North Korea

Tim Beal

Description

This book seeks to demystify North Korea by cutting through the propaganda to unearth the complex and contradictory realities of this unique country. The North is not a 'workers' paradise' but neither is it a threat to its neighbours and the world. The once vigorous economy was devastated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and now its main foreign policy objective, and the key to its economic rehabilitation, is normalisation of relations with the United States. But not normalisation at the expense of independence.



Tim Beal reveals a country overburdened by military spending that sees itself under constant threat. However, he also reveals how North Korea has opened to the world in recent years, establishing diplomatic relations with the West and trying to break free of foreign aid. Exploring a broad range of subjects including the historical and political framework of North Korea, the development of the nuclear crisis, human rights issues, drug trading, as well as its shifting relationship with South Korea, this is an ideal book for anyone who wants a thorough introduction to the remarkable challenges this country faces.
Introduction



Part I: Fulcrum of geography, anvil of history: DPRK in historical perspective



Introduction to Part I

Chapter one: The roots of modern Korea: from Tangun to Liberation

Chapter two: Years of struggle, years of hope: Korean War to first nuclear crisis

Chapter three: Creation of the Agreed Framework and the flowering of détente

Chapter four: Crisis reignited: economic reform, regional accord, Washington discord



Part II: The pillars of confrontation

Introduction to Part II

Chapter five: The Human Rights record: complexities, causes, solutions

Chapter six: Drugs and Generals

Chapter seven: The Nuclear Confrontation

Chapter eight: On the Precipice: Options, positions and dangers at the start of the second Bush administration



Appendices

Appendix one: Economic statistics

Appendix two: Military statistics

Appendix three: Documentary sources

Appendix four: A timeline of nuclear and missile issues and activities



Notes

Bibliography

Index

Sujets

• Political Science

Informations

• Publié par: Pluto Press
• Date de parution: 20 août 2005
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781849641821
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

North Korea The Struggle Against American Power

Tim Beal

P Pluto Press LONDON • ANN ARBOR, MI

First published 2005 by Pluto Press 345 Archway Road, London N6 5AA and 839 Greene Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48106

www.plutobooks.com

Copyright © Tim Beal 2005

The right of Tim Beal to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN ISBN

0 7453 2014 7 hardback 0 7453 2013 9 paperback

Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data Beal, Tim.  North Korea : the struggle against American power / Tim Beal.  p. cm.  Includes bibliographical references.  ISBN 0–7453–2014–7 (hardback) –– ISBN 0–7453–2013–9 (pbk.)  1. Korea (North)––Politics and government. 2. Korea (North)––Military policy. 3. Nuclear weapons––Korea (North) 4. Korea (North)––Foreign relations––United States. 5. United States––Foreign relations––Korea (North) 6. World politics––21st century. I. Title.  DS935.5.B43 2005  951.9304’3––dc22  2005008411

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Designed and produced for Pluto Press by Chase Publishing Services Ltd, Fortescue, Sidmouth, EX10 9QG, England Typeset from disk by Stanford DTP Services, Northampton, England Printed and bound in the European Union by Gutenberg Press, Malta

Cont

List of Maps, Figures and Tables Timelines Acknowledgements

Introduction

Part I

e

nt

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FulcrumofGeography,AnvilofHistory:DPRKinHistorical Perspective

Introduction to Part I: Time and Place, from Past to Present 1 The Roots of Modern Korea: From Tangun to Liberation 2 Years of Struggle, Years of Hope: Korean War to First Nuclear Crisis 3 Creation of the Agreed Framework and the Flowering of DÉtente 4 Crisis Reignited: Economic Reform, Regional Accord, Washington Discord

Part II The Pillars of Confrontation

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Introduction to Part II 127 5 The Human Rights Record: Complexities, Causes, Solutions 129 6 Drugs and Generals: Some Surprising Facts on Narcotics, Missiles, Terrorism and Military Confrontation 167 7 The Nuclear Confrontation 202 8 On the Precipice: Options, Positions and Dangers at the Start of the Second Bush Administration 219

Appendices

I II III IV

Economic Statistics Armed Forces, Military Expenditure and Exports Documentary Sources A Timeline of Nuclear and Missile Issues and Activities

Notes Bibliography Index

247 248 251 253

273 304 326

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List of Maps, Figures and Tables

MAPS

Korea: the divided peninsula The Korean peninsula: strategic hub of Northeast Asia Shadows of the past: the ancient kingdom of Koguryo straddles modern boundaries A dwarf amongst giants: North Korea’s military expenditure in comparative perspective

FIGURES

Per capita GNP, North and South Korea, 1953–90 Comparative military expenditure, North Korea and its enemies, 2003 The two Koreas: comparative military expenditure, 1988–2003

