What Moves Man

Annette Freyberg-Inan

Description

The realist theory of international relations is based on a particularly gloomy set of assumptions about universal human motives. Believing people to be essentially asocial, selfish, and untrustworthy, realism counsels a politics of distrust and competition in the international arena. What Moves Man subjects realism to a broad and deep critique. Freyberg-Inan argues, first, that realist psychology is incomplete and suffers from a pessimistic bias. Second, she explains how this bias systematically undermines both realist scholarship and efforts to promote international cooperation and peace. Third, she argues that realism's bias has a tendency to function as a self-fulfilling prophecy: it nurtures and promotes the very behaviors it assumes predominate human nature. Freyberg-Inan concludes by suggesting how a broader and more complex view of human motivation would deliver more complete explanations of international behavior, reduce the risk of bias, and better promote practical progress in the conduct of international affairs.

1. Introduction

Exploring the Realist Image of Man
Main Arguments
Approach and Layout of This Book
Why is This Study Important?

Part I: What Moves Man? An Analysis of the Realist Psychology

2. The Roots of Realism

Introduction
The Roots of Realism in the History of Thucydides
Alternatives to Realism in the History of Thucydides
Summary and Conclusions

3. Realism Goes Modern

Introduction
Niccolo Machiavelli
Thomas Hobbes
Summary and Conclusions

4. Realism Today

Introduction
"Classical" Realism in the Twentieth Century
Neorealism and Beyond
Rational Choice and Game Theory
Summary and Conclusions

5. Realist Man through the Ages: A Synopsis

The Realist Image of Man
The Role of Motivational Assumptions in Realist Theory
The Effects of the Realist Use of Motivational Assumptions

Part II: Sunglasses at Night: A Critique of the Realist Psychology

6. What Is Wrong with the Realist Psychology?

The Incompleteness of Realist Motivational Assumptions
The Bias of Realist Motivational Assumptions
Realist Defenses

7. The Effects of the Realist Bias

How Biased Assumptions Produce Biased Interpretations
How Biased Interpretations Affect Realist Scholarship
How Theoretical Biases Affect Reality
How the Realist Bias Affects International Politics

8. A Self-Fulfilling Prophesy?

The Problem of the Self-Fulfilling Prophesy
The Prophetic Status of the Realist Paradigm
Concluding Observations

9. Conclusion: Great Debates and Small Suggestions

Realism—Where Do We Go from Here?
Complementary Motivational Assumptions in International Relations Theory
Transcending the Third Debate

Appendix: Biographical Notes on Authors of Classical Realism

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Philosophie politique
• International relations

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 01 février 2012
• Nombre de lectures: 1
• EAN13: 9780791486351
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

W The Realist Theory of International HAT MOVES MAN Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature

Annette FreybergInan

What Moves Man 

SUNY series in Global Politics

James N. Rosenau, editor

W HAT M OVES M AN

The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature



A NNETTE F REYBERG I NAN

S TATE U NIVERSITY OF N EW Y ORK P RESS

Published by State Universit y of New York Press, Albany

© 2004 State Universit y of New York

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.

For information, address State Universit y of New York Press, 90 State Street, Suite 700, Albany, NY 12207

Production by Kelli Williams Marketing by Michael Campochiaro

Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data FreybergInan, Annette. What moves man : the realist theor y of international relations and its judgment of human nat ure / Annette FreybergInan. p. cm. — (SUNY series in global politics) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 079145827X (alk. paper) — ISBN 0791458288 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Political science. 2. Realism—Political aspects. 3. International relations. I. Title. II. Series.

JA66.F68 2003 327.1'01—dc21

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2002045263

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Introduction

Exploring the Realist Image of Man 1 Main Arguments 5 Approach and Layout of This Book 8 Why is This St udy Important? 14

Contents

Part I What Moves Man? An Analysis of the Realist Psychology The Roots of Realism Introduction 19 The Roots of Realism in the Histor y of Thucydides 23 Alternatives to Realism in the Histor y of Thucydides 29 Summar y and Conclusions 34 Realism Goes Modern

Introduction 37 Niccolo Machiavelli 40 Thomas Hobbes 46 Summar y and Conclusions

Realism Today

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Introduction 63 “Classical” Realism in the Twentieth Cent ur y 67 Neorealism and Beyond 73 Rational Choice and Game Theor y 78 Summar y and Conclusions 86 Realist Man through the Ages: A Synopsis The Realist Image of Man 91 The Role of Motivational Assumptions in Realist Theor y 96 The Effects of the Realist Use of Motivational Assumptions 100

Part II Sunglasses at Night: A Critique of the Realist Psychology What Is Wrong with the Realist Psychology?

