Epistemology

Nicholas Rescher

Description

Guided by the founding ideas of American pragmatism, Epistemology provides a clear example of the basic concepts involved in knowledge acquisition and explains the principles at work in the development of rational inquiry. It examines how these principles analyze the course of scientific progress and how the development of scientific inquiry inevitably encounters certain natural disasters. At the center of the book's deliberations there lies not only the potential for scientific progress but also the limit of science as well. This comprehensive introduction to the theory of knowledge addresses a myriad of topics, including the critique of skepticism, the nature of rationality, the possibility of science for extraterrestrial intelligences, and the prospect of insoluble issues in science.

Preface

Introduction

KNOWLEDGE AND ITS PROBLEMS

1. Modes of Knowledge

Is Knowledge True Justified Belief?
Modes of (Propositional) Knowledge
Other Basic Principles

2. Fallibilism and Truth Estimation

Problems of Metaknowledge
The Preface Paradox
The Diallelus
An Apory and Its Reconciliation: K-Destabilization
Costs and Benefits
More on Fallibilism
The Comparative Fragility of Science: Scientific Claims as Mere Estimates
Fallibilism and the Distinction Between Our (Putative) Truth and the Real Truth

3. Skepticism and Its Deficits

The Skeptic's "No Certainty" Argument
The Role of Certainty
The Certainty of Logic Versus the Certainty of Life
Pragmatic Inconsistency
Skepticism and Risk
Rationality and Cognitive Risk
The Economic Dimension: Costs and Benefits
The Deficiency of Skepticism

4. Epistemic Justification in a Functionalistic and Naturalistic Perspective

Experience and Fact
Problems of Common-Cause Epistemology
Modes of Justification
The Evolutionary Aspect of Sensory Epistemology
Rational versus Natural Selection
Against "Pure" Intellectualism
The Problem of Error
Conclusion

5. Plausibility and Presumption

The Need for Presumptions
The Role of Presumption
Plausibility and Presumption
Presumption and Probability
Presumption and Skepticism
How Presumption Works: What Justifies Presumptions

6. Trust and Cooperation in Pragmatic Perspective

The Cost Effectiveness of Sharing and Cooperating in Information Acquisition and Management
The Advantages of Cooperation
Building Up Trust: An Economic Approach
Trust and Presumption
A Community of Inquirers

RATIONAL INQUIRY AND THE QUEST FOR TRUTH

7. Foundationalism and Coherentism

Hierarchical Systemization: The Euclidean Model of Knowledge
Cyclic Systemization: The Network Model—An Alternative to the Euclidean Model
The Contrast Between Foundationalism and Coherentism
Problems of Foundationalism

8. The Pursuit of Truth: Coherentist Criteriology

The Coherentist Approach to Inquiry
The Central Role of Data for a Coherentist Truth-Criteriology
On Validating the Coherence Approach
Ideal Coherence
Truth as an Idealization

9. Cognitive Relativism and Contextualism

Cognitive Realism
What's Wrong with Relativism
The Circumstantial Contextualism of Reason
A Foothold of One's Own: The Primacy of Our Own Position
The Arbitrament of Experience
Against Relativism
Contextualistic Pluralism is Compatible with Commitment on Pursuing "The Truth"
The Achilles' Heel of Relativism

10. The Pragmatic Rationale of Cognitive Objectivity

Objectivity and the Circumstantial University of Reason
The Basis of Objectivity
The Problem of Validating Objectivity
What is Right with Objectivism
Abandoning Objectivity is Pragmatically Self-Defeating

11. Rationality

Stage-Setting for the Problem
Optimum-Instability
Ideal versus Practical Rationality: The Predicament of Reason
The Problem of Validating Rationality
The Pragmatic Turn: Even Cognitive Rationality has a Pragmatic Rationale
Alternative Modes of Rationality?
The Self-Reliance of Rationality is Not Viciously Circular

COGNITIVE PROGR

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Épistémologie
• Epistémologie
• Epistémologie
• Epistémologie
• Philosophy of science
• Pragmatism

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 01 février 2012
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780791486375
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 2 Mo

