Summary of Keith William Nolan's Ripcord

Everest Media

Description

Please note: This is a companion version & not the original book.
Sample Book Insights:
#1 The NVA drew more fire than they delivered. The 105mm howitzers of Captain David F. Rich’s B/2319th and the 155s of Captain Gordon A. Baxendale’s A/211th Field Artillery were booming in response to the NVA.
#2 The allies had the firepower, but the terrain favored the enemy, who remained mostly unseen under the jungle canopy as they alternated their fire from numerous locations. The key terrain features around Hill 927, atop which Ripcord was built, included Hill 805, situated across a sharp draw from the southeast end of the firebase ridgeline at four o’clock.
#3 The enemy concentrated his fire on Captain Rich’s battery on the highest part of Ripcord. The artillerymen continued to fire, and the enemy only put about thirty rounds in the air, half of which overshot Ripcord.
#4 The attack on Hill 805 was carried out by Company B, commanded by Captain William J. Williams. The troops were not anxious to go into battle under him, but they had to obey his orders. He was a pugnacious, highly experienced combat officer.

Sujets

• Vietnam War

Informations

• Publié par: Everest Media LLC
• Date de parution: 01 avril 2022
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781669373094
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

Insights on Keith William Nolan's Ripcord
Contents Insights from Chapter 1 Insights from Chapter 2 Insights from Chapter 3 Insights from Chapter 4 Insights from Chapter 5 Insights from Chapter 6 Insights from Chapter 7
Insights from Chapter 1

#1

The NVA drew more fire than they delivered. The 105mm howitzers of Captain David F. Rich’s B/2-319th and the 155s of Captain Gordon A. Baxendale’s A/2-11th Field Artillery were booming in response to the NVA.

#2

The allies had the firepower, but the terrain favored the enemy, who remained mostly unseen under the jungle canopy as they alternated their fire from numerous locations. The key terrain features around Hill 927, atop which Ripcord was built, included Hill 805, situated across a sharp draw from the southeast end of the firebase ridgeline at four o’clock.

#3

The enemy concentrated his fire on Captain Rich’s battery on the highest part of Ripcord. The artillerymen continued to fire, and the enemy only put about thirty rounds in the air, half of which overshot Ripcord.

#4

The attack on Hill 805 was carried out by Company B, commanded by Captain William J. Williams. The troops were not anxious to go into battle under him, but they had to obey his orders. He was a pugnacious, highly experienced combat officer.

#5

The landing zone was hot, and the captain gave the troops on his slick an enthusiastic thumbs-up as if to say, let’s go, the game is on. As his Huey made its approach, Sergeant Rubsam saw a muzzle flash and caught a quick glimpse of somebody among the boulders on top of Hill 805.

#6

The landings were chaotic, but the attacks went as planned. The only discordant note was a man named Foster, who was sitting on the slope below the landing zone, looking away from the action, his rifle between his knees. He was mumbling to himself.

#7

The attack pressed on. Wallace’s well-trained troops operated with an alertness not seen in the average platoon. When moving as a company, they moved like the enemy, creeping through the jungle.

#8

Wallace, a college dropout who had volunteered for Officer Candidate School, was assigned to lead a platoon in Vietnam. He quickly asked for another platoon, as it was absolutely insane to pull lieutenants out of the field as soon as they figured out what was going on.

#9

After weeks of getting shot at and never seeing the enemy, it was nice to finally get one kill. The only thing that mattered was that the enemy was dead, and the platoon took pleasure in propping him up next to his bunker and taking pictures with him.

#10

The 2-17th Cavalry was sent to the ridgeline known as Triple Hill, a kilometer north of Hill 1000, to destroy the mortar and recoilless rifle that had been firing on Ripcord. They were unsuccessful, but did destroy the gun.

#11

The action continued after dark. The 105s and 155s fired around the firebase to deter any possible sapper attack. A trip flare went off on the knoll between Ripcord and Hill 1000, and the mortar platoon fired a salvo on the spot. The ground attack was launched not against the firebase but Company B atop Hill 805.

#12

The company was hit hard the night of the attack, and many casualties were sustained. The battalion commander, Lucas, left Hewitt in place, assuming that the NVA would not attack during the night. However, the sappers were able to sneak inside the lines during the night and destroy the positions of the platoon commander and other soldiers.

#13

The six-month rule also applied to company commanders. To make room for Captain Hewitt, Colonel Vazquez was wastefully reassigned to a staff position when his time was up. The original intent of the rule had been to spread around as much combat experience as possible in the officer corps, but that had been institutionalized to serve the needs of career officers.

#14

The 1-506th Infantry was temporarily given responsibility of the Ripcord area, and the 3-501st Battalion was sent to relieve them. Captain Hewitt and Company C landed on the ridgeline running southeast from Hill 902 to replace a 1-506th company that had been lifted out.

