The Five Front War

Daniel Byman

Description

A comprehensive look at the War on Terror and the best way to a safer future

Scholar Daniel Byman offers a new approach to fighting the war on terrorism. He convincingly argues that two of the main solutions to terrorism offered by politicians--military intervention and the democratization of the Arab world--shouldn't even be our top priorities. Instead, he presents a fresh way to face intelligence and law enforcement challenges ahead: conduct counterinsurgency operations, undermine al-Qaeda's ideology, selectively push for reforms, and build key lasting alliances.

Daniel Byman (Washington, DC) directs the Security Studies Program and the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University. He is a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and also served on the 9/11 Commission. He regularly writes about terrorism and the Middle East for the Washington Post, Slate, and other publications.

Sujets

• Security International
• Security National
• Political Science
• Politics of the United States

Informations

• Publié par: Turner Publishing Company
• Date de parution: 01 octobre 2007
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781620459720
• Langue: English

Extrait

The Five Front War
The Five Front War
The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad
Daniel Byman

John Wiley Sons, Inc.
Copyright 2008 by Daniel Byman. All rights reserved
Published by John Wiley Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey
Published simultaneously in Canada
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:
Byman, Daniel, date.
The five front war : the better way to fight global jihad / Daniel
Byman.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN: 978-0-471-78834-8
1. Terrorism-Prevention. 2. War on Terrorism, 2001- 3. Jihad.
4. Islam and world politics. I. Title.
HV6431.B963 2007
363.325 17-dc22
2007001701
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To Beryl
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction

