The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718
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In the late spring of 1718 near the village of Pozarevac (German Passarowitz) in northern Serbia, freshly conquered by Habsburg forces, three delegations representing the Holy Roman Emperor, Ottoman Sultan, and the Republic of Venice gathered to end the conflict that had begun three and a half years earlier. The fighting had spread throughout southeastern Europe, from Hungary to the southernmost tip of the Peloponnese. The peace redrew the map of the Balkans, extending the reach of Habsburg power, all but expelling Venice from the Greek mainland, and laying the foundations for Ottoman revitalization during the Tulip period. In this volume, twenty specialists analyze the military background to and political context of the peace congress and treaty. They assess the immediate significance of the Peace of Passarowitz and its longer term influence on the society, demography, culture, and economy of central Europe.



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Date de parution 12 août 2011
Nombre de lectures 0
EAN13 9781612491950
Langue English
Poids de l'ouvrage 1 Mo

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The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718
Central European Studies
Charles W. Ingrao, senior editor Gary B. Cohen, editor Franz Szabo, editor
The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718
Edited by Charles Ingrao, Nikola Samard i , and Jovan Pe alj
Purdue University Press West Lafayette, Indiana
Copyright 2011 by Purdue University. All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The peace of Passarowitz, 1718 / edited by Charles Ingrao, Nikola Samardzic, and Jovan Pesalj.
p. cm. -- (Central European studies)
This book developed from the proceedings of the First International Academic Conference The Peace of Passarowitz 1718 held on 14-15 November 2008, on the occasion of the 290th Anniversary, in Po arevac, Serbia --Pref.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-55753-594-8
1. Treaty of Passarowitz (1718)--Congresses. 2. Austro-Turkish War, 1716-1718--Peace--Congresses. 3. Austria--Foreign relations--Turkey--Congresses 4. Turkey--Foreign relations--Austria--Congresses. 5. Balkan Peninsula--History--18th century--Congresses. 6. Austria--History--1519-1740--Congresses. 7. Turkey--History--Ottoman Empire, 1288-1918--Congresses. 8. Venice (Italy)--History--18th century--Congresses. I. Ingrao, Charles W. II. Samard ic, Nikola. III. Pesalj, Jovan, 1976-
DB631718 .P37 2011
943.6 031--dc22
This book developed from the proceedings of the First International Academic Conference The Peace of Passarowitz 1718, held on 14-15 November 2008, held on the occasion of the 290th Anniversary, in Po arevac, Serbia.
Organization Board: Nikola Samard i (Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade), Milorad or evi (National Museum, Po arevac), Jelena Mrgi (Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade), Jovan Pe alj (Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade)
Program Board: Charles Ingrao (Purdue University, USA), Aleksandar Foti (Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade), Nikola Samard i (Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade)
Scientific Board: Karl Roider (Louisiana State University), Paula Sutter Fichtner (City University of New York), Derek McKay (emeritus, London School of Economics, UK), Drago Roksandi (Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb), Aleksandar Mirkovi (Arkansas Technical University)
Copyedited and proofread by Timothy Byford and Penelope Cray
Supported by:
The Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade
Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Science and Technological Development
(The Modernization of the Western Balkans project, no. 177009)
National Museum Po arevac
City of Po arevac
HesperiaEdu, Belgrade
Austrian Cultural Forum, Belgrade
List of Figures, Illustrations, and Maps
The Habsburg-Ottoman Wars and the Modern World Charles Ingrao
The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718: An Introduction Nikola Samard i
The Peace of Passarowitz in the Historical Sciences, 1718-1829 Martin Peters
The Impact of the Treaty of Passarowitz on the Habsburg Monarchy Harald Heppner and Daniela Schanes
The Peace of Passarowitz in Venice s Balkan Policy Egidio Ivetic
Twists and Turns in the Diplomatic Dialogue: the Politics of Peacemaking in the Early Eighteenth Century Rhoads Murphey
The Ottoman Wars and the Changing Balance of Power along the Danube in the Early Eighteenth Century G bor goston
The Influence of the Peace of Passarowitz on Bosnia Enes Pelidija
The Crimean Tatars and the Austro-Ottoman Wars Dan D. Y. Shapira
Making a Prosperous Peace: Habsburg Diplomacy and Economic Policy at Passarowitz Jovan Pe alj
Implementation of the Commercial Treaty of Passarowitz and the Austrian Merchants, 1720-1750 Numan Elibol and Abdullah Mesud K kkalay
The Navigation and Trade Agreement of 1718 and Ottoman Orthodox Merchants in Croatia and the Military Border Hrvoje Petri
The Habsburg-Ottoman War of 1716-1718 and Demographic Changes in War-Afflicted Territories Vojin S. Dabi
The Peace of Passarowitz and the Re-establishment of the Catholic Diocesan Administration in Belgrade and Smederevo Katarina Mitrovi
Tracking the Mapmaker: The Role of Marsigli s Itineraries and Surveys at Karlowitz and Passarowitz Jelena Mrgi
The Festival Book for the Exchange of Austrian and Turkish Deputations in 1719 Ana Milo evi
The Emergence of the Baroque in Belgrade Nikola Samard i
Patriotism and Propaganda: Habsburg Media Promotion of the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz Vladimir Simi
List of Contributors
This project really begins with local, EU, and Serbian government support for the 290th Anniversary Conference of the Peace of Passarowitz (1718). The city of Po arevac, together with the nearby Roman ruins of Viminacium and the surrounding region, constitutes a valuable historic site in its own right. Yet taking a retrospective look at the 1718 peace as its tercentenary approaches establishes why this city now deserves to host the commemoration of one of the turning points in early modern European history. The Passarowitz project also highlights the need to rethink not only this history, but also the looming centenaries of 1914 and 1918.
The international academic conference The Peace of Passarowitz 1718 represents the culmination of the work of the city s leading visionaries and institutions, as well as their appreciation of the future importance of a contemporary reanalysis of the historical spectacle commemorated here. Mr. Milorad or evi , director of the National Museum in Po arevac, initiated the project and provided the first crucial resources. It was his idea to hold this conference, and in it he invested his own vision, energy, and determination. These efforts position him ten years ahead of his time. The conference also received support from Po arevac City Hall. Both the Serbian Ministry of Science and Technology and the Faculty of Philosophy at Belgrade University furnished additional support. I also had the unique opportunity to bring on board my very dear friend and colleague Adele Mazzola, editor of the Southeastern Europe Review and publisher of the renowned Italian review of geopolitics, Limes Plus . I would be remiss not to mention the invaluable assistance offered by the Austrian Cultural Forum, for which I am truly grateful. My thanks also go to the Spanish and American embassies in Belgrade, both of which have supported me throughout my academic career. Always inspiring and reliable, my assistant and colleague Mr. Jovan Pe alj also played a crucial role. Everything else was smooth sailing.
The conference essentially covered the history of war and peace in Southeastern Europe between 1699 and 1739, when military events, diplomatic negotiations, and decisions made at Karlowitz (now Sremski Karlovci), Po arevac, and Belgrade helped shape modern international relations, international law, and international borders that replaced what were then only mythical frontiers. These developments also helped to bring new regions under the influence of modern Christian states and Baroque culture, albeit, in some cases, only temporarily. Although the conference focused chiefly on frontiers, treaties, and migration (a key factor in Serbian culture, collective identity, historical lexicography, and literature), it also touched on material and artistic culture, as well as the migration of styles, mentalities, knowledge, animals, plants, and diseases.
I also would like to take this opportunity to recall some of the fundamental events that led to the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718. The previous conference that resulted in the Peace of Karlowitz of 1699-also signed in present-day Serbia-was all but forgotten during the tragic events of 1999, as the country s social, economic, and political disintegration made any serious retrospection impossible. Yet the Karlowitz and Passarowitz peace treaties ended two devastating and pivotal wars that were confined exclusively neither to Southeastern Europe nor to relations between Austria, Venice, Rome, and the Ottoman Empire.
Finally, the American edition of this collection is the result of the considerable effort, knowledge, and interest that Charles Ingrao has invested in this conference. It is absolutely essential that readers from North America, Serbia and, above all, the former Yugoslavia become familiar with his endeavors to advance postconflict dialogue and cultural attitudes about the past-the immediate past especially. Purdue University Press has succeeded in wholly comprehending the full scope of his enterprise. Our thanks to Zrinka Bla evi . We also owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Karl Roider. A personal privilege of mine is my acquaintance with Paula Sutter Fichtner, and I am grateful for her contribution to this project.
-Nikola Samard i
List of Figures, Illustrations, and Maps
1. Effective and paper strength of the Habsburg military, 1683-1718
2. Paper strength of the Ottoman central and garrison troops, 1652-1731
3. Paper strength of the Janissaries, 1698-1717
4. Number of Janissaries in Constantinople (Istanbul) and in forts, 1654-1710
5. Number of Austrian merchants entering and exiting the Ottoman Empire, 1703-1750
6. Annual distribution of Austrian merchant ships, 1728-1734
7. Number of settlements and houses in the Banat districts, 1716-1720
8. Inhabited villages and deserted villages in the frontier districts of the Kingdom of Serbia, 1718
9. Number of settlements and houses in the Klju , Krajina, and Krivina districts in eastern Serbia, 1718-1736
10. Number of houses in the Pan evo District, 1717-1739
11. Number of frontiersmen in military service in frontier settlements of the Kingdom of Serbia, 1721-1728
12. Number of houses in the Bosnian Posavina, 1718-1725
13. Marsigli s itineraries prior to and during the War of the Holy League (1683-1699)
14 Introductory sheet with dedication, The Album of Conrad Weiss , published by Jeremias Wolff (Augsburg, 1720), engraving (Belgrade City Museum)
15. Central sheet with Count Oduyer and Abdullah Pasha waiting for the Imperial and Turkish representatives, The Album of Conrad Weiss , published by Jeremias Wolff (Augsburg, 1720), engraving (Belgrade City Museum)
16. Part of the Imperial Delegation with the Count s majordomo, his court marshal, cavalrymen, and Catholic clergy, The Album of Conrad Weiss , published by Jeremias Wolff (Augsburg, 1720), engraving (Belgrade City Museum)
17. Part of the Imperial Delegation with the Imperial Emissary Count Virmont and his servants and musicians, The Album of Conrad Weiss , published by Jeremias Wolff (Augsburg, 1720), engraving (Belgrade City Museum)
18. Part of the Imperial Delegation with carts loaded with presents and baggage, The Album of Conrad Weiss , published by Jeremias Wolff (Augsburg, 1720), engraving (Belgrade City Museum)
19. Part of the Turkish Delegation: Cavalrymen with flags, court officials, horses, and stable boys, The Album of Conrad Weiss , published by Jeremias Wolff (Augsburg, 1720), engraving (Belgrade City Museum)
20. Part of the Turkish Delegation: Turkish Emissary Ibrahim Pasha surrounded by court dignitaries and representatives of Islam, The Album of Conrad Weiss , published by Jeremias Wolff (Augsburg, 1720), engraving (Belgrade City Museum)
21. Part of the Turkish Delegation: horses and stable boys, loaded camels and mules, carts with baggage, The Album of Conrad Weiss , published by Jeremias Wolff (Augsburg, 1720), engraving (Belgrade City Museum)
22. Count Oduyer receives the Ottoman representative in his tent (left); return visit to Ibrahim Pasha (right), The Album of Conrad Weiss , published by Jeremias Wolff (Augsburg, 1720), engraving (Belgrade City Museum)
23. Ibrahim Pasha s visit to Count Oduyer (left); Imperial Emissary Count Virmont s visit to Abdullah Pasha (right), The Album of Conrad Weiss , published by Jeremias Wolff (Augsburg, 1720), engraving (Belgrade City Museum)
24. The Charles VI Gate, Lower City, Belgrade (1736)
25. Town House, 10 Gra ani ka Street, Belgrade (after 1724)
26. Town House, 10 Du anova Street, Belgrade (1724-1727)
27. Emblem on the Peace Treaty signed in Passarowitz in 1718, from Antal Vanossi, Poesis entheia (Vienna, 1719)
28. From Louis Jobert, Einleitung zur Medaillen oder M nzwissenschaft (Nuremberg, 1738)
29. From Louis Jobert, Einleitung zur Medaillen oder M nzwissenschaft (Nuremberg, 1738), the front page
30. Medal appropriated after the ratification of the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz, 1718 (National Museum in Belgrade)
31. Medal by G. W. Vestner, appropriated after the ratification of the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz, 1718 (National Museum in Belgrade)
32. Medal by P. H. M ller and G. W. Vestner, appropriated after the ratification of the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz, 1718 (National Museum in Belgrade)
33. Medal by B. Richter, appropriated after the ratification of the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz, 1718 (National Museum in Belgrade)
34. Medal by J. C. Hedlinger, appropriated after the ratification of the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz, 1718 (National Museum in Belgrade)
35. Medal by M. Brunner, appropriated after the ratification of the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz, 1718 (National Museum in Belgrade)
36. Medal by B. Richter and H. Fuchs, appropriated after the ratification of the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz, 1718 (National Museum in Po arevac, photo: M. Manojlovi )
1. The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718
2. Pan evo district with populated and depopulated areas
3. Marsigli s Itineraries in Southeastern Europe, 1683-1700
Note: PDF versions of these maps can be downloaded from the following web address for easier viewing:

Map 1. The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718
Charles Ingrao
The Peace of Passarowitz of 1718 has received scant attention over the past three centuries. Perhaps the main reason for this neglect lies with another event that took place precisely two centuries later. While we have gathered to commemorate the approaching tercentenary of the treaty between the Ottoman, Habsburg, and Venetian empires, scholars and pundits across Europe and North America will, in just a few years, more likely observe the end of the First World War in 1918 and, with it, the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy. Together with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the concurrent demise of tsarist Russia and the second German Reich , the partitioning of the Habsburg dominions in 1918 refashioned the multiethnic eastern half of Europe into a vast realm of nation-states. And it was that new reality, rather than the coincidental, bicentenary relationship between these two dates, that has relegated the Peace of Passarowitz to a back shelf, if not exactly the dustbin, of history. The new nation-states that emerged from the Great War immediately went about writing heroic national histories that emphasized both their suffering at the hands of their Habsburg, Ottoman, and tsarist oppressors and their achievements against them. Absent from these histories is any appreciation for the long period of mostly peaceful and mutually beneficial coexistence these disparate peoples had enjoyed. This essay constitutes a modest attempt to present a balanced international and multinational perspective on the treaty that was concluded in Po arevac (Passarowitz) while also identifying its actual and potential significance.
