even if Poland, a weak Western bargaining discussing the Polish question, could they were fruitless. not exercise as much of a restraining position and a joint belief that the · Fact that the Red Army contributed influence over talks between Britain Soviet Union would be a key post-war the most to the German defeat gave and the Soviet Union until it became a world player that necessitated British the Soviets added moral bargaining full belligerent. acquiescence and U.S. indifference Britain had already power to have their security concerns made ‘half-promises’ to Soviet Union until the end of the war. addressed. · by the time the United States became a British and U.S. policy over the Polish full belligerent. question was substantially in harmony FDR speaks to the Polish ambassador Resulted in an ‘informal’ post-war therefore, if not ideologically, then in · about the Russian advance spheres of influence commitment with the pragmatic acceptance of what was (20/12/1943). the U.S.S.R., to which the U.S. was realistic. U.S. involvement from the “Do you think they will just stop to ideologically opposed before the U.S. start of the war may have resulted in a please you, or us for that matter? Do you could effectively intervene to prevent more ‘quid pro quo’ arrangement over expect us and Great Britain to declare concessions on Poland though, rather it. war on Joe Stalin if they cross your · than creating the impression the West British generosity to the Soviet Union previous frontier? Even if we wanted to, was happy to meekly surrender the during the early stages of the war Russia can still field an army twice our territorial sovereignty of one of its contributed to an effective early combined strength, and we would just allies. settlement of the Polish question as it have no say in the matter at all. “ gave Stalin a basis from which he would not easily be moved. The Gardner,Spheres of influence, pp. 208-209.

IMPORTANCE OF DOMESTIC support for both his wartime and US ATTITUDES TO POLAND ATTITUDES postwar policies. * Ultimately Polish hopes were to be POLISH QUESTION AND US dashed and Roosevelt’s attitude Interfaces for Public Opinion POLITICS came to be seen by many as a · Elections– esp. Prez’l elections (1944) ‘betrayal’. · Petitions/Delegations– e.g. P.A.C. in Factors in Domestic Attitudes * Gaddis (1972) argues that FDR’s Oct ‘44 · Atlantic Charter– principles of rhetoric left the public · Propaganda– altering public opinion insufficiently prepared for the foreign policy; “price” of isolationist · Press/Media– President needed realpolitikof the post-war conversion; made Polish independent public support settlement and was ultimately a key to support · factor in US public hostility to the FDR’S Death– “martyrdom” (Gaddis) Impact of Public Opinion and the · USSR. Sympathy/Trust in Stalin– conduct Response · Public Attitudes echoed FDR’s of WW2 · 1944 Presidential Elections * · Public attitudes converged with PolishAmerican Politics– e.g. Polish * Polish Americans were perceived Roosevelt’s public pronouncements American Council · and wartime compromises. During as a key support group for Rhetoric– commitments to ‘self- Roosevelt. They felt acutely effects the war Americans (albeit only in determination’ of Roosevelt’s policy towards their homeland. Polish American the short-term) came to terms Changing Attitudes to Poland Congress organised and enhanced with Soviet territorial – if not their · Start of WW2– great deal of effect of Polish American opinion. political demands. Roosevelt’s sympathy for Poland vs. Germany * Documentary evidence public stance matched the public · By 1944– attitudes have changed: demonstrates perceived mood. · Positive impression of Russia importance of Polish American · Media increasingly take Russian opinion: e.g. September 1944, FDR CONCLUSIONS side in disputes means a delegation of Polish · There are continued – but Americans and makes general · Lukas study suggests public opinion increasingly outspoken – critics of commitment to Atlantic Charter did not “directly influence” policy. S.U. in period. (e.g. Taft) principles. · Polish American attitudes remained · Why have attitudes changed? * Yet Roosevelt’s response is divergent from Roosevelt’s and though · London Poles’ mismanagement of sectional– there is little mention of their attitudes concerned him his public opinion, unwillingness to specific issue of Poland in broader efforts to reassure them did not lead to compromise. election campaign. concrete commitments. The policy · Soviet Union’s contribution to War * Poles continued to voteen blocfor that, in retrospect, he seems to have and Grand Alliance FDR because of his ‘New Deal’ pursued, is not one that they would · Basic attitude “Keep USSR Fighting” – policies and because Dewey had have endorsed. concessions over Poland became more really failed to make a challenge to · Domestic attitudes to Poland were palatablebut neverthelessthere was his Polish policy at the forefront of important because they were a ‘make still an underlying commitment to its his campaign. or break’ response to the Atlantic independence and as Walsh (1944/5) · Atlantic Charter Charter. If FDR was to win over his argues fear of USSR’s expansion. So a * Rhetorical commitment to critics and especially the Senate he continued commitment to the principles of Atlantic Charter needed to be able to plausibly claim Atlantic Charter principles was crucial throughout period. the principles were workable. to public support of the government’s * Rhetoric important because it is an · A study of public attitudes over policies. attempt to win over public Poland would support Gaddis’ 1975 hypothesis that Roosevelt failed to prepare the public for the reality of postwar compromise. FDR’s State of the Union Message to Congress (7/1/1945). “During the interim period we and our Allies have a duty to use our influence to the end that no temporary or provisional authorities in the liberated countries block the eventual exercise of the peoples’ right freely to choose the government and institutions under which, as free men, they are to live. “ From Gardner,Speres of influence, p 224.

SUGGESTED READING

Lloyd Gardner,Spheres of influence (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1993) Real gold-dust this: a history book that’s also a compulsive page-turner! Good narrative about the Grand Alliance problems in trying to organise the post- war order. J.A. Lukacs,The Great Powers and Eastern Europe(New York: American Book Co., 1953) Rather pejorative, and highly critical of Roosevelt’s foreign policy. Nevertheless a useful summary of events. R.C. Lukas, ‘The Big Three and the Warsaw Uprising’Military Affairs39/3 (1975) A little outside the time period but provides useful info. on attitudes in later part of period. R.C. Lukas,The Strange Allies: The United States and Poland, 1941-45 (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee, 1978) Authoritative summary of events and account of domestic political aspects. Geir Lundestad,The American non- policy towards Eastern Europe, 1943-47 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978) Does what it says on the tin: a systematic breakdown on American policy towards each eastern European country. The typeface is bloody awful though. Eduard Mark, ‘American Policy Toward Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Cold War 1941—1946: An Alternative Interpretation’Journal of American History68/2 (1981) Mark provides a useful analysis of ‘Spheres of Influence’. Sarah Terry,Poland’s place in Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) Writes from the Polish perspective on the western border. John Lewis Gaddis,The United States and the origins of the cold war(New York: Columbia University Press, 1972) Chapter 5 is good for domestic considerations. John Lewis Gaddis,We now know (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) The first essay is a good introduction on Soviet security concerns.

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