Rolling Back Revolution

Ivan Molloy

Description

Ivan Molloy analyses the de-facto foreign policy strategy of Low Intensity Conflict as propagated by the United States. He recounts how LIC emerged during the Reagan Administration as a way of counteracting the legacy left by the Vietnam War, which constrained America from getting involved in direct military intervention. Part covert, part overt, LIC was developed as a low-cost and low-risk method of dealing with revolutionary movements and post-revolutionary governments (usually Marxist) considered threatening to national interests. As such, this secretive strategy was an integral component of the Iran-Contra affair, and at the heart of the Reagan Doctrine.



Molloy argues that LIC was a means of civilianising and privatising America's foreign policy. He reveals that LIC was always more of a political, rather than military, tool. The United States used LIC selectively in the 1980s to combat guerrilla movements and undermine targeted regimes to achieve its foreign policy objectives. The author uses Nicaragua and the Philippines as major case studies to analyse the profile of this multi-dimensional strategy as it emerged in the 1980s. He also demonstrates - using such examples as Cuba, Yugoslavia and East Timor - that this complex strategy is still evident today and even pursued by other states.
List Of Abbreviations



Acknowledgments



Sources



Introduction



1 What Is LIC?



2 An Inevitable Strategy: LICs Emergence In Context



3 From Approach To Strategy



4 The Reagan Doctrine: Selling LIC To America



5 Central America: The Strategy’s Proving Ground?



6 Nicaragua: A Case Of Revolutionary LIC



7 LIC In The Philippines?



8 The Counterrevolutionary Profile



9 LIC Continued?



Bibliography



Index

Sujets

• Political Freedom
• International Relations
• Political Science

Informations

• Publié par: Pluto Press
• Date de parution: 20 juillet 2001
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781849641081
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

ROLLING BACK REVOLUTION The Emergence of Low Intensity Conflict

I VAN M OLLOY

P Pluto Press LONDON • STERLING, VIRGINIA

First published 2001 by PLUTO PRESS 345 Archway Road, London N6 5AA and 22883 Quicksilver Drive, Sterling, VA 20166–2012, USA

www.plutobooks.com

Copyright © Ivan Molloy 2001

The right of Ivan Molloy to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Molloy, Ivan. Rolling back revolution : the emergence of low intensity conflict/ Ivan Molloy. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0–7453–1707–3 (hbk.) — ISBN 0–7453–1706–5 (pbk.) 1. United States—Foreign relations—1981–1989. 2. United States— Foreign relations—1989– 3. United States—Military policy. 4. Low-intensity conflicts (Military science)—United States. I. Title. E876 .M65 2001 327.1'17'0973—dc21 00–012925

1 1

ISBN 0 7453 1707 3 hardback ISBN 0 7453 1706 5 paperback

0 09 0 9

08 8

07 7

06 6

05 5

04 4

03 3

02 2

01 1

Designed and produced for Pluto Press by Chase Publishing Services, Fortescue, Sidmouth EX10 9QG Typeset from disk by Stanford DTP Services, Northampton Printed in the European Union by Antony Rowe, Chippenham, England

CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations Acknowledgements Sources

Introduction A Fresh Perspective The Argument in a Nutshell LIC in Context A New Perspective The Approach The Scope Terminology

1 What is LIC? The Strategy’s Broad Thrust A Definition of Low Intensity Conflict The LIC Conflict Profile The Need for Context?

2 An Inevitable Strategy: LIC’s Emergence in Context Continuity and Discontinuity Old and New The Status of LIC The Development of the Full Profile An Expected Foreign Policy Initiative?

3 From Approach to Strategy Self-Analysis and Debate: The Influence of Vietnam The Debate Within the Reagan Administration and the Military Evidence of LIC Gaining Coherence The Strategy Emerges

4 The Reagan Doctrine: Selling LIC To America What was the Reagan Doctrine? The Reagan Doctrine as an Expression of Low Intensity Conflict

vii x xi

1 2 2 7 8 10 12 13

15 15 16 19 31

32 32 48 51 53 54

55 55 62 65 70

72 73 83

vi 5

6

7

8

9

Rolling Back Revolution Central America: The Strategy’s Proving Ground?86 Central America as the Focus of US Foreign Policy 86 The Determinants of LIC 88 The Determinants/Preconditions for LIC 99 The Emergence of Low Intensity Conflict 102

Nicaragua and Revolutionary LIC The Political/Psychological Dimension The Economic Dimension The Military Dimension The Civic Action Dimension Nicaragua and the Strategy of LIC

LIC in the Philippines? The Determinants of the Response The Need for a New Approach The Reagan Administration Responds The Third Way – The LIC Response LIC Characteristics The Collective Response

The Counter-Revolutionary Profile The Political/Psychological Dimension The Economic Dimension The Military Dimension The Civic Action Dimension – Completing the Picture A Characteristic LIC Response?