Extrait

EpistemologySUNY series in Philosophy
George R. Lucas Jr., editorEpistemology
An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge
Nicholas Rescher
State University of New YorkPublished by
State University of New York Press, Albany
© 2003 State University of New York
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
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Production by Michael Haggett
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Rescher, Nicholas.
Epistemology : an introduction to the theory of knowledge / Nicholas
Rescher.
p. cm. — (SUNY series in philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7914-5811-3 (alk. paper) — ISBN 0-7914-5812-1 (pbk. : alk.
paper)
1. Knowledge, Theory of. I. Title. II. Series
BD161R477 2003
121—dc21
2003057270
10987654321Contents
Preface xi
Introduction xiii
KNOWLEDGE AND ITS PROBLEMS
Chapter 1: Modes of Knowledge 3
IS KNOWLEDGE TRUE JUSTIFIED BELIEF?3
MODES OF (PROPOSITIONAL) KNOWLEDGE 7
OTHER BASIC PRINCIPLES 10
Chapter 2: Fallibilism and Truth Estimation 15
PROBLEMS OF METAKNOWLEDGE 16
THE PREFACE PARADOX 19
THE DIALLELUS 22
AN APORY AND ITS RECONCILIATION:
K-DESTABILIZATION 23
COSTS AND BENEFITS 26
MORE ON FALLIBILISM 27
THE COMPARATIVE FRAGILITY OF SCIENCE:
SCIENTIFIC CLAIMS AS MERE ESTIMATES 30
FALLIBILISM AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
OUR (PUTATIVE) TRUTH AND THE REAL TRUTH 34
Chapter 3: Skepticism and Its Deficits 37
THE SKEPTIC’S “NO CERTAINTY”ARGUMENT 37
THE ROLE OF CERTAINTY 39
THE CERTAINTY OF LOGIC VERSUS
THE CERTAINTY OF LIFE 41
vvi Contents
PRAGMATIC INCONSISTENCY 42
SKEPTICISM AND RISK 45
RATIONALITY AND COGNITIVE RISK 49
THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION:COSTS AND BENEFITS 53
THE DEFICIENCY OF SKEPTICISM 56
Chapter 4: Epistemic Justification in a Functionalistic and
Naturalistic Perspective 61
EXPERIENCE AND FACT 61
PROBLEMS OF COMMON-CAUSE EPISTEMOLOGY 62
MODES OF JUSTIFICATION 64
THE EVOLUTIONARY ASPECT OF SENSORY EPISTEMOLOGY 68
RATIONAL VERSUS NATURAL SELECTION 69
AGAINST “PURE”INTELLECTUALISM 74
THE PROBLEM OF ERROR 76
CONCLUSION 78
Chapter 5: Plausibility and Presumption 81
THE NEED FOR PRESUMPTIONS 81
THE ROLE OF PRESUMPTION 85
PLAUSIBILITY AND PRESUMPTION 87
PRESUMPTION AND PROBABILITY 90
PRESUMPTION AND SKEPTICISM 92
HOW PRESUMPTION WORKS:WHAT JUSTIFIES
PRESUMPTIONS 96
Chapter 6: Trust and Cooperation in Pragmatic Perspective 101
THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF SHARING AND COOPERATING
IN INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND MANAGEMENT 101
THE ADVANTAGES OF COOPERATION 103
BUILDING UP TRUST:AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 104
TRUST AND PRESUMPTION 106
A COMMUNITY OF INQUIRERS 108
RATIONAL INQUIRY AND THE QUEST FOR TRUTH
Chapter 7: Foundationalism and Coherentism 113
HIERARCHICAL SYSTEMIZATION:THE EUCLIDEAN
MODEL OF KNOWLEDGE 113
CYCLIC SYSTEMIZATION:THE NETWORK MODEL—
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE EUCLIDEAN MODEL 118Contents vii
THE CONTRAST BETWEEN FOUNDATIONALISM
AND COHERENTISM 123
PROBLEMS OF FOUNDATIONALISM 128
Chapter 8: The Pursuit of Truth: Coherentist Criteriology 131
THE COHERENTIST APPROACH TO INQUIRY 131
THE CENTRAL ROLE OF DATA FOR A COHERENTIST
TRUTH-CRITERIOLOGY 135
ON VALIDATING THE COHERENCE APPROACH 139
IDEAL COHERENCE 145
