The effects of procedures on decision making [Elektronische Ressource] : experimental evidence / vorgelegt ovn Vanessa Mertins

Sujets

• Management

Informations

• Publié par: justus-liebig-universitat_giessen
• Publié le: 01 janvier 2009
• Nombre de lectures: 7
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 2 Mo

Extrait

The Effects of Procedures on Decision Making
– Experimental Evidence –
Dissertation
zur Erlangung eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaft
(Doctor rerum politicarum)
der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der
Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen
vorgelegt von
Dipl.-Vw. Dipl.-Hdl. Vanessa Mertins
Giessen
Februar 2009Contents
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
1 Introduction 1
I Theoretical foundations 7
2 Procedural preferences 9
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Procedures in social sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.1 Relevant procedural characteristics: What matters? . . 12
2.2.2 Why do people care about procedures? . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.3 The effects of procedures: How do they matter? . . . . 15
2.3 Procedures in economic experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.1 The role of appointment procedures . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.2 The role of intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.3 The role of procedural fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 Procedures in economic theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3 Experimental methodology 33
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 Preference elicitation methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.1 Does the elicitation procedure affect behavior? . . . . . 35
3.2.2 Differences between preference elicitation procedures . 38
3.2.3 Strengths and weaknesses of the strategy method . . . 41
3.2.4 The strategy method within our own experimental work 42
3.3 Player types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3.1 Classification schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.2 methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.2.1 Classification based on observed behavior . . 49
iiiiv CONTENTS
3.3.2.2 Classification based on value orientation . . . 54
3.3.2.3 The multi-method classification approach . . 55
3.3.3 Consistency and stability of individual behavior . . . . 56
3.3.4 Type classification within the own experimental work . 59
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
II Experimental evidence 63
4 Experiment 1 65
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2 The experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2.1 The basic game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2.2 Experimental design and procedures . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2.3 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.3 Experimental results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3.1 Procedural preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3.2 Allocated appointment procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3.3 Procedural fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3.4 Individual preference satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3.5 Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.3.6 Responder situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5 Experiment 2 85
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.2 The experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2.1 The basic game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2.2 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.2.3 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.3 Experimental results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.3.1 Aggregate results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.3.1.1 Procedural preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.3.1.2 Tax proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.3.1.3 Contributions to resistance . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.3.2 Procedure effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.3.2.1 Frequency of responder situations . . . . . . . 97
5.3.2.2 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.3.2.3 Individual preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3.2.4 Majority preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.3.3 Responder situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99CONTENTS v
5.3.4 Strength of majority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.3.5 I-want-YOU effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6 Experiment 3 107
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.2 The experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.2.1 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.2.2 Equilibria under maximization of expected payoffs . . . 113
6.2.3 Experimental procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.3 Experimental results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.3.1 Take rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.3.1.1 Takers’ choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.3.1.2 Take rate proposals of responders . . . . . . . 120
6.3.1.3 Responders’ preferred group take rates . . . . 121
6.3.2 Destruction rates: Aggregate results . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.3.3 Dest rates: Treatment effects . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.3.4 Destruction rates: Responder types . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7 Conclusion 129
A Appendix to Chapter 3 133
A.1 Figures: Responder types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
B Appendices to Chapter 4 139
B.1 Sign-up sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
B.2 Written instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
B.3 Post-experimental questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
B.4 Ptal questionnaire: Answers . . . . . . . . . . . 152
C Appendices to Chapter 5 157
C.1 Written instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
C.2 Post-experimental questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
C.3 Ptal questionnaire: Answers . . . . . . . . . . . 167
D Appendices to Chapter 6 173
D.1 Written instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
D.2 Post-experimental questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
D.3 Perimental questionnaire: Answers . . . . . . . . . . . 181
E Eidesstattliche Erklärung 187vi CONTENTS
References IList of Figures
3.1 Responder types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.1 Sequence of events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.1 Sequence of events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
A.1 Responder types in treatment PartHigh . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
A.2 Responder types in treatment PartLow . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
A.3 Responder types in treatment NoPartHigh . . . . . . . . . . . 136
A.4 Responder types in treatment NoPartLow . . . . . . . . . . . 137
viiviii LIST OF FIGURESList of Tables
4.1 Responder situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2 Participants n in each responder situation . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3 Answer frequencies (in %) to decision stage 1 questions . . . . 77
4.4 Responders’ mean contributions to resistance for AP 1 vs. AP 2 77
4.5 Respmeancontoaccordingtopro-
cedural fairness evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
+ −4.6 Responders’ mean contributions to resistance for I vs. I
depending on tax proposal x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
+ −4.7 Responders’ mean contributions to resistance forM vs. M
depending on tax proposal x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.8 Average contributions to resistance situation by situation de-
pending on tax proposal x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.1 Responder situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.2 Answer frequencies (in %) to decision stage 1 questions . . . . 96
5.3 Mean resistance y for each tax proposal x . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.4 Participants n in each responder situation . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.5 Responders’ mean contributions to resistance for AP 1 vs. AP
2 depending on tax proposal x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
+ −5.6 Responders’ mean contributions to resistance for I vs. I
depending on tax proposal x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
+ −5.7 Responders’ mean contributions to resistance forM vs. M
depending on tax proposal x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.8 Average contributions to resistance situation by situation de-
pending on tax proposal x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.9 Differencesinaveragecontributionstoresistancedependingon
tax proposal x in pairwise comparisons of responder situations 101
5.10 Strength of majority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.11 Average contributions to resistance depending on tax proposal
x and strength of majority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
ixx LIST OF TABLES
5.12 Differences in average contributions to resistance depending
on tax proposal x and strength of majority . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.1 Treatment groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .