First Do No Harm

David N. Gibbs

Description

In First Do No Harm, David Gibbs raises basic questions about the humanitarian interventions that have played a key role in U.S. foreign policy for the past twenty years. Using a wide range of sources, including government documents, transcripts of international war crimes trials, and memoirs, Gibbs shows how these interventions often heightened violence and increased human suffering.

The book focuses on the 1991-99 breakup of Yugoslavia, which helped forge the idea that the United States and its allies could stage humanitarian interventions that would end ethnic strife. It is widely believed that NATO bombing campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo played a vital role in stopping Serb-directed aggression, and thus resolving the conflict.

Gibbs challenges this view, offering an extended critique of Samantha Power's Pulitzer Prize-winning book, A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide. He shows that intervention contributed to the initial breakup of Yugoslavia, and then helped spread the violence and destruction. Gibbs also explains how the motives for U.S. intervention were rooted in its struggle for continued hegemony in Europe.

First Do No Harm argues for a new, noninterventionist model for U.S. foreign policy, one that deploys nonmilitary methods for addressing ethnic violence.

Sujets

• International Relations
• Human Rights
• Political Science

Informations

• Publié par: Vanderbilt University Press
• Date de parution: 29 juin 2009
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780826516459
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 2 Mo

Extrait

First Do No Harm

D A L M A T I A H E R Z E G O V I N A C S E A

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National capital

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Republics and Autonomous Provinces of Yugoslavia, 1990

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Priština

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Belgrade

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Sarajevo

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First Do No Harm

Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia

David N. Gibbs

Vanderbilt University Press • Nashville

©  by Vanderbilt University Press Nasville, Tennessee  All rigts reserved

    

    

his book is printed on acid-free paper made from % post-consumer recycled content. Manufactured in te United States of America

Frontispiece: Based on “he Former Yugoslavia” (map) from te United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartograpic Section.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Gibbs, David N. First do no arm : umanitarian intervention and te destruction of Yugoslavia / David N. Gibbs. p. cm. Includes bibliograpical references and index. ISBN 8--8-- (clot : alk. paper) ISBN 8--8-- (pbk. : alk. paper) . Humanitarian intervention—Bosnia and Hercegovina. . Humanitarian intervention—Serbia—Kosovo. . Yugoslav War, –—Participation, Foreign. . Kosovo (Serbia)—History—Civil War, 8–—Participation, Foreign. . United States—Foreign relations—Yugoslavia. . Yugoslavia—Foreign relations—United States. I. Title. JZ.G  .—dc 8

For Diana and Natan

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Contents

Preface

he Rise of Humanitarian Intervention US Predominance and te Logic of Interventionism Origins of te Yugoslav Conflict Germany Drops a Matc he War Spreads to Bosnia-Herzegovina Only te Weak Rely on Diplomacy: he Clinton Administration Faces Bosnia Kosovo and te Reaffirmation of American Power Conclusion

Notes Bibliograpy Index

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1

16

45

76

106

141

171

205

223

309

335

Preface

his book is te product of my long-standing interest in foreign interven- tion. As I grew up during te s and s, te unfolding disaster of US intervention in Vietnam sparked my interest in tis topic. I remember well wen I eard in  te first details of te My Lai massacre and was dis- turbed to realize tat US troops were capable of suc actions. I was similarly saken by te effects of US bombing, te use of cemical weapons, and te advent of “free fire” zones, among oter orrors of tat war. Wat impressed me even more was te extent to wic official lies and deceptions elped to justify te war and to mislead te public (a point underscored by te pub- lication of tePentagon Papersin , wen I was tirteen). As a graduate student and a young professor, I pursued tese interests in extended studies of foreign interventions in te Congo Crisis of te early s, and ten in Afganistan after 8.  I am tus writing from a position tat is fundamentally skeptical about te merits of intervention and, to some extent, of war more generally. I agree tat tere ave been a andful of wars tat produced positive results (and yes, US involvement in World War II was one suc example). But I would see tese “positive” cases as rare. In most instances, te legacy of military intervention as been appalling, and I ave found noting in my studies of Yugoslavia to callenge tis basic assumption.  Anoter influence on tis book as been te continuation of US mili- tarism following te demise of te USSR. he basic paradox was succinctly stated by Calmers Jonson in a recent interview:

In 8, Mikail Gorbacev makes a decision. [He] could ave stopped te Germans from tearing down te Berlin Wall, but [instead] . . . e just watces tem tear it down and, at once, te wole Soviet empire starts to unravel. . . . [W ]at startled me almost more tan te Wall coming down

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