Philosophy of the Moral Feelings

John Abercrombie

Description

John Abercrombie was a Scottish medical doctor who dedicated his spare time to dabbling in philosophy. Over the course of his career, he produced a number of well-regarded volumes on philosophy. In The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings, Abercrombie presents a systematic overview of human emotions, their sources, and their moral and ethical implications.

Sujets

• Philosophie et théologie

Informations

• Publié par: The Floating Press
• Date de parution: 01 juillet 2014
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781776580514
• Langue: English

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MORAL FEELINGS
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JOHN ABERCROMBIE
 
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The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings First published in 1833 Epub ISBN 978-1-77658-051-4 Also available: PDF ISBN 978-1-77658-052-1 © 2014 The Floating Press and its licensors. All rights reserved. While every effort has been used to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the information contained in The Floating Press edition of this book, The Floating Press does not assume liability or responsibility for any errors or omissions in this book. The Floating Press does not accept responsibility for loss suffered as a result of reliance upon the accuracy or currency of information contained in this book. Do not use while operating a motor vehicle or heavy equipment. Many suitcases look alike. Visit www.thefloatingpress.com
Contents
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Preface Preliminary Observations Philosophyofthe Moral Feelings Part I - Of the Desires, the Affections, and Self-Love Part II - Of the Will Part III - Of the Moral Principle, or Conscience Part IV - Of the Moral Relation of Man Towards the Deity Endnotes
Preface
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In a former work, the Author endeavoured to delineate, in a simple andpopular form, the leading facts relating to the Intellectual Powers, andto trace the principles which ought to guide us in the Investigation ofTruth. The volume which he now offers to the public attention, isintended as a sequel to these Inquiries; and his object in it is toinvestigate, in the same unpretending manner, the Moral Feelings of theHuman Mind, and the principles which ought to regulate our volitions andour conduct as moral and responsible beings. The two branches ofinvestigation are, in many respects, closely connected; and, on thisaccount, it may often happen, that, in the present work, principles areassumed as admitted or proved, which, in the former, were stated atlength, with the evidence by which they are supported.
In presenting a fifth edition of this volume, the Author feels mostdeeply the favourable manner in which it has been received, and thenotice which has been bestowed upon it by those whose approbation heregards as a distinction of the most gratifying kind. He had two objectschiefly in view when he ventured upon this investigation. The one was todivest his inquiry of all unprofitable speculation, and to shew that thephilosophy of the moral feelings bears directly upon a practical purposeof the highest moment,—the mental and moral culture of every rationalbeing. The other was to shew the close and important relation whichexists between this science and the doctrines of revealed religion, andthe powerful evidence which is derived, for the truth of both, from themanner in which they confirm and illustrate each other. These twosources of knowledge cannot be separated, in the estimation of any onewho feels the deep interest of the inquiry, and seriously prosecutes theimportant question,—what is truth. If we attempt to erect thephilosophy of morals into an independent science, we shall soon findthat its highest inductions only lead us to a point beyond which we arecondemned to wander in doubt and in darkness. But, on the other hand, bydepreciating philosophy, or the light which is derived from the moralimpressions of the mind, we deprive ourselves of a most important sourceof evidence in support of revelation. For it is from these impressions,viewed in connexion with the actual state of man, that we learn thenecessity, and the moral probability, of a revelation; and it is byprinciples existing in the mind that we are enabled to feel the power ofthat varied and incontrovertible evidence, by which revelation comes tothe candid inquirer with all the authority of truth.
EDINBURGH, November 1838.
Preliminary Observations
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SECT I - NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE SCIENCE OF THE MORAL FEELINGS
Man is to be contemplated as an intellectual, and as a moral being. Byhis intellectual powers, he acquires the knowledge of facts, observestheir connexions, and traces the conclusions which arise out of them.These mental operations, however, even in a high state of cultivation,may be directed entirely to truths of an extrinsic kind,—that is, tosuch as do not exert any influence either on the moral condition of theindividual, or on his relations to other sentient beings. They may existin an eminent degree in the man who lives only for himself, and feelslittle beyond the personal wants, or the selfish enjoyments of the hourthat is passing over him.
