Crisis of the Naval War

Earl Jellicoe John Rushworth Jellicoe

Description

Owing to the peculiar nature and demands of naval warfare, but few dispatches, corresponding to those describing the work and achievements of our great armies, were issued during the progress of the war. In a former volume I attempted to supply this defect in the historical records, which will be available for future generations, so far as the Grand Fleet was concerned, during my period as its Commander-in-Chief. The present volume, which was commenced and nearly completed in 1918, was to have been published at the same time. My departure on a Naval mission early in 1919 prevented me, however, from putting the finishing touches to the manuscript until my return this spring.

Sujets

• Histoire
• World War I

Informations

• Publié par: Pub One Info
• Date de parution: 23 octobre 2010
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9782819900221
• Langue: English

Extrait

INTRODUCTION
Owing to the peculiar nature and demands of navalwarfare, but few dispatches, corresponding to those describing thework and achievements of our great armies, were issued during theprogress of the war. In a former volume I attempted to supply thisdefect in the historical records, which will be available forfuture generations, so far as the Grand Fleet was concerned, duringmy period as its Commander-in-Chief. The present volume, which wascommenced and nearly completed in 1918, was to have been publishedat the same time. My departure on a Naval mission early in 1919prevented me, however, from putting the finishing touches to themanuscript until my return this spring.
I hesitated as to the publication of this portion ofwhat is in effect one complete narrative, but eventually decidednot to depart from my original purpose. There is some reason tobelieve that the account of the work of the Grand Fleet gave thenation a fuller conception of the services which the officers andmen of that force rendered in circumstances which were necessarilynot easily appreciated by landsmen.
This second volume, dealing with the defeat of theenemy's submarine campaign, the gravest peril which ever threatenedthe population of this country, as well as of the whole Empire, maynot be unwelcome as a statement of facts. They have been set downin order that the sequence and significance of events may beunderstood, and that the nation may appreciate the debt which itowes, in particular, to the seamen of the Royal Navy and theMercantile Marine, who kept the seas during the unforgettable daysof the intensive campaign.
This book, therefore, gives the outline of the workaccomplished by the Navy in combating the unrestricted submarinewarfare instituted by the Central Powers in February, 1917. Itwould have been a labour of love to tell at greater length and inmore detail how the menace was gradually overcome by the gallantry,endurance and strenuous work of those serving afloat in shipsflying the White or the Red Ensigns, but I had not the necessarymaterials at my disposal for such an exhaustive record.
The volume is consequently largely concerned withthe successive steps taken at the Admiralty to deal with asituation which was always serious, and which at times assumed avery grave aspect. The ultimate result of all Naval warfare mustnaturally rest with those who are serving afloat, but it is onlyjust to the Naval officers and others who did such fine work at theAdmiralty in preparing for the sea effort, that their share in theNavy's final triumph should be known. The writing of this bookappeared also to be the only way in which I could show my keenappreciation of the loyalty and devotion to duty of the NavalStaff, of the many clever, ingenious and audacious schemesdeveloped and carried through for the destruction of submarines andthe safeguarding of ocean-borne trade, and of the skilfulorganization which brought into being, and managed with suchsuccess, that great network of convoys by which the seacommunications of the Allies were kept open. The volume shows howthe officers who accompanied me to the Admiralty from the GrandFleet at the end of 1916, in association with those already servingin Whitehall and others who joined in 1917, with the necessary andvaluable assistance of our comrades of the Mercantile Marine,gradually produced the measures by which the Sea Service conqueredthe gravest danger which has ever faced the Empire.
There were at times inevitable set-backs as theenemy gained experience of our methods, and new ones had then to bedevised, and we were always most seriously handicapped by thestrain imposed upon the Fleet by our numerous military and othercommitments overseas, and by the difficulty of obtaining suppliesof material, owing to the pre-occupation of our industries inmeeting the needs of our Armies in equipment and munitions; but,generally speaking, it may be said that in April, 1917, the lossesreached their maximum, and that from the following month andonwards the battle was being slowly but gradually won. By the endof the year it was becoming apparent that success was assured.
