Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers

E. Johnson David

Description

The U.S. Army entered World War II unprepared. In addition, lacking Germany's blitzkrieg approach of coordinated armor and air power, the army was organized to fight two wars: one on the ground and one in the air. Previous commentators have blamed Congressional funding and public apathy for the army's unprepared state. David E. Johnson believes instead that the principal causes were internal: army culture and bureaucracy, and their combined impact on the development of weapons and doctrine.Johnson examines the U.S. Army's innovations for both armor and aviation between the world wars, arguing that the tank became a captive of the conservative infantry and cavalry branches, while the airplane's development was channeled by air power insurgents bent on creating an independent air force. He maintains that as a consequence, the tank's potential was hindered by the traditional arms, while air power advocates focused mainly on proving the decisiveness of strategic bombing, neglecting the mission of tactical support for ground troops. Minimal interaction between ground and air officers resulted in insufficient cooperation between armored forces and air forces.Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers makes a major contribution to a new understanding of both the creation of the modern U.S. Army and the Army's performance in World War II. The book also provides important insights for future military innovation.

Sujets

• Histoire
• USA
• United States of America
• Military history
• History of the Americas
• États-Unis

Informations

• Publié par: Cornell University Press
• Date de parution: 15 février 2013
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780801467110
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers

A volume in the series Cornell Studies in Security Affairs edited byRobert Jervis, Robert J. Art,andStephen M. Walt

A full list of titles in the series appears at the end of the book.

Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers

Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945

Dav i d E . J o h n s o n

Cornell University Press

Ithaca and London

Excerpt from “Losses” fromThe Complete Poemsby Randall Jarrall. Copyright ©1969by Mrs. Randall Jarrall. Reprinted by permission of Farrar, Straus & Giroux, Inc., and Faber and Faber Ltd.

Copyright ©1998

by Cornell University

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House,512East State Street, Ithaca, New York14850.

First published1998by Cornell University Press First Printing, Cornell Paperbacks,2003

Printed in the United States of America

Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are also recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwood fibers.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Johnson, David E. (David Eugene),1950– Fast tanks and heavy bombers : innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945/ David E. Johnson. p. cm. — (Cornell studies in Security affairs) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN0-8014-3458-0(cloth : alk. paper) ISBN0-8014-8847-8(pbk. : alk. paper) 1States. Army—Weapon systems—History—. United 20th century. 2I. Title.States. Army—Operational readiness. . United II. Series UF503.J65 1998 355.07097309041—dc21 98-16418

1

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

10Cloth printing Paperback printing

To Wendy

Tables Acknowledgments

Introduction

Contents

Part I. Soldiers and Machines: 1917–1920

1the Army, and the Great War. America, 2Tank Corps. The 3. The Air Service 4. The Army in the Aftermath of the Great War

Part II. Inertia and Insurgency: 1921–1930

5. Peace and Quiet 6Tanks. Infantry 7Failed Revolution and the Evolution of Air Force. The 8War Department. The

Part III. Alternatives and Autonomy: 1931–1942

9. From Domestic Depression to International Crusade 10for Armor. Alternatives 11. Autonomous Air Power 12. A Crisis in the War Department

[vii]

ix xi

1

19 30 40 54

63 72 81 95

107 116 153 176

13. 14. 15. 16.

Part IV. Dying for Change: 1942–1945

The Arsenal of Attrition Armored Bludgeon Air Force Triumphant Coequal Land Power and Air Power

Conclusion Notes Primary Sources Index

Contents

[viii]

187 189 202 212

218 231 277 285

Tables

1. Army active-duty strength,1940–1945 188 2tank and airplane production,. American 1940–1945 188 3. American and German gun penetration against armor at30degrees obliquity at500to2,000yards (in millimeters)194

[ix]