The frontiers negotiated in 1718 marked the farthest advance of Western European civilization into the Balkans before the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This is not to say that the Western values or institutions of that time were intrinsically superior to those pervading the Ottoman Balkans. Rather the intent here is to point out differences between the East and the West, without engaging in the kind of condescending Orientalism famously decried by the late Edward Said. However and wherever it was drawn, the Habsburg-Ottoman frontier juxtaposed two different models of state building. To observers from the eighteenth century and today, the Ottoman sultan ruled as an Asiatic despot with absolute unregulated power over his subjects; obedience was ensured through the typically fickle application of terror by the sultan and his officials. By contrast, the feudal regimes of Western Christendom were moderated by law and by a separation of powers whose limited checks and balances were the precursors of modern liberal democracies. Another less widely acknowledged difference was the Ottoman Empire s relative disinterest in its subjects religion, language, or form of local governance, that is, as long as they provided their quota of taxes and army recruits. Meanwhile, the mantra of one king, one god, one law obtained in the West, where progressive governmental centralization was gradually creating culturally and linguistically homogenous polities.
Although the Habsburg monarchy had much more in common with Western Christendom s other great powers, its exposed position in the heart of Europe obliged it to maintain some of the attributes of its Ottoman and other Eastern neighbors. Less centralized than France, Spain, or even England, the Habsburg monarchy permitted its disparate and sometimes noncontiguous dominions a substantial amount of autonomy. Although the Habsburgs were no less accepting of religious dissenters than their Western counterparts were, they were forced to tolerate Protestant and Orthodox Christians throughout most of their extensive Hungarian lands. Indeed, the monarchy was diverse not only religiously but also linguistically and, in this diversity, resembled its Ottoman adversary much more than it did the polities of Western Europe.
I propose that the Habsburg-Ottoman wars did not by themselves significantly change either empire s political, economic, or cultural structure. This was because neither empire was sufficiently threatened by the other. Habsburg forces rarely-and then only momentarily-marched beyond Ottoman frontier provinces. Although the Ottomans twice besieged Vienna, they never shook the confidence of the emperors ministers that any gains would be but temporary, both because of their access to support from allies and because of the logistical problems that constrained the sultan s forces. For over two centuries, the Ottoman war machine evolved little in terms of organization or tactics. Meanwhile, improvements in the Habsburg military were driven exclusively by the need to meet threats originating in the West, rather than in Constantinople. Although Leopold I (1657-1705) occasionally flirted with forms of confessional absolutism prevalent in the West, the monarchy survived and ultimately triumphed over the Ottomans by relying on the time-honored tradition of achieving consensus among both its own corporate estates and its prospective allies.
This persistence of these norms had two overriding effects on Habsburg policy in the aftermath of the Peace of Passarowitz. The first was the demographic revolution that took place across the Hungarian plain. The transfer of the Banat, Syrmia, and northern Serbia was attended by the emigration of over 100,000 Turks and other Muslims, further depopulating a region already wasted by war and disease. Left behind was a residual population of Hungarians, Serbs, and Romanians whose numbers swelled with the steady immigration of peoples south of the newly erected Habsburg-Ottoman frontier. Over the next century, these immigrants were joined by far greater influxes from the north and the west. Indeed, the ambitious and ultimately successful attempts to resettle Syrmia and the Banat (together with the previously conquered Baranya, Ba ka, Slavonia, and Transylvania) compounded the existing linguistic and confessional diversity of greater Hungary with Czech, German, Hungarian, Ruthene, Slovak, and even a smattering of Catalan and French immigrants. At the same time, the Habsburg regime ensured that its newly acquired territories would be more submissive than other parts of the kingdom represented in the Hungarian Diet by extending the length of the Military Border and placing most of the other remaining conquests under the direct control of the imperial treasury ( Hofkammer ) or war council ( Hofkriegsrat ). Nobody could have anticipated then the role this southern strategy would have in laying the groundwork for the administrative and cultural integrity of the region s non-Magyar populations. Hence, the resettlement and administrative restructuring of the kingdom s neo acquistica helped to incubate a diversity that would contribute to the kingdom s dissolution in 1918.
Notwithstanding the long-term consequences of southern Hungary s demographic and administrative reconstitution, the Peace of Passarowitz marks a missed opportunity of even greater significance. The fact remains that the Habsburg-Ottoman wars did not fundamentally alter the monarchy s overall political orientation, administrative structure, or strategic outlook. The policymakers in Vienna continued to focus their attention both on threats and on opportunities for territorial expansion in the West, particularly in Germany and Italy. This had been the case throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and remained so as late as 1682, the year before the celebrated siege of Vienna. The city s relief and the formation of the Holy League (1684) could have marked the beginning of a crusade to liberate the Balkans. Two decades later, Leopold s successor, Joseph I (1705-1711), spoke wistfully of doing just that once the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) had concluded. Although Joseph I did not survive the war, the Peace of Passarowitz positioned his successor, Charles VI (1711-1740), to acquire the Ottomans remaining Serb- and Romanian-inhabited territories. Habsburg war aims during the century s two remaining conflicts did, in fact, include the acquisition of Ni , Wallachia, and Moldavia. Nonetheless, the triumphant wars that ended in 1718 had conclusively reinforced Vienna s preexisting predilection for western expansion. Clearly, the Ottomans were no longer a mortal threat, or even a mortal enemy. The resounding triumph over the Turks also so strengthened the self-congratulatory rhetoric of the Habsburg High Baroque that nobody questioned the efficacy of a political system that relied on the close collaboration of the crown, aristocracy, and Counter-Reformation church. After all, the triad had succeeded; the adoption of existing and emerging western models of state building was simply unnecessary. 1
The monarchy s defeat in the Silesian Wars belatedly inspired far-reaching reforms that brought it into conformity with the innovative agendas of German cameralism and the Enlightenment. 2 Once again, the driving force behind this revolution from above was the Prussian threat from the West, not any residual fear of the Ottomans. Of course, if the Habsburg monarchy was now a first-class military power capable of defending itself against renewed Prussian aggression, it was also in a position to resume its earlier expansion into the Balkans, where the Ottomans waited until the Russian seizure of Crimea (1783) before embarking on a century of fitful reforms. Alas, the opportunity to exploit Ottoman weakness had passed. The ever-present Prussian threat, soon to be followed by the even more daunting challenge from revolutionary France, kept Vienna s foreign ministers and field marshals focused almost exclusively on the West. Moreover, the resilient culture of consensus among the monarchy s corporate institutions and ruling elites foreclosed any possibility of launching a war of aggression in the Balkans.
This longstanding cultural disinclination toward wars of conquest was abetted by the Enlightenment s acceptance of the non-Christian Turks. The change was evident in Maria Theresa s commissioning of Josef Starzer s ballet Le Turc g n reaux (1758), in which he sought to assure a Turkish embassy that the recently concluded Diplomatic Revolution (1756) was designed solely against Prussia, and not against their common French ally. The sympathetic portrait of the sultan in Mozart s Entf hrung aus dem Serail (1782) reinforced the trend toward relativizing the Turk, as did the enormous popularity of janissary music during the last three decades of the eighteenth century. 3
Much as the monarchy s political and cultural elite accepted their Ottoman neighbor, its policymakers were far from eager to acquire more of the sultan s Orthodox subjects. This diffidence dated at least as far back as the early eighteenth century. 4 Nowhere was this disinclination stronger than in the mind of Maria Theresa, who in 1772 at the height of a Russo-Turkish war forcefully argued against territorial expansion at the sultan s expense:
Of all the enterprises, the most hazardous and most dangerous will be the partition of the Ottoman Empire, whose consequences we have the most to fear. What can we gain from such conquests to the gates of Constantinople? Provinces unhealthy, depopulated, or inhabited by treacherous and ill-intentioned Greeks-they would not strengthen the Monarchy but weaken it. . . . Without a fatal combination of unfortunate circumstances, I will never prepare myself for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, and I hope that our descendants will never see it expelled from Europe. 5
Admittedly, the Austro-Russian alliance of 1781 briefly raised the prospect of Balkan expansion, although, once again, Emperor Joseph II (1765-1790) was much more interested in recruiting Catherine the Great as an ally against Prussia, while limiting her appetite for Ottoman territory. 6 When war did break out in 1787, it took only the threat of a Prussian Dolchstoss for the new Emperor Leopold II (1790-1792) to surrender his brother s conquests in an effort to preempt the impending Prussian invasion. Emperor Francis II/I (1792-1835) and Chancellor Clemens von Metternich followed the Theresian policy of maintaining the Ottoman Empire to the point of declining repeated invitations by Djordje Petrovi to absorb Serbia. The emperor even directed his commanders on the Austrian Military Border to forgo reprisals against Turkish incursions in order to preserve the fragile stability of his Ottoman neighbor, despite incessant cross-border raids launched from Ottoman Bosnia. Meanwhile, Francis actively worked to prevent both the publication of Serb propaganda against and Serb immigration from the Ottoman Empire! 7 Instead Vienna continued the futile policy of eschewing expansion while simultaneously seeking to prevent Russia from filling the power vacuum in the Balkans.
We can only hypothesize about the future the Balkans might have experienced had the monarchy s leaders expanded to the south and the east. It seems likely that incorporation would have led to modest infrastructural and economic advantages for the new acquisitions. However, by bringing together most if not all of the Serbs and Romanians under a single enlarged empire, Vienna would have preempted the formation of the magnet states centered in Belgrade and Bucharest that would ultimately undermine the monarchy s territorial integrity. This fatal neglect reaffirms the Prussian dictum that states that cease to expand must contract. The resulting triumph of the nation-state at the end of World War I had been unknowingly abetted by the dynasty s eclectic colonization program and by its consciously decentralist southern strategy. Hence, the reason so many people remember 1918 and so few celebrate the unfulfilled promise of 1718.
1 R. J. W. Evans, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1550-1700 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 419.
2 See, for example, P. G. M. Dickson, Finance and Government under Maria Theresia, 1740-1780 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); Franz Szabo, Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism, 1753-1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); C. A. Macartney, Maria Theresa and the House of Austria (Mystic, CT: L. Verry, 1969).
3 Paula S. Fichtner, Terror and Toleration: The Habsburg Empire Confronts Islam, 1526-1850 (London: Reaktion, 2008), 96.
4 Ivan Parvev, Habsburgs and Ottomans: Between Vienna and Belgrade, 1683-1739 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1995), 175.
5 Karl A. Roider, Jr., Reform and Diplomacy in the Eighteenth-Century Habsburg Monarchy, in State Society in Early Modern Austria , ed. Charles Ingrao (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University, 1994), 321.
6 Karl A. Roider, Jr., Austria s Eastern Question, 1700-1790 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982). Indeed, Vienna s fear of Russian expansion is already evident under Joseph I, following Peter the Great s victory over the Swedes at Poltava (1709), while its disinclination to join Russia in a war of conquest against the Ottomans surfaced repeatedly under Charles VI, both in 1722 and 1733. Charles Ingrao, In Quest and Crisis: Emperor Joseph I and the Habsburg Monarchy (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1979), 266; Parvev, Between Vienna and Belgrade , 168-69, 181, 195, 203.
7 Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522-1747 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960), 102-07, 128-31, 136-37; Charles Ingrao, The Revolutionary Origins of Europe s Twentieth-Century Holocausts, Proceedings of the 25th Consortium on Revolutionary Europe (1997) (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1997), 29.
Nikola Samard i
Southeastern Europe was gradually moving closer to the modern European world. Prior to the eighteenth century, the Ottoman conquests had largely prevented it from sharing in the great achievements of European culture. Seemingly condemned to a permanent state of relative decline, Southeastern Europe also remained unaffected by political innovations that were rapidly accelerating the pace of the modernization in the West. Had its medieval and Ottoman inheritance limited its inner human and social potential, or was there still room for further development? Did its troubles conceal a Balkan historical curse that prevented it from reintegrating with the great systems to which it had once belonged? Had the accident of its existing political borders condemned the Balkans to remain on Europe s periphery? Did these borders themselves constitute confirmation of the curse of the Limes myth?
In the generation following the great siege of Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Empire lost most of the conquests it had made in the previous 150 years. The peace treaty concluded at Karlowitz in 1699 marked a turning point in the Ottoman Empire s relations with the Christian world. This turning point came during the very period in international relations that witnessed the establishment of clearly defined borders. The most reliable borders were natural frontiers, such as the new line Habsburg-Ottoman border that was pushed southward to the great Mure , Tisza, Sava, and Danube Rivers of the Pannonian plain. The Treaty of Karlowitz had revealed the Habsburg monarchy to be a force equal almost to France. 1
Yet these borders were neither absolute nor impenetrable. Hungary remained ardently dissatisfied with Habsburg centralization and the proselytism of Rome. The Hungarian rebels maintained their bond with Turkey and France. In the meantime, developments in the statebuilding process had reduced the Holy Roman Empire to a mere chimera that was now overshadowed by the newly invigorated Austrian Habsburg monarchy. Its emperor and his advisors were aware of all of the opportunities that were opening up before them. And by 1718 they had made the most of these opportunities with a series of triumphs in wars against the Turks and the French. Austria s great eighteenth century was already well under way, despite the lingering tensions with Hungary and the increasingly complex kaleidoscope of internal contradictions that demanded the kind of careful and well-thought-out answers that were in keeping with the spirit of the eighteenth century.
With the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, Austria achieved a new identity that transcended its German patrimony. The Holy Roman Empire had recovered from the chaos, confessional fratricide, and depopulation of the Thirty Years War. The attacks of Louis XIV, including his armies systematic devastation of the Rhineland, had promoted a new German unity against Louis XIV symbolized by the formation of the League of Augsburg. German identity and Baroque culture spread to Southeastern Europe, Hungary, and Poland, and even launched a modest Baroque revival in Italy. Yet the Ottomans did not accept their losses, and hostility continued to smolder in their relations with Austria, fuelled by Hungarian discontent.
The seventeenth century concluded successfully for Vienna, enabling it to devote its foreign policy to the question of the Spanish succession and to expanding into Italy. Its new priorities were the confirmation of its new foreign relations and cultural identity. The Spanish question had been opened by the death of Charles II, the last Spanish Habsburg, in 1700. The War of the Spanish Succession had involved the whole of Western Europe. The Swedish king Charles XII opened another front in the Great Northern War (1700-1721) against a coalition of Russia, Denmark, and Poland. It seems almost as if the first decades of the new century belonged more to the previous era of constant crisis and turmoil. War was being waged almost everywhere. The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 did no more than herald future settlements. Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI continued hostilities against France for a few more months until Prince Eugene of Savoy signed the Treaty of Rastatt in 1714 in his name. Milan, Naples, and Sardinia were used to compensate Charles VI for not being recognized as king of Spain. With the Barrier Treaty concluded with Holland in Antwerp in 1715, Austria also retained most of the Spanish Netherlands. For the time being, only Austria and Spain remained at war.
