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Publié par | Turner Publishing Company |
Date de parution | 24 août 2007 |
Nombre de lectures | 0 |
EAN13 | 9780470255452 |
Langue | English |
Informations légales : prix de location à la page 0,1100€. Cette information est donnée uniquement à titre indicatif conformément à la législation en vigueur.
Extrait
Grant Wins the War
Grant Wins the War
Decision at Vicksburg
James R. Arnold
This text is printed on acid-free paper.
Copyright 1997 by James R. Arnold. Published by John Wiley Sons, Inc.
Maps 1997 by D. L. McElhannon
All rights reserved. Published simultaneously in Canada.
Reproduction or translation of any part of this work beyond that permitted by Section 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act without the permission of the copyright owner is unlawful. Requests for permission or further information should be addressed to the Permissions Department, John Wiley Sons, Inc.
This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional services. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Arnold, James R.
Grant wins the war : decision at Vicksburg / James R. Arnold.
p. cm.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-471-15727-9(cloth : alk. paper)
1. Vicksburg (Miss.)-History-Siege, 1863. 2. Grant, Ulysses S. (Ulysses Simpson), 1822-1885. 3. Strategy. I. Title. E475.27.A75 1997 973.7 344-dc21
96-53871
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To my wife, Roberta
Contents
List of Maps
Acknowledgments
Prologue
Part 1 Father of Waters
1 Battles on the River
2 Fates Intermingled
3 Ebb Tide
4 The Hazardous Enterprise
Part 2 The Shot-Torn Ground
5 The Battle of Port Gibson
6 Blitzkrieg through Mississippi
7 To the Crossroads
8 The Hill of Death
9 A Perilous and Ludicrous Charge
10 Assault
11 Siege
12 Come Joe! Come Quickly!
13 A Hard Stroke for the Confederacy
Troops Present for the Vicksburg Campaign: May 1, 1863
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Maps
Map 1. The Mississippi River Valley
Map 2. Five Failures: February-March 1863
Map 3. The Bombardment of Grand Gulf: April 29, 1863
Map 4. The Battle of Port Gibson: Morning, May 1, 1863
Map 5. The Battle of Port Gibson: Afternoon, May 1, 1863
Map 6: The Decisive Campaign Begins: March 31-May 7, 1863
Map 7. The Battle of Raymond: May 12, 1863
Map 8. The Battle of Champion Hill: 8:30 A.M. , May 16, 1863
Map 9. The Battle of Champion Hill: Hovey s Assault, 11:30 A.M .-1 P.M.
Map 10. The Battle of Champion Hill: Logan Makes History, 11:30 A.M .-12:30 P.M.
Map 11. The Battle of Champion Hill: Bowen s Counterattack, 2 P.M .-4 P.M.
Map 12. The Battle of Champion Hill: 4 P.M .-5 P.M.
Map 13. The Battle of the Big Black River: May 17, 1863
Map 14. Vicksburg: May 19-July 4, 1863
Map 15. Endgame: The Mobile Option-Situation, July 17, 1863
Acknowledgments
A word is in order about language, and then a few more-although volumes are needed-about the people who contributed to this book.
The quotes contained in what follows are as the words originally appeared. I have avoided the term Yankee whenever describing something from the Union perspective. Grant s soldiers did not think of themselves as Yankees -it was a term they understood to apply to New Englanders-but rather as westerners. The Confederates, who wore the label rebel with pride, did not differentiate: their foes were Yankees one and all.
I gratefully wish to thank Mr. And Mrs. Robert C. Arnold for their work at Vicksburg; Jon Bigler for his help at the Virginia Historical Society; Gordon Cotton at the Old Court House Museum, Vicksburg; Pam Cheney, David Keogh, John Slonaker, and Richard Sommers at the Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania; Jim Gullickson, who provided diligent copyediting; Grace McCrowell, who processed my interlibrary loan request at the Rockbridge Regional Library; David McElhannon for his cartographic work; Ralph Reinertsen, who helped research several complex issues; the librarians and helpful staff at the University of Virginia, Virginia Military Institute, and Washington and Lee University; Terry Winschel at Vicksburg National Military Park, who kindly opened his archives and answered many questions; Matt Bialer, my agent, whose diligence found a home for this book; Hana Lane, who had the confidence to initiate this project; and Roberta Wiener, my chief of staff, wife, and soul mate.