#15

The company cut a cross-country route than risk ambush by walking trails. The heavily jungled ridge was dotted with freshly dug, heavily fortified, well camouflaged bunkers.

#16

The point man of the four-man team that was following the trail left his position and ran back to apologize to his wounded comrades, unaware that the explosion had been command detonated.

#17

The day after the ambush, Charlie One, with which Hewitt’s command group was moving, reached the top of Hill 902. Lieutenant Campbell was supposed to link up with Hewitt that evening, so as dusk approached, Charlie Two jumped on a trail cutting up the mountain from the southwest.

#18

Campbell realized that Captain Hewitt was sitting right next to the man he was berating. Captain, come here a minute, Campbell said, leading Hewitt away from the CP. Look, I don’t want to act like I’m trying to run the company, but we’ve got to get some things straight out here.

#19

Captain Hewitt needed some old pro Regular Army NCOs to help him train his new recruits. He had none. The contacts continued, and on June 27, Charlie One opened fire on two enemy soldiers whose line of retreat inadvertently led them directly toward Charlie Two. Herndon popped a claymore on them, and the platoon fired, killing both NVA.

#20

The company commander, Hewitt, deployed no listening posts the second night on Hill 902. Nor did he insist that everyone dig in and camouflage their positions. The perimeter was a ring of three-man positions, 13 in all.

#21

The platoon made a poncho hootch, two feet high, to provide relief from the sun during the day and some warmth during the cool of the night. It was a bad example. Other easy-to-spot poncho hootches dotted the mountaintop.

#22

On July 2, 1970, the Easy Company soldiers were sleeping when they were woken up by something moving on the side of the hill. It was most likely a monkey or a wild pig, but the noise definitely put their ears on alert.

#23

When the first rocket crashed, Moyer was crawling back to wake up Sergeant Herndon and Gary Steele. They rolled out from under their poncho hootch at the sound of the blast, and Steele stood up on one side and Herndon got to his knees on the other, reaching for his M16.

#24

The first illumination round, fired by the mortar platoon on the firebase, popped overhead. The enemy took cover, but when the flare burned out, another satchel charge came sailing toward Herndon. It landed on the left side of Steele, rupturing his eardrum.

#25

When Mueller opened fire, his team leader, Sergeant Mendez, jumped into the foxhole with him. They were hit by another satchel charge, and Mueller had to dive uphill and slide down the slope so his left leg was across the top of the foxhole when the satchel charge at the bottom detonated.

#26

Many things were happening at the same time. Dreher and Cafferty were still in their foxhole when a close friend of Cafferty’s, Sp4 Robert P. Radcliffe, and a man Cafferty didn’t recognize in the dark, Sergeant Lenz, climbed in with them.

#27

The sapper went down like a spastic marionette. Jerry Cafferty, a wisecracking, extremely dedicated draftee-medic from an Irish neighborhood in West Haven, Connecticut, saw only then that another sapper was beside the first, and he frantically grabbed a fresh magazine from the bandolier across his chest. The magazine jammed in his weapon.

#28

The battle continued, and Mueller was shot in the leg. The sappers continued to try and attack the Americans, but they were unsuccessful.

#29

During the attack, Moyer was lying behind a log when another flare popped overhead, revealing an NVA soldier in green fatigues directly in front of him. Moyer shot the man four times, but he didn’t stop shooting. He was afraid that if he stopped, the noise would reveal him to any other enemy soldiers slinking along the slope.

#30

As the sun set, Steele could hear Vietnamese voices about 20 feet up from where he lay next to his smashed poncho hootch. He had to get past a fallen tree to get to the foxhole, and he was shot at as he did so. He eventually reached the foxhole, but it wasn’t much of a hole.

#31

The sappers were still inside the perimeter at daybreak. They tried to slip out the way they had come, but were silhouetted against the twilight skyline as they started down from the top of the hill. Mueller shot them both.

#32

The top of the mountain had been secured by Doc Cafferty, who had heard shouts and screams from the wounded on Charlie Two’s side of the hill. He rounded up two guys from a nearby foxhole, and began walking the hilltop methodically shooting each sprawled-out NVA in the back of his head.

#33

On the hilltop, Cafferty policed up Lenz and his good friend Bob Radcliffe, who had no heads. They were shocked at the devastation on the other platoons.

#34

The mortaring began when the helicopters landed to pick up the KIAs and WIAs. The wounded included several deaf men, who were desperate to get to the rear. After the casualties were evacuated, what was left of Charlie One and Two was shuttled to Ripcord.
Insights from Chapter 2

#1

The 2nd Battalion, 506th Airborne was tasked with capturing Hill 902, and the entire brigade and division commanders were present to observe the assault. The plan went awry when the only way the troops could get in was to jump off the skids.

#2

The decision was made to send A/2-506th to Hill 927, an easy place to land a helicopter, but it had not been selected as the primary LZ because it was dominated by nearby Hill 1000.