Instead of Spain s Iberian and overseas possessions, Charles VI inherited the continental leftovers from previous conflicts. He also had to face all the limitations of his own position. First of all, he was entangled by the Pragmatic Sanction. The Treaty of Szatm r in 1711, which followed shortly after the death of Joseph I, left Hungary disturbed. Nonetheless, the agreement ended the uprising of Ferenc II R k czi (1703-1711), which followed almost two centuries of Hungarian unrest and struggle in the almost wicked triangle between Turkey, Austria, and France. 2 It was now up to Charles VI to recognize and honor the agreement. This meant seriously reassessing the constitutional crisis. Failing to resolve the Hungarian question would have seriously disturbed the monarchy s stability, especially if the Ottoman Empire and France became involved. Meanwhile, the increasing demographic, constitutional, and military significance of Croats and Serb settlers raised issues of justice and freedom, with repercussions that could not have been easily foreseen. It was amid these heightened tensions that the Diet at Pozsony (Bratislava) brought together Charles VI and the Hungarian nobility. The Magyar nation had agreed to recognize him as King Charles III with the understanding that he would respect Hungary s laws and autonomy. The Hungarian court chancellery in Vienna kept Hungarian finances independent of the Hofkammer in Vienna. The agreement implied that the previous forms of Hungarian feudal society would be left intact, with the peasants still firmly attached to the feudal lords. The Hungarian nobility won relief from direct taxation by accepting their obligation to house what they regarded as a foreign German army on their soil. Hungary s loss of feudal autonomy was thus compensated for by the advancement of their economic interests. Meanwhile, the religious question was left for future consideration.
The Habsburg monarchy s constitutive problems were underscored by the opening of the question of the Austrian succession. After patiently studying the mood of the estates, the still childless Charles VI announced in 1713 that his possessions would pass intact by the principle of primogeniture to his legal male heirs or, in their absence, to his legitimate daughters. This meant the termination of Joseph I s line of inheritance. The final solution was left for future consideration.
Despite a succession of peace congresses, declarations, and treatises aimed at stimulating international law, war was still very much a reality. The theaters simply moved south and east from France and Spain. Admittedly the recovery of most of Hungary in the so-called Vienna War (1683-1699) had removed the Balkans as a high priority since descending farther into the peninsula was hardly an attractive proposition. Instead, the impending extinction of the dynasty s Spanish line had once again elevated Italy s value almost to the level of Renaissance times. Whether it was a bastion of stability or the symbol-and sometimes the battleground-of major upheavals, Italy remained the champion of unequalled culture in the Baroque era and a symbol of an earthly paradise, with its unsur-passed beauty and pleasures, not to mention all its other whims and attractions. The Peace of Utrecht brought an end to Spanish rule over Naples and Milan and introduced Austrian Habsburg control, which lasted until 1738. Yet Italy was dragged into a new southeastern conflict when Turkey declared war on Venice in 1714 and soon took over many of Venice s possessions on Crete and the Peloponnese (Morea). Having lost the Peloponnese during the Morean War (1684-1699), the Turks now held a commanding advantage. 3 Charles VI s answer was to renew his alliance with Venice and demand Ottoman withdrawal, a demarche that the Porte refused. 4
The cast of characters in conflict was even broader. During the second war with Turkey, which began in 1711, Russia invited the Montenegrin and Herzegovinian tribes under Metropolitan Danilo I to move against local Turkish strongholds. When the uprising failed, the Turks launched two punitive expeditions, in 1712 and 1714. 5 After the Venetians refused to surrender refugees who had fled to Boka Kotorska, the Porte declared war on 10 December 1714. Meanwhile, Danilo visited the Russian court and was granted minimal financial support. Yet Montenegro s real enemies were despair and anarchy. The period of general confusion following the War of the Holy League fostered a Serbian cultural malaise that manifested as a resistance to modernization. These prejudices were rooted in Russian myth and in the authoritarian, despotic persona of Tsar Peter the Great, but uninformed by the tsar s celebrated advocacy of western culture, institutions, and technology. Such prejudices had already taken hold of the values and outlook of the post-Byzantine commonwealth. Interpretation of the past, including events that had been completely fabricated-such as the istraga poturica (the persecution of converts to Islam in Montenegro) or the much earlier Serbian character of the army that had fought the Turks in Kosovo in 1389-became as important as the true course of events and their place in history. 6
Southeastern Europe s long seventeenth century extended from the beginning of the Austro-Ottoman Long War (1593-1606) to the Peace of Passarowitz in 1718. This period was clearly defined by stagnating living conditions, wars, unstable frontiers, and large movements of the civilian population that sometimes temporarily depopulated entire areas. 7 The long seventeenth century in Europe continued with the War of the Spanish Succession, which constituted one more chapter in the Age of Louis XIV. The war was concluded by eleven separate treaties signed in 1713 and 1714. These agreements influenced international relations considerably over the next thirty years. However, Austria and Spain remained in a state of war. Philip V accepted the Spanish crown and control over the Spanish Americas, on condition that he found a new, Spanish branch of Bourbons. As compensation, Charles VI received the Spanish Netherlands and possessions in Italy. The Hanoverian dynasty was recognized on the throne of Great Britain, which retained Gibraltar and Minorca and strengthened its influence in the Mediterranean. In the shadow of almost continual warfare, these changes effectively reorganized the political and strategic structure of Europe, and the death of Louis XIV in 1715 heralded a new era of international relations.

Meanwhile, Ottoman ambitions were revived after the empire s victory over Russia in an important battle near the Pruth River in 1711. Sultan Ahmed III decided to break the Treaty of Karlowitz and declared war on the Venetians. By attacking the Peloponnese he hoped to compensate for the losses sustained in the previous war, while taking advantage of Austria s engagement in the War of the Spanish Succession. The attack had been expected. It had been preceded by Turkish action against Maltese pirates, followed in 1710 by peace between the Porte and Russia. Venice tried to keep Turkey at war with Russia and then to direct the sultan against Austria. The new war between Turkey and Russia, lasting from late 1711 to June 1713, however, only delayed the conflict with Venice. The Porte made no attempt to conceal its preparations for attacking the Peloponnese; its speedy and relentless stifling of the uprising in Montenegro showed that the Porte also intended to send forces into Dalmatia. The Porte also rejected Vienna s repeated attempts at diplomatic intervention, reminding him of the good will it had shown by remaining at peace throughout the War of the Spanish Succession and the R k czi uprising. Nor had any of the terms and annexes of the Treaty of Karlowitz of 1699 mentioned the alliance between Austria and Venice. Hence the sultan did not prepare for war with Austria and did all he could to avoid it-at least until Venice had been defeated-so that he could then redirect his attention to Hungary. 8
The sultan s decision to attack Venice was based on the accusation that Venice had broken a series of peace terms from 1699, assisted both the Montenegrin rebels and Maltese pirates, and tolerated plundering raids in the Adriatic hinterland. Success against Venice depended, among other things, on keeping peace with Austria, and then with Poland and Russia. The new Belgrade seraskier, Numan-pasha K pr ly, was supposed to keep careful watch over the situation on the border with Austria. At the beginning of 1715, the Porte directly contacted Vienna with a communiqu announcing the start of a war with Venice and stating the need to maintain peace between them. Nonetheless, the conventional wisdom in Vienna was that the war with Venice would necessarily be followed by renewed conflict between the Ottoman and Habsburg empires.
The Turks commenced hostilities by occupying the islands of Tinos and Aegina, after which they crossed the isthmus and took Corinth. The Venetian admiral Daniele Dolfin thought it better to save his fleet than to risk it for the Morea. In the meantime, Nauplia, Modon, Corone, and Malvasia all fell. Within a few months the Turks had conquered all of the Peloponnese, except for a few coastal garrisons. Even the island of Kitera fell after having been under Venetian rule since the fourteenth century. Lefkas in the Ionian Sea and the bases of Spinalonga and Suda on Crete were abandoned. Only when the Turks landed on Corfu did the Venetian defenders manage to rebuff them. Subsequent Venetian naval operations in the Aegean and the Dardanelles in 1717-18 meet with no success, despite their Habsburg ally s dramatic victories elsewhere.
Vienna lent only limited support to the beleaguered Venetians, partly because of its own reserved position during the War of the Spanish Succession and R k czi s uprising. Charles VI concentrated instead on securing his new Italian possessions in Naples and Sicily, without putting any extra strain on his forces in the Mediterranean. Prince Eugene, chief Habsburg military commander and president of the Hofkriegsrat , favored a new war with Turkey, arguing that the seizure of Temesv r and Belgrade would further protect Hungary. Yet his awareness of the monarchy s parlous finances inclined him to buy precious time by maintaining peaceful relations with the Porte.
By summer 1715 it had become only too clear that the war in the Peloponnese would move to Dalmatia, where the Turkish forces would be in a better position to resume the struggle for Hungary. Fortunately, the death of Louis XIV (15 September 1715) created circumstances under which Austria could move more freely. France was hardly in a position to support either the Ottomans or Spain. Vienna itself was without powerful allies, aside from the hapless Venetians and the modest contingents usually provided by the German principalities. Prince Eugene was opposed to recruiting the tsar, who could only offer minimal military assistance.
Once again Eugene became a key figure in plotting the monarchy s grand strategy, as he had been during the War of the Spanish Succession. By now he had become a reflection of the age to which he belonged. Baroque taste, manners, and mentality were gradually retreating before an age characterized by a greater sense of organization and rationalism. Policy making was increasingly being made by cabinet absolutism. Charles VI himself thought that the new Turkish war would give his Hofkriegsrat president Prince Eugene and Hofkammer president Count Starhemberg more authority than they had ever had, given its bearing on foreign policy and administrative reform. 9
Austria sought assurance from Venice that it would allow Austrian troops free passage and join their operations on land and at sea in the event of an attack by Spain on Austria s possessions in Italy. The alliance was signed in Vienna on 13 April 1716. By joining forces with Venice, Vienna expected to fortify its gains from the previous Turkish war. Prince Eugene of Savoy gave an ultimatum to Turkey to cease hostilities and to refund Venice for the losses it had sustained. Turkey refused and requested that Austria remain neutral.
While part of the Ottoman army attacked Corfu and another part remained in Dalmatia, the sultan s son-in-law, Grand Vizier Damad Ali Pasha, set off with the main body toward Petrovaradin. It was there on the banks of the Danube that he and his 120,000 men encountered Prince Eugene. Although his own force was significantly smaller, Eugene attacked on the morning of 5 August, killing the grand vizier and 30,000 Ottoman soldiers.
This defeat instigated unrest in Istanbul. The sultan withdrew his forces from Corfu, expecting that the Austrians would attack Belgrade next. Instead, Eugene marched on Temesv r, which surrendered in mid-October. By November the Austrians had taken Pan evo and Nova Palanka, thereby completing the conquest of the Banat of Temesv r. They continued into Wallachia, capturing T rgovi te and taking prisoner Wallachia s Prince Nikolas Mavrocordato, the former lead interpreter of the Ottoman Porte. His brother John surrendered all of Wallachia west of the Olt (Oltenia) in February 1717. Combat continued along the front between Belgrade and abac as well as in Syrmia and northern Bosnia, but Austrian attacks on Biha , Novi, and Gradi ka were unsuccessful. The assault on Belgrade would have to wait until the following year.
Austria prepared for the attack on the city by bringing in new forces from Bavaria and Saxony. Eugene crossed the Danube downstream at Vi njica, thus avoiding the Turkish border troops. He laid siege to Belgrade before the end of June, only to be surrounded in turn by Ottoman forces brought in by Grand Vizier Halil Pasha. It is estimated that the grand vizier brought as many as 150,000 soldiers, while the Belgrade garrison commanded by Mustafa Pasha numbered no more than 30,000 men. At one stage it seemed as though Eugene s cause was lost. To save the situation, he launched a surprise attack on 16 August 1717, defeating the grand vizier s army and forcing the Turkish garrison to surrender two days later. Belgrade s garrison withdrew along with the entire Muslim population, who were able to take with them only their basic personal possessions. 10 The Austrians followed up by occupying northern Serbia as far as Ni (Nissa), while the Turks abandoned the south bank of the Sava and Danube as far as Or ova. It was at this point that the emperor was obliged to turn his attention to the Spanish descent on Habsburg Italy, which had begun with an attack on Sardinia on 20 August 1717. This threat to his Italian patrimony obliged Charles VI to conclude the war with Turkey and sue for peace. 11

Following the dramatic losses of Belgrade and northern Serbia, the Porte asked Britain and the Netherlands to mediate a peace. The British delegate, Sir Edward Wortley Montagu, traveled from London via Vienna to begin the negotiations and was eventually joined by the Netherlands diplomat, Count Colyer. By then, however, the sultan had changed his mind. The French ambassador, the Marquis de Bonnac, announced a continuation of the war with the emperor, thanks in part to the signing of a separate peace agreement with Venice and to lobbying by Hungarian rebel exiles. Spain then added to the drama by invading Sicily. Charles VI rejected the suggestions that Montagu had placed before the Porte, resulting in Montagu s recall.
The emperor s actions reflected the pervasive influence of Prince Eugene, who had heretofore relied on Anglo-Dutch mediation, but now wanted to buy time. The official Ottoman proposal that negotiations begin with the principle of uti possidetis revealed that the Porte had abandoned hope of returning to the Karlowitz frontiers, but intended to retain its recent conquest of the Peloponnese. Turkey suggested that the negotiations should take place in Passarowitz, a small town in Serbia, near the point where the Morava flows into the Danube. Prince Eugene rejected a truce, but agreed to mediation, and set conditions that implied he would accept the principle of uti possidetis if Venice were included in the negotiations. Eugene protested when the grand vizier replied at the end of January without alluding to these conditions. Nonetheless, by March an agreement had been reached to commence negotiations in Passarowitz. The new grand vizier, Ibrahim Pasha, led the Porte s peace faction and the negotiations were speeded up. The plenipotentiaries met in Passarowitz in May, the emperor being represented by Count Virmont and Michael von Talman, Venice by Ruzzini (who had also negotiated at Karlowitz), and the sultan by Ibrahim Agha and Mehmed Effendi, with the British and the Dutch ambassadors to the Porte, Robert Sutton, and Count Colyer, acting as intermediaries.
The Austrian side did not accept the grand vizier s authorization, and the peace conference did not begin until a letter arrived from the sultan on 5 June, consenting to Venice joining the negotiations. Eight conferences were held, eventually resulting in the declaration of a truce and the acceptance of uti possidetis, which suited the Ottomans as far as the Peloponnese were concerned, the occupation of which ensured additional security for the capital, Constantinople. Of course, they also had to accept the Austrian conquests. When the emperor laid claim to the whole of Serbia and some fortresses in Bosnia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, the Ottoman side insisted on the consistent application of the territorial principles that had been agreed to in advance. It also rejected Austria s request that the sultan hand over R k czi and the other leaders of the Hungarian revolt. Eugene was obliged to yield to the Ottoman demarche , and Austro-Turkish negotiations lasted until the end of the second week of July. Then all that remained was the dispute over the Peloponnese. The emperor s team refused to allow separate negotiations with the Venetians, who were still left with no alternative but to accept uti possidetis.
