Summary of John Winton's Ultra at Sea

Everest Media

Description

Please note: This is a companion version & not the original book.
Sample Book Insights:
#1 The problem of how to use Special Intelligence, which was code-named ULTRA, was especially acute at sea, where the Admiralty traditionally exercised only remote control and gave the local Commander-in-Chief all the forces and intelligence he needed. But ULTRA eventually gave the Admiralty an unprecedented overall view of the enemy’s naval operations and intentions.
#2 There were many forms of intelligence available to the Allies in World War II. The Sigint, or Signal Intelligence, Service was responsible for the interception and exploitation of all enemy radio transmissions, which might yield intelligence.
#3 The Admiralty took the strictest precautions to safeguard the ULTRA secret. It was revealed only to certain Flag and Senior Officers, and not more than three other selected members of the cypher staff. The names of these ULTRA-indoctrinated officers had to be communicated to NID.
#4 The British government knew that the German Navy, Army, and Air Force were all using cyphers based on the Enigma machine, which was an electro-mechanical wired encyphering machine with a series of drums or wheels. It was difficult to obtain the correct settings for the drums or wheels, so it was easy for the British to make mistakes when trying to account for Allied forces at the scene.

Sujets

• Histoire
• General officer
• General
• History

Informations

• Publié par: Everest Media LLC
• Date de parution: 20 août 2022
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9798350016024
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

Insights on John Winton's Ultra at Sea
Contents Insights from Chapter 1 Insights from Chapter 2 Insights from Chapter 3 Insights from Chapter 4 Insights from Chapter 5 Insights from Chapter 6 Insights from Chapter 7 Insights from Chapter 8 Insights from Chapter 9 Insights from Chapter 10 Insights from Chapter 11 Insights from Chapter 12 Insights from Chapter 13 Insights from Chapter 14 Insights from Chapter 15
Insights from Chapter 1

#1

The problem of how to use Special Intelligence, which was code-named ULTRA, was especially acute at sea, where the Admiralty traditionally exercised only remote control and gave the local Commander-in-Chief all the forces and intelligence he needed. But ULTRA eventually gave the Admiralty an unprecedented overall view of the enemy’s naval operations and intentions.

#2

There were many forms of intelligence available to the Allies in World War II. The Sigint, or Signal Intelligence, Service was responsible for the interception and exploitation of all enemy radio transmissions, which might yield intelligence.

#3

The Admiralty took the strictest precautions to safeguard the ULTRA secret. It was revealed only to certain Flag and Senior Officers, and not more than three other selected members of the cypher staff. The names of these ULTRA-indoctrinated officers had to be communicated to NID.

#4

The British government knew that the German Navy, Army, and Air Force were all using cyphers based on the Enigma machine, which was an electro-mechanical wired encyphering machine with a series of drums or wheels. It was difficult to obtain the correct settings for the drums or wheels, so it was easy for the British to make mistakes when trying to account for Allied forces at the scene.

#5

GC CS had broken into one German Air Force Enigma key in May, 1940, and continued to read it until the end of the war. This revealed that Admiral Hipper was to make a reconnaissance sortie into the Barents Sea in September, 1940.

#6

The German Navy Enigma was still inviolate, and there was no further Enigma information when Admiral Hipper sailed for two more sorties late in 1940 and early 1941. The balance of decrypting success lay with the Germans throughout the first eighteen months of the battle of the Atlantic.

#7

In August 1940, Hitler threw off all shackles from the U-boats, and declared a total blockade of the British Isles. The U-boats forsook their previous tactics of attacking at periscope depth by day, and instead attacked by night.
Insights from Chapter 2

#1

The Italian Navy was well-prepared for war, as their most secret high-grade cyphers and their general naval code book were both being read regularly at Bletchley Park.

#2

The British surface fleet began the war well, and events seemed to confirm the Italian Navy’s belief that their opponents’ intelligence was better than it actually was. However, the Italian fleet commander Admiral Riccardi planned to lure the British into a submarine and aircraft ambush close to the Italian coast.

#3

The British intelligence situation with regard to the Italian Navy deteriorated drastically in mid-1940, and never recovered. The Italians overhauled the high-grade cypher systems for all three armed services in July, and brought in new tables for their most secret naval cyphers in October.

#4

The Taranto raid, on the night of 11 November, was a dramatic victory for the British Navy. It dramatically changed the balance of capital ship power in the Mediterranean, and proved to be another shattering psychological blow for the Italian Navy.

#5

In November 1940, the 7th Cruiser Squadron sortied into the Adriatic and successfully intercepted one of the regular Italian convoys to Albania. They had already sunk four ships when a message was received that the Italian fleet was about to bombard Corfu. The cruisers thereupon broke off their attack and prepared for action with the Italian fleet.

#6

The transport of British troops in special convoys to the Piraeus began on 6 March 1941. The Italians began to pressure their German allies to take action against these convoys. The Italians planned a major offensive by a force of cruisers and a battleship covering them, which was to penetrate into the waters south of Crete and intercept the troop convoys.

#7

On the 26th, the Italians attempted to strike at British convoys in the Mediterranean. The British were forewarned by Ultra, and made preparations. The Italian Navy could no longer attack weakly escorted and surprised troop convoys, nor could they raid Suda Bay without British intervention.

#8

The British Admiralty had been studying the possible implications of the earlier signals from Rome, which indicated that the Italians intended only attacks by surface ships on the convoys. However, it was possible that military forces were also to be employed.

#9

Cunningham had a cover plan of his own to defeat enemy intelligence. He was a keen golfer, and often went ashore with his golf clubs and a large suitcase, apparently intending to spend the night ashore.

#10

The Italian fleet was at sea. The commander, Admiral Angelo Iachino, flew his flag in the new, fast and powerful battleship Vittorio Veneto.