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Central to the question of how to promote economic growth in Latin America is the role different types of regimes play in determining economic performance. Guardians of the Nation? challenges conventional wisdom regarding the expected advantages of military rule for economic growth. Glen Biglaiser explains why many military regimes in Latin America have not performed noticeably better than their democratic counterparts. Biglaiser argues that economic policy-making under military regimes is essentially an unintended by-product of the military’s strategy to retain power. Using this premise, he examines the economic performance of regimes in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Biglaiser shows that the appointment of neoliberal economists occurred not because military rulers possessed inherent interest in following market-oriented policies, but because they saw the appointments as a way to solidify their power. Biglaiser’s study also depicts Pinochet’s one-man rule as unique vis-à-vis the military regimes in Argentina and Uruguay. He concludes by demonstrating that his study is also applicable for understanding economic policy choice under democratic rule, and by comparing the similarities and differences between presidential and parliamentary governments.
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Informations
Publié par | University of Notre Dame Press |
Date de parution | 01 août 2020 |
Nombre de lectures | 0 |
EAN13 | 9780268076016 |
Langue | English |
Poids de l'ouvrage | 15 Mo |
Informations légales : prix de location à la page 0,1750€. Cette information est donnée uniquement à titre indicatif conformément à la législation en vigueur.
Extrait
Biglaiser-000.FM 7/26/02 3:24 PM Page i
Guardians of the Nation?Biglaiser-000.FM 7/26/02 3:24 PM Page ii
Scott Mainwaring, general editor
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For a complete list of titles from the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies,
see http:www.undpress.nd.eduBiglaiser-000.FM 7/26/02 3:24 PM Page iii
GUARDIANS
OF THE
ATION?N
Economists, Generals,
and Economic Reform
in Latin America
GLEN BIGLAISER
Notre Dame, IndianaBiglaiser-000.FM 7/26/02 3:24 PM Page iv
Copyright © by
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana
www.undpress.nd.edu
Published in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Biglaiser, Glen, –
Guardians of the nation? : economists, generals, and economic reform
in Latin America / Glen Biglaiser.
p. cm.
“From the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies.”
Includes bibliographical references and index.
--- (cloth : alk. paper)- (pbk. : alk. paper)
. Southern Cone of South America—Economic Policy.
. Southern Cone of Soerica—Politics and government—
th century. . Military government—Southern Cone of
South America I. Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies.
II. Title.
.
.-dc
∞ The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence
and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines
for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.Biglaiser-000.FM 7/26/02 3:24 PM Page v
CONTENTS
List of Tables, Charts, and Diagrams vii
Acknowledgments ix
ONE —The Effects of Institutions and Ideas
on Policy Choice
TWO — Economic Policy Choices in the Southern Cone
THREE —The Effects of Institutions
on Policy-Making Appointments
FOUR —The Effects of Neoliberal Economists
in Economic Policy Making
FIVE — Privatization under Military Rule
SIX — The Professionalization of Economists
SEVEN — The Strategic Role of Ideas under Democratic Rule
Notes
References
Index Biglaiser-000.FM 7/26/02 3:24 PM Page viBiglaiser-000.FM 7/26/02 3:24 PM Page vii
TABLES, CHARTS, AND DIAGRAMS
Table . Annual Growth Indicators for Latin America, –
Table . Basic Economic Indicators in Chile, –
Table . Economic Policies in Chile, –
Table . Basic Economic Indicators in Argentina, –
Table . Economic Policies in Argentina, –
Table . Basic Economic Indicators in Uruguay, –
Table . Economic Policies in Uruguay, –
Table . Military Personnel in the Southern Cone: , ,
and
Table . Effect of Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Variables
on Privatization
Table . Demand for and Resistance to Privatization of SOEs
Table . Assistance and Grants from AID to Latin America,
–
Table . Measurement of Executive Strength, –
Table . Executive Party’s Seats in Argentina’s Senate and Chamber
of Deputies, –
Table . Executive Party’s Seats in Colombia’s Senate and House
of Representatives, –
—— vii ——Biglaiser-000.FM 7/26/02 3:24 PM Page viii
—— viii Tables, Charts, and Diagrams ——
Table . Executive Party’s Seats in Mexico’s Senate and Chamber
of Deputies, –
Table . Executive Party’s Seats in Uruguay’s Senate and Chamber
of Deputies, –
Chart . Percent of Neoliberal Economists in Economic Policy
Making in Chile, –
Chart . Percent of Neoliberal Economists in Economic Policy
Making in Argentina, –
Chart . Percent of Neoliberal Economists in Economic Policy
Making in Uruguay, –
Chart . Military Control in Chilean Public Enterprises,
–
Chart . Chilean Privatization of Public Enterprises,
–
Chart . Military Control in Argentine Public Enterprises,
–
Chart . Military Contro