The peace treaties were signed in Passarowitz on 21 July 1721. The text of the treaty between the emperor and the sultan contained 20 paragraphs. According to the uti possidetis principle, the Habsburg monarchy gained the Banat with Temesv r, the southern part of Syrmia, northern Serbia including Belgrade, the area from the Drina River as far as the confluence of the Timok and Danube Rivers, a tiny belt of Bosnia along the Sava River, 12 and the region west of the Olt (Oltenia) known as Little Wallachia. The peace treaty provided for the formation of border commissions that, over the ensuing two months, would determine the new frontiers. Remaining areas of dispute were left to the experts. 13
The treaty relied heavily on the earlier document signed in Karlowitz in 1699, prohibiting border violations or intrusions from either side, denying asylum for criminals and rebels (except for R k czi and the other Hungarian rebels, so long as they were not found near the border), and providing for the release of prisoners of war and the ransoming of private prisoners. It also set forth the formalities for the treaty s ratification, the exchange of special embassies, and the rights and privileges of the ambassadors. The final paragraph stipulated that the treaty would be valid for 24 lunar years, after which it could be extended by mutual agreement, while also providing for an exchange of copies of the text in Turkish and Latin. The treaty also applied to the Crimean Tatars.
Venice and the Ottoman Empire signed a separate treaty whose timeframe was unlimited. Venice was to take control in Dalmatia and at a few coastal points in Albania and on the coast of the Ionian Sea, but there was no mention of the loss of the Peloponnese, which was understood on the basis of uti possidetis; the Peloponnese would remain in Turkish hands. The requirement that Venice withdraw from the immediate environs of the Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) reflected the spirit of the Treaty of Karlowitz. Provision was made for a cessation of hostilities, a general pardon for citizens on both sides, and an exchange of prisoners of war. The borders were precise and inviolable. Considerable space was devoted to religious questions, as well as to trade in the form of immunity from taxation, navigation rights, the jurisdiction of courts and the law in general, and the position of diplomats and merchants. Although Venice lost Morea and Crete, it retained the Ionian Islands, the cities of Preveza and Arta, and Dalmatia. In Montenegro, Venice enlarged its territory between Kotor and Katunska nahiya to include Grbalj, Pobori, Maine, and Braji i. Danilo I was ensured a peaceful period over the next ten years. However, Venetian gains in Albania, Boka Kotorska, and Dalmatia could not compensate for its many losses from the previous Morean war, and the Venetian Levantine Empire became a thing of the past, while the Republic shrank from an independent maritime and economic power to an insignificant Austrian client state. Venice had underestimated Ottoman power, but more importantly had further alienated the Morea s Orthodox Greeks by imposing a defensive system that had become too costly for both the Republic and the local inhabitants. By contrast, the Turks offered temporary exemptions from taxes and other dues. Hence, Venetian rule was not remembered for its tolerance and generosity. Meanwhile, Dubrovnik preserved its security, being surrounded by the territory of Bosnia s pashalik, as provided by the earlier agreement of 1699. 14 Thus ended the last war ever fought between the Ottoman Empire and Venice. 15
For the first time in the history of Austro-Turkish relations there was an exchange of ambassadors. Turkey gradually accepted the principle of bilateralism and mutual interests. The Turkish embassy was run by Ibrahim Pasha, whom the grand vizier had sent with great pomp and ceremony. The Austrian embassy was entrusted to Count Virmont, whose brief was to negotiate with the Porte how precisely to implement the treaty, given the reality of everyday affairs. Of particular importance to Vienna was the treaty s fifteenth paragraph, which promised protection to R k czi and the other Hungarian rebels. On completion of the negotiations at the beginning of 1720, the Porte promised that R k czi would be interned on the European side of the Sea of Marmara, while the rebels were placed in different counties and provinces. Virmont returned to Vienna in May 1720. 16

While Eugene was fighting the Turks in the East, unresolved issues following the Treaties of Utrecht and Rastatt led to hostilities in the West between the emperor and Philip V of Spain. Charles VI had refused to recognize Philip as king of Spain, while Philip himself refused to renounce his own claims to Naples, Milan, and the Netherlands, which the peace treaties had transferred to the house of Austria. Philip V was encouraged by his influential wife, Elisabeth Farnese, daughter of the duke of Parma, who personally held dynastic claims to the duchies of Tuscany and Parma in the name of her son, Don Carlos. Representatives from a newly formed Anglo-French alliance were determined to enforce a general European peace for their own dynastic security. Yet, when both parties were called on to affirm each other s sovereignty, Philip remained intractable. On 22 August 1717, Spain s chief minister, Cardinal Alberoni, organized the invasion of Habsburg Sardinia in what seemed to herald the beginning of the reconquest of Spain s former Italian empire.
Determined to prevent an escalation of the conflict, Prince Eugene returned to Vienna following his victory at Belgrade, but before the conclusion of peace in the East, complaining that two wars cannot be waged with one army. He reluctantly released some troops from the Balkans in order to continue the Italian campaign. In June 1718, Philip V, rejecting all diplomatic overtures, unleashed another assault, this time on Savoyard Sicily, as a preliminary to attacking the Italian mainland. Charles VI realized that only the British fleet could prevent further Spanish landings and that pro-Spanish groups in France might push the regent, Philip of Orl ans, into war against him. For this reason, on 2 August 1718 Charles VI signed an agreement with Britain and France, endorsing the British proposal that he renounce his claims to the Spanish throne should Philip V renounce his earlier Spanish possessions in Italy. Savoy was to give him Sicily and receive Sardinia in exchange, and Charles VI was to confirm the house of Savoy s rights to the Spanish throne if the Bourbon line failed to survive. It was only the Peace of Passarowitz that enabled Charles VI to concentrate on resisting Spanish attempts in Italy.
Yet Philip V and Elizabeth Farnese remained resolute. Although Prince Eugene could have gone south after the signing of the Peace of Passarowitz, thus bringing an end to the Turkish war, he chose instead to manage both theaters from Vienna. The Austrian military effort in Sicily proved elusive, and only after the French army s advance into the Basque provinces of northern Spain in April 1719 and the British navy s attacks on the Spanish fleet and shipping did Philip V and Elizabeth Farnese acquiesce by dismissing Alberoni and joining the Quadruple Alliance (25 January 1720). The Spanish attacks had placed considerable strain on the imperial government, raising tensions between the emperor, his Spanish Council, and Prince Eugene. Charles VI insisted on fulfilling his personal ambitions in the Mediterranean, and it was clear to him that Prince Eugene had not only put the preservation of his Balkan conquests before everything else, but had been responsible for the military setbacks in Sicily. Consequently the Prince s influence over Charles VI declined considerably.

Events that had depended on a single paragraph in the articles of the Treaty of Passarowitz of 1718 heralded significant changes in international relations, particularly in the formation of borders and the everyday life along them. The tectonic shocks that had shaken Southeastern Europe from the inside over the previous four decades gave rise to new forms of identity and to the existence of ethnic collectivity. On a broader scale, new powers such as Prussia, Russia, and Sardinia-Piedmont had appeared on the scene. Russia s presence was already having a noticeable effect on the political mindset and culture in central and Southeastern Europe, even before it had attained tangible form. Despite the Habsburg monarchy s penetration into northern Serbia, the Balkans remained on the periphery of Europe. The monarchy s top priority remained securing a central position in international relations and matching France in every field-in politics, warfare, and culture.
At the same time, the monarchy s rise was not the only development that contributed to the historical tapestry. The French and the British had overtaken the Dutch as the leading trading powers, while both the Anglo-French rivalry and the decline of imperial Spain had shifted traditional struggles to the Atlantic, the Americas, and the Pacific. This in turn led to the further marginalization of the Mediterranean and the Balkans, even though it was along this periphery that important changes were taking place. The Passarowitz trade agreement stimulated a significant increase in commercial exchange, opening new opportunities for both the Habsburg monarchy and Ottoman Empire.
International relations, as defined in such agreements as those signed in Karlowitz, Passarowitz, and Belgrade, formed the political and legal basis for the consolidation of foreign policy among European states. The Peace of Passarowitz released a tremendous amount of energy and resources that had been tied up in the conflict. The settlements at Karlowitz, Utrecht, Rastatt, Baden, and Passarowitz enabled Charles VI to establish both his effective personal rule and the new identity of the Austrian state. Gains such as Belgrade along with northern Serbia, the Banat along with Temesv r, and Little Wallachia brought significant territorial increases. State building and prosperity were generally evident throughout Europe, especially after 1720. Cities were growing in importance, as was an urban middle class. The expansion of overseas trade and economic growth increased the number of independent and wealthy entrepreneurs. These peace agreements clearly reflected the role of modern governments, bringing about a clear definition of foreign affairs, diplomacy, and the regulation of frontiers, trade, and the economy. Both war and peace were becoming more formal and conventional, leaving behind the previous postulates of righteousness and moral or religious purpose. Wars were starting to focus on specific territories, their eventual exchange, and the rectification of frontiers. The total and devastating character of warfare had begun to retreat before the regulations and restrictions of international law, which had originated in a series of peace agreements and contracts; armies were now counted among the unproductive elements of society-although the military zone that Vienna created along either side of the Ottoman frontier represented a very special society of its own.
The Treaty of Passarowitz confirmed the new reality of international relations that the sultan had accepted at Karlowitz. By agreeing on neutral mediation during the negotiations, for the first time in its history Turkey was actually admitting defeat by the Christian coalition. At both Karlowitz and Passarowitz, the Ottomans were forced to agree on common frontier missions, the aim of which was to decide on the demarcation and revision of territories. The peace treaties were actualized at every level of state administration, especially given that the frontiers were to be defined by common commissions from both sides rather than by natural obstacles. This was the first time in history that the Ottoman Empire had been defined by internationally and legally recognized frontiers. The peace negotiations held on an equal and bilateral basis with the Ottomans from 1697 to 1699 were an important precedent in the history of international relations and law. This precedent was confirmed in 1718.
For the Ottomans, facing this new reality in international relations forced a kind of ideological self-questioning. Demarcations with neighboring Christian states involved at least two principles in international law, which up to now had been unacceptable to the Ottomans, namely, the recognition of political frontiers and the respecting of foreign states sovereignty. However, the acceptance of these principles also revealed the Ottoman Empire s overall inability to control and organize the frontiers in question. On top of this, acceptance of the concept of political frontiers and the principles of territorial integrity implied that whether the Ottoman dynasty survived into the future was superfluous. Ottoman leadership in the Islamic world was primarily based on its historic military capabilities against the Christians. From its very beginnings, the Ottoman dynasty had accepted as official ideology the expansion of the Moslem kingdom (dar l-Islam). Constant expansion extended the Ottomans territories and forced them to confront different cultures. Their frontiers were plunging deep into hostile and alien areas, leaving behind newly conquered regions and communities, which necessarily became subject to Islamic and Ottoman assimilation. By 1683, Ottoman expansion had reached its peak, strategically, logistically, and economically. Its European frontiers had become too distant from the metropolis, the usual starting point in any campaign. It was an inviolable rule for Ottoman armies to do what they had always done and then return to the capital for the winter. The ideological concept of the empire did not allow for social and economic reform that might precipitate changes in the principles and practice of warfare. In the meantime, the new modern Christian states were in a position to organize serious resistance and effective coalitions as the Ottomans approached.
The acceptance of international law as a matter of reality, although not as an established system, had immediate political consequences for the Ottoman Empire. The Porte was obliged to abandon unilateralism in diplomacy and negotiations and accept multilateral conditions, including, after a defeat, a position of weakness. This new reality in its relations with modern Christian states required adapting to significant changes in foreign affairs. Diplomacy was suddenly forced upon it as an alternative to war and unilateralism after 350 years of the Ottoman Empire s presence on European soil. The recognition of significant territorial losses in 1699 and again in 1718 led to a fall in religious enthusiasm, including efforts to convert Christian subjects to Islam. Deprived of what was, in a religious context, its subjugating and revolutionary energy, the Ottoman Empire maintained its largely Islamic character as more of a burden and source of inequality in terms of its relations with Christian states. Christian European states had already made considerable progress in their reforms and conversions, thanks to a series of modern revolutions in which both their religious and secular character had adapted to the new reality, even when their institutions and societies had resisted these reforms. Ottoman Islam did not survive its reformation or rationalization-or even its counter-reformation. The European Christian side saw an era of enlightenment during which the experiences of modern revolutions were evaluated and applied to institutions and to the very depths of society. The Ottoman Empire succeeded in maintaining close and intensive diplomatic relations with France, but it was not in a position, outside of the field of court life or progress in the techniques of war, to apply modern French historical experience. In the context of the general changes that were taking place in Europe, the multicultural character of the Turkish court and government was losing its importance. This loss was becoming an increasingly obvious factor, together with the world of reality, corruption, and general falling behind. The only advantage it had gained was the role its Christian subjects played in negotiations, and sometimes in the diplomatic corps. This way the Porte found itself in a position to concentrate more and more on its own diplomacy, including its analysis of European international relations.
It turned out, in this same general state of affairs, that the Ottoman renewal, which was taking place alongside that of Europe, was only temporary, and for this reason did not have the revolutionary character that formed the basis of European modernity. During the War of the Spanish Succession, notably in the Black Sea area, the Turks recovered Azov in 1711, and in the Mediterranean they conquered Morea and the island of Aegina in 1716. They also stabilized their Russian frontiers and extended their territories in the Caucasus. However, the Ottomans were halted by Safavid attacks that caused panic in Istanbul, forcing them to turn their attention away from Russia. In addition, Ahmed III, who surrounded himself with excessive pomp and luxury, had become increasingly unpopular. A mutinous riot by a number of janissary officers on 20 September 1730, subsequently backed by both civilians and the military, led to an insurrection that forced the sultan to surrender the throne to his nephew Mahmud I, who would reign from 1730 to 1754.
Any long-term progress was restricted to those areas in which there had been essential reform. One such area was economic reform, which benefited from being situated outside of religious ideology. Ahmed III improved the financial situation without falling back on excessive taxation or extortion. He was a cultivated patron of art and literature, and it was during his reign that the first printing press authorized to use the Arabic or Turkish language was set up in Istanbul. His reign also saw the initiation of a Greek, or Hellenic, renaissance, based in the Danubian Principalities. Previously, the Porte had appointed Hospodars, usually native Moldavian and Wallachian Boyars, to administer these provinces. After the Moldovian Prince Dimitrie Cantemir s alliance with Peter the Great in 1711, however, the Porte began overtly to deputize Phanariote Greeks; he extended the system to Wallachia after discovering that Prince Stefan Cantacuzino had established links with Eugene of Savoy. The Phanariotes also served the Porte as functionaries in many important state departments.
