Bullets Not Ballots

L. Hazelton Jacqueline

Description

In Bullets Not Ballots, Jacqueline L. Hazelton challenges the claim that winning "hearts and minds" is critical to successful counterinsurgency campaigns. Good governance, this conventional wisdom holds, gains the besieged government popular support, denies support to the insurgency, and makes military victory possible. Hazelton argues that major counterinsurgent successes since World War II have resulted not through democratic reforms but rather through the use of military force against civilians and the co-optation of rival elites.Hazelton offers new analyses of five historical cases frequently held up as examples of the effectiveness of good governance in ending rebellions-the Malayan Emergency, the Greek Civil War, the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, the Dhofar rebellion in Oman, and the Salvadoran Civil War-to show that, although unpalatable, it was really brutal repression and bribery that brought each conflict to an end. By showing how compellence works in intrastate conflicts, Bullets Not Ballots makes clear that whether or not the international community decides these human, moral, and material costs are acceptable, responsible policymaking requires recognizing the actual components of counterinsurgent success-and the limited influence that external powers have over the tactics of counterinsurgent elites.

Sujets

• Histoire
• Military history
• International relations

Informations

• Publié par: Cornell University Press
• Date de parution: 15 mai 2021
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781501754807
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 6 Mo

Extrait

Bullets Not Ballots

a volum e in th e series

Cornell Studies in Security Affairs

Edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt

A list of titles in this series is available at cornellpress.cornell.edu.

Bullets Not Ballots

Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare

J a c q u e l i n e L . H a z e lt o n

Cornell University Press Ithaca and London

Copyright © 2021 by Cornell University

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. Visit our website at cornellpress.cornell.edu.

First published 2021 by Cornell University Press

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data Names: Hazelton, Jacqueline L., author. Title: Bullets not ballots : success in counterinsurgency warfare /  Jacqueline L. Hazelton. Description: Ithaca, [New York] : Cornell University Press, 2021. |  Series: Cornell studies in security affairs | Includes bibliographical  references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020029368 (print) | LCCN 2020029369 (ebook) |  ISBN 9781501754784 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781501754791 (epub) |  ISBN 9781501754807 (pdf) Subjects: LCSH: Counterinsurgency. | Government, Resistance to. Classification: LCC U241 .H39 2021 (print) | LCC U241 (ebook) |  DDC 355.02/18—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020029368 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020029369

Cover photograph: Smoke from a truck bomb, Baghdad, January 2007. Credit: Robert H. Reid. Used by permission.

For my family

There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. —Niccolo Machiavelli,The Prince

Contents

Acknowledgments

1. Eating Soup with a Chainsaw Counterinsurgency: 2. What It Is and Is Not Counterinsurgency: 3.  Not the Wars You’re Looking For: Malaya, Greece, the Philippines 4. New Laboratory: Dhofar, Oman A 5.  High Cost Success: El Salvador 6.  How Much Does the Compellence Theory Explain? Turkey and the PKK 7.  Counterinsurgency Success: Costs High and Rising

Notes Index

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1 8

29 81 106

130 147

155 203

Acknowledgments

Everyworkofscholarshipisacollectiveenterprise.Iamfortunatetohave had the support of several communities in writing this book. Above all, I have to thank Robert Art as my adviser, mentor, and guide to the world of international relations. It is a pleasure and a privilege to serve as his appren tice. He very properly recused himself from this project. Along with Bob, Ste ven Burg provided wise advice and support through his comparativist’s eye as this project took shape. I thank Robert Pape for sending me to work with Bob Art; this was a great gift. Bob Pape tutored me in the ways of academia when I was an MA student who had never studied political science but brought a journalist’s experience and keen mind to the problems of compel lence, terrorism, and Islamic political thought. Other members of my com munity at the University of Chicago, the Massachusetts Institute of Technol ogy, and the Harvard Kennedy School have also been unfailingly supportive and generous. This community includes Steven Miller and Stephen Walt of the International Security Program at the Belfer Center, my scholarly home for two idyllic years; Barry Posen, who introduced me to Dhofar; and John Mearsheimer and Charles Glaser. I appreciate the welcome I have received at workshops held by the International Security Program at the Kennedy School, the Security Studies Program at MIT, and the Program on International Secu rity Policy at Chicago. They are where I learned my trade. I appreciate the unfailing interest and generosity of the community of scholars of insurgency and counterinsurgency and practitioners of counter insurgency who seek theoretically and empirically sound answers to impor tant policy questions, including Dale Andrade, Huw Bennett, Stephen Biddle, Andrew Birtle, Nick Carter, Joe Collins, Conrad Crane, Greg Daddis, William Fallon, Brendan Green, Karl Hack (whose exclamation that the standard

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