Natural Philosophy

Wilhelm Ostwald, Thomas Seltzer

Description

Along with several collaborators, Russian-born chemist Wilhelm Ostwald is regarded as one of the key figures in developing the field now known as physical chemistry. In 1909, he was awarded the Nobel Prize for his work on catalysis and several other key processes. In this comprehensive volume, Ostwald lays out a complete scientific system and relates it to many other topics, including cognition and probability.

Sujets

• Philosophie et théologie
• Philosophy of science

Informations

• Publié par: The Floating Press
• Date de parution: 01 juillet 2014
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781776584215
• Langue: English

Extrait

NATURAL PHILOSOPHY
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WILHELM OSTWALD
Translated by
THOMAS SELTZER
 
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Natural Philosophy First published in 1910 Epub ISBN 978-1-77658-421-5 Also available: PDF ISBN 978-1-77658-422-2 © 2013 The Floating Press and its licensors. All rights reserved. While every effort has been used to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the information contained in The Floating Press edition of this book, The Floating Press does not assume liability or responsibility for any errors or omissions in this book. The Floating Press does not accept responsibility for loss suffered as a result of reliance upon the accuracy or currency of information contained in this book. Do not use while operating a motor vehicle or heavy equipment. Many suitcases look alike. Visit www.thefloatingpress.com
Contents
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Preface Introduction PART I - GENERAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 1 - The Formation of Concepts 2 - Science 3 - The Aim of Science 4 - Concrete and Abstract 5 - The Subjective Part 6 - Empirical Concepts 7 - Simple and Complex Concepts 8 - The Conclusion 9 - The Natural Laws 10 - The Law of Causation 11 - The Purification of the Causal Relation 12 - Induction 13 - Deduction 14 - Ideal Cases 15 - The Determinateness of Things 16 - The Freedom of the Will 17 - The Classification of the Sciences 18 - The Applied Sciences PART II - LOGIC, THE SCIENCE OF THE MANIFOLD, AND MATHEMATICS 19 - The Most General Concept 20 - Association 21 - The Group 22 - Negation 23 - Artificial and Natural Groups 24 - Arrangement of the Members 25 - Numbers 26 - Arithmetic, Algebra, and the Theory of Numbers 27 - Co-Ordination 28 - Comparison 29 - Counting 30 - Signs and Names 31 - The Written Language 32 - Pasigraphy and Sound Writing 33 - Sound Writing 34 - The Science of Language 35 - Continuity 36 - Measurement 37 - The Function 38 - The Application of the Functional Relation 39 - The Law of Continuity 40 - Time and Space 41 - Recapitulation PART III - THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES 42 - General 43 - Mechanics 44 - Kinetic Energy 45 - Mass and Matter 46 - Energetic Mechanics 47 - The Mechanistic Theories 48 - Complementary Branches of Mechanics 49 - The Theory of Heat 50 - The Second Fundamental Principle 51 - Electricity and Magnetism 52 - Light 53 - Chemical Energy PART IV - THE BIOLOGIC SCIENCES 54 - Life 55 - The Storehouse of Free Energy 56 - The Soul 57 - Feeling, Thinking, Acting 58 - Society 59 - Language and Intercourse 60 - Civilization Endnotes
Preface
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The beginning of the twentieth century is marked by a sudden rise ofinterest in philosophy. This is especially manifest in the vast growthof philosophic literature. The present movement, it is noteworthy, is byno means a revival proceeding from the academic philosophy traditionallyrepresented at the universities, but has rather the original characterof natural philosophy . It owes its origin to the fact that after thespecialization of the last half century, the synthetic factors ofscience are again vigorously asserting themselves. The need finally toconsider all the numerous separate sciences from a general point of viewand to find the connection between one's own activity and the work ofmankind in its totality, must be regarded as the most prolific source ofthe present philosophic movement, just as it was the source of thenatural philosophic endeavors a hundred years ago.
But while that old natural philosophy soon ended in a boundless sea ofspeculation, the present movement gives promise of permanent results,because it is built upon an extremely broad basis of experience. Thelaws of energy in the inorganic world and the laws of evolution in theorganic world furnish mental instruments for a conceptual elaborationof the material provided by science, instruments capable not only ofunifying present knowledge, but also of evoking the knowledge of thefuture. If it is not permissible to regard this unification asexhaustive and sufficient for all time, yet there is still so much leftfor us to do in working over the material we have on hand from thegeneral points of view just mentioned, that the need for systematizingmust be satisfied before we can turn our gaze upon things more remote.