The peace treaties drawn up in Karlowitz, Passarowitz, and then in Belgrade confirmed the continuation of a new, polycentric reality in international relations. In this new reality, there were no longer any definitive, long-term victors, least of all in the field of warfare and diplomacy, but neither were there any losers. The southeast and the Mediterranean maintained their internal positions, including their own forces, which had an impact on European relations as a whole, and in spite of their peripheral character, these positions were not permanently overshadowed by these relations. During the wars that filled the first two decades of the eighteenth century, the weary forces of Turkey and Spain were engaged in formidable military, diplomatic, and economic activities. A century after a series of gloomy and pessimistic debates over its future and economy, Spain still managed to survive and became increasingly linked with its American empire, from which it drew new energy. The Ottoman Empire, long in decline, nevertheless succeeded in rising from time to time and maintained its position in the scheme of international relations, in spite of its complexity, so that over the following two centuries, there were always a few European powers who felt it was in their interest for Turkey to remain on the side of Europe. Shortly after the settlements of 1713 and 1714, Turkey, in 1714 and 1717, and Spain, in 1718 and 1725, once again began to threaten European peace. In this context, Britain, France, and Austria emerged as forces positioned to prevent larger-scale hostilities, and, as a result, wars became restricted and were local or regional in nature. This was why Charles VI agreed to cede parts of Italy to Spain, to Elisabeth Farnese personally. Fine-tuning in international relations was also made possible by the decline of Russia after 1725, in the decade following Peter the Great, and the emergence of Prussia as a military power.
The Peace of Passarowitz was of special importance to Austria s place in international relations, as well as to the future of the Habsburg family. New forces such as Prussia and, in the forthcoming era, Russia were clearly interested in the possible disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy. Charles VI had no male heir and his empire was culturally diverse. Hungarian revolts, internal dissatisfactions, and potential separatism had influenced European international relations over the previous 200 years. Faced with both internal problems and, in the field of foreign affairs, challenges from Turkey and Prussia, Charles VI was obliged to initiate reforms in administration, trade, and the economy, as well as make investments in infrastructure and the general reconstruction of the state. After the long, exhausting War of the Holy League (1683-1699) and concurrent Nine Years War against France (1688-1697), not to mention the almost endless Hungarian revolt that had consumed the reign of Joseph I (1705-1711), reforms became possible only after Charles VI s return from Spain in 1712, when he was able to establish his authority in Hungary. The new Turkish war, which started as early as 1716, not only committed the Habsburg forces to the campaign, but also meant that their international relations, especially with France and Spain, became overbearing and complex. It was not until the Peace of Passarowitz in 1718 that Charles VI was able to strengthen his influence through such convincing territorial gains as the Banat, Belgrade, and northern Serbia. A separate trade and navigation contract signed on 27 July 1718 granted freedom of commerce on Ottoman territory to all subjects of the Holy Roman Empire, regardless of nationality and religion. Only the trading of arms and gunpowder was excluded. The Danube was declared free for navigation, and Turkish traders were granted reciprocal rights in Austria. Persian traders were also allowed transit trade along the Danube through Turkish territory. By 1720 the prolonged hostilities over the Spanish succession had ended. The conclusion of the disorder in Hungary and the Turkish war promised a revival of economy and trade in Southeastern Europe, just as the trade agreement with the Turks had favored Austrian commerce in the Balkans. The 1718 trade contract provided Austria with the same rights and privileges that had been obtained, from the sixteenth century, by France, Britain, and the Netherlands. By 2 June 1717, Charles VI had already succeeded in forcing Venice to surrender its traditional exclusive monopolies, and freedom of navigation in the Adriatic was declared. In 1719 the new Vienna Eastern Company was founded, and Trieste and Fiume were given the status of open, free ports. The Semmering pass from Vienna to the Adriatic, and the later Via Carolina through Croatia, gave Hungary access to Fiume (Rijeka). Such far-reaching decisions and provisions as these were to color the international scene into the distant future.
For Venice, the treaties of 1718 confirmed its already long-term stagnation that had, among other things, led to the loss of the Peloponnese, an important possession in the Mediterranean. This stagnation had led Venice to withdraw from active Italian politics in the second half of the seventeenth century. Even so, the advance of the French and British fleets into the Mediterranean enabled Venice to intensify its navigation and trade during the eighteenth century. Its demography remained stable, and no decline in its cultural activities was recorded during the eighteenth century. In spite of Venice s defeat, from 1718 to 1797 peace was maintained in the Adriatic Sea, which suited Venice s needs. Later, it chose to remain neutral in the wars that involved Italy. The experience Venice gained from the war of 1714-1718, during which it lost its bases in Montenegro and on the Peloponnese, had also been extremely valuable. 17
The 1718 trade agreement between Austria and Turkey also laid the foundation for a prosperity that included minority communities on both sides. The Ottoman Greeks and Jews took particular advantage of the export activity that was dedicated mostly to the Hungarian market. The Greeks displayed exceptional skills that had originated in their experiences with the Ottoman administration and in trading situations that were free of outside control. On the other hand, the Austrians were finding it difficult to adapt to the Levantine mentality, habits, and temperament, including contacts with Ottoman officials.

Interstate documents are not always capable of reproducing the complexity of the time to which they refer. Peace treaties came into being as part of the development of foreign relations. Early modern states found themselves in various processes of maturing, bureaucratizing, centralizing, and delving into the depths of society, all of which involved signing, organizing, taxing, mobilizing, and advancing their society s educative and working potential. Charles VI worked at this for decades, during which time Austria, a peripheral, hereditary Habsburg domain, built the bureaucratic and intellectual structure of a new modern empire, albeit an overexpanded one that was falling apart-particularly from the inside-and incoherent in every respect. Venice, meanwhile, had become more like a system of functions than a territorial nation-state. Its insignificant inland territories, islands, and navigation routes were almost exclusively subordinated and adapted to these functions. With all its specificities, the Ottoman Empire was the best organized, but it nevertheless did not succeed in adapting to the changing circumstances of European relations that had been building since the mid-seventeenth century. All this might have had some importance, given that at the beginning of the eighteenth century states were still illusions, faraway ideals whose everyday happenings habitually avoided drawing the attention of the government or court.
The organization of frontiers was among the first mechanisms of social and economic management and control. Frontiers guaranteed and defined territories, protected dynasties and the privileged classes, and determined rights of movement and trade. While, over time, states formed as communities gathered around dynasties that put increasing effort into creating internal cohesion and unity in cultural identity, interstate treaties attracted more and more attention and without doubt became more significant. In the long run, treaties and the territories determined by them became the framework of new collective identities. Perhaps it was the importance that historical study had accorded treaties and frontiers in the past that actually created the new meanings these categories acquired over time. However, it is not easy to apply the categories created in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to an earlier period. The Peace of Passarowitz was drawn up when these categories were just starting to take shape, which is why the challenges created by a deep study of the history surrounding the treaty are so special.
War and peace are matters that have been primarily dealt with in the history of diplomacy and international relations. However, this approach allows certain details that should not be ignored to fall too easily outside the researcher s range. It is only the first round of questions that are being asked here, but such research, on the very surface, draws attention to the fact that the process of archiving, translating, memorizing, and interpreting peace negotiations, treaties, and the documentation that accompanies such processes has been masked by the veil of forgetfulness, the realities of the period in question, the language, manners, culture, and so on. The questions traditional history deals with sometimes require further attention, perhaps because, decades earlier, they had been derisively rejected.
The Ottoman Empire s peace treaties of 1699, 1718, and 1739 have gradually exposed western media, diplomats, observers, and sometimes archeologists and adventurers, to the until now under-appreciated reality from the other side of the Limes. The Ottoman Empire became part of the European system at the initial appearance of that system. Some primary economic liberalization understood by the economic segment of the treaty of 1718 actually had the effect of creating an unknown society. This society, on either side of the new border, in time became more mobile and open. More than anything else, what is all too clear is the course of history that led from the process of negotiating, defining, and putting into effect the peace treaty, to the establishment of the new borders and the first incentives for economic exchange, to the outbreak of the Serbian revolution in 1804, the first movement in modern history to take place in an independent, autonomous nation-state. In this context, the fact that the decrees from 1718 lasted no longer than twenty years is of little importance.
The Peace of Passarowitz provided a long-term respite from the Hungarian question and opened up streams of traffic, commerce, and cultural encounter that stretched from the other side of the Limes, a frontier separating distant and relentless worlds. There is a certain significance-and meaning-to Austria s provisional success in breaching these frontiers and removing an archetype and in ending-indeed, exploding-a thousand-year-old myth. There were also very obvious stimuli for this. Austria had definitely grown, removing itself from the context of the constitutive, ambiguous, and out-dated Romano-Germanic Empire and becoming a modern and rational state. With the added security of Hungary, Austria could devote itself to its internal organization, which, including the constitutional process that continued until 1867, was a peaceful and successful undertaking. Right up to the collapse in 1918, Austria gave particular importance to sorting out its relations with Turkey and France, each of which, in its own way, stimulated Hungarian dissatisfaction.
Does the era of the Europeanization of Balkan politics and culture actually start with the Peace of Passarowitz? If so, what is the scale of this process and what limits does it set? Was this process actually mutual and, if so, to what degree was European culture Balkanized? One thing is certain-the Europeanization of the Balkans is still underway in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Any trace of the construction of a new Baroque Belgrade, whose intensity and optimism lasted not even two decades, is now only symbolic. The modernization of Serbian politics and culture took place, at least until the beginning of the twentieth century, in the context of Austrian influence. At the same time, hostility, as far as Austria was concerned, became one of the codes of Serbian politics. In any case, relations, in the sphere of Austrian politics, that constitute Serbian political, cultural, and, what is more, regional identity are very complex and most likely require more thorough research.
Did the peaceful eighteenth century begin with the Peace of Passarowitz? This peace certainly did not translate into the total absence of war. Rather, appeasement was evident in the organization of everyday life, in the maturing of states and their bureaucracy, and in the, albeit illusionary, absence of serious controversy. Of those who signed the treaty, Venice best understood the character of the time, as it had the time before that. Its noninvolvement in the Turkish wars has sometimes been interpreted hastily as decadence. Its retreat from the heroic age of the previous two centuries of maritime and economic expansion, wars, and European diplomacy, points to its entrance into a peaceful age, through which it realized the new importance and role of Italy itself. Venice certainly carried its enormous knowledge, experience, and wealth into the new age. It perhaps no longer engaged in any spectacular architectural endeavors, but it maintained its continuity of development, made considerable investments in the city s conservation (e.g., repaving the Piazza San Marco), and witnessed the construction of several new palaces (e.g., Palazzo Grassi, Ca Rezzonico).
Austria proved itself especially capable of making the most of its great eighteenth century. It had no intention of entering into any wars, which contributed to its alliance with Venice. The gains concluded in 1699 enabled Austria to integrate with Hungary. With the rearranging of the borders and its new internal structure, which enabled it to reach a long-term solution to the Hungarian question, Austria became a European power. Its new position in international relations meant that Austria had to maintain certain commitments, such as solidarity with Venice, which determined its path to prestige. Thereby, relations between Austria and Venice actually became more complex. It was the Peace of Passarowitz that enabled Austria to open the ports of Trieste and Rijeka, which, in turn, compromised Venice s traditional superiority in the Adriatic. 18
The Ottoman Empire gradually became the object of international relations and only occasionally managed to take the initiative. The increasing interest shown by Austria, and then Russia, led to the opening of the so-called Eastern Question. It was the start of a period of great national migration. The great Serbian migration from Turkey to Austria in 1690 was significant because of the privileged position and the national and ecclesiastical autonomy granted to the new settlers. Austria s conquest of Belgrade and the moving of the borders south of the Sava and Danube Rivers and, in the long-term, the liberalization of movement and trade united the Christian peoples with their neighbors on the European side. Austria s military frontiers widened, from the Generalates of Karlovac and Vara din over a wide belt to Transylvania. In time, the Military Frontier became a social community that stood out because of its organization within the bounds of Habsburg and Ottoman feudalism. Vienna s centralism and the example of the Military Frontier became the basic framework for the reorganization of Hungary and, above all, of its feudal structure. 19
After 1718, Austria attempted to organize its long-term penetration into the Balkans using peaceful means. The new Military Frontier society and the privileges Austria was granted after 1690-namely, the revival, with the Peace of Passarowitz in 1718, of its borders -were the main events that set in motion the migration of Serbs and other Balkan peoples. The influence of these events, on the Austrian side, in the wars that, after the battle for Vienna in 1683, continued throughout the eighteenth century became one of the important determinants of such migration, which had an exceptionally complex political, economic, demographic, and cultural character. The relative liberalization of border trade and the provision of free movement for Habsburg subjects on the Turkish side contributed to the breakthrough of new economic and political ideas, which, in the nineteenth century, sparked off a series of national revolutions. The treaty of 1718 also provided for the opening of a network of Austrian consulates in the Balkan part of the Ottoman Empire, and a regular postal service between Vienna and Constantinople was established. The landscape was transformed; forests and marshland disappeared and soon there was lasting evidence of this new and well-consceived enterprise.

During the second occupation of Belgrade that, after a short period between 1688 and 1690, lasted up to 1739, the new and important Austrian stronghold was significantly fortified and embellished, and its ethnic and religious structure changed, largely because of the German and Serbian settlers. The Austrian Kingdom of Serbia was organized militarily, but from 1720 a civil administration was imposed, under Field Marshal Alexander von W rttemberg. The Banat was divided into twelve districts, Serbia into fifteen, and there were seven more districts in Serbia under the Temesv r administration.
The forthcoming period of peace, stability, and economic development required new human resources. Vienna was facing the effects of the enormous human losses it suffered during the wars between 1683 and 1718, which, together with the losses it suffered during the Hungarian revolts and from the plague, was estimated at more than a half million. Huge parts of Hungary were almost deserted, even though from 1690 considerable Serbian migration had repopulated southern Hungary and Buda and new settlers had been attracted and provided with a special, privileged status. After 1718, the military authorities of the Banat and the Military Frontier invited more Serbians to settle there. The Hungarian population was also reinforced with Germans from Austria and southern Germany, better known as Swabians, who were especially favored by the central Vienna authorities. The Banat had been settled, over the previous century, by seventeen different nationalities, including Catalans, French, Slovaks, Romanians, and Russian Cossacks, with Germans constituting the largest element. Under 45,000 in 1720, fifty years later the population had reached over 700,000. Although Hungary had remained depopulated until the end of Charles VI s reign, and long afterward, repopulation or the redistribution of population during the first half of the eighteenth century provided Hungary with forces for recovery. 20
Among the political consequences of this migration was the clash between the cultures of these new settlers and the existing attitudes of Hungarians and Serbians, leading to mutual dissatisfaction. The Hungarian Diet tried in vain to place the Serbs under direct control. The Serbs did not succeed in their desire to be settled in a single area, under their own leaders, both temporal and ecclesiastical, who would be directly subordinate to the emperor. They remained dispersed along the frontier, under Austrian military commanders. The only influential institution remained the Church and the only personality its head, the Patriarch, who, in 1731, extended his authority over Belgrade and Austrian northern Serbia.
