Aristotle's Discovery of the Human

Mary P. Nichols

Description

Aristotle’s Discovery of the Human offers a fresh, illuminating, and accessible analysis of one of the Western philosophical tradition’s most important texts.

In Aristotle’s Discovery of the Human, noted political theorist Mary P. Nichols explores the ways in which Aristotle brings the gods and the divine into his “philosophizing about human affairs” in his Nicomachean Ethics. Her analysis shows that, for Aristotle, both piety and politics are central to a flourishing human life. Aristotle argues that piety provides us not only an awareness of our kinship to the divine, and hence elevates human life, but also an awareness of a divinity that we cannot entirely assimilate or fathom. Piety therefore supports a politics that strives for excellence at the same time that it checks excess through a recognition of human limitation.

Proceeding through each of the ten books of the Ethics, Nichols shows that this prequel to Aristotle’s Politics is as theoretical as it is practical. Its goal of improving political life and educating citizens and statesmen is inseparable from its pursuit of the truth about human beings and their relation to the divine. In the final chapter, which turns to contemporary political debate, Nichols’s suggestion of the possibility of supplementing and deepening liberalism on Aristotelian grounds is supported by the account of human nature, virtue, friendship, and community developed throughout her study of the Ethics.

The modern separation between church and state sought to protect civil peace from sectarian conflict and to protect religious liberty and freedom of thought from political interference. If successful, a secular politics would serve both civil life and religion and philosophy. This liberal solution nevertheless left humanity’s spiritual life, moral aspirations, and devotion to truth without any authoritative support, as individuals are allowed and even encouraged to pursue happiness as they see fit. Such permissiveness, which accepts no imposition of order or rank of goods, encourages a moral relativism that asserts that ways of life are equal, that the good is whatever we desire, and that moral distinctions are arbitrary. Liberalism has been criticized almost from its inception for the quality of life that emerges under its auspices such as Rousseau’s criticism of the bourgeois or Nietzsche’s of the “last man.” It has also come under attack more recently by theocratic regimes for its secularism and moral decadence. Aristotle offers an alternative to both liberalism and its critics, or rather support for liberal politics against the criticisms to which liberal theory leaves it open. Whether we live a good life and govern ourselves well may be “up to us,” but our very freedom for Aristotle makes us responsible for living lives consistent with that freedom. We pursue happiness as we see fit, but we must see what is fit for human beings, what distinguishes us from other beings, and therewith what sort of activity will make us happy.

For Aristotle, the challenges of political life can summon the moral and intellectual excellence of which human beings are capable, without leading to the dogmatism and even fanaticism that liberal theorists sought to avert. On one hand, a pious awareness of the distance between ourselves and the divine supports a humble toleration of different religious communities. Not the diminution of the impact of religion on civil life but reverence itself begets toleration, while holding pious citizens back from any attempt to assimilate politics to religion. On the other hand, politics, including liberal politics, cannot be traced to a godless assertion of human power over nature if the achievements of our reason are made possible, as Aristotle says, by “what is most divine in us.” For these reasons, liberal politics need not be understood as merely secular, but could be supported by a kind of piety, indeed one in which theocratic regimes that claim divine sanction are deficient. Politics, as Aristotle understands it, especially a politics that protects and encourages the pursuit of happiness, challenges us to develop and exercise our highest human capacities. Along these lines, liberalism has a high and demanding work to do, but also a defense against its critics.

Acknowledgements

Introduction

1. Our Unfinished Humanity: A Divine Gift (Book 1)

2. Ethical Virtue: Nature, Character, and Choice (Books 2-3)

3. The Virtues of Living Together (Book 4)

4. A Shrine to the Graces: Justice and Tragedy (Book 5)

5. Intellectual Virtue: Prudence, Wisdom, and Philosophy (Book 6)

6. Human Strength and Divine Perfection (Book 7)

7. Friendship: Family, Political Community, and Philosophy (Books 8-9)

8. Divine Thoughts and Political Reform (Book 10)

Conclusion: Aristotelian Piety for a Liberal Politics

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Philosophie politique
• Éthique et morale
• Philosophie de la religion
• justice
• Political Science
• Political
• PHILOSOPHY
• Religión
• State
• Politics
• Religion

Informations

• Publié par: University of Notre Dame Press
• Date de parution: 15 juillet 2023
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780268205478
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 6 Mo

