Who Gets What?

Aslaug Asgeirsdottir

Description

During international bargaining, who gets the better deal, and why, is one of the questions at the heart of the study of international cooperation. In Who Gets What? Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir analyzes seven agreements signed throughout a twenty-year span between Iceland and Norway to allocate shared fish stocks. While the Law of the Sea regime provides specific solution concepts for negotiators, it does not dictate the final outcome. Looking at the actual negotiation process and the political and economic constraints negotiators operate under, Ásgeirsdóttir examines how domestic interest groups can directly influence the negotiating process, and thus affect international agreements over scarce resources. Who Gets What? demonstrates empirically that a nation with more domestic constraints on its negotiators gets a better deal.
List of Illustrations
Acknowledgments

1. Explaining Distributional Outcomes
The Importance of Distributional Conflicts
Theoretical Framework
Who Matters, How, and When
Marginal, Monitoring, and Information Costs
Norway and Iceland and the Global Capture Industry
Conflict over Common Fish Stocks
Tragedy of the Commons
The Fisheries and the Quest for International Cooperation
Summary

2. Role of the Law of the Sea and the Straddling Stocks
Agreement in Determining Distributive Outcomes
Law of the Sea Prior to 1982
The Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
Rights and Duties Imposed by the 1982 Law of the Sea
The Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
Role of International Law in the Negotiating Process
Regional Fisheries Bodies and the Role of Science
Summary

3. The Decline of Norwegian Fishing Interests
Norway’s Place in the International System
The Actors: Government, Scientists, and Interest Groups
Structure of the Norwegian Fishing Industry
Interest Group Organization
Summary

4. Dictating Policy and Influencing Outcomes in Iceland
Icelandic Fisheries Policy before the 200-Mile EEZ
Policy after the 200-mile Extension
The Actors: Government, Scientists, and Interest Groups
Structure of the Icelandic Fishing Industry
The Interest Groups
Summary

5. Interest-Group Power and its Impact on the International Allocation of Shared Fish Stocks
Capelin
Herring
Cod
Oceanic Redfish
Summary

6. Conclusions
Broadening the Research Question
Same Issue Area and Changes over Time
The International Arena
Further Analysis of International Cooperation

Notes
Bibliography
Index

Sujets

• International relations

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 07 août 2008
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780791477816
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 2 Mo

Extrait

Who Gets What?

SUNY series in Global Politics James N. Rosenau, editor

Who Gets What?

Domestic Influences on International Negotiations Allocating Shared Resources

Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir

Published by State University of New York Press, Albany

© 2008 State University of New York

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.

For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY www.sunypress.edu

Production by Marilyn P. Semerad Marketing by Michael Campochiaro

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ásgeirsdóttir, Áslaug, 1966– Who gets what? : domestic influences on international negotiations allocating shared resources / Aslaug Asgeirsdottir. p. cm — (SUNY series in global politics) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7914-7539-3 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Mediation, International. 2. Resource allocation. 3. Law of the sea. 4. Fish populations. I. Title.

K2390.A98 2008 346.04'6717—dc22

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2007044398

For my parents—you have always been an inspiration.

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Contents

List of Illustrations Acknowledgments Chapter 1. Explaining Distributional Outcomes The Importance of Distributional Conflicts Theoretical Framework Who Matters, How, and When Marginal, Monitoring, and Information Costs Norway and Iceland and the Global Capture Industry Conflict over Common Fish Stocks Tragedy of the Commons The Fisheries and the Quest for International Cooperation Summary Chapter 2. Role of the Law of the Sea and the Straddling Stocks Agreement in Determining Distributive Outcomes Law of the Sea Prior to 1982 The Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Rights and Duties Imposed by the 1982 Law of the Sea The Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Role of International Law in the Negotiating Process Regional Fisheries Bodies and the Role of Science Summary

vii

ix xi

1 6 7 14 14 16 17 19 19 29

31 32 35 36

38 41 43 46

viii

Contents

Chapter 3. The Decline of Norwegian Fishing Interests Norway’s Place in the International System The Actors: Government, Scientists, and Interest Groups Structure of the Norwegian Fishing Industry Interest Group Organization Summary Chapter 4. Dictating Policy and Influencing Outcomes in Iceland Icelandic Fisheries Policy before the 200-Mile EEZ Policy after the 200-mile Extension The Actors: Government, Scientists, and Interest Groups Structure of the Icelandic Fishing Industry The Interest Groups Summary

Chapter 5. Interest-Group Power and its Impact on the International Allocation of Shared Fish Stocks Capelin Herring Cod Oceanic Redfish Summary Chapter 6. Conclusions Broadening the Research Question Same Issue Area and Changes over Time The International Arena Further Analysis of International Cooperation

Notes Bibliography Index SUNY Series in Global Politics

47 48 55 62 65 79

81 82 85 90 98 99 110

113 115 123 128 135 139

141 141 142 143 144

145 157 167 177

Illustrations

Maps Map of the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea.

Table 1.1. Table 1.2. Table 3.1. Table 5.1.

Figure 1.1. Figure 1.2. Figure 1.3. Figure 1.4. Figure 1.5. Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.2. Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.4. Figure 3.5.

Tables Allocation of fish stocks.

Initial negotiating preferences.

Changes in the composition of Norwegian exports.

Interest group strength and distributional outcomes.

Capelin catches.

Herring catches.

Cod catches.

Figures

Oceanic redfish catches.

Oceanic redfish catches for participating states.

Changes in the number of full-time and part-time fishermen in Norway.

Annual subsidies to the Norwegian fishing industry.

Total number of fisheries related items discussed in the Norwegian parliament.

General propositions before the Norwegian parliament.

Questions posed about the fishing industry in the Norwegian parliament.

ix

2

4 5 72 114

21 23 25 28 28

71 74

76 77

78