Kant on Causation

Steven M. Bayne

Description

Kant famously confessed that Hume's treatment of cause and effect woke him from his dogmatic slumber. According to Hume, the concept of cause does not arise through reason, but through force of habit. Kant believes this can be avoided through the development of a revolutionary new cognitive framework as presented in the Critique of Pure Reason. Focusing on the Second Analogy and other important texts from the first Critique, as well as texts from the Critique of Judgment, the author discusses the nature of Kant's causal principle, the nature of his proof for this principle, and the status of his intended proof. Bayne argues that the key to understanding Kant's proof is his discussion of objects of representations, and that it is his investigation into the requirements for an event's being an object of representations that enables him to develop his proof of the causal principle.

Acknowledgments

Introduction

1. Relationships

Concepts and intuitions

Kant's introduction to the problem of the Schematism and his introductory solution
Kant's true task in the Schematism
Leibniz
Hume
Leibniz, Hume, Kant, and applicability
The importance of the Schematism
A problem with Kant's account of the Schematism

The transcendental deduction and the principles

Principles of Understanding and Principles of Reason

Analogies of Experience

Kant and Hume

Hume's Doubt
Hume's reasons for doubting the possibility of demonstration
Transcendental proof and Kant's proof of the causal principle

2. The Causal Principle

The principle of the second analogy

Evaluation of Possible Interpretations of the Formulation of the Causal Principle

The Same-Cause-Same-Effect thesis
The Every-Event-Some-Cause thesis

3. The Fivefold Routes to the Principle of Causation

Possible Argument Strategies

Evaluation of Argument Strategies

The Veridical Strategy
The Event/Object Strategy
The Event/Event Strategy
The Justification Strategy

4. The Irreversibility Argument

Lovejoy's Position

Strawson's Position

Bennett's Position

Melnick's Position

Guyer's Position

The house, the ship, and irreversibility

5. Objects of Representations

The principle of the Second Analogy

Subject to a rule

Objects of representations and being subject to a rule

Irreversibility revisited: Are successions of appearances' subject to a rule?

An example for the official definition

Successions of appearances must be subject to a rule

Problems and Defense

The requirements for a succession of appearances being subject to a rule
Are my requirements too strong?
Are my requirements too weak?

Repeatability
Necessary Order

Textual Worries

Repeatability
Necessary Order and Necessity
Is this really a causal theory?

6. Hume Revisited

A brief review

Transcendental proof and the mistake strategy

A problem with Kant's transcendental proof and mistake strategy

The implications of this problem

Turning the copy thesis on its head

Problem: Drawing the distinction between a beginning of existence and a cause of existence

Final Status of Kant's Answer to Hume

Conclusion

On the Guide(s) to the Discovery of the Route to the Principle of Causation

The house, the ship, and irreversibility
The nature of the principle of the Second Analogy

Synthetic and a priori
Constitutive versus regulative

Objects of representations

Object of Experience Strategies

Bibliography

Index

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Philosophie moderne
• Philosophie moderne

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 01 février 2012
• Nombre de lectures: 2
• EAN13: 9780791485897
• Langue: English

Extrait

Kant on Causation

SUNY series in Philosophy George R. Lucas Jr., editor

Kant on Causation

On the Fivefold Routes to the Principle of Causation

Steven M. Bayne

State University of New York Press

Published by State University of New York Press, Albany

© 2004 State University of New York

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Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data

Bayne, Steven M. Kant on causation : on the fivefold routes to the principle of causation / Steven M. Bayne. p. cm. — (SUNY series in philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7914-5901-2 (alk. paper) — ISBN 0-7914-5902-0 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Kant, Immanuel, 1724–1804. 2. Causation. I. Title. II. Series.

