Iranian Drones

Mehran Riazaty

Description

In September 2007, the former Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Mohammad Aziz Ali Jafari (2007-2019), said, “We must be flexible in confronting any threat. The IRGC’s goal is to increase its resilience against enemies of Iran and the Islamic Revolution and strengthen the country’s power and ability to deal with threats to prevent the enemy from acting against the country and the regime.” Jafari stated that he would try to strengthen the IRGC’s power in three ways: first, prepare the IRGC forces for asymmetric warfare; second, improve the country’s intelligence collection power to have better information on enemy’s activities in the region; third, improve country’s missiles capabilities. Aziz Jafari did not mention strengthening and enhancing the use of drones or unmanned aircraft systems. It seems that the IRGC has been working and improving its drone technology covertly since the Iran/Iraq War. The IRGC has around 90 drones for commercial, surveillance, tactical, and suicide missions. The IRGC not only shipped its suicide drones to Russia to be used against Ukraine but also equipped its proxies such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Yemeni Houthis, the Syrian army, and Iraqi Shia Militia groups with all kinds of armed drones. The IRGC also has sold armed drones to Venezuela, Ethiopia, and soon Armenia to use in case of war again with the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Iranian drones look primitive and unsophisticated but are still very lethal. A small and innovative drone, made of wood and foam with a small engine carrying about 5 kg of explosives, may seem unimportant and impractical at first glance. But effectively using such a simple and primitive drone can impose a high cost on the enemy. Iran has decided to enter a drone market focusing on more accurate, longer-range drones. The use of technologically capable Iranian drones as Iranians advance their drone technology, with a more extended range and improved precision, can be devastating to ground forces.

Sujets

• Islamic
• Histoire
• Irán
• Military
• Revolution
• Révolution (homonymie)
• History
• Iran

Informations

• Publié par: Xlibris US
• Date de parution: 30 juin 2023
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9798369401781
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

Iranian Drones A New Menace From the Ayatollah
 
 
 
 
 
MEHRAN RIAZATY
 
 
Copyright © 2023 by Mehran Riazaty. 848886
 
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright owner.
 
 
 
Xlibris
844-714-8691
www.Xlibris.com
 
 
ISBN:
Softcover
979-8-3694-0179-8
 
Hardcover
979-8-3694-0180-4
 
EBook
979-8-3694-0178-1
 
Library of Congress Control Number: 2023911639
 
 
 
Rev. date: 06/30/2023
Contents
Acknowledgment
Introduction
PART 1
History of Drones
History of the Iranian Drones
How and When the First Iranian Drone Was Made?
The Round Table of the First Commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Drone Unit
Iranian Drone Industries
Advantages of Drones Over Warplanes for Iran
US Drones Captured by IRGC
Statistics of Iranian Drones According to Israeli Security Sources
IRGC Ground Force’s Drone Division
First IRGC’s Overseas Drone Operation
IRGC Secretive Drone Base in Kashan
IRGC Drone Bases in the South of Iran
Drone Swarm Base Near City of Shiraz
PART 2
Types of Iranian Drones
Saegheh (Thunderbolt) Drone
Shahed-161 Drone
Shahed-171 Drone
Shahed-191 Drone
Fotros Drone
Simorgh Drone (Shahed-129)
Pelican Drone
MERAJ-504 Suicide Drone
Eris Drone
Sineh Sorkh (Red Chest) Drone
Homa Drone
Delta Drone
Kliak Drone
Kaman-22 Drone
Hamaseh (Epic) Drone
Shahin Drone
Gaza Drone (Shahed-149)
Mohajem (Invader) 92 Drone
Karrar Drone
Kaman-12 Drone
Ra’ad-85 suicide Drone
H-110 Sarir Drone
Arash- 2 Suicide Drone
Shahed-136 Suicide Drone
Kian-1 and Kian-2 Drones
Naseh jet Drone
Sofreh Mahi (Eagle Ray Fish) Drone
Taregh Drone
Kalagh (Crow) Drone
American RQ-11 Raven Drone
Sejjil Jet Drone
Talash-1 and Talash-2 (Hadaf-3000) Drones
Talash-2 (Hadaf-3000) Drone
Farpad Drone
Mobin Drone
Yasir Drone
Tofan (Storm) Drone
Faraz-2 Drone
Faraz-3 Drone
Faraz-20 Drone
Faraz-102 Drone
Faraz-220 Drone
Hazem drone (Ambassador of death for Iran’s enemies)
Mohajer-1 Drone
Mohajer-2 Drone
Mohajer-2 Drone (New version of Mahajer-2)
Mohajer-3 Drone
Mohajer-4 Drone
Mohajer-4 Drone armed with Hydra-70 rocket
Mohajer-6 Drone
Ababil-1 Drone
Ababil-2 Drone
Ababil-3 Drone
Ababil-5 Drone
Sayeh (Shadow) Drone
Sadegh Drone
Touba-500 Drone
Touba-800 (Gen-X5) Drone
Touba-350 Drone
Touba-400 Drone
Touba-270 Drone
Touba-600 Drone
Ofogh Drone
Oghab (Eagle) hand-launched Drone
Nasim Drone
Safir Reconnaissance Drone
Bena Drone
Saher Drone
Qaher-313 Drone
Kodkar (Automatic) Drone
Shand Drone
Omid (Hope) Drone
Shahab Drone
Shahed-123 Drone
Twin-Engine Drone
Hud Hud-3 Drone
Saqib Suicide Drone
Nazer Drone
Haider-2 Strategic Drone
Payloads of Iranian Drones
Almas 1 and 2 Missiles
Haider 1 cruise missile
Sadid guided bomb
Akhgar missile
Shahab Saqib missile
Ghaem air guided bomb
Ghaem 1 and Ghaem 5 bombs under the wing of Kaman-12
Iran’s first Anti-Drone Missile
PART 3
Exporting Iranian Drones
Iranian Drones: From Latin America to Central Asia
The Iranian Drones in Hands of the Terrorists Groups (Axis of Resistance)
The Jenin drone of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement
Samad UAV of Yemen’s Ansarullah movement
Qasif drone of Yemen’s Ansarullah movement
Rased Surveillance drone of Yemen’s Ansarullah movement
Lebanon’s Hezbollah drone is very similar to Iran’s Ababil-2
Lebanon’s Hezbollah drone is similar to Iran’s Mohajer-2 drone
PART 4
Iran’s Effort to Employ Artificial Intelligence (AI)
Combination of Artificial Intelligence and Suicide Drones by IRGC
Demonstration of the Operation of Swarming UAVs Shahed-161 and 141 in the IRGC Exercise
Iran Ground Forces (NEZAJA) joined the club of Swarming suicide drone attacks and Artificial Intelligence
 