Reform and modernization, however, remained overshadowed by foreign policy. Austria was also still paying the huge economic price of frequent warfare, although, after 1683, conflicts were kept well away from central Habsburg territories. The Peace of Passarowitz enabled Charles VI to renew his efforts to secure the crown and imperial succession for his daughter. Although no woman could inherit the Holy Roman Empire, Charles VI still held the power to determine his successor in Austria and Bohemia. The end of the Hungarian revolt and success in the Turkish war enabled him to convince the Hungarian Diet to surrender the right to elect a new ruler should the Habsburg male line die out, while at the same time announcing his readiness to elect the Austrian archduchess as queen. The price in foreign policy was relatively high, as Charles VI was forced to gain recognition from most of the European powers. The dynastic gain in the War of the Polish Succession in 1733 was secured by ceding Naples and Sicily to Spain, while Charles VI gained Parma and Piacenza and future control over Tuscany.
Prince Eugene s death on 1 April 1736 left Austria without a single talented commander, and a new crisis was approaching. Russia attacked the Crimean Tatars and provoked war with Turkey, calling on Austria for assistance based on the Treaty of 1726. Charles VI was willing to negotiate with Turkey instead, but the Congress of Nimirov in August 1737 did not bring any agreement, despite English and Dutch mediation. While Charles VI was demanding only minor frontier rectifications in Moldavia and Serbia, Russian expectations were too high, and Turkey broke off the negotiations. Austria tried to grasp the initiative by taking Ni , while the congress was still deliberating. However, the Turks drove back General Seckendorf, and even concluded an alliance with the late Ferenc II R k czi s son, J zsef, who led a force of Hungarian exiles against Vidin. Although R k czi was soon taken by plague, the Austrian commander Field Marshal Count Oliver Wallis was defeated during a decisive battle at Grocka, near Belgrade. As Wallis ended the war trapped in Belgrade, Vienna abolished his peacemaking powers and chose Count Reinhard William Neipperg as plenipotentiary. The Belgrade peace contract that was concluded on 1 September 1739 established a firm and long-term frontier between the Habsburg monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless the agreement was not so much the result of military or diplomatic necessity as of Wallis and Neipperg s cavalier decision making and the lack of precise and proper communication between them. Ironically, Austria had accepted the new Turkish war simply to retain the Russian alliance, which mainly concerned its interests in the West. Even during the final Turkish war of 1787-1791, the preservation of the Russian alliance remained Austria s priority.
With the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739, the Habsburgs ceded northern Serbia and Belgrade to the Ottomans, and Oltenia, which had been gained by the Peace of Passarowitz in 1718, to Wallachia, the Ottoman vassal; the demarcation line was set along the Sava and Danube Rivers. The Habsburg withdrawal forced Russia to accept peace at the Treaty of Nissa (Ni ), whereby it was allowed to build a port at Azov, thus gaining a foothold on the Black Sea. The next year Charles VI died and with the accession of his daughter, Maria Theresa, the War of the Austrian Succession began.
The Treaty of Belgrade, concluded in 1739, ended the earlier period of Austrian expansion that had started after 1683 and had been affirmed in Karlowitz in 1699 and in Passarowitz in 1718. Over a period spanning more than fifty years, the Austrians had gained supremacy both on the battlefield and in diplomatic peace negotiations. The Ottoman Empire had been pushed back deep into the Balkans, with a stable frontier established along natural obstacles such as the Danube and Sava Rivers. However, priorities in foreign policy related to the Habsburg inheritance, Italy, or European relations restricted Austrian penetration. After 1737, Austria did not advance into the Balkans until the 1878 occupation and the 1908 annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the Belgrade peace agreement was concluded in curious, almost chaotic, circumstances, the settlement turned out to be firm and lasting.
The historical evidence surrounding the Peace of Passarowitz of 1718 both reveals its complex structure and poses new questions, to be answered with a new, painstaking method of investigation. The past that the official documents bear witness to is provocative, in the sense that it draws attention away from the depths of history, as well as from the history it is directly concerned with. Moreover, the precise facts have not always managed to prevent the breakthrough of an artificial meta-history, a later construction that could not have been recognized in the past. This meta-history actually relies on the lasting existence of that specific, very basically conceived positivism that in time became the source of ideology, manipulation, and mythologization. In Balkan history, myths interpret the meaning and, in a specific sense, the quality of real, tangible history. In myths people are born, they live, and they die. It turns out that myths are more powerful than both rational European culture and collectivist eastern hedonism. They are the myths of a deserted, suffocating, depressing, pessimistic buffer zone that, in the context of the history that is being considered in these pages, found itself operating on the frontiers of two civilizations as the periphery of peripheries and, to protect itself from these civilizations basic values, developed defence mechanisms that negated their basic values for generations. Above all, these mechanisms include a very specific interpretation of rationalism and enlightenment, processes that form the very essence of the early modern age. Over the years, myths have been fortified by mistaken interpretation, caricatured facts, or their unconscious embracement. Myths are also based on the building up of a conviction that there are absolute borders between states, nations, religions, and civilizations. It is the adopted, imported, and adapted Limes myth, which originated in a western civilization established in the Roman Empire, about a predetermined, fateful border between two basically different orders and views of the world.
Did the Peace of Passarowitz of 1718, as an agreement, as an acceptance of a new reality, even temporarily explode that myth? Did Austria, by withdawing its frontiers from the other side of the Limes, simply secure its frontiers on the Limes itself, strengthening its interests in central Europe and Italy and its place in the overall relations of the European powers? Does the building of a Baroque Belgrade, on the Balkan, predestined, cursed side of the Limes, prefigure an eventual breakthrough?
This paper presents the results of the scientific project The Modernization of the Western Balkans (Modernizacija zapadnog Balkana, 177009) financed by the Serbian Ministry of Science and Technological Development.
1 For general surveys, see John P. Spielman, Leopold I of Austria (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1977); Robert A. Kann, Geschichte des Habsburgerreiches, 1526-1918 (Vienna: B hlau, 1977); Charles W. Ingrao, Quest and Crisis: Emperor Joseph I and the Habsburg Monarchy (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1979); Robert J. W. Evans, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1550-1700: An Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); Jean B renger, Histoire de l empire des Habsbourg, 1273-1918 (Paris: Fayard, 1990); Erich Z llner, Geschichte sterreichs (Vienna: Verlag f r Geschichte und Politik, 1990); Bernd Rill, Karl VI: Habsburg als barocke Gro macht (Graz: Styria, 1992); Charles W. Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1618-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 2nd ed.); Karl Vocelka, Geschichte sterreichs: Kultur, Gesellschaft, Politik (Graz: Styria, 2000); Vocelka, Geschichte sterreichs, 1699-1815: Glanz und Untergang der h fischen Welt (Vienna: Ueberreuter, 2001); Henry Bogdan, Histoire des Habsbourg: Des origines nos jours (Paris: H. Champion, 2002); Jean B renger, L opold Ier (1640-1705): Fondateur de la puissance autrichienne (Paris: PUF, 2004); Robert J. W. Evans, Austria, Hungary and the Habsburgs: Essays on Central Europe, c. 1683-1867 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
2 For the Hungarians relations with the Habsburgs and France, see B la K peczi, Etude d histoire des relations diplomatiques et d histoire des ide s (Budapest: Akad miai Kiado, 1971); K peczi, La France et la Hongrie au d but du XVIIIe si cle: L Autobiographie d un prince rebelled; Confession et memoires de Fran ois II R k czi; Choix des textes, pr face et commentaires par B la K peczi (Budapest, 1977); Theodor Mayer, Verwaltungsreform in Ungarn nach der T rkenzeit (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1980); Geschichte Ungarns , ed. Istv n Gy rgy T th (Budapest: Corvina, 2005).
3 On the First Morean war (i.e., War of the Holy League, 1684-1699), see T. E. Mommsen, The Venetians in Athens and the Destruction of the Parthenon in 1687, American Journal of Archaeology 45, no. 4 (October-December, 1941): 544-56; Gligor Stanojevi , Dalmacija u doba morejskog rata 1684-1699 [Dalmatia during the Morean War 1684-1699] (Belgrade: Vojno delo, 1962); Ekkehard Eickhoff, Venedig, Wien und die Osmanen: Umbruch in Sudosteuropa 1645-1700 (Munich: Callwey, 1970); Gligor Stanojevi , Jugoslovenske zemlje u mleta ko-turskim ratovima XVI-XVIII vijeka [Yugoslav lands during the Venetian-Turkish wars from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries] (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1970); P. Topping, Venice s Last Imperial Venture, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 120 (15 June 1976): 159-65; D. Caccamo, Venezia e la Lega santa: Disimpegno in Italia ed espansione in Levante (1682-1686), Atti e memorie della Societ dalmata di storia patria 12 (1978): 119-23; Marko Ja ov, Le guerre veneto-turche del XVII secolo in Dalmazia (Venice: Societ dalmata di Storia patria, 1990); P. Preto, Venezia e la guerra di Morea: Guerra, politica e cultura alla fine del 600 , ed. Mario Infelise and Anastasia Stouraiti (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2005); Egidio Ivetic, Cattolici e ortodossi nell Adriatico orientale veneto, 1699-1797, in Geografie confessionali: Cattolici e ortodossi nel crepuscolo della Repubblica di Venezia (1718-1797) , ed. Giuseppe Gullino and Egidio Ivetic (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2009), 85-119.
4 For Austrian diplomacy, see Heinz Duchhardt, The Missing Balance, Journal of the History of International Law 2 (2000): 67-72; Duchhardt, Europa als Begr ndungs- und Legitimationsformel in v lkerrechtlichen Vertr gen der Fr hen Neuzeit in Faszinierende Fr hneuzeit, Reich, Frieden, Kultur und Kommunikation, 1500-1800 . Festschrift f r Johannes Burkhardt zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Wolfgang E. J. Weber and Regina Dauser (Berlin, 2008), 51-60; Duchhardt, Europa als Begr ndungsformel in den Friedensvertr gen des 18. Jahrhunderts: Von der tranquillit zur libert in Instrumente des Friedens: Vielfalt und Formen von Friedensvertr gen im vormodernen Europa , ed. Heinz Duchhardt and Martin Peters (Mainz, 2008-06-25) (Ver ffentlichungen des Instituts f r Europ ische Geschichte Mainz, Beiheft online 3), Abschnitt 5-11, , urn:nbn:de:0159-2008062408 .
5 Enes Pelidija, Pohodi bosanskih pa a na Crnu Goru od 1706. do 1714. godine [The Bosnian pashas campaigns in Montenegro, 1706-1714], Prilozi Instituta za istoriju 17 (Sarajevo 1980): 124-25.
6 D. Caccamo, Venezia, Pietro il Grande e i Balcani, in Studi balcanici , ed. Francesco Guida and Luisa Valmarin (Rome: Quaderni di Clio, 1989) 61-80; Nikola Samard i , Ruski mit u srpskoj istoriji [Russian myth in Serbian history] Limes plus 1 (2005): 171-80.
7 On Austrian eastern policy, see Karl A. Roider, The Reluctant Ally: Austria s Policy in the Austro-Turkish War, 1737-1739 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1972); Roider, Austria s Eastern Question, 1700-1790 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Charles Ingrao, Habsburg Strategy and Geopolitics during the Eighteenth Century in East Central European Society and War in the Pre-Revolutionary Eighteenth Century , ed. Gunther E. Rothenberg et al. (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1982), 49-66, A. V. Florovsky, J. Keep, and L. Collins, Russo-Austrian Conflicts in the Early 18th Century, The Slavonic and East European Review 47, no. 108 (January, 1969): 94-114; Harald Heppner, Die Entwicklungspolitik der Habsburger in S dosteuropa infolge der T rkenkriege, S dostdeutsches Archiv 26-27 (1983-84): 88-99; Heppner, Die Entwicklungsm glichkeiten f r die s dosteurop ische Gesellschaft infolge der habsburgisch-osmanischen Auseinandersetzungen des 16. bis 18. Jahrhunderts in sterreich und die Osmanen: Prinz Eugen und seine Zeit , ed. Erich Z llner (Vienna: sterreichischer Bundesverlag, 1988), 203-18; Kenneth M. Setton, Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1991); Ivan Parvev, Habsburgs and Ottomans between Vienna and Belgrade (1683-1739) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Parvev, Balkanite me du dve imperii: Habsburgskata monarhija i Osmanskata d r ava (1683-1739) [The Balkans between two empires: The Habsburg monarchy and the Ottoman state (1683-1739)] (Sofia: University Sv. Kliment Ohridski, 1997).
8 On Ottoman state and society, see Virginia Aksan, Locating the Ottomans among Early Modern Empires, The Journal for Early Modern History 3, no. 2 (1999): 103-34; Jane Hathaway, Rewriting Eighteenth-Century Ottoman History, Mediterranean Historical Review 19, no. 1 (June 2004): 29-53; Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Martin Peters, The Ottoman Empire in the historical sciences of the 18th and 19th centuries, Publikationsportal Friedensvertr ge (publication of the Institute of European History, Mainz, publication of the project group European Peace Treaties in the Pre-Modern Period) (Mainz: 2008-11-18), 1-7, (1 February 2009).
9 On Prince Eugene of Savoy, see, for example, Max Braubach, Prinz Eugen von Savoyen: Eine Biographie , vol. 1, Aufstieg ; vol. 2, Der Feldherr ; vol. 3, Zum Gipfel des Ruhmes (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1963, 1964, 1964); Derek McKay, Prince Eugene of Savoy (New York: Thames Hudson, 1977); Prinz Eugen und das barocke sterreich , exhibition catalogue, Marchfeldschl sser Schlosshof and Niederweiden 22 April-26 October 1986 (Vienna, 1986); C. Paoletti, II Principe Eugenio di Savoia (Rome: Stato Maggiore dell Esercito/Ufficio Storico, 2001); Prince Eugene: General-Philosopher and Art Lover , ed. A. Husslen-Arco and M.-L. von Plessen (Vienna: Belvedere, 2010), with bibliography.
10 On Belgrade, 1683-1739, see Gligor Stanojevi , Mleta ke i dubrova ke vijesti o austrijsko-turskim ratovima u XVIII vijeku [Venetian and Dubrovnik news about the Austro-Turkish wars in the eighteenth century] Godi njak Dru tva istori ara Bosne i Hercegovine 17 (1966-1967): 209-30; Rajko Veselinovi , Beograd od 1683. do 1717. godine [Belgrade, 1683-1717], Godi njak grada Beograda 15 (1968): 5-25. Gligor Stanojevi , Beograd u vrijeme Austrijsko-turskog rata 1716-1718. godine [Belgrade during the Austro-Turkish war of 1716-1718], Vojnoistorijski glasnik 23, no. 1 (1972): 139-60; Istorija Beograda , vol. 1, Stari, srednji i novi vek [History of Belgrade: The ancient, medieval and modern ages] ed. Vasa ubrilovi (Belgrade, 1974). Also, on 1739, see Die t rkische Wiedereroberung von Belgrad 1739: Die Reichsgeschichte Mehmed Subhi s 1738-1740 , ed. Ferdinand Hausmann et al. (Graz: Historische Landeskommission, 1987).