LIC Continued? LIC Emergent The Success of Reagan’s LIC? An Ongoing Strategy

Notes Index

104 104 114 116 124 125

127 128 132 133 134 134 142

143 143 155 156 161 163

167 168 173 174

183 218

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAFLI AFL-CIO

AFP AIFLD ARDE

ARVN ASC ASD[SO/LIC]

ASEAN ATC BAYAN CANF CAUSA

CBN CDA CDS CENCOM CER CHDF CHR CIA CINCPAC CMA COPROSA

COSEP

CPD CPP CPS CRMA

Asian American Free Labor Institute American Federation of Labor – Congress of Industrial Organizations Armed Forces of the Philippines American Institute for Free Labor Development Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica (Democratic Revolutionary Alliance) Army of Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnamese Army) American Security Council Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Association of Southeast Asian Nations Rural Workers’ Association(s) New Patriotic Alliance Cuban American National Foundation Confederation of the Associations for the Unity of the Societies of the Americas Christian Broadcasting Network Cuban Democracy Act Sandinista Defense Committee(s) Central Mindanao Command Centro de Estudios Religiosos Civilian Home Defense Forces Commission on Human Rights Central Intelligence Agency Commander-In-Chief of the Pacific Civilian Military Assistance Comision de Promocion Social Arquidiocesana (Commission of Archdiocesan Social Promotion) Nicaraguan Business Association (Nicaraguan Democratic Front) Committee on the Present Danger Communist Party of the Philippines Coalition for Peace through Strength Civilian Refugee Military Assistance

vii

viii DCI DCSOPS DOD DPA EMJP ENVIO EPIC EPS ESF FDN FID FMLN FOA FSLN GHQ ICFTU IDB IMET IMF INP IRD ISA JCS JGRN JSOA JSOC JUSMAG KMP

KMV LIC LIW MAA MAP MDB MDB MDN MEDCAP METROCOM METRODISCOM MNLF MTTs NAFP NDC NDF

Rolling Back Revolution

Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Department of Defense Deep Penetration Agent Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace the publication of Instituto Historico Centroamericano Ecumenical Partnership for International Concerns Sandinista People’s Army Economic Support Funds Frente Democratico Nicaraguense Foreign Internal Defense Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front Friends of Americares Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional General Headquarters International Confederation of Free Trade Unions Inter-American Development Bank International Military Education and Training International Monetary Fund Integrated National Police Institute for Religion and Democracy Intelligence Support Activity Joint Chiefs of Staff Government Junta of National Reconstruction Joint Special Operations Agency Joint Special Operations Command Joint United States Military Advisory Group Philippine Peasant Movement (Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas) May First Movement Low Intensity Conflict Low Intensity Warfare Military Assistance Agreement Military Assistance Program Multilateral Development Bank Mutual Defense Board Nicaraguan Democratic Movement Medical aid programmes Metropolitan Command Metropolitan District Command Moro National Liberation Front Military/Mobile Training Teams New Armed Forces of the Philippines National Defence Council National Democratic Front

Abbreviations

NED NEPL NICA NISA NPA NSC NSC-68 NSDD NSPG NSSD OSS PAHRA PC PCHR PNF PRODEMCA PSC PSYOPS RAM RDF RIG RP SOCOM SOFs SOTs SOUTHCOM SWAG TRADOC TUCP UCLAs UNO US USAF USAID USCWF USIA USIS USMC USSR VC VOA WACL WB

National Endowment for Democracy National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty National Intelligence Co-ordinating Authority National Intelligence and Security Agency New People’s Army National Security Council National Security Council Directive 68 National Security Decision Directive National Security Planning Group National Security Study Directive Office of Strategic Services Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates Philippine Constabulary Presidential Committee on Human Rights Philippine News and Features Friends of the Democratic Center in Central America Presidential Security Command Political/Psychological Operations Reform the Armed Forces Movement Rapid Deployment Force Restricted Interagency Group Republic of the Philippines Special Operations Command Special Operations Forces Special Operations Teams Southern Command Special Warfare Advisory Group US Army Training and Doctrine Command Trade Union Congress of the Philippines Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets United National Opposition United States United States Air Force United States Agency for International Development United States Council for World Freedom United States Information Agency United States Information Service United States Marine Corps Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Viet Cong Voice of America World Anti-Communist League World Bank