TABLES

5.1 Imprisonment rates, US, DPRK, ROK, 2001 5.2 Major recipients of WFP assistance, 2000–03 6.1 World’s largest military forces, 1999 8.1 China as trading partner, 2003 A1.1 GNP, per capita GNP and growth, North and South Korea, 1946–90 A2.1 World military spending, 2001–02 A2.2 Comparative military expenditure, US, Japan and the Koreas, 1988–2001 A2.3 The world’s top 15 individual arms exporters, 1997–99

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Timelines

From Tangun to Japanese annexation The struggle for independence and buildup to war The Korean War From Armistice to 1972 joint communiquÉ 1973–84 1985–92 1992–94 1995–99 2000–01 2002 2003 2004 1945–2004 (Appendix IV)

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30 37 53 55 64 69 74 82 99 104 116 118 253

Acknowledgements

So many people have contributed in manifold ways to producing this book that singling out individuals is a frightening, if gratifying, task. I am grateful to innumerable Koreans, North and South, and in the United States, New Zealand and elsewhere, who personally or by email have encouraged me to engage the issue of what may broadly be called, in Roh Moohyun’s phrase, ‘peace and prosperity’ for the Korean people and I hope this book makes some contribution to that cause. My intellectual debts are best calculated by looking at the bibliography, but if anyone should attempt to categorise this book as ‘antiAmerican’, as no doubt some will on the spurious confusion between opposing particular political policies and being hostile to a people, then it should be noted that the authorities most frequently drawn upon, such as Bruce Cumings, Sig Harrison, Dan Oberdorfer and Leon Sigal, are American. On a personal level I am particularly grateful to Gill Goddard, East Asian Studies Librarian at the University of Sheffield, and James Grayson, Director of the Centre for Korean Studies there, for helping me mine their Korean collection. My stays in London were made possible, and always pleasant, by the hospitality of Pat and Bärbel Daly and Lesley Sheringham, of Arthur Probsthain’s famous Asian bookshop, whose smile was always welcoming. Hazel Smith who first encouraged me to move from articles and papers on Korea to the more daunting challenge of a book. Karin Lee, and John Feffer, who provided hospitality, and sanity, in Washington. On the home front, Kala S. Retna and John Beal were forbearing of my frequent absences, both of body and of mind. Christine Dann gave soothing and wise advice and was largely instrumental in the establishment of the New Zealand Korean Peace Committee. Still in New Zealand I have no greater longterm debt than to Don Borrie who, decades ago, founded the NZDPRK Society with Wolf Rosenberg and has laboured over the years to foster better understanding of the DPRK in New Zealand and to improve relations between our two countries. Peter Thirkell, Val Lindsay, and my colleagues at the School of Marketing and International Business at Victoria University of Wellington have been tolerant of my attention to Korean issues in the best tradition of accepting that scholarship leads beyond the

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Acknowledgements ix

narrow confines of academic departments. In this respect, Stephen Epstein, my colleague at Victoria who straddles European Classics and Korean Studies, was a supporting encouragement. Gordon Anderson and Sally Davenport, of the Research Committee of the Faculty of Commerce and Administration, provided some much appreciated research funding. Hugh Blackstock in Earth Sciences produced the maps very speedily and efficiently. Julie Stoll, Sejal Chad and Roger van Zwanenberg of Pluto Press patiently and professionally kept me focussed on producing the best possible manuscript pretty much on time, but not at the expense of thorough research and careful writing. I owe special thanks to Yang Wen, who brought her librarian skills to bear on bibliographic matters, both helping me locate books in Sheffield, London and Washington, and keeping citations in proper, professional order. My greatest personal debt in bringing this project to fruition is to Ankie Hoogvelt. Although she should have known better, having put up with my vagaries for many years, she was so generous with her hospitality in Sheffield and unstinting with her time in reading and meticulously commenting on draft chapters.

Introduction

Born out of the division of Korea following the surrender of the Japanese empire in 1945, North Korea had been one of the star performers of the developing world, vigorously industrialising on the basis of a proclaimed programme of ‘selfreliance’. However, in the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was plunged into a dreadful economic crisis which caused widespread death and malnutrition. Even today, according to the World Food Programme, 1 about a quarter of the population are in need of international aid. The economic crisis was compounded by bad weather but it had its roots in the longstanding hostility of the United States, which had long imposed sanctions and threatened military action, including nuclear strikes, and the geopolitical environment that engendered. The crisis of the 1990s was exacerbated by a escalating confrontation with the United States over nuclear issues. This period of crisis and privation came to be called the ‘Arduous March’. In 1994 the DPRK – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to give it its formal name – had signed an agreement with the United States called the Agreed Framework. Under this, the Koreans mothballed their graphitemoderated nuclear reactors which the Americans suspected had produced plutonium that could be used in weapons, in exchange for a package which included two lightwater reactors, heavy fuel oil as interim compensation for the electricity forgone, formal guarantees against nuclear attack and movement towards lifting of sanctions and the normalisation of relations. Although the North Koreans were generally punctilious about complying with the Agreed Framework, the United States was dilatory in keeping its promises, partly because Clinton had lost control of Congress to the Republicans. In 1997 Kim Daejung, a longtime opposition leader, was elected president of South Korea (Republic of Korea or ROK). He soon enunciated a policy on engagement with the North which came to be labelled the ‘Sunshine Policy’. North Korea was initially sceptical, because peace accords between North and South had fallen apart in the past, but after secret negotiations a summit took place in Pyongyang in June 2000 between Kim Daejung and DPRK leader Kim Jong Il.