Conclusion
Source & Links
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this book are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the U.S. government. The author enjoys full academic freedom to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on Iran’s issues.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Prepare Every Force that Can Create Fear in the Hearts of the Enemies”
 
Quran, Verse 60 of Surah Al-Mubarakah
Acknowledgment
I want to thank my friends Amir Tavakoli, Arya Khalesi, and several others who wish their names to stay anonymous for their review and countless constructive comments, which I incorporated herein. I also thank my wife Leyla for having the patience and love to tolerate the many long hours spent researching and writing this work.
Introduction
“It does not matter if the cat is black or white;
As long as it catches mice, it is a good cat.”
Former Leader of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Deng Xiaoping
These days armed drones are engaged in military and intelligence activities in many parts of the world, especially in West Asia and North Africa. In the past several years, armed drones have been one of the main pillars of conflicts in these regions and worldwide.
The Iranian drones look primitive and unsophisticated, but they are lethal. Extensive sanctions and limited financial resources forced Iran to design and build its weapons indigenously. To meet its needs, Tehran produces efficient and low-cost battle-ready drones.
The intensified sanctions program aimed to hinder Iran’s weapons manufacturing process; however, it has helped the country to produce low-cost weapons through simple designs and available parts indigenously. Iran must make various industrial parts and import many components like many countries. Due to sanctions against Iran, especially in the military sector, Tehran buys parts from black markets for manufacturing weapons, circumventing sanctions, and making their manufacturing more resilient.
A small and innovative drone, made of wood and foam with a small engine carrying about 5 kg of explosives, may seem like it could be unimportant and impractical at first glance. But using such a simple and primitive drone can impose a high cost on the enemy. To counter these low-cost drones, Iran’s adversaries must use expensive missiles to shoot them down. For example, a single unit of the Shahed-136 drone recently deployed by Russian forces in Ukraine costs roughly $20,000. To defend itself from these attacks, Ukraine uses the U.S. Patriot system which cost $4 million apiece, and PAC-3 missiles that accompany the Patriot which cost 4.1 million apiece.
In contrast with Turkey’s TB2 drone, used by the Ukrainian side, which comes with a price tag of $1-2 million per unit, the Shahed-136 drone carries a warhead of 30-50 pounds designed to explode on impact. Despite its low cost, the Shahed-136 retains critical capabilities, including the ability to evade radar detection and to operate at a range between 970-1,500km (600-900 mi) to 2000-25,00 km (1,200-1,600mi). Iranian drones usually fly in pairs and then dive toward targets. Although the Iranian drones’ quality and reliability are lower than their Western counterparts, they will likely become the world’s next round of fighting machines.
The Russia-Ukraine war demonstrates that a low-cost single-use drone could do much of what a costly cruise missile can do. Russia’s Kalibr cruise missiles, used widely by Russia in Ukraine, cost $1 million each. The Ukrainian military claims they have intercepted 65% to 85% of the Iranian Shahed-136 drones. Russians claim that the Iranian drones are low-cost and good enough as long as they do the job. A spokesman for the Odesa region administration said the Shahed-136 drones are slow. Still, they carry a powerful charge, so a hit from them is equivalent to a missile.” In November 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said that if Iran were not supplying Russia with arms, the world “would now be closer to peace.”
At the same time, using low-cost drones in large numbers during the war makes it easy to launch a swarming attack with high casualties, forcing the enemy’s defenses to remain busy until the primary weapon arrives and delivers the main blow. This ability can also significantly reduce the cost of combat operations.
Tehran can quickly put Iranian drones into mass production due to their simplicity, design, and low cost. As a result, Iran has stockpiled many of them in its warehouses, ready for its customers. Iran has consistently demonstrated that it can deliver weapons to its customers and allies in the most challenging situations. This issue is especially evident in Venezuela, where Iran has armed a country in the United States’ backyard with various weapons, including Mohajer-2 and Mohajer-6 drones.
The goal of the Iranian engineers is to mass produce drones similar to missiles so that if the enemy attacks them, so many missiles and drones will be launched and will destroy