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There is a widespread belief that American politics is becoming more polarized, in the sense that the Republican Party and electorate are becoming more conservative while the Democratic Party and electorate are becoming more liberal. But is this truly the case? The Phantom of a Polarized America places widely held scholarly assumptions about the "polarization" of American politics under the microscope and tests them to determine their veracity. In the case of Congress, Manabu Saeki reveals that contrary to popular beliefs, polarization is largely due to the rightward shift of Republican legislators without any corresponding leftward shift by Democratic legislators. The conservative shift of House Republican ideology has produced a rightward shift of Republican voters, and conservative voters in the Democratic Party have switched to the Republican Party, resulting in a more liberal Democratic Party overall. Saeki concludes that the so-called "polarization" of American politics is largely a phantom being; in truth, it is a neo-conservative movement led by House Republicans.
Tables and Figures
Acknowledgments

1. Introduction

2. Electorate

3. Congress

4. Ideology of Partisan Voters and Congressional Members

5. Policy Change

6. Veto and Override

7. Partisanship

8. Conclusion

Notes
Bibliography
Index
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Date de parution

01 février 2016

Nombre de lectures

0

EAN13

9781438459097

Langue

English

Poids de l'ouvrage

12 Mo

The Phantom of a
Polarized Amerıca
The Phantom of a
Polarized Amerıca
MYTHS AND TRUTHS OF AN IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE
Manabu Saeki
Published by State University of New York Press, Albany
© 2016 State University of New York
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.
For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY
www.sunypress.edu
Production, Eileen Nizer
Marketing, Fran Keneston
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Saeki, Manabu.
The phantom of a polarized America : myths and truths of an ideological divide / Manabu Saeki.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4384-5907-3 (hardcover : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-1-4384-5909-7 (e-book)
1. Divided government—United States. 2. Party affiliation—United States. 3. Political parties—United States. 4. Polarization (Social sciences)—United States. 5. Ideology—United States. 6. Political culture—United States. 7. Politics, Practical—United States. 8. United States—Politics and government. I. Title. JK2261.S24 2015 320.50973—dc23 2015004949
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Tables and Figures
Acknowledgments
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Electorate
Chapter 3 Congress
Chapter 4 Ideology of Partisan Voters and Congressional Members
Chapter 5 Policy Change
Chapter 6 Veto and Override
Chapter 7 Partisanship
Chapter 8 Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Tables and Figures
Tables Table 3.1 Mean Nominate Score of the Democratic Members in the House: 1973–2010 Table 3.2 Mean Nominate Score of the Democratic Members in the Senate: 1973–2010 Table 3.3 Mean Nominate Score of the Republican Members in the House: 1973–2010 Table 3.4 Mean Nominate Score of the Republican Members in the Senate: 1973–2010 Appendix 3.1 Nominate Score and Percentage of Southern Democrats: House Appendix 3.2 Nominate Score and Percentage of Southern Democrats: Senate Table 4.1 Variance Decomposition of Republican Voters’ Ideology Table 4.2 Variance Decomposition of Republican Senators’ Ideology Table 4.3 Variance Decompositions 1: Democratic Voter Table 4.4 Variance Decompositions 2: Democratic Voter Appendix 4.1 Republican Voters and House Republican Appendix 4.2 Republican Voters and Republican Senators Appendix 4.3 Democratic Voters and House Democrats Appendix 4.4 Democratic Voters and Democratic Senators Appendix 4.5 Democratic Voters and House Republicans Appendix 4.6 Democratic Voters and Republican Senators Appendix 4.7 Republican Voters and House Democrats Appendix 4.8 Republican Voters and Democratic Senators Table 5.1 Policy Change in House: 84th–111th Congresses Table 5.2 Policy Change in Senate: 84th–111th Congresses Table 5.3 Weighted Policy Change in House: 84th–111th Congresses Table 5.4 Weighted Policy Change in Senate: 84th–111th Congresses Table 5.5 Nondirectional Policy Change in House: 84th–111th Congresses Table 5.6 Nondirectional Policy Change in Senate: 84th–111th Congresses Table 6.1 Various Determinants on Sustained Vetoes: 84th–111th Congresses Table 6.2 Change in Presidential Approval Ratings after Veto Overrides Table 6.3 Presidential-Congressional Ideological Distance and Veto Overrides Table 6.4 Prediction Evaluation of Probit Model Table 6.5 Various Determinants on Veto Overrides Appendix 6.1 Various Determinants on Quarterly Presidential Approval Ratings Table 7.1 Variance Decomposition of Party Unity in Democratic Party: Senate Table 7.2 Variance Decomposition of Preferential Radicalization in Democratic Party: Senate Table 7.3 Variance Decomposition of Party Unity in Republican Party: House Table 7.4 Variance Decomposition of Party Unity in Republican Party: Senate Table 7.5 Variance Decomposition of Party Unity in Democratic Party: House Table 7.6 Variance Decomposition of Party Unity in Republican Party: Senate Table 7.7 Variance Decomposition of Preferential Homogeneity in Republican Party: Senate Appendix 7.1 Party Unity Score and Preferential Radicalization in Democratic Party: House Appendix 7.2 Party Unity Score and Preferential Radicalization in Democratic Party: Senate Appendix 7.3 Party Unity Score and Preferential Radicalization in Republican Party: House Appendix 7.4 Party Unity Score and Preferential Radicalization in Republican Party: Senate Appendix 7.5 Party Unity Score and Preferential Homogeneity in Democratic Party: House Appendix 7.6 Party Unity Score and Preferential Homogeneity in Democratic Party: Senate Appendix 7.7 Party Unity Score and Preferential Homogeneity in Republican Party: House Appendix 7.8 Party Unity Score and Preferential Homogeneity in Republican Party: Senate
