Seeing with Free Eyes

Marlene K. Sokolon

Description

Responding to Plato's challenge to defend the political thought of poetic sources, Marlene K. Sokolon explores Euripides's understanding of justice in nine of his surviving tragedies. Drawing on Greek mythological stories, Euripides examines several competing ideas of justice, from the ancient ethic of helping friends and harming enemies to justice as merit and relativist views of might makes right. Reflecting Dionysus, the paradoxical god of Greek theater, Euripides reveals the human experience of understanding justice to be limited, multifaceted, and contradictory. His approach underscores the value of understanding justice not only as a rational idea or theory, but also as an integral part of the continuous and unfinished dialogue of political community. As the first book devoted to Euripidean justice, Seeing with Free Eyes adds to the growing interest in how citizens in democracies use storytelling genres to think about important political questions, such as "What is justice?"
Acknowledgments

Introduction

Part I: Justice in the City

1. The Medea: What Justice Conceals

2. The Bacchae: Justice, Dialectics, and Dismemberment

3. The Phoenician Women: Justice is Multicolored

Part II: Justice in Sacred Spaces

4. The Ion: Justice, In and Out of Bounds

5. The Children of Heracles: And Justice for Others

6. The Suppliant Women: Justice among Cities

Part III: Justice in the Wilderness

7. The Hecuba: Justice as Autonomy

8. The Alcestis: Justice as Generosity, or Too Much of a Good Thing

9. The Electra: The Justice of Good and Bad Judgment

Conclusion

Notes
Bibliography
Index

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Philosophie politique
• Philosophie antique
• Historiography
• Ancient philosophy

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 01 août 2021
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781438484723
• Langue: English