Extrait

ARISTOTLE’S DISCOVERY OF THE HUMANARISTOTLE’S
DISCOVERY
OF THE HUMAN
Piety and Politics in the
Nicomachean Ethics
MARY P. NICHOLS
University of Notre Dame Press
Notre Dame, IndianaCopyright © 2023 by the University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana 46556
undpress.nd.edu
All Rights Reserved
Published in the United States of America
Library of Congress Control Number: 2023937442
ISBN: 978-0-268-20545-4 (Hardback)
ISBN: 978-0-268-20547-8 (WebPDF)
ISBN: 978-0-268-20544-7 (Epub)
This e-Book was converted from the original source file by
a third-party vendor. Readers who notice any formatting,
textual, or readability issues are encouraged to contact the
publisher at [e-mail] DavidReciprocity holds the city together, our reciprocating not only harm for
harm, but also good for good. Shrines to the Graces are therefore placed
along the roadways, to foster doing good in return, for this belongs to
gratitude. One ought to help in turn someone who has been gracious, and
even to initiate reciprocal giving.
—from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book 5C ONT E NTS
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction1
one Our Unfnished Humanity: A Divine Gift (Book 1) 19
two The Ethical Virtues: Nature, Character, and Choice 61
(Books 2–3)
three The Virtues of Living Together: Distinguishing the 91
Human from the Divine (Book 4)
four A Shrine to the Graces: Justice and Tragedy (Book 5) 123
five Intellectual Virtues: Prudence, Wisdom, and 155
Philosophy (Book 6)
six Human Strength versus Divine Perfection: Deepening 197
Our View of Virtue (Book 7)
seven Friendship: Family, Political Community, and 231
Philosophy (Books 8–9)viii Contents
eight Divine Thoughts and Political Reform: Summing 275
Up and Moving Forward (Book 10)
Afterthoughts: Aristotelian Piety for a Liberal Politics 317
Bibliography 327Index333ACK N O WL E D GM E N TS
I studied Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in the early 1970s with Joseph
Cropsey at the University of Chicago. Thanks to his teaching, I have been
unable to leave the book behind—I returned to it every few years in my
graduate seminars, frst at Northern Illinois University, then at Catholic
University and Fordham University, and most recently at Baylor
University until my retirement in 2018. Even after retiring, I conducted several
informal seminars on the Ethics with Baylor students as an extension of
the class that I never quite fnished teaching. Aristotle’s Ethics has been
with me all my academic life. With the help of students, my thoughts have
evolved, and I have seen anew, always, I believe, guided by Aristotle’s text.
I do not think that I ever taught the same course twice. That many of my
students have written dissertations and books on Aristotle, in many ways
going further than I have, witnesses the depth of Aristotle’s “philosophy
concerning human afairs.”
Rachel Alexander, Christine Basil, Steve Block, Ronna Burger,
Gerald Mara, Jef Poelvoorde, and Denise Schaefer have read one or
more chapters. Several of them have read the entire manuscript. I am
grateful for their questions and objections, and most of all for their
encouragement and support. Jef Poelvoorde’s insightful comments, his
Herculean eforts in compiling the index, and his apparently infnite en -
ergy and enthusiasm are to me a source of wonder. I am also grateful to
friends with whom I have been close almost my entire adult life, some
even longer. Without their friendship, I would not have acquired the
experience to understand as much as I have of Aristotle’s thought. Naming
them could not approach the return for what they have given me.
Most of all, I am grateful to my family, with whom I have been
blessed. My sons Keith and John tolerated my occupation with writing
ixx Acknowledgments
books and continue to share their mother with her students. I hope that
they know that however much I love my work, I love them even more.
Finally, without David’s support and love, I would not have been able to
write this book, not simply because he read revision after revision. In more
ways than one, this book is his as well as mine. Introduction
In elaborating his famous teaching that human beings are political by
nature, Aristotle observes that one who is incapable of living with others
or who is need of nothing and self-sufcient would be either a beast or a
god (Politics 1253a28–29). He locates human life, even human life at its
best, in a middle ground between the bestial and the divine, on which
beings endowed with reason share in thoughts and actions. He gives a full
and rich picture of this middle ground in his Nicomachean Ethics, as he
explores the meaning of a good human life and how human beings can
1attain happiness (1097b23–26, 1098a12–18). Aristotle attempts to
preserve that middle ground as he encourages us to rise above the beasts by
acquiring virtue and to live with a view to what is most akin to the divine