TRUTH AS AN IDEALIZATION 147
Chapter 9: Cognitive Relativism and Contexualism 151
COGNITIVE REALISM 152
WHAT’S WRONG WITH RELATIVISM 154
THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL CONTEXTUALISM OF REASON 155
A FOOTHOLD OF ONE’S OWN:THE PRIMACY OF OUR
OWN POSITION 159
THE ARBITRAMENT OF EXPERIENCE 161
AGAINST RELATIVISM 165
CONTEXTUALISTIC PLURALISM IS COMPATIBLE WITH
COMMITMENT ON PURSUING “THE TRUTH” 168
THE ACHILLES’HEEL OF RELATIVISM 170
Chapter 10: The Pragmatic Rationale of Cognitive Objectivity 173
OBJECTIVITY AND THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL UNIVERSITY
OF REASON 173
THE BASIS OF OBJECTIVITY 175
THE PROBLEM OF VALIDATING OBJECTIVITY 177
WHAT IS RIGHT WITH OBJECTIVISM 180
ABANDONING OBJECTIVITY IS PRAGMATICALLY
SELF-DEFEATING 182
Chapter 11: Rationality 187
STAGE-SETTING FOR THE PROBLEM 187
OPTIMUM-INSTABILITY 188
IDEAL VERSUS PRACTICAL RATIONALITY:THE
PREDICAMENT OF REASON 190
THE PROBLEM OF VALIDATING RATIONALITY 193
THE PRAGMATIC TURN:EVEN COGNITIVE
RATIONALITY HAS A PRAGMATIC RATIONALE 196viii Contents
ALTERNATIVE MODES OF RATIONALITY? 198
THE SELF-RELIANCE OF RATIONALITY IS NOT
VICIOUSLY CIRCULAR 203
COGNITIVE PROGRESS
Chapter 12: Scientific Progress 209
THE EXPLORATION MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 210
THE DEMAND FOR ENHANCEMENT 211
TECHNOLOGICAL ESCALATION:AN ARMS RACE
AGAINST NATURE 212
THEORIZING AS INDUCTIVE PROJECTION 215
LATER NEED NOT BE LESSER 217
COGNITIVE COPERNICANISM 221
THE PROBLEM OF PROGRESS 223
Chapter 13: The Law of Logarithmic Returns and the
Complexification of Natural Science 229
THE PRINCIPLE OF LEAST EFFORT AND THE
METHODOLOGICAL STATUS OF SIMPLICITY-PREFERENCE
IN SCIENCE 230
COMPLEXIFICATION 234
THE EXPANSION OF SCIENCE 239
THE LAW OF LOGARITHMIC RETURNS 240
THE RATIONALE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW
OF LOGARITHMIC RETURNS 245
THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 248
THE DECELERATION OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 251
PREDICTIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE INFORMATION/
KNOWLEDGE RELATIONSHIP 253
THE CENTRALITY OF QUALITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 254
Chapter 14: The Imperfectability of Knowledge: Knowledge as
Boundless 257
CONDITIONS OF PERFECTED SCIENCE 257
THEORETICAL ADEQUACY:ISSUES OF EROTETIC
COMPLETENESS 259
PRAGMATIC COMPLETENESS 262
PREDICTIVE COMPLETENESS 264
TEMPORAL FINALITY 267Contents ix
“PERFECTED SCIENCE”ASAN IDEALIZATION THAT
AFFORDS A USEFUL CONTRAST CONCEPTION 271
THE DISPENSABILITY OF PERFECTION 274
COGNITIVE LIMITS AND THE QUEST FOR TRUTH
Chapter 15: The Rational Intelligibility of Nature 279
EXPLAINING THE POSSIBILITY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 279
“OUR”SIDE 282
NATURE’S SIDE 284
SYNTHESIS 287
IMPLICATIONS 289
Chapter 16: Human Science as Characteristically Human 293
THE POTENTIAL DIVERSITY OF “SCIENCE” 293
THE ONE WORLD,ONE SCIENCE ARGUMENT 297
A QUANTITATIVE PERSPECTIVE 299
COMPARABILITY AND JUDGMENTS OF RELATIVE
ADVANCEMENT OR BACKWARDNESS 305
BASIC PRINCIPLES 308
Chapter 17: On Ignorance, Insolubilia, and the Limits of Knowledge 315
CONCRETE VERSUS GENERIC KNOWLEDGE AND
IGNORANCE 316
EROTETIC INCAPACITY 317
DIVINE VERSUS MUNDANE KNOWLEDGE 318
ISSUES OF TEMPORALIZED KNOWLEDGE 319
KANT’S PRINCIPLE OF QUESTION EXFOLIATION 321
COGNITIVE INCAPACITY 323