Extrait

Seeing with Free Eyes
SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy

Anthony Preus, editor
Seeing with Free Eyes
The Poetic Justice of Euripides
Marlene K. Sokolon
Published by State University of New York Press, Albany
© 2021 State University of New York Press
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.
For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY
www.sunypress.edu
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Name: Sokolon, Marlene K., author
Title: Seeing with free eyes : the poetic justice of Euripides / Marlene K. Sokolon, author.
Description: Albany : State University of New York Press, [2021] | Series: SUNY series in Ancient Greek Philosophy | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: ISBN 9781438484716 (hardcover : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781438484723 (ebook)
Further information is available at the Library of Congress.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For Patrik Marier
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Part I: Justice in the City
Chapter 1 The Medea : What Justice Conceals
Chapter 2 The Bacchae : Justice, Dialectics, and Dismemberment
Chapter 3 The Phoenician Women : Justice is Multicolored
Part II: Justice in Sacred Spaces
Chapter 4 The Ion : Justice, In and Out of Bounds
Chapter 5 The Children of Heracles : And Justice for Others
Chapter 6 The Suppliant Women : Justice among Cities
Part III: Justice in the Wilderness
Chapter 7 The Hecuba : Justice as Autonomy
Chapter 8 The Alcestis : Justice as Generosity, or Too Much of a Good Thing
Chapter 9 The Electra : The Justice of Good and Bad Judgment
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Acknowledgments
As this manuscript had many false starts and was interrupted by serving time as departmental chair, it took far too long to write, and there are too many people to thank for finally bringing it to completion. Bookended as it was by two sabbaticals, I especially would like to thank my hosts Jean-Baptiste Gourinat and the Centre Léon Robin for the incredible year at Paris IV/Lettres Sorbonne Université, as well as Tim Hayward of the Just World Institute at the University of Edinburgh. The excellent librarians at the Bibliothèque Historique de la Ville de Paris were wonderful and gracious during the many hours of editing I spent in their beautiful reading room. I also would like to thank the many conference discussants who commented on earlier and alternative versions over the years. In particular, the manuscript has been much improved by the comments of Mary P. Nichols, Ann Ward, Lee Trepanier, Lee Ward, Thornton Lockwood, Bernard Dobski, Dustin Gish, Ryan McKinnell, Michael Di Gregorio, Nina Valiquette Moreau, and Lilly Goren. My ideas also have benefited from the many discussions about Euripides over the years with my patient colleagues and remarkable students at Concordia University. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their careful reading of the full draft and comments for revisions, as well as Michael Rinella and the team at SUNY Press for their commitment to this manuscript. Finally, thank you to the amazing poet Frederick Turner and the Liberty Fund for inviting me many years ago to the colloquium “Freedom and the Epic,” which first inspired this investigation into the political thought of ancient poetry.
Introduction
On February 18, 1992, a cold and cloudy day in Milwaukee, Rita Isbell made a victim impact statement during the sentencing of the notorious serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer. 1 The previous year, Dahmer had murdered and raped her brother Errol Lindsey. After a parade of weeping family members, Isbell is the very image of rage. She opens by declaring: “This is what hate looks like.” For several minutes, she starkly lays bare her desire for revenge. She screams obscenities. She calls him “Satan.” She wants him to see “what out of control is.” Eventually it takes three guards to restrain her from physically attacking her brother’s murderer, and the judge orders a recess. Isbell’s rage is juxtaposed with the calmness of court proceedings, where participants dressed in pressed suits and ties deliberated on whether the accused was responsible for raping, murdering, and eating seventeen people. Her display of rage also contrasts sharply with our court system’s emphasis on logic, argumentation, and material evidence. Yet, somehow her response seems more genuine and more human than an image of justice removed from such private wrath. The pure spectacle of her honesty also likens her to a character in a Greek tragedy: in her rage, she is Hecuba, or Alcmene, or Medea. Such a spectacle also raises questions as to what might be missing or lost when justice becomes institutionalized and is grounded in an understanding of impartial or dispassionate rationality. Might it be important for our comprehension of justice to understand Medea?
This image of justice as requiring some kind of impartial rationality is found across the history of political thought. Although there is certainly no agreement on what kind of rationality is necessary for just decision making, one dominant perspective emphasizes reason as an instrumental ends-means calculation or maximization of a fairly coherent set of preferences. 2 Rawls, for example, reflects an ideal version of this perspective in his theory of justice, which employs a value-neutral form of rationality that avoids introducing “controversial ethical elements.” 3 The idea that justice demands objectivity can be found in earlier philosophers, such as Locke’s founding of community on the relinquishing private judgment to impartial arbitrators and settled, known laws. 4 Even earlier, although Aristotle may have labeled our contemporary view of instrumental reason as a form of “cleverness,” he emphasized the ends-means deliberation of prudence as essential to ethical decision making. 5 Importantly, however, like most ancient philosophers, Aristotle stresses that contemplative reasoning, which investigates universal or invariable first principles, is a higher form of rational activity.
Plato placed even greater emphasis on rational contemplation as the highest activity of the soul. 6 He opens his famous examination in the Republic by questioning popular ancient Greek opinions of justice, such as keeping oaths or helping friends and harming enemies. Socrates’s own opinion is that justice is found in every member minding their own business and contributing to the community in the role for which they are most naturally suited. Establishing such justice requires not only the famous philosopher-king but holding all things, including the family, in common. This latter point underscores the preference for one’s own as a source of injustice. Whether Plato intends this opinion of justice literally, or as merely a segue into justice as a properly ordered soul, is a long-standing scholarly debate. 7
More relevant for this present discussion, in this same dialogue on justice, Socrates invokes his most derisive critique of his pedagogical rivals: the poets. Hence, in Book III, Socrates censors poetry that depicts gods or heroes as emotionally excessive or deceitful; in Book V, he suggests those drawn to the theater resemble philosophers, but their love of learning results only in opinions and not truth. And, by Book X, the poets and the makers of tragedy are not only censored but banished. 8 In particular, Socrates dismisses poets as imitators of imitation who do not understand what improves human beings or cities; instead, they manipulate the people with a kind of wizardry that destroys calculative and prudential understanding. Thus, “unconcerned with justice and other virtues,” the poets are dangerous to good government and banished. 9 By contrast, Socrates suggests the philosopher possesses a love of learning, desire for wisdom, and always seeks the truth itself concerning the good and the just. Philosophy is nourished not by shadows and images but by rational calculation, geometry, and dialectic. Like a true pilot, philosophers are useful because they are concerned with the health of the soul and what is truly good for cities. Thus, appearing to set up a strict dichotomy between philosophical truth-seeking and dangerous poetic trickery, Socrates boldly declares that “for a long time, there has been a quarrel ( diaphora ) between poetry and philosophy.” 10
Although this is an extremely crude sketch of Plato’s extensive and highly complex assessment of poetry in this text—and throughout many of his dialogues—the question of whether Plato is serious about this quarrel has itself become another ancient debate. 11 In general, the censorship and banning of the poets is taken seriously by scholars who argue that Plato rejects traditional mythology in favor of rational inquiry and proposes an insurmountable distance between poetic inspiration and philosophy. 12 By contrast, the very poetic elements in the dialogues suggest Plato may not be as hostile to the poets as Socrates’s critique implies. Socrates frequently quotes the poets, and especially Homer, as authorities in his arguments. 13 Poetic elements, such as dramatic context and narrative, are argued as essential for understanding and interpreting his dialogues. 14 Plato also generously employs many other poetic devices from analogy, myths, and allegories, to outrageous examples likely intended to provoke his audience. 15
From this perspective, Plato’s critique of poetry is ironic or, at least, does not support a strict dichotomy between poetry and philosophy. 16 Scholars who think Plato is being ironic about t