The volume describes the changes carried out in theAdmiralty Staff organization; the position of affairs in regard tosubmarine warfare in the early part of 1917; and the numerousanti-submarine measures which were devised and brought intooperation during the year. The introduction and working of theconvoy system is also dealt with. The entry of the United States ofAmerica into the war marked the opening of a new phase of theoperations by sea, and it has been a pleasure to give particularsof our cordial co-operation with the United States Navy. Thesplendid work of the patrol craft and minesweepers is described alltoo briefly, and I have had to be content to give only a briefsummary of the great services of the Dover and Harwich forces.
Finally, an effort has been made to suggest therange and character of the work of the Production Departments atthe Admiralty. It is impossible to tell this part of the storywithout conveying some suggestion of criticism since the outputnever satisfied our requirements. I have endeavoured also toindicate where it seemed to me that changes in organization werenot justified by results, so that in future years we may benefit bythe experience gained. But I would not like it to be thought that Idid not, and do not, realize the difficulties which handicappedproduction, or that I did not appreciate to the full the work doneby all concerned.
It is unfortunate that attempts to draw attention tothe lessons taught us by the war are regarded by many people eitheras complaints of lack of devotion to the country's interests on thepart of some, or as criticisms of others who, in the years beforethe war or during the war, were responsible for the administrationof the Navy. In anticipation of such an attitude, I wish to stateemphatically that, where mention is made of apparent shortcomingsor of action which, judged by results, did not seem, to meet aparticular situation, this is done solely in order that on anyfuture occasion of a similar character – and may the day be longpostponed – the nation may profit by experience.
Those who are inclined to indulge in criticismshould ever bear in mind that the Navy was faced with problemswhich were never foreseen, and could not have been foreseen, byanyone in this country. Who, for instance, would have ever had thetemerity to predict that the Navy, confronted by the secondgreatest Naval Power in the world, would be called upon to maintainfree communications across the Channel for many months until themonths became years, in face of the naval forces of the enemyestablished on the Belgian coast, passing millions of men across insafety, as well as vast quantities of stores and munitions? Whowould have prophesied that the Navy would have to safeguard thepassage of hundreds of thousands of troops from the Dominions toEurope, as well as the movement of tens of thousands of labourersfrom China and elsewhere? Or who, moreover, would have beenbelieved had he stated that the Navy would be required to keep openthe sea communications of huge armies in Macedonia, Egypt,Palestine, Mesopotamia and East Africa, against attack by surfacevessels, submarines and mines, whilst at the same time protectingthe merchant shipping of ourselves, our Allies, and neutral Powersagainst similar perils, and assisting to ensure the safety of thetroops of the United States when they, in due course, were broughtacross the Atlantic? Compare those varied tasks with thecomparatively modest duties which in pre-war days were generallyassigned to the Navy, and it will be seen how much there may be tolearn of the lessons of experience, and how sparing we should be ofcriticism. Wisdom distilled from events which were unforeseeableshould find expression not in criticisms of those who did theirduty to the best of their ability, but in the taking of wiseprecautions for the future.
Little mention is made in this volume of the work ofthe Grand Fleet during the year 1917, but, although that Fleet hadno opportunity of showing its fighting power, it must never beforgotten that without the Grand Fleet, under the distinguishedofficer who succeeded me as Commander-in-Chief at the end of 1916,all effort would have been of no avail, since every operation bysea, as well as by land, was carried out under the sure protectingshield of that Fleet, which the enemy could not face.
I am conscious of many shortcomings in the book, butit may prove of interest to those who desire to know something ofthe measures which gradually wore down the German submarine effort,and, at any rate, it is the only record likely to be available inthe near future of the work of fighting the submarines in 1917.
June, 1920.
CHAPTER I
ADMIRALTY ORGANIZATION; THE CHANGES IN 1917
It is perhaps as well that the nation generallyremained to a great extent unconscious of the extreme gravity ofthe situation which developed during the Great War, when theGermans were sinking an increasing volume of merchant tonnage weekby week. The people of this country as a whole rose superior tomany disheartening events and never lost their sure belief in finalvictory, but full knowledge of the supreme crisis in our historymight have tended to undermine in some quarters that confidence invictory which it was essential should be maintained, and, in anyevent, the facts could not be disclosed without benefiting theenemy. But the position at times was undoubtedly extremelyserious.
At the opening of the war we possessed approximatelyhalf the merchant tonnage of the world, but experience during theearly part of the struggle revealed that we had not a single shiptoo many for the great and increasing oversea military liabilitieswhich we were steadily incurring, over and above the responsibilityof bringing to these shores the greater part of the food for apopulation of forty-fi