Figures Figure 1.1 Percentage of Moderate, Slightly Conservative or Slightly Liberal: GSS 1974.2010 Figure 1.2 Nominate Scores in the House: 1973–2010 Figure 1.3 Nominate Scores in the Senate: 1973–2010 Figure 2.1 Ideology Scores of Partisan Voters: 1974–2010 Figure 2.2 Ideology Scores: All Democratic Voters and All Republican Voters including Leaners Figure 2.3 Ideology Scores (Rescaled): All Democratic Voters and All Republican Voters including Leaners Figure 2.4 Voters’ Ideological Self-Placement: 1974–2010 Figure 2.5 Voters’ Ideological Self-Placement: Liberal, Moderate, and Conservative Figure 2.6 Ideology of Partisan Voters: 1985 Figure 2.7 Ideology of Partisan Voters: 2005 Figure 2.8 Percentages of Liberals, Moderates, and Conservatives among the Republican Voters Figure 2.9 Percentages of Liberals, Moderates and Conservatives among the Democratic Voters Figure 2.10 Adjusted Percentages of Liberals and Conservatives among the Republican Voters Figure 2.11 Adjusted Percentages of Liberals and Conservatives among the Democratic Voters Figure 2.12 Percentages of Democratic and Republican Voters (excluding Leaners) and Independents (including Partisan Leaners) Figure 2.13 Percentages of Democratic and Republican Voters (including Leaners) and Independents (excluding Partisan Leaners) Figure 3.1 Mean Nominate Scores of the Republicans, Southern Democrats, and Non-Southern Democrats in the House: 1955–2010 Figure 3.2 Mean Nominate Scores of the Republicans, Southern Democrats and Non-Southern Democrats in the Senate: 1955–2010 Figures 3.3 Percentage House Democratic members in the South: 1955 to 2010 Figures 3.4 Percentage Democratic Senators in the South: 1955 to 2010 Figure 3.5 Nominate Score and Percentage of Southern Democrats: House Figure 3.6 Nominate score and Percentage of Southern Democrats: Senate Figure 3.7 Percentage Party Votes and Ideological Polarization in the House Figure 3.8 Percentage Party Votes and Ideological Polarization in the Senate Figure 4.1 Ideology of Democratic Voters and Democratic Legislators Figure 4.2 Ideology of Republican Voters and Republican Legislators Figure 4.3 Impulse Response Functions: Republican Voters and House Republicans Figure 4.4 Impulse Response Functions: Republican Voters and Republican Senators Figure 4.5 Impulse Response Functions: Democratic Voters and House Democrats Figure 4.6 Impulse Response Functions: Democratic Voters and Democratic Senators Figure 4.7 Impulse Response Functions: Democratic Voters and House Republicans Figure 4.8 Impulse Response Functions: Democratic Voters and Republican Senators Figure 4.9 Impulse Response Functions: Republican Voters and House Democrats Figure 4.10 Impulse Response Functions: Republican Voters and Democratic Senators Figure 5.1 Wider Gridlock Interval Figure 5.2 Shorter Gridlock Interval Figure 5.3 Unidimensional Policy Space Figure 5.4 Utility Function for Legislator i Figure 5.5 Status Quo and Agendas of Minimum Wage Figure 5.6 Twenty Members in a Legislature Figure 5.7 Voting Decisions of Twenty Legislators Figure 5.8 Filibuster Gridlock Interval Figure 5.9 Veto Gridlock Pivot Figure 5.10 Pivotal Gridlock Interval (Conservative President) Figure 5.11 Pivotal Gridlock Interval (Liberal President) Figure 5.12 Gridlock Interval and Policy Change Figure 5.13 Movement of Gridlock Interval and Policy Change Figure 5.14 Cartel Gridlock Interval and Policy Change Figure 5.15 Movement of Cartel Gridlock Interval and Policy Change Figure 5.16 Bicameral Pivotal Gridlock Model Figure 5.17 Bicameral Pivotal Gridlock Interval Figure 5.18 Bicameral Cartel Model Figure 5.19 Bicameral Cartel Gridlock Interval Figure 5.20 Pivotal Gridlock Intervals: 84th–111th Congresses Figure 6.1 Regular Vetoes: 84th–11th Congresses Figure 6.2 Veto-Override Process Figure 6.3 Override Process Figure 6.4 Ideological Interval in Legislature Figure 6.5 Ideal Points of President and Legislators: P V Figure 6.6 Ideal Points of President and Legislators: P q V Figure 7.1 Bidirectional Model of Party Unity and Preferential Homogeneity Figure 7.2 Bidirectional Model of Party Unity and Preferential Radicalization Figure 7.3 Party Unity Score and Preferential Radicalization in Democratic Party: House Figure 7.4 Party Unity Score and Preferential Radicalization in Democratic Party: Senate Figure 7.5 Party Unity Score and Preferential Radicalization in Republican Party: House Figure 7.6 Party Unity Score and Preferential Radicalization in Republican Party: Senate Figure 7.7 Party Unity Score and Preferential Homogeneity in Democratic Party:

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