1 The Faces of the Adversary

2 What Is Victory and How Do We Achieve It?

3 Tracking Down and Disrupting Terrorists

4 Killing Terrorists

5 Defending the Homeland without Overreacting

6 Fighting Terrorism with Democracy?

7 The War of Ideas

8 Diplomacy

9 The Iraq Dilemma
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Acknowledgments
Many people contributed to this work, and the brief words that follow do not do justice to their assistance and patience.
Beryl Taswell (aka Beryl Byman) painstakingly read every line of every chapter, offering her thoughts and ways to clarify my often purple prose. The result is a far more readable book; any remaining clunkyness is despite her best efforts. Several friends and colleagues read parts of the draft and offered many insights. Nora Bensahel, Michael E. Brown, Chris Connell, David Edelstein, F. Gregory Gause III, Bruce Hoffman, Pat Jones, Mara Miller, Andrew Pierre, Paul Pillar, Justine Rosenthal, Brent Sterling, Steve Ward, and Tamara Cofman Wittes all deserve many thanks. Kenneth Pollack and Bruce Riedel both carefully read an early version of the manuscript and offered many helpful suggestions. Jeremy Shapiro not only served as a helpful critic, but also allowed me to draw on the work we coauthored on U.S.-European differences in counterterrorism. Ned Moran s assistance on jihadist propaganda was particularly helpful. Sara Bjerg Moller s thoughts and research support were invaluable, and I am also grateful to Sarah Yerkes for taking the ball from Sara and helping move the manuscript to completion. Bilal Saab and Shai Gruber helped identify and compile important data on arrests for terrorism in the United States.
At Wiley, Eric Nelson has been a constant source of encouragement from start to finish.
Georgetown University s Center for Peace and Security Studies and School of Foreign Service are hospitable homes for scholars. Particular thanks go to Robert Gallucci and Ellen McHugh for making my life at Georgetown so pleasant. Support also came from the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. I am grateful to Martin Indyk and Kenneth Pollack for securing the Center s institutional support.
Introduction
For weeks and months following the September 11 attacks, the government issued alerts that signaled the possibility of future attacks. Chatter indicated that terrorists were plotting even more violence. Any alert was enough to send a chill through the population. People avoided crowds and stayed off airplanes when they could. Yet despite the ominous warnings, nothing happened. Al-Qa ida has not attacked the U.S. homeland since 9/11. So in March 2006, when the Department of Homeland Security lowered the mass transit alert level to Code Yellow, Americans hardly noticed. People yawned and continued their business as usual.
But al-Qa ida and the broader movement it leads have not been vanquished. Osama bin Ladin and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri remain at liberty. And their jihad rages on. The pace of terrorist attacks overseas has increased since the bloody events of 9/11. Hundreds died when a bomb exploded in a Bali nightclub. Almost two hundred died and far more were wounded when terrorists blew up trains in Madrid. Though insurgencies with links to al-Qa ida have been set back in Uzbekistan, the Philippines, and Indonesia, the brutal wars in Chechnya and Kashmir persist. Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Pakistan have been added to the list of countries with new anti-U.S. insurgencies against the governments. Bin Ladin-inspired militants may have been bloodied, but they remain unbowed.
Even when we recognize that al-Qa ida remains formidable, we often fail to understand that the organization has morphed from the terrorist group that struck America so brutally on 9/11. The core organization is weaker and less capable of a catastrophic attack on U.S. soil than it was six years ago. However, the cause it champions is far more popular, and the overall level of anti-U.S. and anti-Western anger is much higher. In addition, bin Ladin and his lieutenants are having some success in re-creating a haven in tribal parts of Pakistan comparable to what they enjoyed in the Taliban s Afghanistan.
Perhaps the biggest change is Iraq. The war itself led to unprecedented levels of hostility toward the United States throughout the world. Failures of planning and execution have allowed jihadists to gain a foothold in the country, and they are tapping into a lethal mix of religious inspiration and xenophobic nationalism. 1 In fighting the insurgency, the United States has managed to look both brutal and weak at the same time, a dangerous combination that encourages resistance.
Our narrow vision and blunders have exacted a heavy toll. We have produced a policy long on good intentions but short on success. Because we misjudged the nature of the threat, we failed to develop an overall strategy. We ignored al-Qa ida s broad insurgent network. We disregarded the allure of al-Qa ida s ideology for young Muslims. We failed to develop a comprehensive strategy against our new enemy, as we did with the containment of the Soviet Union after World War II. Because our strategic thinking has been muddled, we have uncritically pushed democracy and overly militarized our response to terrorism.
As we reconsider our approach, we must recognize that the fight against the global jihad will be a long one. Any policy, no matter how expedient, should be judged by long-term criteria. If it is not sustainable, it is usually a mistake.
Even as we recognize the long-term nature of the struggle, we must also focus our efforts more narrowly. The enemy is not a generic phenomenon called terrorism but rather a specific set of foes, in particular al-Qa ida and its allies. We can parse this narrow group even further. The United States should try to disrupt or hinder al-Qa ida-linked jihadists around the world, but Washington should focus its efforts on the relatively small number of groups and individuals that are capable of inflicting catastrophic harm on Americans and close allies.
We can begin to fight more effectively on five fronts.
The Five Front War
1. The Military
We should rethink the role of the military. The military plays a vital role in toppling overt sponsors of al-Qa ida-linked terrorists such as the Taliban and deterring the emergence of new ones. In the absence of such an overt state sponsor, the primary military role is fighting the various guerrilla armies linked to al-Qa ida-and at times conducting targeted killings of terrorist leaders. Rather than the U.S. Army fighting insurgencies, we can offer our military expertise to allied governments that will fight them directly. A more effective military will require dramatically changing procurement, recruitment, training, and doctrine.
2. The War of Ideas
Because much of the battle is fought over there, we need to think hard about the abysmal world opinion of America. Terrorist cells and guerrilla fighters draw from a large stream of anti-U.S. sentiment that runs wider than ever before. Al-Qa ida s claim that the United States has long subjugated Muslim lands and dishonored its people grows more popular each day. Most of our propaganda has so far been useless. Instead of trying to justify unpopular U.S. policies, we should go negative and remind people of the jihadists unpopular deeds and theology. Make the debate about them, not about us.
3. Intelligence