Summary of Kenneth L. Privratsky s Logistics In The Falklands War
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41 pages
English

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Description

Please note: This is a companion version & not the original book.
Sample Book Insights:
#1 On 28 March 1982, an Argentine naval task force left its base at Puerto Belgrano, about 300 miles south of Buenos Aires, to take part in a joint exercise with Uruguay. The Argentines were not thinking of a joint exercise with Uruguay, but instead set on executing Operation Azul to retake the Falkland Islands.
#2 The Falklands are an archipelago in the South Atlantic, and they were invaded by Argentina in 1982. The residents were not pleased in the slightest, and they were proud of their surroundings and content with their lifestyle.
#3 The Falklands Islands have been disputed between Britain and Argentina for about 150 years. Britain discovered the islands in 1592, but the first recorded landing was not until 1690, by the British. The islands were named after the Treasurer of the Navy, Viscount Falkland.
#4 The British decision to reduce their commitments overseas was reflected in their reduced interest in the Falklands. The islands seemed to be an expensive obligation, and they were likely to be an opportunity for savings.

Sujets

Informations

Publié par
Date de parution 13 mars 2022
Nombre de lectures 0
EAN13 9781669353546
Langue English
Poids de l'ouvrage 1 Mo

Informations légales : prix de location à la page 0,0150€. Cette information est donnée uniquement à titre indicatif conformément à la législation en vigueur.

Extrait

Insights on Kenneth L. Privratsky's Logistics in the Falklands War
Contents Insights from Chapter 1 Insights from Chapter 2 Insights from Chapter 3 Insights from Chapter 4 Insights from Chapter 5 Insights from Chapter 6 Insights from Chapter 7 Insights from Chapter 8 Insights from Chapter 9 Insights from Chapter 10 Insights from Chapter 11 Insights from Chapter 12
Insights from Chapter 1



#1

On 28 March 1982, an Argentine naval task force left its base at Puerto Belgrano, about 300 miles south of Buenos Aires, to take part in a joint exercise with Uruguay. The Argentines were not thinking of a joint exercise with Uruguay, but instead set on executing Operation Azul to retake the Falkland Islands.

#2

The Falklands are an archipelago in the South Atlantic, and they were invaded by Argentina in 1982. The residents were not pleased in the slightest, and they were proud of their surroundings and content with their lifestyle.

#3

The Falklands Islands have been disputed between Britain and Argentina for about 150 years. Britain discovered the islands in 1592, but the first recorded landing was not until 1690, by the British. The islands were named after the Treasurer of the Navy, Viscount Falkland.

#4

The British decision to reduce their commitments overseas was reflected in their reduced interest in the Falklands. The islands seemed to be an expensive obligation, and they were likely to be an opportunity for savings.

#5

In 1981, the Argentine military Junta led by Galtieri declared that 1983 would be the year of the Malvinas, 150 years since the British had established their presence on East Falkland. The Junta probably was bolstered to some extent by the successful occupation by Argentine scientists of Thule in the British South Sandwich Islands in 1976.

#6

The catalyst that hardened the resolve of both the Argentines and the British was the island of South Georgia, 900 miles out in the Atlantic from East Falkland, a dependency of the Falklands. It was a rugged place, uninhabited except for its famous three-foot tall King Penguins.

#7

The incursion by the Argentine metal merchant Constantino Davidoff in 1981 changed everything. His party landed at Leith and proceeded to shoot local reindeer for their meals, which raised an Argentine flag.

#8

In March 1982, Britain was becoming increasingly worried about the situation in the South Atlantic. The Argentine task force was leaving Puerto Belgrano for the Falklands, and Thatcher decided to send three nuclear-powered submarines as a show of force.

#9

The British military men were proud, professional, confident, and highly trained. They were also cut off from their allies, which would make the task of regaining control of the islands extremely difficult.

#10

The story of Argentina’s military over the past few years provides a stark contrast to those of the British. Procurements had been large, and Argentine ships were still quite capable. However, they lacked the resources to sustain their forces in battle.

#11

The British military was prepared to defend the northern hemisphere, but not the southern. When it came to the Falklands in 1982, the British faced a situation that was at the other end of the spectrum from NATO preparedness. They had no contingency plan if Argentina invaded.

#12

The British had very little time to think about the consequences of an Argentine invasion. They had to commit a large sea-air-ground force, rapid deployment of both forces and equipment, and a supply chain that stretched across the Atlantic.

#13

Leach had been planning to send a task force to the Falklands since he had heard about the meeting in the House of Commons. He had not convinced his direct boss, though. Nott remained with Thatcher after the admiral’s departure, and he expressed his reluctance.

#14

The British had heard about the Argentine plan to invade the Falklands, and they were ready for them. The few dozen Royal Marines at Stanley had little chance of stopping the Argentines unless something catastrophic happened.

#15

The invasion was over quickly on the morning of 2 April, and the first landings were made by Argentine marines around two miles south of Stanley in the vicinity of Mullet Creek. They secured Government House, received Governor Rex Hunt’s surrender, and incarcerated the British garrison.

#16

The British were shocked by the Argentines’ invasion of the Falklands. The local radio station in Stanley was able to transmit some news as the invasion was underway, but they then lost communication once Argentine marines landed.

#17

The British had not taken on such challenges before. The clock was also ticking down from the forty-eight hours Leach had promised Thatcher. Fortunately, well before phone calls on 2 April alerting the task force commanders, wheels had started spinning at high levels to overcome some of the immense deployment challenges.
Insights from Chapter 2



#1

The British military had been anticipating the invasion, and had been planning for it since Thatcher made the decision to send a task force. They had already started moving pieces into place, such as the C-130 Hercules cargo planes that took off from Royal Air Force bases in the United Kingdom on 3 April and landed on the remote island of Ascension in the middle of the Atlantic.

#2

The British government and military were streamlining their activities to focus on the Falklands. They had an inner cabinet known as the Overseas and Defence (South Atlantic) Committee, which provided military advice to Prime Minister Thatcher.

#3

The Defence Situation Centre, which was the home of the Central Defence Staffs, was the focal point for actions to mount the military force out of Britain. The Centre’s normal tasks were to monitor relevant world events and to coordinate positions and provide advice to senior military leaders.

#4

The British were not in a good position in 1982 to project forces, but they could have been worse by far. The timing of the Argentine invasion actually worked to British advantage in some ways. The MoD’s review of military needs had produced some bitter pills for the Navy to swallow.

#5

The Naval Staff Advisory Group was convened on the day of the invasion to assess sealift capabilities, advise on options, and ultimately solve the ship shortage problem. They unarguably produced some of the most important discussions and decisions of the entire war.

#6

The British government used its prerogative to requisition ships from trade to help project and sustain the force in the Falklands.

#7

The Directorate of Naval Operations, supported by the Department of Maritime Services, worked with military departments and ship owners to address needs and challenges. The Directorate focused on ships to support the Royal Navy's feet.

#8

The criteria for selecting ships for trade was the specifc military requirement, but there were several other considerations as well. The need for extended range meant that merchant ships would have to be flled with fuel to provide range.

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