The Kurds in Turkey

Kerim Yildiz

Description

With a foreword by Noam Chomsky, this is the most up-to-date critical analysis of the problems faced by the Kurds in Turkey.



Turkey has a long history of human rights abuses against its Kurdish population – a population that stretches into millions. This human rights record is one of the main stumbling blocks in Turkey’s efforts to join the EU. The Kurds are denied many basic rights, including the right to learn or broadcast in their own language.



This book, written by a leading human rights defender, provides a comprehensive account of the key issues now facing the Kurds, and the prospects for Turkey joining the EU. Kerim Yildiz outlines the background to the current situation and explores a range of issues including civil, cultural and political rights, minority rights, internal displacement, and the international community’s obligations regarding Turkey.
Introduction by Noam Chomsky

1. Introduction

2. Background

3. Turkey, the Kurds and the EU

4. Civil, political and cultural rights in Turkey

5. Internal Displacement

6. The Kurds and human and minority rights

7. Conflict in the Southeast

8. The international dimensions to the conflict

9. The EU and the Kurds

Notes

Index

Sujets

• Human Rights
• Political Science

Informations

• Publié par: Pluto Press
• Date de parution: 20 août 2005
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781849643054
• Langue: English

Extrait

The Kurds in Turkey EU Accession and Human Rights

Kerim Yildiz

Foreword by Noam Chomsky

P Pluto Press LONDON • ANN ARBOR, MI in association with KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT

First published 2005 by Pluto Press 345 Archway Road, London N6 5AA and 839 Greene Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48106

www.plutobooks.com

Copyright © Kerim Yildiz 2005. Foreword © Noam Chomsky 2005

The right of Kerim Yildiz to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him and the right of Noam Chomsky to be identified as the author of the Foreword has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN

0 7453 2489 4 hardback

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data applied for

10

9

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4

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Designed and produced for Pluto Press by Chase Publishing Services Ltd, Fortescue, Sidmouth, EX10 9QG, England Typeset from disk by Stanford DTP Services, Northampton, England Printed and bound in the European Union by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne, England

Contents

Map of the area inhabited by Kurds Acknowledgements Foreword by Noam Chomsky List of Abbreviations

1. Introduction

2. Background  The Kurds  History of the Kurds  History of Turkey  The Kurds in Turkey

3. Turkey, the Kurds and the EU  The route to accession  The opening of formal EU accession negotiations  The political context of Turkey’s EU bid  Accession and the Kurds  Fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria for EU accession?  Turkey in Europe: the future

4. Civil, Political and Cultural Rights in Turkey  The proEU reform process  Torture and ‘zero tolerance’  Publishing and the media  Civil society in Turkey  Political participation  Cultural and linguistic rights  Human rights reform and EU accession  A question of implementation?

5. InternalDisplacement  Background to displacement  The government response to displacement today  Government assistance for return  State impediments to return

vii ix x xxviii

1

4 4 6 12 15

20 20 24 25 28 32 39

41 42 43 49 54 58 63 71 72

76 76 79 80 83

vi The Kurds in Turkey

Remedies and redress for displacement International offers of assistance International standards on internal displacement Displacement: A de facto change in the ethnic makeup of the countryside?

6. The Kurds and Human and Minority Rights  ProEU reforms  Continued oppression  The need for a comprehensive solution  The Kurds and minority rights  Minority rights standards in Turkey  Compliance with minority rights standards: definitional issues  Compliance with international standards: substantive rights  The future of minority rights in Turkey

7. Confl ict in the Southeast  Origins and development of the conflict  Resurgence of the conflict  Implications of the renewed armed conflict  The conflict and democratization in Turkey  Resolving the conflict  International peacemaking  The conflict and Turkish ethnic nationalism  Amnesties  The conflict in the Southeast and the Kurdish question

8. The International Dimensions to the Conflict  Turkey, her neighbours and the Kurds  Turkish military activity in northern Iraq  Kirkuk: Turkish fears over Kurdish autonomy  A Turkish invasion of northern Iraq?  Response in the West  Turkey, Iran and Syria: a new common ground  Syrian–Turkish relations and the Kurds  Iranian–Turkish relations and the Kurds  An antidemocratic alliance

84 85 86

88

89 90 91 92 93 94

98

101 103

104 104 107 108 108 110 112 113 114 115

118 118 119 121 124 126 126 126 129 131

Contents vii

9. The EU and the Kurds  The EU’s responsibility towards the Kurds  Europe’s responsibility to the Kurds  The EU approach to the Kurdish situation  The adequacy of the EU’s approach  The EU and the conflict in the Southeast  The Kurds and the future of EU accession negotiations

Notes Index

133 133 134 137 141 145 148

150 176

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Map of the area inhabited by Kurds

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Acknowledgements

This book was written by Kerim Yildiz, who would like to thank Claire Brigham and Rochelle Harris for their invaluable research assistance. The Foreword is an edited version of a talk delivered by Noam Chomsky at St Paul’s Cathedral, London, on 9 December 2002.

ix

Foreword Noam Chomsky

This Foreword is edited from a keynote speech delivered by Professor Noam Chomsky on behalf of the Kurdish Human Rights Project, on the occasion of its tenth anniversary, on 9 December 2002. Already when this talk was being delivered, the drums of war were being heard everywhere as the Bush administration and its allies prepared to launch war against Iraq. Kurds throughout the regions feared they would lose what autonomy they had achieved in Iraqi Kurdistan since the establishment of the ‘safe haven’. The speech provides the reader with the context not just to the Kurdish question in Turkey, but also to the Iraq invasion which began three months later.

