Security for service-oriented on-demand grid computing [Elektronische Ressource] / von Matthew Smith

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• Informatik

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• Publié par: philipps-universitat_marburg
• Publié le: 01 janvier 2008
• Nombre de lectures: 24
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 16 Mo

Extrait

SecurityforService-Oriented
On-DemandGridComputing
Vom
Fachbereich Mathematik und Informatik
der Philipps-Universitat¨ Marburg genehmigte
Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades
der Naturwissenschaften (Dr. rer. nat.)
von
Matthew Smith
aus Lahn-Gießen
Marburg/Lahn 2008Vom Fachbereich Mathematik und Informatik der
Philipps-Universitat¨ Marburg als Dissertation am
09.07.2008
angenommen.
Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Bernd Freisleben
Zweitgutachterin: Prof. Dr. Claudia Eckert
Tag der mundlichen¨ Prufung¨ am 27.11.2008¨Erklarung
Ich versichere, daß ich meine Dissertation
Security for Service-Oriented On-Demand Grid Computing
selbstandig,¨ ohne unerlaubte Hilfe angefertigt und mich dabei keiner anderen als der
von mir ausdrucklich¨ bezeichneten Quellen und Hilfen bedient habe. Die Dissertation
wurde in der jetzigen oder einer ahnlichen¨ Form noch bei keiner anderen Hochschule
eingereicht und hat noch keinen sonstigen Prufungszweck¨ en gedient.
Marburg, den Matthew Smith6
Acknowledgments
I would like to acknowledge the help of many people during my studies that led to this
thesis. In particular, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Bernd Freisleben for supervising
me and sharing his knowledge, insights and experiences over the course of this thesis,
and for his dedication as the head of research of the Distributed Systems Group.
I would also like to thank Prof. Dr. Claudia Eckert head of the Fraunhofer Institut
for Secure Information Technology (SIT) and professor at the Darmstadt University of
Technology for kindly taking the time to review my thesis.
At the University of Marburg I would like to thank my colleagues and students
past and present at the Distributed Systems Group who were invaluable in the realisa-
tion of the Grid projects which are part of this thesis. In alphabetical order I would
like to thank Kay Dornemann,¨ Tim Dornemann,¨ Ralph Ewerth, Niels Fallenbeck,
Thomas Friese, Torsten Graf, Julian Hagenauer, Sven Hanemann, Marian Harbach,
Sergej Herdt, Steffen Heinzl, Ernst Juhnke, Stefan Paal, Markus Mathes, Thomas
Noll, Elvis Papalilo, Hans-Joachim Picht, Stefan Schindelmann, Matthias Schmidt,
Christian Schridde, Fabian Schwarzer, Roland Schwarzkopf, Christian Seidemann,
Thilo Stadelmann, Bernd Wasmuth and Matthias Weigand. I would especially like
to thank Thomas Friese for the joint work in the first two years of the D-Grid project
and Matthias Schmidt and Niels Fallenbeck for their dedicated work on the production
environment for the D-Grid. I also thank our secretary Mechthild Keßler for efficiently
handling the many travel forms for the University administration.
From the D-Grid security working group I would like to thank Dr. Alfred Geiger
from T-System-SfR, Prof. Dr. Christian Grimm from the University of Hannover, Dr.
Sabine Roller from the Hochstleistungsrechenzentrum¨ Stuttgart (HRLS), Dr. Ulrich
Sax from the University of Gottingen¨ and Dr. Markus Pattloch from the Deutsche
Forschungsnetz (DFN).
At the University of Siegen, Germany, I would like to thank Julian Reichwald,
Juniorprof. Dr. Thomas Barth and Prof. Dr. Manfred Grauer for the cooperation in
the In-Grid project.
At the University of Cork, Ireland, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. John Morrison
whose Adopt a Student policy and the ensuing conversations on my first conference
were a great motivational boost to my academic career.
At the University of Chicago and the Argonne National Lab, USA, I would like to
thank Prof. Dr. Ian Foster, Dr. Kate Keahey, Tim Freeman and Borja Sotomayor for
the many interesting discussions and their work on the Globus Toolkit.
I would also like to acknowledge the financial support the Grid projects I have
worked on have received from the German ministry of research and education (BMBF)
as part of the D-Grid and through an IBM Eclipse innovation award.
Last but not least I would like to thank my family without whose support and
understanding I would not have had the opportunity and perseverance to write this
thesis.
Thank you.Abstract
The Grid computing paradigm is becoming a well established method for high per-
formance computing. While the first generation of Grid computing solutions imple-
mented their own proprietary interfaces, the introduction of the service-oriented com-
puting paradigm and the corresponding web service standards into the field of Grid
computing through the Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA) increased the inter-
