Congress and the Constitution

Neal Devins and Keith E. Whittington (Editors)

Description

For more than a decade, the U.S. Supreme Court has turned a skeptical eye toward Congress. Distrustful of Congress's capacity to respect constitutional boundaries, the Court has recently overturned federal legislation at a historically unprecedented rate. This intensified judicial scrutiny highlights the need for increased attention to how Congress approaches constitutional issues. In this important collection, leading scholars in law and political science examine the role of Congress in constitutional interpretation, demonstrating how to better integrate the legislative branch into understandings of constitutional practice.Several contributors offer wide-ranging accounts of the workings of Congress. They look at lawmakers' attitudes toward Congress's role as a constitutional interpreter, the offices within Congress that help lawmakers learn about constitutional issues, Congress's willingness to use its confirmation power to shape constitutional decisions by both the executive and the courts, and the frequency with which congressional committees take constitutional questions into account. Other contributors address congressional deliberation, paying particular attention to whether Congress's constitutional interpretations are sound. Still others examine how Congress and the courts should respond to one another's decisions, suggesting how the courts should evaluate Congress's work and considering how lawmakers respond to Court decisions that strike down federal legislation. While some essayists are inclined to evaluate Congress's constitutional interpretation positively, others argue that it could be improved and suggest institutional and procedural reforms toward that end. Whatever their conclusions, all of the essays underscore the pervasive and crucial role that Congress plays in shaping the meaning of the Constitution.Contributors. David P. Currie, Neal Devins, William N. Eskridge Jr.. John Ferejohn, Louis Fisher, Elizabeth Garrett, Michael J. Gerhardt, Michael J. Klarman, Bruce G. Peabody, J. Mitchell Pickerill, Barbara Sinclair, Mark Tushnet, Adrian Vermeule, Keith E. Whittington, John C. Yoo

Sujets

• USA
• États-Unis

Informations

• Publié par: Duke University Press
• Date de parution: 18 juillet 2005
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780822387114
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

Congress and the Constitution

    

A Series with the Institute of Bill of Rights Law

at the College of William & Mary

Series editors: Neal Devins and Mark Graber

Congress and the Constitution

                  .           ,      

Duke University Press

Durham and London



©  Duke University Press All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper  Designed by CH Westmoreland Typeset in Monotype Sabon by Tseng Information Systems, Inc. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data appear on the last printed page of this book.

Acknowledgments vii

Contents

Neal Devins and Keith E. WhittingtonIntroduction 

David P. CurrieProlegomena for a Sampler: Extrajudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, – 

Bruce G. PeabodyCongressional Attitudes toward Constitutional Interpretation 

Louis FisherConstitutional Analysis by Congressional Staff Agencies 

Keith E. WhittingtonHearing about the Constitution in Congressional Committees 

Michael J. GerhardtThe Federal Appointments Process as Constitutional Interpretation 

John C. YooLawyers in Congress

J. Mitchell Pickerill

Michael J. Klarman

Congressional Responses to Judicial Review 

Court, Congress, and Civil Rights 

William N. Eskridge Jr. and John FerejohnQuasi-Constitutional Law: The Rise of Super-Statutes 

Neal DevinsCongressional Fact Finding and the Scope of Judicial Review 

Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian VermeuleInstitutional Design of a Thayerian Congress 

viContents

Mark TushnetEvaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria and Two Informal Case Studies 

Barbara SinclairCan Congress Be Trusted with the Constitution? The Effects of Incentives and Procedures 

About the Contributors

Index

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Acknowledgments

A great many people contributed to the completion of this book. First and foremost, we would like to thank the contributors, who worked with us as we tried to put together a book calling attention to the pivotal role that Congress plays in the shaping of constitutional values. We would also like to thank Valerie Millholland of Duke University Press. Based on a prospec- tus calling attention to the need for an interdisciplinary collection on this topic, Valerie signed onto this project. At approximately the same time, the editors of theDuke Law Journalagreed to publish a symposium held in  on Congress and the Constitution. That symposium helped shape this project. Not only did some of the contributors to this book test their ideas in that symposium, but its success proved instrumental in propelling this project. Another symposium was equally instrumental. In  the Institute of Bill of Rights Law at William & Mary hosted a conference at which the contributors to this book presented preliminary versions of their chapters. This conference both facilitated completion of the chap- ters and sharpened them. Thanks are owed to Dave Douglas, who then directed the institute, and Melody Nichols, the institute’s administrative assistant, for their help and encouragement. Others at William & Mary helped support us in producing the manuscript. Felicia Burton of the Fac- ulty Support Center worked with us and many of the contributors. Several research assistants tracked down citations, made sure that the notes con- formed to Duke University Press guidelines, and helped prepare the index. Thanks, in particular, to Stacy Haney. Finally, thanks are owed to Miriam Angress and the production team at Duke University Press.

Congress and the Constitution