No Place for Glory

J. Wynstra Robert

Description

A scrupulous analysis of Rodes's conduct during the Battle of Gettysburg Over the years, many top historians have cited Major General Robert E. Rodes as the best division commander in Robert E. Lee's vaunted army. Despite those accolades, Rodes faltered badly at Gettysburg, which stands as the only major blemish on his otherwise sterling record. Although his subordinates were guilty of significant blunders, Rodes shared the blame for the disjointed attack that led to the destruction of Alfred Iverson's brigade on the first day of the battle. His lack of initiative on the following day was regarded by some in the army as much worse. Whether justified or not, they directly faulted him for not supporting Jubal Early's division in a night attack on Cemetery Hill that nearly succeeded in decisively turning the enemy's flank.The reasons behind Rodes's flawed performance at Gettysburg have long proven difficult to decipher with any certainty. Because his personal papers were destroyed, primary sources on his role in battle remain sparse. Other than the official reports on the battle, the record of what occurred there is mostly limited to the letters and diaries of his subordinates. In this new study, however, Robert J. Wynstra draws on sources heretofore unexamined, including rare soldiers' letters published in local newspapers and other firsthand accounts located in small historical societies, to shed light on the reasons behind Rodes's missteps.As a result of this new research and analysis, we are finally able to come to a more detailed understanding of Rodes's division's activities at Gettysburg, an enduring subject of study and interest.

Sujets

• Histoire
• USA
• United States of America
• History of the Americas
• American Civil War
• États-Unis
• Guerre de Sécession

Informations

• Publié par: The Kent State University Press
• Date de parution: 06 avril 2021
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781631014314
• Langue: English

Extrait

No Place for Glory
CIVIL WAR SOLDIERS AND STRATEGIES Brian S. Wills, Series Editor
Richmond Must Fall: The Richmond-Petersburg Campaign, October 1864 HAMPTON NEWSOME
Work for Giants: The Campaign and Battle of Tupelo/Harrisburg, Mississippi, June–July 1864 THOMAS E. PARSON
“My Greatest Quarrel with Fortune”: Major General Lew Wallace in the West, 1861–1862 CHARLES G. BEEMER
Phantoms of the South Fork: Captain McNeill and His Rangers STEVE FRENCH
At the Forefront of Lee’s Invasion: Retribution, Plunder, and Clashing Cultures on Richard S. Ewell’s Road to Gettysburg ROBERT J. WYNSTRA
Meade: The Price of Command, 1863–1865 JOHN G. SELBY
James Riley Weaver’s Civil War: The Diary of a Union Cavalry Officer and Prisoner of War, 1863–1865 EDITED BY JOHN T. SCHLOTTERBECK, WESLEY W. WILSON, MIDORI KAWAUE, AND HAROLD A. KLINGENSMITH
Blue-Blooded Cavalryman: Captain William Brooke Rawle in the Army of the Potomac, May 1863–August 1865 EDITED BY J. GREGORY ACKEN
No Place for Glory: Major General Robert E. Rodes and the Confederate Defeat at Gettysburg ROBERT J. WYNSTRA
No Place for Glory
Major General Robert E. Rodes and the Confederate Defeat at Gettysburg

