Logic and Philosophy

William H. Brenner

Description

The dual purpose of this volume—to provide a distinctively philosophical introduction to logic, as well as a logic-oriented approach to philosophy—makes this book a unique and worthwhile primary text for logic and/or philosophy courses. Logic and Philosophy covers a variety of elementary formal and informal types of reasoning, including a chapter on traditional logic that culminates in a treatment of Aristotle's philosophy of science; a truth-functional logic chapter that examines Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, logic, and mysticism; and sections on induction, analogy, and fallacies that incorporate material on mind-body dualism, pseudoscience, the "raven paradox," and proofs of God.

Throughout the book Brenner highlights passages and ideas from various prominent philosophers, and discusses at some length the work of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, and Wittgenstein.

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Métaphysique
• Épistémologie
• Philosophie de la religion
• mysticism
• Religious
• PHILOSOPHY
• Philosophie et théologie
• Descartes
• God
• Logic
• Metaphysics
• Immanuel Kant
• Aristotle
• Plato
• History
• Emmanuel Kant
• René Descartes
• Ludwig Wittgenstein

Informations

• Publié par: University of Notre Dame Press
• Date de parution: 30 septembre 1993
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780268158989
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 4 Mo

Extrait

LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY
An Integrated Introduction
Logic and Philosophy
AN INTEGRATED INTRODUCTION
W ILLIAM H. B RENNER
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS NOTRE DAME
University of Notre Dame Press
Notre Dame, Indiana 46556
www.undpress.nd.edu
All Rights Reserved
Published in the United States of America
Copyright 1993 by University of Notre Dame
Reprinted in 2009
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Brenner, William H., 1941-
Logic and philosophy : an integrated introduction / William H. Brenner.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 13: 978-0-268-01299-1 (pbk. alk. paper)
ISBN 10: 0-268-01299-7 (pbk. alk. paper)
1. Logic. 2. Philosophy I. Title.
BC51.B664 1993
160-dc20
94-15464
CIP
ISBN 9780268158989
This book is printed on acid-free paper .
This e-Book was converted from the original source file by a third-party vendor. Readers who notice any formatting, textual, or readability issues are encouraged to contact the publisher at [e-mail] .
T O M ARY D EEGAN
Contents
Preface
I.
Introduction
A. Thales to Aristotle
B. Logic and Philosophy
II.
Traditional Logic
A. Terms, Statements, Syllogisms
B. More Syllogisms
C. The Four Causes
D. Definitions
III.
Modern Logic
A. Truth Functions
B. Truth Tables
C. Formal Deductions
D. More Formal Deductions
E. Language, Logic, and the Meaning of Life
IV.
Non-Deductive Reasoning
A. Induction
B. Non-Inductive Reasoning by Analogy
C. The Dualism Argument
D. Varieties of Argument
V.
Fallacies
A. Begging the Question, Inconsistency, and Non Sequitur
B. More Non Sequiturs
C. The Naturalistic Fallacy
VI.
Plato and Kant
A. The Empirical / A Priori Distinction
B. Care of the Soul
C. Synthetic A Priori Knowledge
D. The Starry Skies Above and the Moral Law Within
VII.
Descartes and Wittgenstein
A. Mind and Body
B. Subject and Object
C. Meaning as Use
D. Theology as Grammar
E. Essence Is Expressed by Grammar
VIII.
Conclusion
A. Thales to Aristotle
B. Logic and Philosophy
C. Checklist
Appendix 1: Rules of the Syllogism
Appendix 2: Venn Diagrams
Appendix 3: Recommended Readings
Appendix 4: Answers to Selected Exercises
Glossary of Terms and Names
Notes
Index
Preface
In the Western philosophical tradition, logical investigation and general philosophical advance have gone hand in hand, each stimulating and shaping the other. The present volume contributes to an understanding of this tradition by presenting a broad range of logical concepts and methods in relation to the larger context of philosophical investigation. The philosophical depth of logic, and its relevance to philosophy generally, are thereby brought to light.
Learning philosophy, or deepening one s understanding of it, involves developing certain skills and sensitivities. The exercises at the end of each section are designed to help make such learning possible. (When it appears after the number of an exercise, # indicates a relatively demanding question or project; * after the number means that there is an answer to the exercise at the back of the book.)
Learning philosophy also requires becoming familiar with the work of master philosophers. A few such philosophers are discussed in this book at some length. Readers unfamiliar with these philosophers will be stimulated, I hope, to read some of their works. And I hope that readers already well-versed in philosophy will find in this volume an illuminating perspective on familiar material. (I have consigned some important but less-central material to footnotes. These footnotes are best read the second time around. )
Chapter III , Modern Logic, contains most of the more technical material. Although what it covers has philosophical depth as well as (modest) technical sophistication, it may be omitted with little loss of continuity. Omitting that chapter (and supplementing what remains with readings from the classics) would tilt one s study toward a standard introduction to philosophy ; keeping it (while adding the first two appendices and subtracting sections from the last chapters) would tilt one s study toward a standard introduction to logic. Either approach would provide an integrated introduction to logic and philosophy. Of course, the best approach, time permitting, would be to omit nothing.
It may go without saying but I will say it anyway: once past the elements of deductive and inductive reasoning, the material in this book gets less standard and more controversial.
* * *
I have profited greatly from the suggestions and corrections of many readers-Mary Deegan, Dan Devereux, Val Derlega, Cora Diamond, Rod Evans, Lynne Garris, Lewis Ford, Larry Hatab, David James, Harry K. Jones, William B. Jones, Michael J. Loux, David Loomis, John Marshall, Jr., Mary E. Marshall, Warren Matthews, Leemon McHenry, Vincent Vacarro, Steven J. Wagner, Shigeru Yonezawa, and many Old Dominion University students from several courses. Of course, none of these patient and generous readers are responsible for the deficiencies that remain.
Portions of Chapters I - V appear in my contribution to Reflections on Philosophy , a collection of essays edited by Leemon McHenry and Fred Adams (St. Martin s Press, 1992). The editors and the publisher s readers were most helpful.
My biggest debt is to Ludwig Wittgenstein. Most sections owe something to the influence of his logico-philosophical writings, as I understand them.
I. Introduction