operability of the Grid. This paved the way for a number of national and international
Grid projects, which now host a large number of academic and a growing number of
business applications requiring on-demand provisioning and use of Grid resources. In
an on-demand Grid environment, Grid users and applications change frequently, and
the value of software and data is much higher than in traditional Grid environments
with academic open source applications. To facilitate on-demand Grid computing, it
is essential that users are able to install and use their applications autonomously in
a timely and secure fashion, even though the software may contain third party com-
ponents and requires root privileges to install. This would also enable the Grid to
act as a base technology for the new Cloud computing paradigm, in which similar
on-demand business constraints are present. Consequently, there are much higher de-
mands for both administrative measures and security mechanisms to enable on-demand
Grid computing.
Like most complex IT systems, Grid middlewares exhibit a number of security
problems which are further compounded by the new on-demand Grid usage scenario.
Not only do these security problems expose the heterogeneous Grid resources to a
homogeneous attack vector, but they also threaten existing cluster resources and their
users, who up till now have worked in a local and secure environment. Furthermore, in
an on-demand Grid scenario, cluster administrators are exposed to a large number of
unknown users with a great variety of usage patterns. This makes the detection of ma-
licious behavior an extremely complex task. As a consequence, Grids are increasingly
becoming an attractive target for attackers, since they offer standardised access to a
large number of machines storing potentially valuable data which can be misused in
various ways. For example, the considerable computing power of clusters exposed via
the Grid could be misused to break passwords, and their large storage capacity could be
misappropriated to store and share illegal software and data. The generous bandwidth
of the Internet connection can be used for launching Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks
or for hosting file-sharing services. However, far more critical than these resource
attacks are attacks against customer data: crash test model data of a new prototype8 ABSTRACT
car, a custom fluid simulation suite or customer billing data all represent intellectual
property of considerable monetary value and need to be protected. If a Grid resource
provider cannot ensure the end-to-end integrity and safety of customer software and
data, an industrial adoption of Grid technology will not be possible. However, at the
same time, easy to use administration capabilities must exist to enable on-demand in-
stallation and usage of custom applications. These are usually diametrically opposite
requirements, and careful balancing is required to satisfy both requirements.
This thesis presents novel security and usability approaches for service-oriented
on-demand Grid computing. They enable users to install and use custom software
autonomously (both service-oriented and traditional) on shared computer systems on
demand, while at the same time they protect software, data and business process infor-
mation from other Grid users and external attackers.
The core solution proposed in this thesis is based on operating system virtualisation
to offer dynamic virtual image creation and deployment in a secure environment. An
automated firewall mechanism provides a user based network security setup
and creates secure user network regions on demand. In addition, the Grid environment
is separated into several zones to protect local cluster resources from illegal access of
Grid users. The Grid headnode and the image creation station are both confined to
separate compartments in a Grid demilitarised zone.
To enable the secure integration of this Grid environment into existing business
workflows, an extension to the Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) and
workflow execution engine is presented which allows the execution of secure Grid ser-
vices in combination with existing business web services. The workflow engine han-
dles the issues of proxy certificate creation transparently and, in the case of long run-
ning applications, certificate renewal. The approach allows both fine-grained service-
oriented applications and legacy Grid applications to run in the same environment by
integrating the Grid sandboxing system into existing cluster scheduling solutions.
Furthermore, a novel server rotation mechanism is introduced to protect the Grid
headnode from unknown stealth attacks by refreshing the headnode transparently using
virtualised images. This reduces the time an attacker can operate in the system to no
more than a few minutes. I