Agency and Ethics

Anthony F. Lang Jr.

Description

Why does political conflict seem to consistently interfere with attempts to provide aid, end ethnic discord, or restore democracy? To answer this question, Agency and Ethics examines how the norms that originally motivate an intervention often create conflict between the intervening powers, outside powers, and the political agents who are the victims of the intervention. Three case studies are drawn upon to illustrate this phenomena: the British and American intervention in Bolshevik Russia in 1918; the British and French intervention in Egypt in 1956; and the American and United Nations intervention in Somalia in 1993. Although rarely categorized together, these three interventions shared at least one strong commonality: all failed to achieve their professed goals, with the troops being ignominiously recalled in each example. Lang concludes by addressing the dilemma of how to resolve complex humanitarian emergencies in the twenty-first century without the necessity of resorting to military intervention.
Preface

Acknowledgments

1. Introduction

2. Intervention in Russia

3. Intervention in Egypt

4. Intervention in Somalia

5. The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention

Notes

Bibliography

Index

SUNY Series in Global Politics

Sujets

• Military history
• International relations

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 01 février 2012
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780791489772
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 5 Mo

Extrait

AGENCY

Anthony F. Lang Jr.

and AGENCY ETHICS ETHICS and

THE POLITICS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

AGENCY AND ETHICS

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SUNY series in Global Politics Edited by James N. Rosenau

A complete listing of books in the series can be found at the end of this volume.

Chapter Title

AGENCY AND ETHICS

The Politics of Military Intervention

Anthony F. Lang Jr.

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS

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Published by State University of New York Press, Albany

© 2002 State University of New York

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For information, address State University of New York Press, 90 State Street, Suite 700, Albany, NY 12207

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Lang, Anthony F., 1968– Agency and ethics : the politics of military intervention / Anthony F. Lang, Jr. p. cm.—(SUNY series in global politics) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–7914–5135–6 (alk. paper)—ISBN 0–7914–5136–4 (pb : alk. paper) 1. Intervention (International law)—Moral and ethical aspects. 2. Humanitarian assistance. I. Title. II. Series.

KZ6368 .L36 2001 341.584—dc21

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

00–054789

Preface

Acknowledgements

Chapter 1: Introduction

Contents

Chapter 2: Intervention in Russia

Chapter 3: Intervention in Egypt

Chapter 4: Intervention in Somalia

Chapter 5: The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention

Notes

Bibliography

Index

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Preface

n May 1798, the French government sent Napoleon Bonaparte with a I large army and armada to conquer Egypt. Intervening in Egypt was not a new French policy; it had been suggested by the philosopher Leibnez in the seventeenth century in order to undermine the power of the Dutch. In 1798, however, the enemy was now England. While invading England her- self was not possible, striking at perfidious Albion through Egypt and India seemed more sensible. The intervention, however, was not only about power politics. A report from the French consul in Ottoman Egypt in 1797 justified the expedition in more humanitarian terms: “He declared that the hour was ripe for inter- vention, that the Egyptian people, victims of oppressive and corrupt gov- ernment, would welcome it, that Turkey, the suzerain Power, would rejoice over the downfall of the Mamlukes, unruly subjects and bitter adversaries (Elgood 1931, 50). Spreading the ideals of the French Revolution meant freeing those unfairly oppressed by backward and uncivilized rulers. A further normative reason for the intervention had to do with knowledge. The French believed that after their revolution they would be able to provide the world with the reason and knowledge of the philosophes. Part of that process meant uncovering the lost wisdom of ancient civilizations, like Egypt. So, accompanying Napoleon and his army was a second army of sorts, a group of scholars and artists whose role was to make a record of the vast store of Egyptian antiquities. As the army fought the ruling Mamlukes, the scholars accompanying them made sketches, measured distances, and wrote journals. So, while power politics certainly played a role in the decision to intervene, normative reasons remained central. Indeed, throughout the course of the intervention, these normative reasons continued to play an important role in the explanations given to the Egyptians, French soldiers, and French citizens.

