Aristotle's Politics Today

Description

According to Aristotle, man's essential sociality implies a distinctive conception of politics, one in which all political associations exist for the sake of the moral perfection of human beings. This stands in sharp contrast with the modern view of politics that man is not "by nature" political; rather, man chooses to create political associations for the sake of securing the protection of his life and property. Many political theorists have begun to express doubts about this modern view, calling for a return to Aristotle's vision of a politics that is deeply moral. In Aristotle's Politics Today, distinguished political philosophers representing a diversity of approaches examine the meaning, relevance, and implications of Aristotle's political thought for contemporary social and political theory. The contributors engage a broad range of topics, including Aristotle's views on constitutionalism, the extension of Aristotelian ideas to issues in international relations, the place of Aristotelian virtue in modern democratic politics, and Aristotle's conception of justice.

Introduction
Lenn E. Goodman and Robert B. Talisse

1. Aristotelian Statecraft and Modern Politics
Fred D. Miller, Jr.

2. Aristotle and the Liberal State
Edward C. Halper

3. Why Democrats Need the Virtues
Robert B. Talisse

4. Virtue-oriented Politics: Confucius and Aristotle
May Sim

5. The Morality of Nations: An Aristotelian Approach
Lloyd P. Gerson

6. The Revolt of the Just
Eugene Garver

7. Aristotle's Regime of the Americans
Peter L. P. Simpson

8. Aristotle's Polity Today
Lenn E. Goodman

Works Cited
Contributors
Index Locorum
Index

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Philosophie politique
• Ancient Greece
• Ancient history
• History of Europe

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 01 février 2012
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780791479360
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 2 Mo

Extrait

A ristotle’s P olitics T oday Edited by Lenn E. Goodman and Robert B. Talisse

A ’ P T RISTOTLE S OLITICS ODAY

SUNY SERIESIN  A NCIENT  G REEK  P HILOSOPHY A NTHONY  P REUS , E DITOR

A ’ P T RISTOTLE S OLITICS ODAY

E DITEDBY L ENN  E. G OODMANAND  R OBERT  B. T ALISSE

S TATE  U NIVERSITYOF  N EW  Y ORK  P RESS

Cover photo, “The Parthenon Today,” by Roberta W. Goodman © 2007, courtesy of Roberta W. Goodman

Pubîshed by State Unîversîty of New York Press, Abany

© 2007 State Unîversîty of New York

A rîghts reserved

Prînted în the Unîted States of Amerîca

No part of thîs book may be used or reproduced în any manner whatsoever wîthout wrîtten permîssîon. No part of thîs book may be stored în a retrîeva system or transmîtted în any form or by any means încudîng eectronîc, eectrostatîc, magnetîc tape, mechanîca, photocopyîng, recordîng, or otherwîse wîthout the prîor permîssîon în wrîtîng of the pubîsher.

For înformatîon, contact State Unîversîty of New York Press, Abany, NY www.sunypress.edu

Productîon by Dana Foote Marketîng by Mîchae Campochîaro

Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data

Arîstote’s Poîtîcs today / edîted by Lenn E. Goodman, Robert B. Taîsse. p. cm. — (SUNY serîes în ancîent Greek phîosophy) Incudes bîbîographîca references and îndex. ISBN 978-0-7914-7227-9 (hardcover : ak. paper) 1. State, The. 2. Arîstote. Poîtîcs. I. Goodman, Lenn Evan, 1944– II. Taîsse, Robert B.

JC11.A75 2007 320.092—dc22

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2006101109

The Moraîty of Natîons: An Arîstoteîan Approach Lloyd P. Gerson

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Vîrtue-orîented Poîtîcs: Confucîus and Arîstote May Sîm

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Introductîon Lenn E. Goodman and Robert B. Talîsse

Arîstote and the Lîbera State Edward C. Halper

C ONTENTS

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Arîstoteîan Statecraft and Modern Poîtîcs Fred D. Mîller, Jr.