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2 North Korea

The easing of North–South relations warmed up that between the DPRK and the US. North Korea’s thirdranking leader, Jo Myong Rok, visited Washington in early October 2000, had a meeting with Bill Clinton and invited Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the DPRK. On 10 October 2000, on the eve of her visit, and on the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the founding of the Korean Workers’ Party, North Korea proclaimed that the ‘Arduous March’ was 2 over. She returned to Washington with an invitation to President Bill Clinton to visit Pyongyang and to consign to history the enmities of the past. Pyongyang’s elation was premature and North Korea was forced to continue the Arduous March. George W. Bush won the election and there was an abrupt change of Korean policy. This shift was not confined to Korea, and it was soon labelled as the ABC – Anything But Clinton – policy. Influenced by ‘neoconservatives’, the Bush administration was to withdraw from international treaties and embark upon a programme of confrontation with countries and peoples it regarded as an impediment to American interests. This more aggressive stance, which was to lead to the invasion of Iraq, predated 11 September 2001 and was built into administration policy from the beginning. The attacks of 9/11 were used by President Bush and his advisors to legitimise plans and policies already in place. Whilst it is important not to overlook the continuities between Clinton and Bush, and the underlying drivers of American imperialism, there were definite fissures in policy, and in few places would they be more significant than in Korea. Clinton, under pressure from Kim Daejung, had been moving to a less hostile position and Gore, had he become president, might have continued the process towards normalisation of relations and the implementation of the Agreed Framework. It is an open secret in Washington that the new Bush administration did not want coexistence, however frosty, with the DPRK, but its 3 destruction; what is euphemistically called ‘regime change’. Worried by this, President Kim Daejung flew to Washington in March 2001 to try and salvage things, but was rebuffed. Relations between Washington and Pyongyang became increasingly acrimonious. North Korea was labelled as part of an Axis of Evil and mentioned as a possible target in the Nuclear Posture Review. However, although the Agreed Framework was much disliked by the administration as a relic of the Clinton era, it limped on. Then, in October 2002, a crisis erupted. This is how the US State Department tells the story:

Introduction 3

Following the inauguration of President George W. Bush in January 2001, the new Administration began a review of North Korea policy. At the conclusion of that review, the Administration announced on June 6, 2001, that it had decided to pursue continued dialogue with North Korea on the full range of issues of concern to the Administration, including North Korea’s conventional force posture, missile development and export programs, human rights practices, and humanitarian issues. In 2002, the Administration also became aware that North Korea was developing a uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons purposes. When U.S.–D.P.R.K. direct dialogue resumed in October 2002, this uranium enrichment program was high on the U.S. agenda. North Korean officials acknowledged to a U.S. delegation, headed by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly, the existence of the uranium enrichment program. Such a program violated North Korea’s obligations under the NPT and its commitments in the 1992 North–South Denuclearisation Declaration and the 1994 Agreed Framework. The U.S. side stated that North Korea would have to terminate the program before any further progress could be made in U.S.–D.P.R.K. relations. The U.S. side also made clear that if this program were verifiably eliminated, the U.S. would be prepared to work with North Korea on the development of a fundamentally new relationship. In November 2002, the member countries of KEDO’s Executive Board agreed to suspend heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea pending a resolution of 4 the nuclear dispute.

Since these are the people who brought us stories about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, we might just be sceptical. And we would be right. Here is an alternative version of events, as described, and documented, in this book. Some of it is necessarily speculative but I do take care to distinguish between what is known, what is uncertain, and what is contested. The Bush administration made no secret of its antipathy towards North Korea and its dislike of the Agreed Framework. Richard Armitage has headed a team (which included Paul Wolfowitz) which had savaged Clinton’s Korea policy in 1999. However, North Korea was complying with the agreement which could not legally be terminated unless an infringement could be found. That’s where enriched uranium comes in. The State Department claims that it was in 2002 that the administration became aware that North Korea had an enriched uranium programme. However, in 1999 a prominent Republican