Will To Believe

Ross Kennedy

Description

A fresh analysis of Woodrow Wilson's national security strategy during World War I"By addressing all sides of the American debate on national security questions, and by showing both the complexity and the nuance that characterized that debate, The Will to Believe fills a major gap in the literature on both World War I and all things 'Wilsonian.'"-Mary Ann Heiss, series editor, New Studies in U.S. Foreign Relations SeriesIn many ways, Woodrow Wilson and the era of World War I cast a deeper shadow over contemporary foreign policy debates than more recent events, such as the Cold War. More so than after World War II, Wilson and his contemporaries engaged in a wide-ranging debate about the fundamental character of American national security in the modern world. The Will to Believe is the first book that examines that debate in full, offering a detailed analysis of how U.S. political leaders and opinion makers conceptualized and pursued national security from 1914 to 1920.Based on extensive research gleaned from public documents, presidential papers, and periodicals, The Will to Believe departs significantly from existing scholarship, which tends to examine only Wilson or his critics. This is the first study of America's approach to the war, which examines all major U.S. perspectives from across the political spectrum and analyzes Wilson's security strategy from the beginning of U.S. neutrality through the end of his presidency. During World War I there was no consensus among Wilson and his contemporaries on such fundamental issues as the nature of the international system, the impact of security policies on domestic freedom, the value of alliances and multinational organizations, and the relationship between democracy and peace. Historian Ross A. Kennedy focuses on how three competing groups-pacifists, liberal internationalists, and Atlanticists-addressed these and other national security issues.

Sujets

• Histoire
• USA
• United States of America
• Diplomacy
• History of the Americas
• États-Unis
• Diplomatie (homonymie)

Informations

• Publié par: The Kent State University Press
• Date de parution: 15 juin 2009
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781612775821
• Langue: English

Extrait

The Will to Believe
NEW STUDIES IN U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mary Ann Heiss, editor
The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965
AMY L. S. STAPLES
Colombia and the United States: The Making of an Inter-American Alliance, 1939–1960
BRADLEY LYNN COLEMAN
NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc Conflicts
EDITED BY MARY ANN HEISS AND S. VICTOR PAPACOSMA
Caution and Cooperation: The American Civil War in British-American Relations
PHILIP E. MYERS
The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and America’s Strategy for Peace and Security
ROSS A. KENNEDY
The Will to Believe
Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and America’s Strategy for Peace and Security