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Arîstote’sRegîme of the Amerîcans Peter L. P. Sîmpson

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Why Democrats Need the Vîrtues Robert B. Talîsse

Contrîbutors

Works Cîted

Index

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The Revot of the Just Eugene Garver

Arîstote’s Poîty Today Lenn E. Goodman

Index Locorum

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I NTRODUCTION Lenn E. Goodman and Robert B. Talîsse

we-known phîosopher who îved through amost a of the bad A habît îsn’t conined to phîosophers, of course. We’ve often seen prema- twentîeth century used to remark on the penchant some phîoso- phers have for announcîng the death of theîr own dîscîpîne. That ture obîtuarîes about art în genera or igura art în partîcuar, or yrîc poetry, or musîc, or meody, the nove, or reîgîon. It was even thought, around the end of the nîneteenth century, that physîcs was about inîshed and nothîng was eft but to i în the ast few decîma paces în the key Newtonîan constants. That was just on the eve of the Mîchaeson-Morey experîment, whîch paved the way for Eînsteîn’s work and opened the door to the expand- îng unîverse of quantum mechanîcs, the nucear age, and strîng theory. Our phîosopher, however, had îved ong enough to see metaphysîcs, poîtîca phîosophy, aesthetîcs, normatîve ethîcs and normatîve epîstemoogy, among other branches of phîosophîca înquîry, revîve more than once from the overhasty and sometîmes overeager death announcements. Hîs observatîon was that before ît had even become trîte to say that thîs or that varîety of phîosophy was washed up some young kîd woud start readîng Arîstote, and everythîng began anew and fresh. It was Arîstote who saîd that phîosophy begîns în wonder. He was too much a beîever în cyces of hîstory, too much Pato’s student, and too ready to probe the vîews of the many and the wîse to thînk thathe had started anythîng from scratch. But he dîd ay out în paîn terms, wîthout the coak of dîaogue or a thîck veî of poetîc tropes, many of the astîng questîons and învîtîng answers that have put phîosophers to work from hîs tîme down to our own. Nowhere was that more true than în poîtîca phîosophy. But îs ît true that Arîstote’s thoughts on poîtîcs have any îfe eft în them for today? What, we mîght ask, haveweto earn about poîtîcs from an ancîent thînker who wrote în Greek and îved at Athens but was not even an Athenîan, et aone a commîtted democrat? What have we to earn în poîtîca phîosophy from a man who coud accept savery as an înstîtutîon, who dîd not see women as men’s equas, who had a îvey înterest în hîstorîca and poîtîca tradîtîons but nothîng much to say about the poîtîcs of group îdentîty?

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L E. G R B. T ENN OODMAN AND OBERT ALISSE

A common answer, we suspect, îs that Arîstote has îtte to teach us modern îbera democrats. Aren’t Arîstote’s vîews on the nature and purpose of the state, the meanîng of cîtîzenshîp, and the orderîng of poîtîca înstî- tutîons not ony archaîc, because they rest on an expoded metaphysîcs, but unacceptabe, because they sîght the modern stapes of poîtîca egîtîmacy: forma equaîty, îndîvîdua rîghts, negatîve îberty, mora neutraîty, and demo- cratîc rue. For those who ind these fundamentas of normatîve dîscourse about poîtîcs însuficîent today, and who ca for more robust commîtments to dîfferentîa equaîty, group rîghts, and îdentîty caîms, Arîstote’s vîsîon of a poîty whose purpose îs to promote vîrtue seems even more remote. The chapters coected în thîs voume aîm to chaenge the common- pace perceptîon of Arîstote as a thînker as panted irmy în the “îberty of the ancîents”—and therefore îrreevant to those who seek to theorîze the “îberty of the moderns,” as Benjamîn Constant framed the contrast. The chapters represent dîfferent methodoogîca and conceptua focî. But they a endeavor to brîng Arîstote înto conversatîon wîth contemporary theorîsts. In most înstances, they ind that Arîstote îndeed has much to say to us. Consîder the questîon of equaîty. Arîstote îs a vauabe companîon în our dîscussîons here, precîsey for hîs openness. He does not share our famî- îar sayîsms about equaîty. He does not assume that a humans are equa în taent, skî, înteect, or abîîty. He does not even assume that we are a mora equas. Hîs vîews here jange our sensîbîîtîes, schooed în the sacred- ness of human dîgnîty and the rhetorîc of democracy. And yet, Arîstote’s freedom from the commîtments we hod dear makes hîm a puraîst about the varîetîes of equaîty, as he îs about so many other topîcs, from the marks of substantîaîty to the dîmensîons of human vîrtue. He can revîew the Pythagorean reductîon of justîce to recîprocîty, dîsmîss the mechanîca equa- tîon of justîce wîth sîmpy makîng “a man suffer what he dîd,” and stî extract from that crude tît-for-tat a subter, hîghy dîversîied notîon of re- quîta. The more nuanced notîon wî be appîcabe în commerce; but ît îs aso generaîzabe to themes of proportîon where equaîty of varîous kînds preserves the sense of equîty that Arîstote inds adumbrated în tempes to the Graces. The mutîfaceted concept he extracts inds îts artîcuacy în con- text, from the aw courts to the tennîs courts, and from works of ictîon and crîtîcîsm to reatîons of întîmacy and understandîng. Passed through Arîstote’s conceptua prîsm, equîty îs refracted înto a îts dîverse coors and recom- bîned înto a sînge îdea crîtîca to the foundatîon of any sound poîty or socîety. For the kerne of truth that Arîstote inds în the Pythagorean dîc- tum, through hîs habîtua practîce of “savîng the appearances,” not ony vîsuay but în the outooks of others, îs that justîce demands a kînd of equîty wîthout whîch human beîngs “woud thînk theîr posîtîon mere savery” (Nîcomachean Ethîcs 1133a7). The îdea of savery îs a irm pîvot poînt for much of Arîstote’s poîtîca thînkîng, not because he assumes that savery îs aways wrong but because he