INSOLUBILIA THEN AND NOW 324
COGNITIVE INCAPACITY 325
IDENTIFYING INSOLUBILIA 327
RELATING KNOWLEDGE TO IGNORANCE 329
POSTSCRIPT:A COGNITIVELY INDETERMINATE
UNIVERSE 330
Chapter 18: Cognitive Realism 333
EXISTENCE 334
IS MAN THE MEASURE? 335
REALISM AND INCAPACITY 337x Contents
THE COGNITIVE OPACITY OF REAL THINGS 339
THE COGNITIVE INEXHAUSTIBILITY OF THINGS 341
THE CORRIGIBILITY OF CONCEPTIONS 343
THE COGNITIVE INEXHAUSTIBILITY OF THINGS 344
COGNITIVE DYNAMICS 345
CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF REALISM AS A POSTULATE 347
HIDDEN DEPTHS:THE IMPETUS TO REALISM 352
THE PRAGMATIC FOUNDATION OF REALISM AS A BASIS
FOR COMMUNICATION AND DISCOURSE 355
THE IDEALISTIC ASPECT OF METAPHYSICAL REALISM 360
SCIENCE AND REALITY 361
Notes 369
Index 403PREFACE
This book is based on work in epistemology extending over several
decades. It combines into a systematic whole ideas, arguments, and doctrines
evolved in various earlier investigations. The time has at last seemed right to
combine these deliberations into a single systematic whole and this book is the
result.
Philosophers are sometimes heard to say that the present is a
post-epistemological era and that epistemology is dead. But this is rubbish. If the time
ever came when people ceased to care for epistemological questions—as
illustrated by the topics treated in the present book—it would not be just
epistemology that has expired but human curiosity itself.
I am grateful to Estelle Burris for her competence and patience in putting
this material into a form where it can meet the printer’s needs.
Nicholas Rescher
Pittsburgh
March 2002
xiIntroduction
The mission of epistemology, the theory of knowledge, is to clarify what the
conception of knowledge involves, how it is applied, and to explain why it has
the features it does. And the idea of knowledge at issue here must, in the first
instance at least, be construed in its modest sense to include also belief, conjecture,
and the like. For it is misleading to call cognitive theory at large “epistemology”
or “the theory of knowledge.” Its range of concern includes not only knowledge
proper but also rational belief, probability, plausibility, evidentiation
and—additionally but not least—erotetics, the business of raising and resolving questions.
It is this last area—the theory of rational inquiry with its local concern for
questions and their management—that constitutes the focus of the present book. Its
aim is to maintain and substantiate the utility of approaching epistemological
issues from the angle of questions. As Aristotle already indicated, human inquiry
is grounded in wonder. When matters are running along in their accustomed
way, we generally do not puzzle about it and stop to ask questions. But when
things are in any way out of the ordinary we puzzle over the reason why and seek
for an explanation. And gradually our horizons expand. With increasing
sophistication, we learn to be surprised by virtually all of it. We increasingly want to
know what makes things tick—the ordinary as well as the extraordinary, so that
questions gain an increasing prominence within epistemology in general.
Any profitable discussion of knowledge does well to begin by recognizing
some basic linguistic facts about how the verb to know and its cognates actually
function in the usual range of relevant disco