11 On the Habsburg and Ottoman militaries, see G. Pruckner, Der T rkenkrieg von 1716-1718: seine Finanzierung und milit rische Vorbereitung (Vienna, 1946); Robert A. Kann, The Social Prestige of the Officer Corps in the Habsburg Empire from the Eighteenth Century to 1918, in War and Society in East Central Europe , vol. 1, Special Topics and Generalizations on the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries , ed. B la K. Kir ly and Gunther E. Rothenberg (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1979), 113-20; Halil nalc k, Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700, Archivum Ottomanicum 6 (1980): 283-337; Gabor goston, Habsburgs and Ottomans: Defense, Military Change and Shifts in Power, The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 22, no. 1 (1998): 126-41; goston, Ottoman Warfare in Europe 1453-1826, in European Warfare 1453-1815 , ed. Jeremy Black (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 118-144; Virginia Aksan, Ottoman War and Warfare 1453-1812, in Black, European Warfare , 147-75; J. Kelenik, The Military Revolution in Hungary, in Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest , ed. G za D vid and P l Fodor (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 117-159; Michael Hochedlinger, Austria s Wars of Emergence: War, State and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1683-1797 (London: Longman, 2003).
12 On Bosnian pashalik and frontiers, see Gligor Stanojevi , Jugoslovenske zemlje u mleta ko-turskim ratovima XVI-XVIII vijeka [Yugoslav countries during the Venetian-Ottoman wars in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries] (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1970); E ref Kova evi , Granice Bosanskog pa aluka prema Austriji i Mleta koj Republici po odredbama Karlova kog mira [The Bosnian pasalik frontiers with Austria and Venice under Karlowitz Treaty rulings] (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1973); Hazim abanovi , Bosanski pa aluk, postanak i upravna podjela [The Bosnian pashalik, its origins and administrative division] (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1982); Radovan Samard i , Bosna i Hercegovina u XVIII veku [Bosnia and Herzegovina in the eighteenth century], in Istorija srpskog naroda , vol. 4, no. 1 (Belgrade: Srpska knji evna zadruga, 1986); Enes Pelidija, Bosanski ejalet od Karlova kog do Po areva kog mira 1699-1718 [The eyalet of Bosnia from the Karlowitz to the Passarowitz Peace 1699-1718] (Sarajevo: Veselin Masle a, 1989).
13 On the frontiers in 1699, 1718, and 1739, see John Stoye, Marsigli s Europe 1680-1730: The Life and Times of Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli, Soldier and Virtuoso (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); L. Kammerhofer, Das Konsularwesen der Habsburgermonarchie (1752-1918): Ein berblick mit Schwerpunkt auf S dosteuropa, in Der Weg f hrt ber sterreich: Zur Geschichte des Verkehrs- und Nachrichtenwesens von und nach S dosteuropa (18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart) , ed. Harald Heppner (Vienna: B hlau, 1996), 7-35; Karl-Peter Krauss, Deutsche Auswanderer in Ungarn: Ansiedlung in der Herrschaft B ly im 18. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Verlag Thorbecke, 2003); Antal De k, Zur Geschichte der Grenzabmarkung nach dem Friedensvertrag von Karlowitz, in Das Osmanische Reich und die Habsburgermonarchie , ed. Marlene Kurz, Martin Scheutz, Karl Vocelka, and Thomas Winkelbauer, Mitteilungen des Instituts f r sterreichische Geschichtsforschung 48 (2005): 83-96; Nikola Samard i , Prvo ure enje jugoisto ne Evrope: Karlova ki mir 1699 [The First Regulation of Southeastern Europe: The Karlowitz Peace 1699] Novopazarski zbornik 30 (2007): 91-106.
14 G. Novak, Dubrova ka diplomacija na mirovnom kongresu u Po arevcu [Dubrovnik diplomacy at the Passarowitz peace congress], in i i ev zbornik (Zagreb: 1929); Vinko Foreti , Povijest Dubrovnika do 1808 [The history of Dubrovnik until 1808], 2 vols. (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1980); Dragoljub ivojinovi , Evropa i Dubrovnik u 17. i 18. veku: Studije i rasprave [Europe and Dubrovnik in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries] (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 2008).
15 For editions and further studies on the treaty, see Jean Dumont, Baron de Carelscroon, Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens; contenant un recueil des traitez d alliance, de paix, de treve, de neutralit , de commerce, qui ont ete faits en Europe, depuis le Regne de l Empereur Charlemagne jusques pr sent , 8 vols., Suppl. 2 (The Hague-Amsterdam, 1739); A General Collection of Treatys, Declarations of War, Manifestos and other publick papers , vol. 4 (London: J. J. and P. Knapton, 1732); D. Pavlovi , Po areva ki mir (1718) [The Passarowitz Peace], Letopis Matice srpske 207, no. 3 (1901): 26-47; Gavro krivani , Dnevnik Mihajila Pe i a o Po areva kom mirovnom kongresu 1718. godine [Mihajlo Pe i s journal on the Passarowitz peace congress] (Belgrade: Nau na kniga, 1952); Dragoljub R. ivojinovi , Po areva ki ugovor u svetlosti politi kih zbivanja u Evropi (1715-1720) [The Passarowitz Treaty in the light of European political events], Zbornik Istorijskog muzeja Srbije 7 (1970): 197-205; N. Todorovi , Po areva ki mir 1718. u literaturi, graviri i medaljarstvu [The Passarowitz peace of 1718 in literature, gravure and medallion studies] Zbornik Narodnog muzeja 8 (1975): 509-24; Miroljub Manojlovi , Muzejski predmeti o Po areva kom miru 1718. godine u Narodnom muzeju u Po arevcu [Museum exhibits concerning the Passarowitz Peace of 1718 in the National Museum of Po arevac] Brani evski glasnik 1 (2002): 57-70; K.-H. Ziegler, The Peace Treaties of the Ottoman Empire with European Christian Powers, in Peace Treaties and International Law in European History , ed. Randall Lesaffer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 338-64; G. Seewann, Friede von Passarowitz, in Lexikon zur Geschichte S dosteuropas , ed. Egar H sch et al. (Vienna: B hlau, 2004): 535-36; Instrumente des Friedens, Vielfalt und Formen von Friedensvertr gen im vormodernen Europa , ed. Heinz Duchhardt and Martin Peters (Mainz: Institut f r Europ ische Geschichte, 2008), M. Peters (Hg.), Grenzen des Friedens. Europ ische Friedensr ume und -orte der Vormoderne ( Ver ffentlichungen des Instituts f r Europ ische Geschichte Mainz , Beiheft online 4, Mainz : 2010-07-15). .
16 On Ottoman diplomacy, see A. C. Wood, The English Embassy at Constantinople, 1660-1762, The English Historical Review 40, no. 160 (1925): 533-61; D. M. Vaughan, Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances, 1350/1700 (Liverpool, 1951); J. Hurewitz, Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System, Middle East Journal 15 (1961): 141-52; R. A. Abou-El-Haj, The Reis lk ttab and Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz (Princeton, NJ, 1963); Lavender Cassels, The Struggle for the Ottoman Empire, 1717-1740 (New York: T. Y. Crowell Co., 1967); R. A. Abou-El-Haj, The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe, 1699-1703, Journal of the American Oriental Society 89, no. 3 (1969): 467-75; Abou-El-Haj, Ottoman Attitudes Toward Peace Making: the Karlowitz Case, Der Islam 51, no. 1 (1974): 131-37; Nikola Samard i , Francuska i Turska 1687-1691 [France and Turkey, 1687-1691] (Belgrade: Istorijski Institut, 1992); Virginia Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed resmi Effendi 1700-1783 (Leiden: Brill, 1995); Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
17 On Venice, after 1699 and 1714, see W. Miller, The Venetian Revival in Greece, 1684-1718, The English Historical Review 35, no. 139 (July 1920): 343-66; Jovan Radoni , Rimska kurija i ju noslovenske zemlje od XVI do XIX veka [Roman Curia and South-Slavic lands from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries] (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka, 1950); J. M. Wagstaff, War and Settlement Desertion in the Morea, 1685-1830, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers , new series, vol. 3, Settlement and Conflict in the Mediterranean World (1978): 295-308; ime Peri i , Dalmacija uo i pada Mleta ke Republike (Zagreb: Centar za povijesne znanosti, 1980); R. Cessi, Storia della Repubblica di Venezia (Florence: Giunti Martello, 1981); Marko Ja ov, Venecija i Srbi u Dalmaciji u XVIII veku [Venice and Serbs in Dalmatia in the eighteenth century] (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1984); S. Ciriacono, Venise et ses villes: Structuration et destructuration d un marche regional 16.-18. siecle, Revue Historique 272, no. 6 (1986): 288-307; Gligor Stanojevi , Dalmatinske krajine u XVIII vijeku [Dalmatian borderlands in the eighteenth century] (Zagreb: Prosvjeta, 1987); P. Polledri, Industrial Activities in Eighteenth-Century Venice, Journal of Architectural Education 41, no. 3 (1984): 15-19; F. Guida, L ultima esperienza imperiale di Venezia: La Morea dopo la pace di Carlowitz, in Studi balcanici , ed. Francesco Guida and Luisa Valmarin (Rome: Quaderni di Clio, 1989), 107-36; R. Tolomeo, La Dalmazia veneta agli inizi del XVIII secolo, in Guida and Valmarin, Studi balcanici , 87-105; Kenneth M. Setton, Venice, Austria and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1991); G. Cozzi, Dalla riscoperta della pace all inestinguibile sogno di dominio, in Storia di Venezia , vol. 7, La Venezia barocca , ed. G. Benzoni and G. Cozzi (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia italiana Treccani, 1997); Egidio Ivetic, L Istria moderna: Un introduzione ai secoli XVI-XVIII (Trieste-Rovigno: Centro di Ricerche storiche di Rovigno, 1999); Ivetic, Oltremare: L Istria nell ultimo dominio veneto (Venice: Istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, 2000); O. Chaline, L Adriatique, de la guerre de Candie la fin des Empires (1645-1918), in Histoire de l Adriatique , ed. Pierre Cabanes (Paris: Seuil, 2001), 361-63; M. Costantini, Porto navi e traffici a Venezia 1700-2000 (Venice: Marsilio, 2004).
18 On the economy, trade, and infrastructure, see Nikola Petrovi , Plovidba i privreda srednjeg Podunavlja u doba merkantilizma [Navigation and the economy of the middle Danube in the mercantile era] (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1978); V. Paskaleva, Sredna Evropa i zemite po Donlija Dunav prez XVIII-XIX v. (Socialno-ikonomiceski aspekti) [The Central Europe and lower Danube lands during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, socio-economic aspects] (Sofia: B lgarskata akademija na naukite, 1986): 17-49; S. G. Focas, The Lower Danube River in the Southeastern European Political and Economic Complex from Antiquity to the Conference of Belgrade of 1948 (Boulder, CO: Columbia University Press, 1987): 59-61; Eva Faber, Zur Konkurrenz der beiden Freih fen Triest und Fiume (Rijeka) im 18.Jahrhundert, in Focus Austria: Vom Vielv lkerreich zum EU-Staat; Festschrift f r Alfred Ableitinger , ed. Siegfried Beer et al. (Graz: Institut f r Geschichte, 2003), 255-68.
19 On the Military Border, see Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522-1747 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960); Vojin Dabi , Banska krajina, 1688-1751: Prilog istoriji srpskog i hrvatskog naroda i kraji kog ure enja u Baniji [The Banal Military Border: A contribution to the history of the Serbian and Croatian peoples and the borderland system in Banija] (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1984); Gra a za istoriju vojne granice u XVIII veku [Sources for the history of the Military Border in the eighteenth century], ed. Slavko Gavrilovi (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1989); see also various articles in Vojne krajine u jugoslovenskim zemljama u novom veku do Karlova kog mira 1699 [Military borders in Yugoslav lands in modern times up to the Peace of Karlowitz in 1699], ed. Vasa ubrilovi (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1989); Vojin Dabi , Vojna krajina: Karlova ki generalat (1530-1746) [Military Border: The Generalate of Karlovac] (Belgrade: Sveti arhijerejski sinod Srpske pravoslavne crkve, 2000).
20 On peoples, migrations, and so on, see D. J. Popovi , Velika seoba Srba: Srbi seljaci i plemi i [The Great migration of the Serbs: The Serbian peasants and nobles] (Belgrade: Srpska knji evna zadruga, 1954); S. Guldescu, The Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom , 1526-1792 (The Hague: Mouton Co., 1970); Robert A. Kann and Zdenek V. David, The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands, 1526-1918 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1984); Istorija srpskog naroda , vol. 4, no. 2, Srbi u XVIII veku [History of the Serbian people: Serbs in the eighteenth century], ed. Slavko Gavrilovi (Belgrade: Srpska knji evna zadruga, 1986); Dejan Medakovi , Chronik der Serben in Triest (Belgrade: Jugoslavenska revija, 1987); W. O. McCagg, A History of Habsburg Jews, 1670-1918 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990); Dejan Medakovi , Serbischer Barock: Sakrale Kunst im Donauraum (Vienna: B hlau, 1991); Istorija srpskog naroda , vol. 3, no. 1, Srbi pod tu inskom vla u: 1537-1699 [History of the Serbian people, Serbs under foreign rule], ed. Radovan Samard i (Belgrade: Srpska knji evna zadruga, 1993); O. Katsiardi-Hering, Das Habsburgerreich: Anlaufpunkt f r Griechen und andere Balkanv lker im 17.-19.Jh. sterreichische Osthefte 38 (1996): 171-88; Migration nach Ost- und S dosteuropa vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ursachen-Formen-Verlauf-Ergebnis , ed. Mathias Beer and Dittmar Dahlmann (Stuttgart: Verlag Thorbecke, 1999); H.-H. Rieser, Das rum nische Banat: Eine multikulturelle Region im Umbruch (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 2001), 171-88; E. Turczynski, Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte Griechenlands im 19. Jahrhundert (Mannheim-M hnesee: Bibliopolis, 2003).
Martin Peters
This paper analyzes the perspectives German scholars took in their historical portrayals of the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz (1718). 1 It examines the question of how the Peace of Passarowitz was commented on and interpreted in those times, focusing exclusively on Enlightenment history. The selection of primary sources includes works published after the Peace of Passarowitz and before the appearance of Leopold Ranke s (1795-1886) opus Die Serbische Revolution in 1829. 2 To this day Ranke s book, which introduced a new historical genre, has been reference for European heritage. 3 Historians resorted to scientific works of the late nineteenth century only in select cases, when it seemed opportune to clarify a point. Thus, analyzing how aware German writers of Enlightenment history were of the Treaty of Passarowitz gives us insight into the mental maps of German-speaking scholars. After all, specific rhetorical and narrative figures, metaphors, or topoi were consistently used to express certain concepts, not only in fiction but also in the historical sciences, which include the disciplines of history, statistics, and geography. These historiographical interpretations, metaphoric rationales, and narrative structures point to a style of thinking that was particular to premodern historians and that went on to shape the genesis of the Western European idea of Europe, as well as modern political worldviews.
