The Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy

José Médina

Description

Exposing the myth of "the two Wittgensteins," this book provides a detailed account of the unity in Wittgenstein's thought from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations. Unlike recent interpretations in the literature, this account is not the story of the unfolding of a single view, but instead the story of an ongoing conversation and its internal logic. Throughout his career, Wittgenstein argued that philosophical problems about the necessary and the impossible, on the one hand, and about the meaningful and the nonsensical, on the other, might be dissolved by means of an elucidation of ordinary language use. This approach always relied on the same strategy, namely contextualism. He identified decontextualization as the main source of philosophical confusion and argued that philosophical understanding consists of situating concepts in the normative contexts in which they function. This critical reconstruction contributes to the understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy and illuminates contemporary debates concerning necessity, intelligibility, and the normativity of language.
Acknowledgments

Abbreviations

Introduction

1. Necessity and Intelligibility in the Tractatus

1.1. Possibility and Necessity in the Tractatus
1.2. What's Color Got to Do with It?
1.3. The Myth of 'Hidden Bodies'
1.4. Deflationism and Realism in the Tractatus

2. From Pictures to Yardsticks: The Colorful Transformations of the Tractarian View of Language

2.1. Let the Phenomena Speak for Themselves!
2.2. The Emergence of the Satzsystem Conception of Language

3. The Calculus View of Language: Meaning and Rules

3.1. Rules as Constitutive of Meaning
3.2. Local Holism, Verificationism, and the Proliferation Problem
3.3. Idealizing Language: The Autonomy of Rules

4. The “Unbridgeable Gulf” between Rule and Application

4.1. Frege on Applicability
4.2. The “Internal Relation” between Rule and Application
4.3. Is Grammar Up to Me?

5. Internal Relations in Action: Following a Rule versus Conforming with It

5.1. Searching for a Differentia Specifica
5.2. The Irrelevance of Learning: Reasons and Causes
5.3. From Possible Applications to Actual Uses

6. Normativity in Practice: Learning and Techniques

6.1. Psychologism and “Logical Madness”
6.2. Learning and Necessity
6.3. Back to the Rough Ground!
6.4. The Role of the Community: Contextualism and Quietism in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy

Notes

References

Index

Sujets

• Philosophy

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 01 février 2012
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780791488508
• Langue: English

Extrait

T HE U NITY OF W ITTGENSTEIN ’ S P HILOSOPHY

SUNY SERIES IN P HILOSOPHY George R. Lucas Jr., editor

T HE U NITY OF W ITTGENSTEIN ’ S P HILOSOPHY

Necessity, Intelligibility, and Normativity

By José Medina

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS

Published by State University of New York Press, Albany

© 2002 State University of New York

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.

For information, address State University of New York Press, 90 State Street, Suite 700, Albany, NY 12207

Production by Christine L. Hamel Marketing by Michael Campochiaro

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Medina, José, 1968– The unity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy : necessity, intelligibility, and normativity / by José Medina p. cm. — (SUNY series in philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7914-5387-1 (alk. paper) — ISBN 0-7914-5388-X (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889–1951. I. Title. II. Series.

B3376.W564.M42 2002 192—dc21

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2002020780

For my parents: Concha and Joaquin

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Acknowledgments

Abbreviations

Introduction

C ONTENTS

1. Necessity and Intelligibility in theTractatus 1.1. Possibility and Necessity in theTractatus 1.2. What’s Color Got to Do with It? 1.3. The Myth of ‘Hidden Bodies’ 1.4 Deflationism and Realism in theTractatus

2. From Pictures to Yardsticks: The Colorful Transformations of the Tractarian View of Language 2.1 Let the Phenomena Speak for Themselves! 2.2. The Emergence of the Satzsystem Conception of Language

3. The Calculus View of Language: Meaning and Rules 3.1. Rules as Constitutive of Meaning 3.2. Local Holism, Verificationism, and the Proliferation Problem 3.3. Idealizing Language: The Autonomy of Rules

4. The “Unbridgeable Gulf” between Rule and Application 4.1. Frege on Applicability 4.2. The “Internal Relation” between Rule and Application 4.3. Is Grammar Up to Me?

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5 7 13 21 28

31 32 41

55 57

63 73

83 88 100 109

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Contents

5. Internal Relations in Action: Following a Rule versus Conforming with It 5.1. Searching for aDifferentia Specifica 5.2. The Irrelevance of Learning: Reasons and Causes 5.3. From Possible Applications to Actual Uses

6. Normativity in Practice: Learning and Techniques 6.1. Psychologism and “Logical Madness” 6.2. Learning and Necessity 6.3. Back to the Rough Ground! 6.4. The Role of the Community: Contextualism and Quietism in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy

Notes

References

Index

117 118 125 132

141 142 156 169

185

195

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A CKNOWLEDGMENTS

his book began as a dissertation written in the philosophy department T at Northwestern University from 1995 to 1998. Thanks are first due to the dissertation committee that supervised my work during those years: Meredith Williams, Michael Williams, Arthur Fine, and Joan Weiner. I am greatly indebted to all of them for their careful reading of my work and for being always both critical and supportive. But my greatest debt is to Meredith Williams, who chaired the dissertation from which this book orig- inated and to whom I owe everything I know about Wittgenstein. Her work on Wittgenstein has always been and continues to be an inspiration for my own. I could not have written this book without the support I have received from my colleagues at Vanderbilt University in the last two years. I am immensely grateful to the department of philosophy for providing the most stimulating intellectual environment one can hope for and to all its mem- bers for giving me their continued and enthusiastic support and for taking the time to read the manuscript. I am thankful for the comments of Professor Lenn Goodman on a draft of chapters 1 and 2 and for the care- ful critical remarks of Professor Jeffrey Tlumak on a complete draft of the manuscript (especialy his detailed criticisms of chapter 4). Special thanks go to Professor Michael Hodges, my colleague and chair, for numerous con- versations on Wittgenstein, for attending my seminar on Wittgenstein in 1999, and for reading and commenting on drafts of the book (especially those of chapters 1 and 6). Finally, the person who is most directly respon- sible for the completion of this book is my mentor, Professor John Lachs, who has always been extremely enthusiastic about my work and has given me invaluable guidance. He was the first person to read a complete draft of the manuscript and had it not been for his encouragement, I would not have kept working on it. It was comforting to know that I could always count

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