Prologue
The tall, gangly man stooped to point to the map. It was the war s second year, 1862, and the Federal commander in chief was beginning to realize that if the rebellion was to be suppressed, he needed to assume a more active role in devising grand strategy. See what a lot of land these fellows hold, he said, of which Vicksburg is the key. Here is Red River, which will supply the Confederates with cattle and corn to feed their armies. There are the Arkansas and White Rivers, which can supply cattle and hogs by the thousand. From Vicksburg these supplies can be distributed by rail all over the Confederacy.
The speaker warmed to his subject. During his youth he had passed through this country, and assured his audience that he knew of what he spoke. Vicksburg meant hog and hominy without limit, fresh enemy soldiers from the territory west of the river, and a cotton country where the rebels could plant without disturbance. President Abraham Lincoln concluded, Let us get Vicksburg and all that country is ours. The war can never be brought to a close until that key is in our pocket. 1
More than a year later, a volunteer Union army of midwestern men and boys fought and won a battle that drove the Confederates into Vicksburg s fortifications and assured its inevitable surrender. After the battle, fought on May 16, 1863, at a place called Champion Hill, the South could no longer win the war through their own generals initiative. There could be spectacular rebel exploits, but, as a Louisiana officer wrote at the time, in the final analysis even Robert E Lee s Gettysburg campaign was nothing more than raids on a grand scale, having no decisive results. 2 Champion Hill reduced Confederate president Jefferson Davis to reliance upon Union bungling or Northern war weariness to confer Southern independence. If a decisive battle is defined as one in which a nation fatally wounds its foe, Champion Hill was indeed a decisive engagement.
At the time, military operations elsewhere obscured the battle s importance. Most significantly, the Vicksburg campaign coincided with the Chancellorsville-Gettysburg campaigns in the East. Those campaigns featured the war s most publicized armies. Since they took place in the corridor between the warring nations rival capitals, political and newspaper attention concentrated on them. To those living along the Atlantic seaboard, what took place in distant Mississippi paled in comparison.
Major General Ulysses S. Grant captured Vicksburg on July 4, 1863. The Battle of Gettysburg had ended the previous day. Then and thereafter, Gettysburg overwhelmed Vicksburg in popular attention. Following the war, the veterans memoirs of the great struggle in the East received national and international circulation via New York and Boston publishing houses. General Robert E. Lee became first a Southern and then a national icon as tales of his dauntless Army of Northern Virginia spread. Likewise, Lee s opponent, the Army of the Potomac, became a venerated institution. The myth grew that Virginia was the war s decisive theater, where American military professionalism shone most brilliantly, while, in contrast, the war in the West was a less important, decidedly amateur affair. The fact that far more West Point graduates served in the East than the West, and that their published accounts greatly outnumbered those of westerners, contributed to this view. With first the contemporary media s eastern focus and then the postwar articles and books, the basis for all subsequent history was set.
Today the American Civil War remains an amazingly popular subject. Yet even among Civil War buffs, few people know the name of the army Grant took to Vicksburg or have heard about the battle of Champion Hill. Almost no one would call it the war s decisive battle. As is often the case, perspective comes from outsiders. In 1929, a British officer named J. F. C. Fuller took a break from his musings on mechanized warfare-musings that some forward-thinking German officers honed into a blitzkrieg doctrine that later threatened to conquer a continent-to turn his attention to the American Civil War. Fuller concluded that Vicksburg, and not Gettysburg, was the crisis of the Confederacy. 3
Few subsequent historians have attended to Fuller s words. But his assertion merits serious consideration. Grant s victory at Champion Hill permanently separated Vicksburg s garrison from outside help. Once Grant invested Vicksburg, its surrender became merely a matter of time. The only other Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi River could not, and did not, stand once Vicksburg fell. Some 37,000 Confederates surrendered during that July summer along the Mississippi. After securing the river, the Union host turned east to campaign against the South s heartland. To defend it, the South, in the absence of the rich resources of the Trans-Mississippi-the hog and hominy without limit that Lincoln had described in 1862-had to rely upon a much attenuated logistical base. It proved inadequate. More importantly, the South fought with a people grown demoralized by the knowledge that the enemy had cut their country in half.
Only one more time after Champion Hill did a major Confederate army fight a successful offensive battle. Thereafter, Grant and Major General William Sherman-the heroes of Vicksburg-collaborated in a grand offensive to which the South had no answer. In 1864, the combination of logistics and Grant s unrelenting pressure kept Lee s Army of Northern Virginia from delivering an offensive rejoinder to the Army of the Potomac s implacable a