B2799.C3B39 2003 122'.092—dc22

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2003190073

Acknowledgments

Introduction

C ONTENTS

1 Relationships Concepts and intuitions Kant’s introduction to the problem of the Schematism and his introductory solution Kant’s true task in the Schematism Leibniz Hume Leibniz, Hume, Kant, and applicability The importance of the Schematism A problem with Kant’s account of the Schematism The transcendental deduction and the principles Principles of Understanding and Principles of Reason Analogies of Experience Kant and Hume Hume’s Doubt Hume’s reasons for doubting the possibility of demonstration Transcendental proof and Kant’s proof of the causal principle

2 The Causal Principle The principle of the second analogy. Evaluation of Possible Interpretations of the Formulation of the Causal Principle The Same-Cause-Same-Effect thesis The Every-Event-Some-Cause thesis

3 The Fivefold Routes to the Principle of Causation Possible Argument Strategies Evaluation of Argument Strategies The Veridical Strategy The Event/Object Strategy The Event/Event Strategy The Justification Strategy

v

ix

xi

1 2

3 4 4 5 7 9 10 13 16 22 26 28 30 32

35 35

39 39 43

45 45 51 52 55 58 67

vi

4

5

6

C ONTENTS

The Irreversibility Argument Lovejoy’s Position Strawson’s Position Bennett’s Position Melnick’s Position Guyer’s Position The house, the ship, and irreversibility

Objects of Representations The principle of the Second Analogy Subject to a rule Objects of representations and being subject to a rule Irreversibility revisited: Are successions of appearances subject to a rule? An example for the official definition Successions of appearances must be subject to a rule Problems and Defense The requirements for a succession of appearances’ being subject to a rule Are my requirements too strong? Are my requirements too weak? Repeatability Necessary Order Textual Worries Repeatability Necessary Order and Necessity Is this really a causal theory?

Hume Revisited A brief review Transcendental proof and the mistake strategy A problem with Kant’s transcendental proof and mistake strategy The implications of this problem Turning the copy thesis on its head Problem: Drawing the distinction between a beginning of existence and a cause of existence Final Status of Kant’s Answer to Hume

Conclusion On the Guide(s) to the Discovery of the Route to the Principle of Causation The house, the ship, and irreversibility

75 76 81 87 89 92 97

103 104 107 108

112 116 118 120

120 121 123 123 126 128 128 130 135

137 137 139 143 144 146

148 150

153

153 154

Contents

The nature of the principle of the Second Analogy Synthetic anda priori Constitutive versus regulative Objects of representations Object of Experience Strategies

Bibliography

Index

vii

157 157 158 160 162

167

173

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A CKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Lee Brown, Charlie Kielkopf, George Pappas, and Ralf Meerbote for their helpful comments on the philosophical predecessors to some sections of this book. I would like to thank the anonymous referee for theJournal of the History of Philosophywho back in 1993 forced me to begin to come to grips with my position on the nature of the necessity in- volved in Kant’s causal principle. I would like to thank the reviewers from the State University of New York Press: Anonymous Reviewer A and Eric Watkins (formerly Anonymous Reviewer B) whose extensive comments on the manuscript were invaluable in my attempt to make this a better book. Portions of chapters 1 and 6 include material first published in my article “Kant’s Answer to Hume: How Kant Should Have Tried to Stand Hume’s Copy Thesis on Its Head,” in theBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy8(2) 2000: 207–24. Chapters 2 through 5 include material first published in my article “Objects of Representations and Kant’s Second Anal- ogy,” in theJournal of the History of Philosophy32, No. 3 (1994) 381–410. I am grateful to the editors of these journals for their kind permission to reproduce this material here. I would like to thank my colleagues at Fairfield University, because without their support over the years I do not believe this book would have ever been written. I would like to thank Tony and Helen Chirakos as well as Pierluigi and Laurie Miraglia for their friendship throughout the preparation of this book. I would like to thank my parents Paul and Myra Bayne, because without their help I would never have become more than apossibleobject of representations. Finally, I would like to thank my wife Laura S. Keating for her sustained philosophical as well as emotional support—without her I would be a much less happy object of representations.

ix