Socrates (c. 469-399 B.C .)
A. THALES TO ARISTOTLE
Western philosophy began in ancient Greece. In the sixth century B.C . Thales of Miletus claimed that everything is made of one material, namely hydor -water. His fellow Milesian Anaximander criticized this view, reasoning that nothing made of fire could be made of water, since all things made of water are essentially wet and cool, while nothing made of fire is essentially wet and cool. Anaximander proceeded to propose his own theory. Suffice it to say here that Thales and Anaximander between them initiated a tradition of systematic reasoning about the fundamental principles of nature, a tradition that, in the fifth century B.C ., gave us the famous atomism of Democritus:
By convention there is sweet, by convention there is bitter, by convention hot and cold, by convention color; but in reality there are only atoms and the void. 1
Also in the fifth century B.C . an Athenian Greek by the name of Socrates argued that there is a radical difference between the physical causes put forward by the natural philosophers from Thales to Democritus and the moral ideals that can move human beings to action. And he initiated a tradition of systematic reasoning about such moral principles. Plato, in the fourth century, wrote the dialogues that were to make Socrates famous. He also founded the first university, the Academy.
Aristotle studied at the Academy for twenty years. Along with (and sometimes in opposition to) his master Plato, he continued the inquiries pioneered by both Socrates and the natural philosophers. And he invented a new discipline-the systematic investigation of the principles of reasoning known as logic.
Looking back at the inquiries of his predecessors from Thales to Plato, Aristotle saw that they not only stated opinions about various subjects but also reasoned about them; he saw further that their reasoning could be analyzed into units- units of reasoning that he termed arguments. An argument is composed of at least two statements, one of which (the conclusion ) is claimed to follow from the other statement or statements (the premise or premises ). Thus, from the premises

No things made of water are essentially hot and dry and All things made of fire are essentially hot and dry,
Anaximander had drawn the conclusion

Nothing made of fire is made of water.
And from the premises,

No physical causes are reasons, and All moral ideals are reasons,
Socrates had concluded

No moral ideals are physical causes .
The preceding arguments are deductive: in a deductive argument the conclusion is claimed to follow necessarily from its premises. The preceding arguments are also valid: in a valid deductive argument the conclusion does follow necessarily from its premises, as claimed. (Non-deductive arguments will be ignored until Chapter IV .)
Characteristically, the validity of deductive arguments is determined by logical form. Aristotle was the first to perceive and develop this point. For example, he saw that although the preceding two arguments differ radically in subject matter, they have the same logical form, namely:

No P are M.
All S are M.
No S are P.
( stands for therefore, thus, or consequently. M, P , and S are blanks that can be filled in with any terms [ things made of water, gods, and the like].)
The preceding logical form can be represented in a diagram such as the following:

Explanation: Since nothing in M is in P , and everything in S is in M , nothing in S is in P .
Both of the preceding arguments (Anaximander s and Socrates ) are valid because they embody this form. Any argument of the same form will be valid, no matter what terms are substituted for P, M , and S. Therefore, the following argument is valid:

No cats are meat-eaters.
All tigers are meat-eaters.
No tigers are cats.
This is just as valid as the preceding cases. Of course, we do not accept both of its premises! But if we did, then (to be consistent) we would have to accept the conclusion as well. If we start with true premises, then we are bound to get a true conclusion. Valid deduction preserves truth . In other words: valid deductive reasoning rules out even the possibility of all true premises and a false conclusion.
Although the preceding argument about tigers is valid, it is not, for all that, a good argument. A good argument has to be sound. A sound argument has true premises (only true premises), as well as validity (that is,