R OSS A. K ENNEDY
The Kent State University Press
Kent, Ohio
© 2009 by The Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio 44242
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 2008035887
ISBN 978-0-87338-971-6
Manufactured in the United States of America
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA
Kennedy, Ross A.
The will to believe : Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and
America’s strategy for peace and security / Ross A. Kennedy.
p.    cm. — (New studies in U.S. foreign relations)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-87338-971-6 (hbk. : alk. paper) ∞
1. World War, 1914–1918—Diplomatic history. 2. National security—United States. 3. United States—Foreign relations—1913–1921. 4. Wilson, Woodrow, 1856–1924. I. Title.
D 619. K 45 2009
940.3′2273—dc22                    2008035887
British Library Cataloging-in-Publication data are available.
13   12   11   10   09          5   4   3   2   1
To my dad ,
James Stirling Kennedy ,
And my wife ,
Larissa
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1 Militarism and Power Politics, 1914–17
2 National Security, 1914–17
3 The Vision of Collective Security, 1914–17
4 Pursuing a Wilsonian Peace, 1914–15
5 Pursuing a Wilsonian Peace, 1915–17
6 Debating Wilsonianism
7 Wilson at War
8 National Security Debates, 1917–18
9 Wilson and the Versailles Treaty
10 National Security Debates, 1918–20
Conclusion
Notes
Select Bibliography
Index
Acknowledgments
There are many individuals and institutions I would like to thank for their support as I worked on this book. First, this project would not have been possible without the education and aid I received from one of the great centers of higher education in the world, the University of California at Berkeley. Doe Library provided me with the bulk of my research material, and the Berkeley history department generously helped to fund my work with several scholarships. My teachers at Berkeley also made a lasting impression on my intellectual development. Leon F. Litwack’s incomparable American survey course first inspired me to study history as an undergraduate. In different ways, Charles G. Sellers and James H. Kettner taught me how to think about the role of ideas in American politics. Professor Kettner’s graduate seminar on colonial America stimulated the basic question in my mind that ultimately led to this book: Whatever happened to America’s fear of standing armies? I am also grateful to Lawrence W. Levine for his insightful reading of my doctoral dissertation and for sharing his views of William Jennings Bryan. My deepest appreciation goes to my dissertation advisor and friend, Paula S. Fass. She taught me how to write and how to analyze historical arguments in a critical, logical way. Even though our fields of study were different, she enthusiastically encouraged my work and, with her probing questioning of my arguments and careful editing of my writing, vastly improved it.
In addition to Professor Fass, I have been fortunate in having three other important mentors in my career. I first met Martin Sherwin while a student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He has remained a friend and advisor ever since, always happy to exchange ideas and help out in guiding me through life as a diplomatic historian. William Rope was the American director of the Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese-American Studies when I taught there in 1995–96. A gifted diplomat and administrator, he was the most patient and fair boss one could hope for, and he never fails to inspire me with his intellectual curiosity, keen intelligence, and profound dedication to public service. Jerald Combs was department chair when I taught at San Francisco State University. At a time when jobs were hard to find, he kept me in the game while offering a treasure trove of sensible advice about academia. I will always be thankful for his wise counsel.
The quality of the book has been improved by advice from several scholars who were kind enough to read summaries or chapters of the manuscript. I am especially indebted to Lloyd E. Ambrosius, John Whiteclay Chambers II, and Roger Baldwin for their thoughtful suggestions and incisive criticisms. My colleagues at Illinois State University—Roger Biles, Anthony Crubaugh, Alan Lessoff, and Richard Soderlund—also offered invaluable comments on this project at various stages, from the book proposal to the final manuscript. Most of all, I am grateful to Professor Mary Ann Heiss, my series editor at Kent State University Press. Professor Heiss edited an early draft of the manuscript with extraordinary care, pushed me to clarify my interpretive points, and guided the work through the peer review process with exemplary professionalism. One of the very best parts of writing this book was working with her.
I would also like to thank Joanna Hildebrand Craig at Kent State University Press for her encouragement and support in meeting all of the key deadlines connected with the work; Mary D. Young at Kent State University Press for shepherding the manuscript through its last stages; John Kostelnick, who produced the excellent maps that accompany the manuscript; and Lawrence Castriotta, who helped me with archival research on the League of Free Nations Association I otherwise would have missed.
Finally, I am grateful to my family. My daughters Sidney and Eliot patiently competed with this book for my attention, rejuvenated me with Post-It note fights, and even offered to check the page proofs for misspellings. My wife, Larissa, served as both sounding board and editor and never allowed her disdain for Woodrow Wilson’s China policies to interfere with her willingness to help in anything I asked her to do. And last, but certainly not least, I thank my dad, James Stirling Kennedy, for everything.
Introduction
December 1918. Woodrow Wilson’s train slowly rolled through Hoboken, New Jersey, its tracks lined with cheering crowds who had interrupted their morning work to wish their president farewell. Wilson was on his way to the USS George Washington , an army transport ship, which would take him to France, where he would begin a round of triumphant parades and speeches before attending to his main task, the writing of the peace treaty that would end the Great War and shape world politics for years to come.
Upon arriving at the ship’s berth, Wilson ate breakfast in his train, then walked up the gangplank and went to an office that had been prepared for him. He was not in a good mood. He had a cold and was “surprised” by what he saw in the morning papers. Theodore Roosevelt, his old rival, had denounced Wilson’s peace program, the Fourteen Points, as “thoroughly mischievous” and “so vague and ambiguous that it is nonsense to do anything with them until they have been defined and made definite.” Roosevelt also stressed that Britain’s navy and the Allied armies had done the most to defeat Germany. America’s role in the peacemaking was therefore “to stand by our allies,” not seek to dominate them.
Joined by three reporters in his office, Wilson rejected Roosevelt’s statement. “He virtually says that England won the war and should have everything she wants,” complained the president. “I don’t believe our boys who fought over there will be inclined to feel just that way about it. We won the war at Chateau Thierry,” insisted Wilson. He then objected to Roosevelt’s naval views, asserting that “militarism is equally dangerous when applied to sea forces as to land forces.” The idea that the United States and Britain should “act as the sea patrol of the world is only a new kind of militaristic propaganda,” argued Wilson. “No power, no two powers, should be supreme. The whole world must be in on all measures designed to end wars for all time.”
Wilson’s emphasis on the equality of nations and the collective enforcement of peace abruptly diminished, however, when he was asked how the United States should deal with a refusal by Britain to reduce naval arms. In that case, Wilson declared, “the United States should show her how to build a navy.” The president related how America had the ability to match Britain “or any other power” in naval construction. “We now have greater navy yards, thousands more shipbuilders than we ever had before,” Wilson boasted, “and an abundance of raw materials such as would make it possible for us to have the greatest navy in the world.” On that note, the interview concluded.
A short time later, Wilson’s ship eased out of its berth and left New York Harbor, escorted by tugboats, launches, airplanes, and, at one point, a huge navy dirigible. It was a clear, cold day, and a bright sun shone upon President Wilson and his party. “In fact,” recorded Dr. Cary Grayson, Wilson’s personal physician, “no person could have wished for a more auspicious commencement of an eventful trip.” 1
The contradictory ideas expressed on that cold December morning—the endorsement of both a collective effort “to end wars for all time” and a unilateral arms buildup to coerce other states into naval disarmament—provide a glimpse into the complexity of American national security debates during World War I. Much more so