I NTRODUCTION

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knows that no one gîven the freedom to choose woud opt to be a save. Savery, as Arîstote deines ît, îs the use of a human beîng as another’s too. It îs, în that sense, the utîmate vîoatîon of the Kantîan împeratîve never to subjugate another to the status of a mere means to an end. We human beîngs, for Arîstote, fui and exercîse our human nature when we are choosers of our own ends. Saves, as a condîtîon of theîr servîtude, cannot do that. They have uses, not ends of theîr own, and those uses are împosed. That Arîstote faîed to ind a way of îberatîng humanîty from the trammes of savery wîthout osîng the opportunîty for fuiment that he hed so precîous for the free matters ess today phîosophîcay than does hîs abîîty to pînpoînt just what ît îs that makes savery repugnant and unacceptabe. The standard he învokes but faîs to appy reaches far beyond the bare demand for emancîpatîon. For ît artîcuates the basîs for condemnîng and combatîng a forms of învîdîous expoîtatîon and abuse, from human trafickîng and sweat- shop abor to meretrîcîous sexuaîty and envîronmenta poîsonîng. It’s fashîonabe today to dîsparage the îdea of human nature. The notîon that one can derîve mora standards or poîtîca norms from a study of the human specîes and human personhood îs vîewed wîth suspîcîon, îf not aarm. Not ony do such efforts breach Hume’s barrîer betweenîsandoughtbut they seem to threaten the very fabrîc of dîversîty—ethnîc, cutura, and mora— that îs wîdey seen as the chîef and rîpest fruît of democracy, burstîng wîth the seeds of a postîbera dîspensatîon. Dîversîty, of course, îs precîous, and not east for what ît brîngs to and draws from the îdea of îberty. But human dîversîty does have îmîts, and îf prescrîptîve judgments and practîca îm- peratîves do foow from the recognîtîon that there are ony certaîn thîngs a human beîng can stand and ony certaîn thîngs that any human beîng shoud be asked to put up wîth (beîng ordered to the back of the bus or reegated to a racîay segregated schoo never among them), then we must recognîze a common core of humanness that deserves respect and demands dîgnîty; and we must acknowedge that the egîtîmate dîstînctîon between factîcîty and rîghtness does not precude the recognîtîon that there are facts about vaues and that the human person, qua human, îs a ocus of învîoabe deserts—and obîgatîons. Some of what Arîstote has to te us about poîtîcs comes în the form of sîmpe home truths that mîght sound îke cîches when speed out and mîght seem too obvîous to need statîng and yet, eementary as they are, have often been forgotten, quîte often wîfuy and wîth dangerous or tragîc con- sequences. Sometîmes an îdea îke Arîsote’s caîm that man îs azoon polîtîkon—that îs, a socîa anîma, a cîvîc beîng—sounds so famîîar and ooks so transparent on the page that we readîy ose track of how rîchy ied wîth împîcatîons these seemîngy sîmpe words can be. Readîng în Arîstote that habît îssecond nature or that a frîend îs a second sef, one rîsks osîng sîght atogether of the fu meanîng of the words and sîps unsefconscîousy înto the mode of the feow who saîd “What’s so great about Shakespeare? It’s just