Public Opinion and the Rehnquist Court

Thomas R. Marshall

Description

Public Opinion and the Rehnquist Court offers the most thorough evidence yet in favor of the U.S. Supreme Court representing public opinion. Thomas R. Marshall analyzes more than two thousand nationwide public opinion polls during the Rehnquist Court era and argues that a clear majority of Supreme Court decisions agree with public opinion. He explains that the Court represents American attitudes when public opinion is well informed on a dispute and when the U.S. Solicitor General takes a position agreeing with poll majorities. He also finds that certain justices best represent public opinion and that the Court uses its review powers over the state and federal courts to bring judicial decision making back in line with public opinion. Finally, Marshall observes that unpopular Supreme Court decisions simply do not endure as long as do popular decisions.

Preface
List of Figures
List of Tables

1. Public Opinion and Supreme Court Policy-Making

A Representative Court?
How Pollsters View the Court
How the Justices View Public Opinion
Judicial Theories of Public Opinion
Linking Public Opinion and the Rehnquist Court
Conclusion

2. Public Opinion and the Rehnquist Court

Studying Representation
Data Results
The State of Public Opinion Model
The Federal Policy Model
The State/Local Policy Model
Alternative Linkages
Conclusion

3. Judicial Norms, Representation, and Public Opinion

Ideology and Representation
Poll Correction and the Lower Courts
Judicial Activism, Judicial Restraint, and Representation
Caseload and Representation
Conclusion

4. Interest Groups, Representation,  and Public Opinion

Interest Group Litigation and Public Opinion
Public Opinion and Litigant Success Rates
Conclusion

5. Justices and Representation

The Political Parties and Ideology Model
The Political Socialization Model
The Appointments Process Model
The Judicial Roles Model
The Tenure and Aging Model
The Realignment Model 
Combining the Predictors
Conclusion

6. Symbolic Representation and the Court

The Politics of Symbolic Representation
Symbolic Representation on the Rehnquist Court
Conclusion

7. Did the Rehnquist Court Influence  Public Opinion?

Public Impressions of the Court
The Short-Term Manipulation Model
The Long-Term Manipulation Model
Conclusion

8. Public Opinion and the Test of Time

Surviving the Test of Time
Data Analysis
Conclusion

9. An Empirical Model of Representation

The Majoritarian Court
Reconsidering the Evidence
An Empirical Linkage Model

Appendix One: Poll-to-Ruling Matches
Appendix Two: List of Cases

Notes 
References
Index

Sujets

• USA
• United States of America
• Government procurement
• Central government
• Public law
• Central
• États-Unis
• National

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 01 janvier 2009
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780791478813
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 2 Mo

Extrait

Public Opinion and the Rehnquist Court

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Public Opinion and the Rehnquist Court

Thomas R. Marshall

S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y o f N e w Y o r k P r e s s

Cover photo credit, istockphoto/Jim Pruitt

Published by State University of New York Press, Albany

© 2008 State University of New York

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

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For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY www.sunypress.edu

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Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data

Marshall, Thomas R., 1949– Public opinion and the Rehnquist court / Thomas R. Marshall p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978–0–7914–7347–4 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. United States. Supreme Court—Public opinion. 2. Judicial process— United States—Public opinion. 3. Public opinion—United States. 4. Rehnquist, William H., 1924–2005 I. Title.

KF8748.M288 2008 347.7326—dc22

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Preface List of Illustrations

Contents

List of Tables Chapter One: Public Opinion and Supreme Court Policy-Making A Representative Court? How Pollsters View the Court How the Justices View Public Opinion Judicial Theories of Public Opinion Linking Public Opinion and the Rehnquist Court Conclusion Chapter Two: Public Opinion and the Rehnquist Court Studying Representation Data Results The State of Public Opinion Model The Federal Policy Model The State/Local Policy Model Alternative Linkages Conclusion Chapter Three: Judicial Norms, Representation, and Public Opinion Ideology and Representation Poll Correction and the Lower Courts Judicial Activism, Judicial Restraint, and Representation Caseload and Representation Conclusion Chapter Four: Interest Groups, Representation, and Public Opinion Interest Group Litigation and Public Opinion Public Opinion and Litigant Success Rates Conclusion

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Contents

Chapter Five: Justices and Representation The Political Parties and Ideology Model The Political Socialization Model The Appointments Process Model The Judicial Roles Model The Tenure and Aging Model The Realignment Model Combining the Predictors Conclusion

Chapter Six: Symbolic Representation and the Court The Politics of Symbolic Representation Symbolic Representation on the Rehnquist Court Conclusion

Chapter Seven: Did the Rehnquist Court Influence Public Opinion? Public Impressions of the Court The Short-Term Manipulation Model The Long-Term Manipulation Model Conclusion

Chapter Eight: Public Opinion and the Test of Time Surviving the Test of Time Data Analysis Conclusion

Chapter Nine: An Empirical Model of Representation The Majoritarian Court Reconsidering the Evidence An Empirical Linkage Model

Appendix One: Poll-to-Ruling Matches

Appendix Two: List of Cases

Notes

Bibliography

Index

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Preface

ublic Opinion and the Rehnquist Courtasks two simple questions. P First, did the Rehnquist Court’s decisions typically reflect American public opinion? Second, to the extent its decisions did, why? To pre- view this book’s findings, between three-fifths and two-thirds of the Rehnquist Court’s decisions agreed with American public opinion. At least since the New Deal era, most Supreme Court decisions have represented American public opinion, well-known exceptions notwithstanding. Some justices agree with American public opinion much more often than do others. The Court’s pattern of representation is sensitive to ideological shifts on the Court, caseload, the justices’ the- ories of judicial decision-making, the justices’ backgrounds and roles, and the attentiveness of American public opinion. The Rehnquist Court enjoyed relatively high popularity, at least compared to the other polit- ical branches. Yet it could not influence American public opinion through its decisions. Sixteen years ago, during the last Burger Court term, I wrote an account of Supreme Court decision-making and American public opin- ion,Public Opinion and the Supreme Court. That book relied heavily on 146 matches between public opinion poll questions with Supreme Court decisions since the mid-1930s. Since that time, judicial scholars have made great advances in studying judicial politics and representa- tion. I gratefully acknowledge the many authors’ work cited in this book, as well as the polling data used herein, without whichPublic Opinion and the Rehnquist Courtwould not have been possible. I hope this book both updates and expands on my previous work. For their comments, I thank Charles Hadley and Steve Wasby. For assistance in producing this manuscript, I thank Erika Contreras, Lydia Villegos, Shelby Henderson, Kenneth Zuercher, and Leah Cook. This book is for Ruth, Aram, Erica, Deacon, Sara, Jack, Claire, Mark, and Bertie.

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List of Illustrations

Figure 1.1 Number of poll questions, per year, during the Rehnquist Court Figure 2.1 Percentage of Supreme Court decisions consistent with public opinion, five-year moving averages, 1970–2005 Figure 3.1 Percentage of Rehnquist Court decisions consistent with public opinion, with differing vote changes, by ideology Figure 3.2 Percentage of Supreme Court decisions consistent with public opinion, prior to the Rehnquist Court, with differing vote changes, by ideology Figure 7.1 Public confidence in the Supreme Court, the Executive Branch, and Congress, NORC/GSS positive ratings Figure 7.2 Short-term poll shifts during the Rehnquist Court Figure 7.3 Long-term poll shifts during the Rehnquist Court Figure 8.1 Probability that a Rehnquist Court decision will survive, by whether the decision is consistent with public opinion or not

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