Robert J. Wynstra
© 2021 by The Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio 44242
All rights reserved
ISBN 978-1-60635-410-0
Manufactured in the United States of America
No part of this book may be used or reproduced, in any manner whatsoever, without written permission from the Publisher, except in the case of short quotations in critical reviews or articles.
Cataloging information for this title is available at the Library of Congress.
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Contents
  Preface
  Introduction: “His Promotion Should Date from May 2”
1 “Everything ahead Looks Like War”
2 “A Perfect Triumphal March”
3 “We Are Brought in Hearing of Artillery”
4 “The Yankes Crossed Fired on Us a Good While”
5 “I Never Saw Troops So Scattered”
6 “For a Few Minutes the Fighting Was Terrific”
7 “We Charged Right over Them”
8 “It Was Then Too Late”
9 “A Day None Will Forget”
10 “The Place Was Thronged with Rebels”
11 “The Night Was Hideous in the Extreme”
12 “So High That We Cannot Cross”
  Epilogue: “The Whole Army Mourned His Death”
  Notes
  Bibliography
  Index
Preface
O ver the years, many historians have cited Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes as probably the best division commander in Gen. Robert E. Lee’s vaunted Army of Northern Virginia. Despite those accolades, he faltered badly at Gettysburg, which stands as the only major blemish on his otherwise sterling record. Although his subordinates were guilty of significant blunders, Rodes shared the blame for the disjointed attack that led to the destruction of Brig. Gen. Alfred Iverson’s brigade along Oak Ridge on the first day of the battle. His lack of initiative on the following day was regarded by some top commanders as much worse. Whether justified or not, they directly faulted him for not supporting Maj. Gen. Jubal Early’s division in a night attack on Cemetery Hill that nearly succeeded in decisively turning the enemy’s flank.
The reasons behind Rodes’s flawed performance at Gettysburg have proved difficult to decipher with any certainty. The major writings on his career remain sparse, with only a single book-length study and two significant articles available in the existing literature. Author Darrell Collins’s treatment of the general’s actions in that battle is limited to a single chapter in his highly regarded biography. Historian Robert K. Krick has also contributed two thought-provoking essays of less than thirty pages each that provide valuable insights on Rodes’s complex character and relations with his brigade commanders. This, then, leaves an opening to explore his role in the defeat at Gettysburg in more depth. 1
The lack of a large body of personal correspondence has long hampered the search for suitable answers. To the regret of future historians, Rodes’s wife, Hortense, destroyed most of his letters and other personal papers in the years following his untimely death in 1864 at the Third Battle of Winchester, which has severely clouded the understanding of this often enigmatic leader. Because he died before the end of the war, there are also no postwar memoirs that could help explain his actions. Other than the official reports on the battle, the record of what occurred at Gettysburg is mostly limited to the letters and diaries of Rodes’s subordinates. 2
Luckily the advent of the internet has provided access to a trove of previously underutilized primary sources. Of special importance are the many contemporary letters and postwar accounts that the rank-and-file soldiers published in their hometown newspapers. Other vital resources include the manuscript collections available from several small archives and local historical societies. With those new materials, it is now possible to develop a more detailed and nuanced understanding of his division’s activities during the Gettysburg Campaign from the men who served alongside the general. More important, those accounts shed light on the reasons behind Rodes’s missteps in the battle.
Although he had performed brilliantly while temporarily leading the division at Chancellorsville, Gettysburg marked Rodes’s first major action as its permanent commander. This time, however, he had to operate without the guiding hand of Lt. Gen. Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson. Rodes was further burdened with two of the weakest brigade commanders in Lee’s army. Both Iverson and Col. Edward A. O’Neal would prove that his doubts about their abilities were well founded. While a third brigade commander would soon prove his merit, Brig. Gen. Junius Daniel was also new to the division. His troops’ only combat experience prior to Gettysburg had come during a brief stint a year earlier with the Army of Northern Virginia at Malvern Hill.
Often overlooked is how much Rodes’s ongoing disputes with Iverson and O’Neal affected his performance on the battlefield. The general particularly had no love lost for O’Neal, whom he regarded as little more than a political conniver. Rodes held the colonel in such low regard that he repeatedly interfered with the deployment of his troops on the field at Gettysburg, leaving O’Neal severely shorthanded at a crucial point during the fighting on Oak Ridge. The colonel refused to take his commander’s criticism lying down and enlisted some of his influential political allies to impugn Rodes’s character in the partisan press. Their feud went on for many months before Lee finally removed O’Neal from the army.
Iverson was so obviously incompetent that it is difficult to understand how Rodes allowed him to take a leading role in the opening part of the battle, which resulted in one of the worst slaughters of the entire war. Although Iverson largely avoided a direct confrontation with Rodes, the men in his own brigade constantly complained about his leadership failures and favoritism toward his friends in obtaining promotions. Following the battle, many of them blasted him as an outright coward who remained hidden behind a log throughout the fighting and called for his immediate dismissal from the army. Rodes enthusiastically supported Lee’s decision to strip Iverson of his command soon afterward.
These sources also add fresh insights into Rodes’s penchant for having every detail in place before aggressively moving forward on the attack. Many in the army regarded the general’s meticulous planning as one of his most admirable traits. At Gettysburg, however, it could be argued that his elaborate preparations were a major factor in the failure to support General Early’s nighttime attack against Cemetery Hill on the second day of the battle. Behind the scenes, both General Lee and Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, his corps commander, held Rodes largely responsible for letting slip away one of the best chances for dramatically turning the tide of the battle. More than any other fault, this was a blot on his record that the division commander would struggle to live down.
Several newly uncovered primary accounts have further confirmed that Rodes was likely sick during Gettysburg. By all indications, this amounted to more than just a minor bout of illness. According to one eyewitness, the general suffered so badly from chills and a high fever that he was forced to rest in an ambulance whenever possible, which surely would have degraded his decision making and the management of his troops. Others speculate that the effects from his well-documented drinking spree at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, a few days earlier during the advance north may also have contributed to his poor performance.
Although much about Rodes remains elusive, the recent flood of letters and diaries have also helped unravel his division’s often perplexing movements on the first day of the battle. In particular, the accounts have mostly settled the controversy over the exact sequence of O’Neal’s attacks along Oak Ridge north of town. They further provide new insights into the key role that Rodes’s men played in thwarting the destruction of Lee’s vital supply trains at Monterey Pass and Hagerstown, Maryland, following the battle and preventing the Federal Army of the Potomac from outflanking the Confederates during the final days of the retreat. Taken together, those sources serve as the crucial raw material for bringing some much-needed clarity to the mix of failures and successes that mark Rodes’s participation in the Gettysburg Campaign.
INTRODUCTION
“His Promotion Should Date from May 2”
B y May 1863, Robert E. Rodes had emerged as one of the rising stars in the Army of Northern Virginia. While in temporary command of a division, he spear-headed Lt. Gen. Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s famed flank attack in the woods at Chancellorsville late in the afternoon on May 2. Only impending darkness prevented his troops from completely sweeping the Federal forces f