But, when we contemplate man as a moral being, new relations open on ourview, and these are of mightier import. We find him occupying a place ina great system of moral government, in which he has an important stationto fill and high duties to perform. We find him placed in certainrelations to a great moral Governor, who presides over this system ofthings, and to a future state of being for which the present scene isintended to prepare him. We find him possessed of powers which qualifyhim to feel these relations, and of principles calculated to guide himthrough the solemn responsibilities which attend his state of moraldiscipline.
These two parts of his mental constitution we perceive to be remarkablydistinct from each other. The former may be in vigorous exercise in himwho has little feeling of his moral condition,—and the latter may be ina high state of culture in the man, who, in point of intellectualacquirement, knows little beyond the truths which it most concerns himto know,—those great but simple principles which guide his conduct asa responsible being.
In a well-regulated mind, there is an intimate harmony and co-operationbetween these two departments of the mental economy. Knowledge, receivedthrough the powers of sensation and simple intellect, whether relatingto external things, or to mental phenomena,—and conclusions derivedfrom these through the powers of reasoning, ought all to contribute tothat which is the highest state of man,—his purity as a moral being.They ought all to lend their aid towards the cultivation of thoseprinciples of his nature which bind him to his fellow-men;—and thosehigher principles still, which raise his feeble powers to the EternalIncomprehensible One, the first great cause of all things, and the moralGovernor of the universe.
A slight degree of observation is sufficient to convince us, that such aregulated condition of the mental constitution does not exist in thegenerality of mankind. It is not my present purpose to inquire into thecauses by which this is primarily deranged; but it may be interesting totrace some of the circumstances which bear a part in producing thederangement. In our present state of being, we are surrounded withobjects of sense; and the mind is kept, in a great degree, under theinfluence of external things. In this manner it often happens, thatfacts and considerations elude our attention, and deeds escape from ourmemory, in a manner which would not occur, were the mind left at libertyto recall its own associations, and to feel the influence of principleswhich are really part of the mental constitution. It is thus that, amidthe bustle of life, the attention is apt to be engrossed byconsiderations of a local and an inferior character;—while facts andmotives of the highest moment are overlooked, and deeds of our own, longgone by, escape from our remembrance. We thus lose a correct sense ofour moral condition, and yield to the agency of present and externalthings, in a manner disproportioned to their real value. For our highestconcern as moral beings is with things future, and things unseen, andoften with circumstances in our own moral history, long past, andperhaps forgotten. Hence the benefit of retirement and calm reflection,and of every thing that tends to withdraw us from the impression ofsensible objects, and lends us to feel the superiority of things whichare not seen. Under such influence, the mind displays an astonishingpower of recalling the past and grasping the future,—and of viewingobjects in their true relations, to itself and to each other. The firstof these, indeed, we see exemplified in many affections, in which themind is cut off, in a greater or less degree, from its intercourse withthe external world, by causes acting upon the bodily organization. Inanother work I have described many remarkable examples of the mind, inthis condition, recalling its old impressions respecting things longpast and entirely forgotten; and the facts there stated call ourattention in a very striking manner to its inherent powers and itsindependent existence.
This subject is one of intense interest, and suggests reflections of themost important kind, respecting the powers and properties of thethinking principle. In particular, it leads us to a period, which we aretaught to anticipate even by the inductions of intellectual science,when, the bodily frame being dissolved, the thinking and reasoningessence shall exercise its peculiar faculties in a higher state ofbeing. There are facts in the mental phenomena which give a high degreeof probability to the conjecture, that the whole transactions of life,with the motives and moral history of each individual, may then berecalled by a process of the mind itself, and placed, as at a singleglance, distinctly before him. Were we to realize such a mentalcondition, we should not fail to contemplate the impressions sorecalled, with feelings very different from those by which we are apt tobe misled amid the influence of present and external things.—The tumultof life is over;—pursuits, principles, and motives, which once bore anaspect of importance, are viewed with feelings more adapted to theirtrue value.—The moral principle recovers that authority, which, amidthe contests of passion, had been obscured or lost;—each act and eachemotion is seen in its relations to the great dictates of truth, andeach pursuit of life in its real bearing on the great concerns of amoral being;—and the whole assumes a character of new and wondrousimport, when view