European peace treaties are state treaties and, as such, have always attracted significant political, scientific, and public attention. They secured dynasties, defined territories, and facilitated trade. Despite this, not a single monograph deals with the question of how the contents, interests, and metaphors of international law, such as welfare, Europe, nation, and balance, were formed, reformed, communicated, and translated during these negotiations. 4 To this day, it is not even entirely evident in which languages some of Europe s peace treaties were written.
Heterogeneity, cultural differences, and varying connotations and legal traditions are typical of the early modern period. Robert Jervis offered an impressive discussion of this diversity more than 30 years ago in Perception and Misperception in International Politics . 5 However, Jervis primarily focused on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As yet, a comparable analysis of the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries does not exist. 6 The cultural historian Peter Burke, however, has begun to make up for this lack of historical analysis of the translations of peace negotiations and treaties. In Cultural Translation in Early Modern Europe as well as in Lost (and Found) in Translation: A Cultural History of Translators and Translating in Early Modern Europe, he discusses the idea that early modern diplomats, historians, experts on constitutional law, journalists, and artists managed to achieve considerable-and sometimes unintentional-feats of translation. 7
These histories of diplomacy and international relations primarily deal with the issues of war and peace. It is only recently that they have opened themselves to inter- and multidisciplinary questions. This new orientation 8 comes in reaction to current scientific challenges, such as the linguistic turn and the spatial turn. The nine volumes of the Handbuch der Geschichte der Internationalen Beziehungen 9 together cover a wide array of topics from politics to culture, religion, geopolitics, and economics.
Some recent studies on transfer and space in early modern times have adopted a distinctly interdisciplinary approach. 10 Moreover, studies on historical translation have become increasingly significant in linguistics and the philosophy of language. 11 Interdisciplinary studies on historical peace research have also added to the body of research. Many of these studies were conducted during the festivities surrounding the 350th anniversary of the Peace of Westphalia and soon thereafter. 12
Scientists are obviously starting to adopt the cultural historical approach more systematically. Yet research on early modern peace policies with respect to cultural translations-that is, the communication of diplomats in Europe, the use of languages and concepts, and the public s reception of peace treaties-has remained surprisingly thin within Europe. 13
The project Achievements in Translation of Diplomacy and the Media , 14 funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), aims to fill these gaps and systematically analyze the act of translation as a cultural achievement that promoted peace efforts in Europe. What were the achievements of and deficits in translation that were crucial to the maintenance of peace in Europe? The project uses examples of pivotal peace treaties to examine this question. 15
Thus far, European Peace Studies has been an integral part of the research on historical concepts. Language and history are the pillars of this school founded by Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck, and Otto Brunner in the 1970s. The variability of the concept of peace in Europe was systematically analyzed in the encyclopedia Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe . Wilhelm Janssen s article on peace analyzes and differentiates the various peace doctrines in play from the Middle Ages through the Enlightenment and up to the nineteenth century. It revolves around the idea that the demise of the Christian peace concept, which was based on a pax universalis , boosted the concept that contract law was the only instrument to enforce and secure peace, a concept that has maintained its validity to this day. 16 J rg Fisch, one of the authors of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe , provides an analysis of historical concepts in his voluminous standard universal history, Krieg und Frieden im Friedensvertrag . 17 Therein, he systematically examines set phrases used in peace treaties and by the institutions of international law according to a certain set of topics-liability and amnesty, restoration and renewal, eternity and conjuncture-providing an example of and justification for each. The study concludes that the plea for a sustainable peace, which was a staple feature of all peace-treaty introductions, was far from an empty promise or stereotype but rather contributed significantly to enhancing the status of peace vis- -vis war.
Was the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz, which comprised the texts of three different contracts, accessible and widely known within the German Empire? Zedler s Universal Lexicon of 1740 18 printed in German the entire text of the trade and navigation agreement between the emperor and sultan, as well as the two peace treaties between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires and between Venice and the Ottoman Empire. 19 The terms of peace are also accessible in abridged form in various peace treaty compilations. Jean Dumont s compilation was the most influential and continues to be used today. 20 Also readily available was Johann Jakob Zincke s Ruhe des jetztlebenden Europa , 21 the Theatrum Europaeum , and Johann Christoph L nig s Das Teutsche Reichs-Archiv . 22 Admittedly, these editions were not put together in a scientifically sound way, given that historical and critical tools were not systematically developed until the nineteenth century, but they were composed with a claim to authenticity and accuracy. It is striking that differences in translation nevertheless led to several possible interpretations. There is uncertainty and a lack of precision with regard to the contents of the treaty texts, as well as mistakes and transcription errors. The Theatrum , for example, places the Treaty of Karlowitz in Sirien, while L nig correctly locates it in Syrmien. The Theatrum mentions the diplomat Michael von Dahlmann, while L nig correctly refers to Michael von Thalmann.
While each of the editions strove for authenticity, their subjective nature becomes obvious when one examines various translations of a central passage from the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz. The translator of the Theatrum renders the passage nec non prospicienda subditorum salute bono recogitaretur as Heil und Frommen der Untertanen (to the avail and salvation of the subjects), 23 while L nig translates the same Latin aphorism as Bef rderung der Wohlfahrt wie auch Bestens derer Unterthanen (advancement of the welfare as well as the best for the subjects). 24 The metaphor Heil und Frommen appears not only in this edition but also is a well-known topos in religious and theological, as well as lyrical, contexts. The term Bef rderung der Wohlfahrt, on the other hand, is more common in historical, statistical, and economic studies, as well as in works on constitutional law. One can thus infer that the above-mentioned editors created a text that was theological first and political second. Johannes Burkhardt has repeatedly pointed to the variations in content between the different translations and editions, which allow for a great number of interpretational possibilities. 25
In addition to looking at the relevant editions, one can gain significant insight into the Western European perspective on the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz by analyzing historical studies of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. One can identify specific positions and justifying metaphors, which attribute glory, sustainability, and the denial of the idea of a divided Serbia, both culturally and under international law.
The Peace Treaty of Passarowitz of 1718 between the Habsburgs, Venice, and the Ottoman Empire led to an increasing Western European interest in the Ottomans and their provinces. 26 Until then, some writers declared in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Turkey, its provinces, and subject countries had been terra incognita for many Europeans. After the Peace of Passarowitz, the Porte got into an ever closer relationship with the European, Christian powers, the diplomat Alfred de Bess wrote pointedly in 1854. 27 The Treaty of Passarowitz, in particular, heralded a paradigm shift in the Western European perception of the Ottoman Empire and the regions under its control.
Until the end of the nineteenth century, commentators prevailing viewpoint was shaped by Prince Eugene s military victory over the Ottomans. German historians and statisticians were not the only ones to positively assess the treaty, sometimes to the point of euphoria, given that the agreements on territorial changes were beneficial to the Habsburgs. As the Danish historian and statistician Christian Molbech (1783-1857), on behalf of many Western European scientists, summarizes briefly and enthusiastically: In the Peace of Passarowitz (21 July 1718), Austria kept Temesv r, Belgrade and a large part of Wallachia, Serbia and Bosnia-Eugene s splendid trophies. 28 The peace was thus interpreted as proof of the decreasing power of the Porte. 29
From a Western European perspective, the peace treaty was a good example of a successful end to a war and a peaceful settlement of conflict-ridden relationships. That it also happened to be an agreement with the former archenemy only added to its significance. The historian Gottlob Benedikt von Schirach (1743-1804), who worked in Altona near Hamburg for many years, wrote in his Biographie der Deutschen , The Peace of Passarowitz spread quiet over the entirety of Europe, from one end to another. 30 Yet not all scholars saw a lasting peace secured for all of Europe. The G ttingen university professor and scholar of European history Johann Gottfried Eichhorn (1752-1827) limits the peacemaking effect of the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz to twenty years, as well as to a specific region, namely Hungary:
For twenty years after the peace treaty, the Hungarian battlefields remained devoid of warring armies. Throughout this time period, deterred by the current superiority of the house of Austria, drawn by the weakness of a Persia shattered by internal unrest, and irritated by the example of Russia, which used that unrest to enlarge its empire at the Persian frontier, the Porte continued to direct its armies and plans for conquest towards the East. 31
Along with Eichhorn, Arnold H. L. Heeren (1760-1842) and Christoph Schlosser (1776-1861), both renowned German historians in their time, juxtapose the peace agreement s glorious dimension with its unsustainability. Yet, while Eichhorn focuses on Hungary, Heeren and Schlosser look to the Peace of Belgrade (1739), by which some territories had to be returned to the Ottomans. Heeren, in his Handbuch der Geschichte des Europ ischen Staatensystems und seiner Colonieen , infuses his judgment with a moral lesson: Who, after such allowances, should not have expected a quick flourishing of Austria, if a wise use were not more difficult than conquest! 32 This point of view, which addresses the difficulty of securing a lasting peace, persisted through the late nineteenth century. Schlosser, for example, in his Weltgeschichte f r das deutsche Volk calls the Peace of Passarowitz the r hmlichsten (praiseworthiest) that Austria had ever received from the Turks, yet at the same time comments that the Habsburgs did not fully exploit the advantages gained. 33
Eichhorn adds another point of view to the discussion by shifting the perspective from Hungary to Italy. For him, there is another loser apart from the Ottomans, a loser who-however paradoxical it may seem-had fought side by side with the successful Habsburgs: Venice. He, along with some other authors, considered Venice s retreat from the European stage and its descent from a European to an Italian power a Pyrrhic victory:
Starting with the peace treaty (Passarowitz, 21 July 1718), Venice turned in on itself and lived without taking part in the wars that the European powers waged among themselves. Its wealth and territorial greatness had all but disappeared; the former through a different path of action, the latter through unfortunate wars with its neighbors, namely with the Turks. 34
While these scholars stress the glorious peace the treaty secured, they simultaneously avoid any analysis of Serbia as a cultural and historical entity. How German-speakers received the Peace of Passarowitz was influenced by the treaty s participants and contracting parties, namely, the Habsburgs, the Venetians, and the Ottomans. Serbia tends to appear in the historical literature as the playing field of the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, rather than as an active participant, and is primarily discussed via other countries such as Hungary and Bosnia. Monographs on Serbia remain the exception. 35
Two leading historians of eighteenth-century Hungary include Ludwig Albrecht Gebhardi (1735-1802), an archivist from L neburg and later Hannover, and Johann Christian von Engel (1770-1814), the aforementioned Hungarian-German, who served in Vienna as secretary for the Transylvanian Court Chancellery. In the third part of his Geschichte des Reichs der Hungarn und der damit verbundenen Staaten , written for the Leipzig Welthistorie , Gebhardi provides a sketch of the Geschichte der K nigreiche Servien, Raszien, Bosnien und Rama. 36 According to Gebhardi, the history of Serbia is characterized by frequent changes of ruler, among them the Romans, Avars, and Ottomans, as well as a continuous redrawing of its cultural and political boundaries. Thus Gebhardi considers Serbia as belonging to both the Orient and the Occident. 37
In his interpretation of the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz, Gebhardi mentions each of the territorial agreements and divisions without once discussing the consequences of these divisions for Serbia. He writes: The Emperor held on to Wallachia up to the Olt, the Banat of Temesv r, the stronghold of Belgrade, the land of Serbia up to the Timok, and the mountain range of Stara Planina. 38 Serbia and its territorial, legal, political, or economic situation after the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz was not an issue for him. 39
Johann Christian von Engel also viewed Serbia from the perspective of Hungarian history. His Geschichte von Servien und Bosnien appeared in 1801 as the third volume of his Geschichte des Ungrischen Reichs und seiner Nebenl nder , which was itself the forty-ninth installment in Halle s renowned Allgemeinen Welthistorie . 40 In his brief sketch of the Peace of Passarowitz in the fifth volume of his Geschichte des Ungrischen Reichs , von Engel again largely ignores Serbia, to which he attributes nothing but a subordinate role as an Hungarian Nebenland (associated territory). Although he is obviously capable of assuming a critical perspective-he notes, for example, that no Hungarian councilors took part in the negotiations-he still ignores the Serbian situation. 41 Only in the last volume does he report on how the Ottomans managed to establish and consolidate their rule in Eastern Europe throughout the fourteenth century. Here he grants a more active role to the Serbs, for example, by mentioning the political achievements of Stefan Du an (reign 1331-1355). 42
Serbia was also covered indirectly through Bosnia. In his Das K nigreich Bosnien (1787) 43 the then well-known Austrian historian Maximilian Schimek (1748-1798) deals extensively with the text of the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz-particularly its territorial and geographical details-which stipulated that the new Habsburg-Ottoman frontier would run through Serbia and be fortified with measures such as pickets. 44 Interestingly, Schimek deals with the border as a military-political phenomenon. For him, Serbia is not only a highly contested border region, but also a particularly pacified and interesting one when it comes to international law. He thereby distinguishes himself significantly from other historians, who mostly limit themselves to describing the geographical course of the frontier through Serbia.
In 1718, Serbia s two powerful neighbors divided it into two zones, one Ottoman, the other Habsburg. The Peace of Passarowitz amicably targets and guarantees the Ruhe der Grenze (quiet of the frontier). This is why, for example, the peace treaty forbids potentially restive Hungarian families from settling in the border region. Article 15 of the treaty states (in L nig s translation) that in order to maintain quiet at the borders and the wealth of the subjects, R k czi, along with other Hungarians who failed to obey His Highness the Roman Emperor and escaped to the Ottoman areas, shall be sent away and distributed within the Ottoman Empire. 45 The contracting parties thus turn their special political attention to ensuring the peace of the Habsburg-Ottoman frontier.
Engel adds the cultural dimension to the discussion of the partition. He is not only concerned with drawing a frontier between two equal powers, but between barbarians, as he calls the Ottomans, and Europeans, observing that it cost us the treasures of the Old and New World, the core of the Hungarian and German-particularly Austrian-youth, and an almost 200-year-long war (that is, from 1526 to 1718, until the Peace of Passarowitz), to liberate Hungary from the barbarians and to repel that arch enemy of European culture over the Sava and Danube. 46 Once again, Serbia is not mentioned and remains in the shadow of Hungarian history.
Apart from the barbarian metaphor, which, indirectly, also implicates Serbia, other topoi are construed. In the second third of the nineteenth century, Serbia appears as a Kampfplatz f r Islam und Christentum (battlefield for Islam and Christianity), as the liberal Karl Rotteck and Carl Welcker put it in their Staats-Lexikon . 47 Belgrade was already the antemuralis (bulwark) of Europe for Prince Eugene, who used this well-known metaphor. 48 Other Western European scholars saw Poland and Hungary as well as Serbia as European bulwarks against the Ottoman Empire. This topos of the antemurale christianitatis

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