in ourselves. A good human life, which refects both the virtues and the
limitations of the human, would therefore neither deny the human
con2nection to the divine nor try to eliminate the distance between the two.
A good human life could, in this sense, be considered a pious one, a life
1. Citations in parentheses refer to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics unless I
indicate otherwise. Translations of Greek texts are my own, but for the Ethics I
have consulted the translation by Bartlett and Collins, Aristotle’s “Nicomachean
Ethics.” I have often followed their felicitous choice of words to capture
Aristotle’s Greek. The translation by Sachs, Aristotle: “Nicomachean Ethics, h” as also
been helpful. For Greek texts, I have relied on the Loeb Classical Library
editions.
2. As Salkever, “Democracy and Aristotle’s Ethics of Natural Questions,”
355, explains Aristotle’s position, to act well we need a clear sense of who we are
-as human beings, and for such self-knowledge “we need to pass a moment won
dering about what exists beyond ourselves.” Thus Aristotle’s ethical and political
-theory culminates in questions “about our relationship to beings superior to our
selves, that is, to Aristotle’s gods.”
12 Introduction
cognizant both of the elevated place of human beings in the cosmos
insofar as they are akin to the divine and also of a divinity beyond the
human. A good political community has, in turn, the task of supporting
such a life by encouraging human achievement, and we can judge it by
how well it does so.
At the outset of the Ethics, Aristotle refers to the work of the
statesman in securing the good of his community as divine (1094b7–11). He
says that the individual who possesses greatness of soul is worthy of the
greatest things, such as the honors we assign to the gods (1123b13–20).
He encourages us to pursue happiness, the end of all our actions, and
places it among the most divine things (1094a18–25, 1099b16). He
contrasts reverence (aidōs) not only with shameless arrogance but also with
cowering timidity (1108a33–b1). His references to the gods and to the
divine support human activity and achievement. That we wonder at the
divine, for example (1141a33–b7), elevates us above the beasts. Because
we can look up, to speak metaphorically, we can look ahead. We form
political communities that aim at common goods. We deliberate, make
choices, and act. Like free persons rather than slaves, we rule ourselves.
What we do, as Aristotle puts it, “admits of being otherwise” or is “up to
us” (1140a32–36, 1113b6). This is not true of other natural beings, who
develop toward their ends by nature, unless chance or human activity
divert them (1140a15–16). Human beings do not receive the ethical virtues
from nature; they must acquire them by their own eforts (1130a24–26).
There are many virtues, intellectual and ethical, and many lives we choose
in which they are manifest. We can think about who we are, we can
question, and although some perplexities remain, we can resolve others
(1146b6–7).
At the same time, our wonder, our awe, and even our questioning
make us aware that there is something more, something higher, than
human life. Piety supports the elevation of human life—for we are akin
to the divine—but it also limits it. Aristotle claims that although we can
become “blessed”—a state we attribute to the gods—we can do so “only
as human beings” (1101a19–21). Human beings can think “divine thoughts”
(1177b32–37), but thoughts about the divine that human beings think
include the diferences between divine and human. In spite of his admi -
ration for greatness of soul, Aristotle warns against its assumption of
divine-like per fection and attempts to turn the great-souled individual to Introduction 3
friendship (1124b10–16, 1125a10–13, 1124b33–1125a1). Aristotle says that
prudence, the virtue of the statesman who considers the good of the
community, is not the highest virtue, for “the human being is not the best thing
in the cosmos” (1141a19–23, 1141b24–28, 1145a6–9). And even though we
can resolve some perplexities, others, such as those involving what is best
in the cosmos, remain. The Ethics attempts no thematic discussion of the
gods, as does Plato’s Republic (379a–383c) and Laws (885c–907b), nor does
Aristotle raise the question there of what is the pious or the holy, as does
Plato’s Euthyphro. This may be less a diference between Aristotle’s
political thought and Plato’s than a sign that Aristotle learned from Plato
the problems with such direct approaches to the divine and that a less
direct and less precise approach was called for. His Ethics takes just such
an approach. The piety that emerges in his philosophizing about human
things is a source at the same time of confdence, on the one hand, and
moderation, on the other. Our very activities, which we undertake in
confdence and hope, manifest our incompleteness, our imperfection.
Aristotle defnes the human work as the activity of soul in accord
wi