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Two records of this expedition give us a unique picture of it, a picture that remains relevant to this day. The first comes from Dominique Vivant Denon whose workVoyage dans la Basseet la Haute Égypterivaled only the Description d’Égyptein its popularity. Vivant Denon chose to accompany one of the generals whose task it was to pursue the Mamluke leader, Mourat-Bey, into southern Egypt. In the course of this pursuit, Vivant Denon was able to record ancient temples, the mores of the people, and even the weather and topography, both in pictures and words. His work has recently been republished as part of the French government’s celebra- tion/remembrance of 200 years of interactions between Egypt and France (Vivant Denon 1998). This record of the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt has much to teach us about military intervention. Even though it was written by a scholar whose primary aim was not political or military conquest, his comments on these elements are revealing. Vivant Denon does not hide his pride in being a Frenchmen, and has no compunction in celebrating the intervention as a demonstration of France’s Enlightened approach to the world. As the ships set sail, he sees in them “la splendeur de la France, de sa force, de ses moynes.” Nor is this expedition only for the aristocracy; as France repre- sents now the “rights of man,” those gathered on the shore to send off the expedition include “individus dus de toutes les classes de la société” (Vivant Denon 1801/1998, 37). The glory of France exists not only on the departure, but displays itself in the midst of the intervention as well. As the troops pursuing Mourat-Bey come upon the glory of Thebes, they burst into spontaneous applause. For Vivant Denon this reaction reveals that which makes France unique—that its troops had such a sensitivity to art and beauty they would applaud while in the midst of a military campaign (194). And, not only can they appreciate beauty, the soldiers are also sensi- tive to the humanitarian needs of a native population oppressed by the ruling Turkish class, caring for children left behind in their villages (207). So, on one level, the military intervention in Egypt represented not simply power politics (although that certainly prompted the intervention), but a larger task of somehow presenting France to the world. Vivant Denon’s book became one of the best-selling books describing the expedi- tion and was translated into a number of other languages soon after its publication in French. But presenting France to the world was not the only fact of the intervention. It also disrupted the life of Egyptians, socially, economically, and politically. Vivant Denon observes how the presence of troops had a profound influence on the lives of those living in Egypt. He describes how the French army, the model of efficiency, created its own society and economy when it took over a town or village (211). Perhaps more importantly, he describes how the presence of the French army

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caused disruptions in the systems of tribal authority which existed in Egypt (81), to say nothing of the fact that the French created their own gov- ernment in Cairo, run by a French general who had converted to Islam. The second text that provides insights into this intervention comes from a different perspective, that of an Egyptian. Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, a Muslim scholar of Ottoman Egypt, provided three different accounts of the French intervention. His most famous is theTarikh muddat al-Faransis bi Misr, orChronicle of the French Occupation, written in the midst of the inter- vention. It describes the French attempt to win over the Muslim popula- tion. More importantly, however, it describes the Muslim revolt of mid-October 1798. While that particular uprising failed to change French policy, it did provide a “harbinger for future Franco-Egyptian relations” (Tignor 1993, 9). Those relations were characterized by the local population resisting the French presence at every turn. While the French eventually left Egypt in 1801 for a number of reasons, one of the most important was undoubtedly the resistance offered by Egyptians as described by al-Jabarti. The normative impulses that lead to and sustain an intervention, and the resistances and conflicts generated by those normative impulses, can be found in almost every intervention since that time. The attempt to accom- plish a set of normative aims and the assertion of the identity of the inter- vening power can be seen in interventions as old as the French in Egypt and as new as the Americans in Somalia. This book is an attempt to describe and explain these elements of military intervention. It seeks to do so by explain- ing why interventions, even humanitarian interventions, seem to fail more often than they succeed. Not only that, it is an attempt to put those elements in a larger context—to use them to understand what is “the political.” Not politics, although the political certainly informs and structures politics, as this book will demonstrate in one particular realm. No, this book is about the political, that “constitutive, quasi-transcendental setting or matrix of political life” (Dallmayr 1996, 193), a distinct realm, one that differs from the economic, the social, the family, and the religious. While the political impacts and is impacted by each of these other areas of human existence, it cannot be reduced to any of them. The political inhabits a particular space in the ambit of human life. In supposing that one can speak of the political as a separate realm, I follow the lead of political theorists like Claude Lefort, who seek to “look for signs of the political in areas where its existence usu- ally goes unnoticed or is denied, and a willingness to recognize and identify those signs” (Lefort 1988, 1). While Lefort’s search takes him to the intersec- tion of politics with the social, my search moves elsewhere to the realm of interstate politics, or what is more commonly called international relations. In this book, I focus on the normative and the political, both of which are manifestly displayed in a military intervention. Normative does not