With the political leadership in Washington, and their London affiliate, declaring in every possible way their determination to go to war in Iraq – and crucially, without delay – the future for the people of the region is highly uncertain, and ominous as well. No one can predict the consequences of war: not the CIA, not Donald Rumsfeld, no one, and prospects include outcomes that are far from pleasant. These include, for Iraq, the dire warnings of humanitarian and medical organizations; and for the world beyond, the grim predictions of US and other intelligence agencies that an attack might stimulate terror for deterrence or revenge. These are among the many reasons why the threat or use of violence always carries a heavy burden of proof; very powerful arguments are needed for it, and no argument at all is needed against it. That holds for international affairs just as it does for personal relations or any other human interaction. I will not try to review the arguments offered for the resort to violence in this case, apart from joining in the extreme skepticism, to put it politely, that reigns outside of narrow though influential sectors in Washington and London. Very narrow sectors. The academic dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, international relations specialist Stephen Walt, speaks for many analysts in the mainstream when he observes that ‘there is no evidence to suggest that Iraq is becoming significantly more dangerous’ or that deterrence is not a feasible option, and that

x

Foreword xi

‘the timing [of the war plans] is being driven primarily by domestic politics.’ He adds further that we should disregard the ‘small but wellplaced group of neoconservative officials and commentators’ who are passionately dedicated to war, and we should instead be ‘pursuing a more evenhanded policy in the Middle East in general.’ Here he presumably has in mind particularly US–Israel–Palestine relations. In this domain, US government policy continues to stand in opposition to regional and world opinion, and to a large majority 1 of domestic opinion, as studies regularly demonstrate. Even the most hardline military and strategic analysts, like Anthony Cordesman, are warning the administration not to heed ‘neoconservative and Israeli fantasies about going on to regionwide conflicts or triggering broader overthrows of regimes,’ and other plans of the ‘sillier armchair strategists and more vocally irresponsible hardliners.’ Cordesman is presumably referring to high civilian officials in the Pentagon who were writing position papers for the farright Binyamin Netanyahu in the 1990s, and are circulating ideas about extending the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan to parts of Iraq and Saudi Arabia, establishing Jordan as Palestine with the obvious consequences for Palestinians, and going on with ambitious plans 2 as far as China. One of the best current sources is the Israeli press, particularly informative now because of the close relations between Washington hawks and extremist sectors in Israel. One prominent Israeli strategic analyst, Ehud Sprintzak, returned recently from a meeting with high ranking civilians at the Pentagon and described them to the Israeli press as ‘a revolutionary group, with a totally different approach to the Arab world and the threats coming from it. One can summarize their approach in one sentence: they think that the Arab world is a 3 world of retards who only understand the language of force’ – an understatement, as one can see by their reaction when German or Canadian leaders violate the rules by paying some attention to the will of their own populations. It is hard to rank the likely victims in terms of imminent threats, and pointless to try, but there can be little doubt that the Kurdish populations are among them, and once again face dangerous times. Those concerns hold for Kurds everywhere, including the 4 million Kurds of northern Iraq, who for the moment have achieved unusual progress in the northern enclaves under the uneasy alliance of Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani. Anders Lustgarten may prove to be right in his warning that in the long run ‘none stand to lose

xii The Kurds in Turkey

more than the occupants of Iraqi Kurdistan,’ and that ‘any successor to Saddam will see the Kurdish threat to Baghdad in the same light’ 4 (citing Kurdish historian David McDowell). If the worst can be averted – and there is always a lot that we can do about that – then there are some real signs of hope: some external, others within. And in both domains, again, we can do a lot to nourish these hopes. It is obvious beyond any need for comment that the rich and powerful countries, primarily the US and Britain, will have an enormous influence on future developments, as they have had in the past, decisively in the Middle East for a century. And in free societies, where fear of repression is slight, that means that popular forces and independent organizations can have a decisive influence. For that reason alone it is a real privilege to be able to participate in the tenth anniversary celebration of the Kurdish Human Rights Project, which has compiled a stellar record in promoting and significantly advancing the cause of human rights in this tortured part of the world. In the coming years, its tasks will be even greater, and concerns reach well beyond the Kurds, severe as their problems are. We need not rehearse the reasons why Britain and later the US have been determined to control the Gulf region. It suffices to recall the observation of the State Department in 1945 that the resources of Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf more generally, are a ‘stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history.’ It was taken for granted that the US must control these resources. France was unceremoniously expelled by legal chicanery, and Britain reduced over the years to a ‘junior partner,’ as the Foreign Office recognized early on. Control over these resources yields ‘wealth beyond the dreams of avarice,’ as one standard history of the energy system puts it; the wealth recycles to the US and British economies particularly, along many avenues, not just oil company profits. ‘Strategic power’ translates into a lever of world domination. All of this was understood clearly by those who planned the postwar world, with much care and thought. According to current intelligence projections, Gulf energy resources are expected to become even more 5 significant in the years ahead; and, correspondingly, so do the stupendous source of strategic power and the great material prize. Note that the issue has not been access by the US itself, but control, a crucial distinction, often overlooked. When President Eisenhower warned in 1958 that ‘to lose [Jordan to Nasserite indigenous nationalist