The present work is meant to serve as the first aid and guide in theacquisition of these comprehensive notions of the external world and theinner life. It is not meant to develop or uphold a "system ofphilosophy." Through long experience as a teacher the writer has learnedthat those are the best pupils who soon go their own way. However, it is meant to uphold a certain method, that is, the scientific (or, ifyou will, the natural scientific), which takes its problems, andendeavors to solve its problems, from experience and for experience. If,as a result, several points of view arise that differ from those of thepresent day, and consequently demand a different attitude towardimportant matters in the immediate future, this very fact affords proofthat our present natural philosophy does not lead away from life, butaims to form a part of our life, and has a right to.
Introduction
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Natural science and natural philosophy are not two provinces mutuallyexclusive of each other. They belong together. They are like two roadsleading to the same goal. This goal is the domination of nature by man,which the various natural sciences reach by collecting all theindividual actual relations between the natural phenomena, placing themin juxtaposition, and seeking to discover their interdependence, uponthe basis of which one phenomenon may be foretold from another with moreor less certainty. Natural philosophy accompanies these specializedlabors and generalizations with similar labors and generalizations, onlyof a more universal nature. For instance, while the science ofelectricity, as a branch of physics, deals with the relation ofelectrical phenomena to one another and to phenomena in other branchesof physics, natural philosophy is not only concerned with the questionof the mutual connection of all physical relations, but also endeavorsto include in the sphere of its study chemical, biological,astronomical, in short, all the known phenomena. In other words, natural philosophy is the most general branch of natural science .
Here two questions are usually asked. First, how can we define theboundary line between natural philosophy and the special sciences,since, obviously, sharp lines of demarcation are out of the question?Secondly, how can we investigate and teach natural philosophy, when itis impossible for any one person to master all the sciences completely,and so obtain a bird's-eye view of the general relations between all thebranches of knowledge? To the beginner especially, who must first learnthe various sciences, it seems quite hopeless to devote himself to astudy that presupposes a command of them.
Since a discussion of the two questions will afford an excellentpreliminary survey of the work in hand, it will be well to consider themin detail. In the first place, the lack of complete and preciseboundary lines is a general characteristic of all natural things , andscience is a natural thing. If, for instance, we try to differentiatesharply between physics and chemistry, we are met with the samedifficulty. So also in biology if we try to settle beyond the shadow ofa doubt the line of separation between the animal and the vegetablekingdoms.
If, despite this well-known impossibility, we consider the division ofnatural things into classes and orders as by no means useless and do notdiscard it, but regard it as an important scientific work, this ispractical proof that such classification preserves its essentialusefulness, even if it does not attain ideal definiteness. For, thisimperfection notwithstanding, classification reaches its end, which isa comprehensive view, and thus a mastery, of the manifoldness ofphenomena. For example, with the overwhelming majority of organic beingsthere is no doubt whether they are animals or plants. Similarly, mostphenomena of inorganic nature can readily be designated as physical orchemical. For all such cases, therefore, the existing classification isgood and useful. The few cases presenting difficulty may very well beconsidered by themselves wherever they occur, and we need merely takecognizance of them here. It follows from this, to be sure, thatclassification will be all the better fitted to its purpose the lessfrequently such doubtful cases arise, and that we have an interest inrepeatedly testing existing classifications with a view to finding outif they cannot be supplanted by more suitable ones.
In these matters it is much the same as when we look upon the waves onthe surface of a large body of water. Our first glance tells us that anumber of waves are rolling there; and from a point giving us asufficiently wide outlook, we can count them and gauge their width. Butwhere is the line of division between one wave and the next? Weundoubtedly see one wave following another, yet it is impossible for usto indicate precisely the end of one and the beginning of the next. Arewe then to deduce that it is superfluous or unfeasible to designate thewaves as different? By no means. On the contrary, in strictlyscientific work we will endeavor to find some suitable definition of theboundary line between two consecutive waves. It may then be called anarbitrary line, and in a degree arbitrary it will certainly be. But tothe investigator this does not matter. What concerns him is, if, withthe help of this definition, wave lengths can be unequivocallydetermined, and if this is possible, he will use the definition assuitable to the purposes of science, without dismissing from his mindthe idea that possibly some other definition may provide an even easieror sharper determination. Such an one he would instantly prefer to theold one.
Thus we see that these questions of classification are not questions ofthe so-called "essence" of the thing, but pertain merely to purelypractical arrangements for an easier and mor