Congressional Preemption

Joseph F. Zimmerman

Description

Congressional Preemption provides an in-depth account of the use of preemption powers by Congress to either partially or completely remove regulatory authority from state and local governments in a wide variety of fields. Author Joseph F. Zimmerman exposes the inadequacies of the two current theories of United States federalism—dual and cooperative—by exploring the impact of Congress' frequent use of its preemption powers since 1965. While the dual and cooperative federalism theories retain a degree of explanatory power, Zimmerman considers why they do not explain the profound systemic changes produced by congressional preemption. Other topics covered include congressional use of conditional grants-in-aid, crossover sanctions, tax credits, tax sanctions, and partial and complete redemption; the theory of political safeguards of federalism; and the Blackmun Thesis, which encourages states to seek relief from preemption statutes in Congress and not the courts. The book concludes with postulates of a broader theory of federalism and recommendations addressed to Congress to reinvigorate the federal system.
Preface
Acknowledgments

1. Congressional Preemption
2. Establishment of a Federation
3. Spending Power Preemption
4. Complete Field Preemption
5. Imperium in Imperio and Limited Preemption
6. Judicially Determined Preemption
7. Metamorphic Federalism

Notes
Bibliography
Index

Sujets

• USA
• United States of America
• Central government
• Region
• Regional
• Central
• États-Unis
• National

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 01 février 2012
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780791482735
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

Congressional Preemption

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Congressional Preemption

Regulatory Federalism

Joseph F. Zimmerman

_________ _________ 

S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y o f N e w Yo r k P r e s s

Published by State University of New York Press, Albany

© 2005 State University of New York

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.

For information, address State University of New York Press, 194 Washington Avenue, Suite 305, Albany, NY 12210-2365

Production by Marilyn P. Semerad Marketing by Michael Campochiaro

Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data

Zimmerman, Joseph Francis, 1928– Congressional preemption : regulatory federalism / Joseph F. Zimmerman. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–7914–6563–2 (hardcover : alk. paper)—ISBN 0–7914–6563–2 (pbk : alk. paper) 1. Federal government—United States. 2. Central-local government relations—United States. I. Title.

JK325.Z558 2005 320.473049—dc22

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2004027748

For Peggy

In appreciation of her continuing support

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Preface

Acknowledgments

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Contents

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Congressional Preemption

Establishment of a Federation

Spending Power Preemption

Complete Field Preemption

Imperium in Imperioand Limited Preemption

Judicially Determined Preemption

Metamorphic Federalism

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Preface

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federal system automatically creates national-state state relations A which may be cooperative and/or conflictive in nature. The United States Constitution grants Congress authority to provide only one ser- vice—the postal service—within states with the exceptions of services provided on federal properties such as military bases. In consequence, there are few opportunities for conflict and more opportunities for national-subnational cooperation in service provision. Constitutional amendments and congressional preemption statutes removing regulatory powers from subnational governments have pro- duced a major restructuring of the United States federal system, demon- strating the framers of the United States Constitution did not intend to establish a federal system with rigid national-state jurisdictional bound- aries. The first two preemption statutes were enacted in 1790. Subse- quently, the number enacted, if any, in a given year was small until the mid-1960s, when the number increased sharply and made the federal system increasingly fluid and complex in nature. These statutes, simple and complicated ones, surprisingly have attracted the attention of rela- tively few political scientists. This volume, building upon an earlier one, seeks to encourage research on the ramifications of the preemption revo- lution that removes powers completely or partially in various regulatory 1 fields from state and local governments. In exercising its preemption powers, Congress often actsde novo without consideration of the effectiveness of similar types of preemp- tion statutes enacted earlier or their potential unforeseen adverse impact upon subnational governments. The United States Supreme Court, for example, interpreted the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 as a field preemption statute that deprived state attorneys general of authority individually and collectively to enforce state deceptive prac- tices laws against airlines. Investigations by the New York attorney general in 2001 and 2002 revealed the ineffectiveness of the United States Security and Exchange Commission, empowered by nine con- gressional statutes, to police the investment banking industry ade- quately. To date, Congress has not conducted an in-depth study of the

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