ix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My sincere gratitude is due to many individuals and organisations who have in some way contributed to the completion of this book. Most particularly I wish to thank the Department of Politics, La Trobe University for financing much of this research. In the United States I received much kind assistance from many individuals and organisations but in particular I would like to thank Mr John Veach for his advice, the staff of the Center for Defense Information, the State Department, the Defense Department and the many individuals who assisted me at the Library of Congress and elsewhere. In Nicaragua I would like to thank many individuals and organisations who also assisted me, most par- ticularly those representatives of the Nicaraguan Government who allowed me access to areas of the country I otherwise would not have been able to visit. I would also like to give special thanks to Daniel Knott for acting as my interpreter on many occasions. While in the Philippines I received much kind assistance from many sources and so I wish to acknowledge the help of the staff of the Dansalan Research Center, Marawi City, and the staff of the Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines for access to and assistance with their research materials. I also wish to thank Mrs Mendoza and family, the staff of Kahayag, Davao City, Datu Tahir Lidasan and family for their kindness of heart and wonderful accommodation, and similarly Mrs Lita Lorenzo and Dr Bob McAmis of Mindanao State University. I would also like to extend my thanks to the many combatants and supporters of both the government and insurgent movements in Nicaragua and the Philippines who assisted me, some even at great risk to themselves. While the sheer number of these people prohibits me from listing them indi- vidually here, I must also point out that in many cases the nature of their involvement in the conflicts I investigated during the course of my research prevents me from publicly revealing their true identities. Finally, I wish to thank my family, particularly Cate and my three daughters, Honorlee, Melanie and Bonnie, and my mother and father, for their support and for putting up with me during the long time I have been locked away working on this project.

x

SOURCES

This study relied on a wide range of first-hand accounts, including interviews with insurgents from the New People’s Army and the Contras, members of the Philippine armed forces, ex-US servicemen and Philippine and Nicaraguan government sources. Other primary sources include official US and Philippine government documents. I gathered much of this material in the course of extensive fieldwork in the Philippines, the United States, Nicaragua and Cuba between 1983 and 1995. In pursuing this work I received invaluable assistance from such institutions and organisations as the University of the Philippines, the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Associations (PAHRA) in Manila, the Philippine military, the New People’s Army and members of the National Democratic Front (NDF). In the United States, I consulted and was assisted by the Library of Congress, the State Department, the United States Information Agency (USIA), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Heritage Foundation, the Institute for Religion and Democracy (IRD), and the Center for Defense Information in Washington DC. In Nicaragua, the University of Central America was most helpful as was the Instituto Historico Centroamericano (the publishers ofENVIO), and the Sandinista People’s Army (EPS) which allowed me to visit a number of war zones and interview Contra prisoners. Secondary source materials in the form of articles and works by other theorists were also extensively consulted. It should be stressed that the difficulties and personal dangers involved in undertaking some aspects of this research made the gathering of certain primary source material virtually impossible. To fill these gaps, it was often necessary to rely upon secondary sources.

xi

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the ‘New World Order’ President Bush once described so glowingly during the West’s crushing of Iraq continues to be racked by countless nationalist struggles, many led by guerrilla movements. The world community continues in disorder evident in many crises such as in the former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Chechenya and elsewhere with dire possible consequences for regional and even world peace. As a result some argue we have entered an age of competing ‘nationalisms’. But this phenomenon is not new. Throughout the Cold War, many revolutionary nationalist struggles ensued in the Third World albeit most were presented as expressions of the greater superpower rivalry with their true nature diminished or distorted. However, in the post-Cold War era their true nature can no longer be obscured. Also apparent in these post-Cold War years has been the continued use of a very effectivede factoUS strategy designed to combat those Third World revolutionary and post-revolutionary forces that are deemed threatening to Western interests. This strategy is best described as ‘Low Intensity Conflict’ (LIC). Originating during the Reagan era and used with great effect in the waning Cold War of the 1980s, LIC remains the foremost and most effective means by which the United States can combat threatening revolutionary nationalism when direct intervention is not an option. Or alternatively, it remains the pre-eminent strategy for preparing the ground for direct and ‘just’ US military intervention in foreign target states. As such, this most effective strategy has continued to be used either fully or partially by the United States, and indeed other countries, since the 1980s and its original emergence in the Philippines and Central America. Used to fight wars when ‘it is not fighting wars’, LIC remains one of the most enduring legacies of the Reagan era. Just as LIC was most effective in rolling back revolution and forcing the end of the Cold War, at the beginning of the twenty-first century the effectiveness of this strategy continues to be seen in many conflict situations around the world. It is indeed one of Reagan’s success stories, one however that has been relatively neglected or little told. This book aims to tell part of that story by investigating LIC’s emergence and outlining the part- overt, part-covert ‘profile’ of what has proven to be a very effectivede facto US national security strategy. In so doing this book also aims to assist the

1