The Incompleteness of Realist Motivational Assumptions The Bias of Realist Motivational Assumptions 112 Realist Defenses 114

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Contents

The Effects of the Realist Bias How Biased Assumptions Produce Biased Interpretations 119 How Biased Interpretations Affect Realist Scholarship 120 How Theoretical Biases Affect Realit y 125 How the Realist Bias Affects International Politics 133

A SelfFulfilling Prophesy? The Problem of the SelfFulfilling Prophesy 143 The Prophetic Stat us of the Realist Paradigm 144 Concluding Observations 152

Conclusion: Great Debates and Small Suggestions Realism—Where Do We Go from Here? 155 Complementar y Motivational Assumptions in International Relations Theor y 162 Transcending the Third Debate 168

Appendix: Biographical Notes on Authors of Classical Realism

Notes

Bibliography

Index

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1

Introduction

Exploring the Realist Image of Man

This book discovers and examines important psychological assumptions and argu ments that underlie the socalled realist approach to the st udy of international rela 1 tions and foreign policy. In these fields of st udy, the realist approach is considered “paradigmatic.” A “paradigm” is “a larger frame of understanding, shared by a wider 2 communit y of scientists, that organizes smallerscale theories and inquiries.” One might say that a paradigm provides a “common sense” that informs those individual attempts at explanation which fall within its frame of understanding. These individ ual attempts at explanation are what we call “theories.” 3 A theor y may be described as a “deductively connected set of laws.” It consists of a number of related statements that link causes to effects to provide an explana 4 tion for, and sometimes a prediction of, a particular phenomenon. For example, a theor y that tries to explain why nations go to war might identif y a number of pos sible reasons and argue that some of these are more important than others under specific conditions. By doing so, it would not only explain why war might break out but also give us some idea when it would be more and when it would be less likely to occur. Being part of the same paradigm, all realist theories, no matter what they tr y to explain, share certain characteristics. However, it is not always fully clear what those shared characteristics are, and the nat ure of the paradigm as a whole is thus some what elusive. This book will examine a particular defining aspect of the realist para digm: the realist psychology. More specifically, it will focus on realist views concerning human motivation, the psychological driving forces for action. To be able to examine these views, this book takes a closer look at a range of individual realist 5 theories and makes explicit the psychological beliefs on which they are based. As Graham Allison has explained, “[T]he purpose in raising loose, implicit con 6 cept ual models to an explicit level is to reveal the basic logic of an analyst’s activit y.” When we examine a basic characteristic of the realist paradigm, we gain insight into the logic of realist theories, which share this characteristic. By identifying what indi vidual realist theories have in common, we also learn something about realist the ory in general and thus develop a clearer understanding of the nature of the paradigm as a whole. To identify those theories which help define the realist paradigm, we need to begin by explaining what we mean when we speak of realism. As Cornelia Navari has put it, the term

realism was first used in philosophical discourse to denote the doctrine that univer sals exist outside the mind. . . . In political theor y, however, the term has come to be

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What Moves Man

reserved for the theorists of raison d’état or Realpolitik. It denotes a school which holds that there are real forces operating in the world beyond our immediate per ceptions of them, that these forces are revealed by the historical process and that the able political practitioner takes account of these forces and incorporates them into 7 his political conceptions and his political acts.

Political realism may be contrasted with a number of alternative worldviews or paradigms. As a political worldview, it is traditionally opposed to idealism. As a par adigm of international relations and foreign policy, it is more commonly contrasted 8 today with liberalism or pluralism, with constructivism, or with globalism. Com pared with these other approaches, political realism is arguably the dominant para digm in the fields of st udy of international relations and foreign policy today. According to Joseph Nye, “[T]he conventional wisdom in the professional study of in ternational relations since 1945 has awarded the ‘realists’ a clear victor y over the ‘ide 9 alists,’” particularly in the United States. Comparing realism with the main competing theoretical approaches, scholars in the field today frequently conclude with Stephen Walt that “realism remains the most compelling general framework for 10 international relations.” The realist paradigm has been evolving through the cent uries, with roots as far back as the famous “Athenian thesis” presented in Thucydides’History of the Pelo 11 ponnesian War. There are different kinds of realist theories, and realists may even develop explanations and predictions that contradict one another. However, it is pos sible to identif y core elements, the criteria that make an argument “realist,” as op posed to something else. According to Benjamin Frankel, for example, “[T]he theories in the realist family . . . do have a common center of philosophical gravit y: they are all grounded in an understanding of international relations, and politics 12 more generally, as a constant struggle for, and conf lict over, power and securit y.” This understanding is based on beliefs that are shared by realist theorists. As John Vasquez has explained, when we speak of the “realist paradigm,” we re ally speak of “the shared fundamental assumptions various realist theorists make 13 about the world.” Assumptions can be defined as “post ulates relied on as part of a 14 theor y’s foundation, which the theor y itself does not account for or explain.” A number of these post ulates of realism are routinely acknowledged by realist theorists. Realists have, for example, traditionally claimed that nation–states are the relevant ac tors in the field of international relations. These nation–states are seen as unitar y in the sense that the policies they produce may be regarded as the authoritative deci sions of indivisible entities. Nation–states are also rational in the sense that their re sponses to international events are based “upon . . . cool and clearheaded meansend 15 calculation[s]” designed to maximize their selfinterest. An understanding of the motives of nation–states—that is, of their basic goals and of the underlying reasons for their decisions—requires the analyst to determine how the national selfinterest may be defined in any given case. To avoid the need to act ually examine the particular interests of individual states at different times, realist theories traditionally employ the strong simplif ying assumption that one goal all

Introduction

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states strive to maximize at all times is power. In defense of this assumption, realists commonly point out that power is a necessar y means needed to achieve all other pos sible goals a state might have. In addition, a nation’s power relative to other nations is considered crucial in the pursuit of the most basic and important of these goals. 16 That goal is the survival of the nation–state as an independent entit y. In the words of neorealist Kenneth Waltz, all states “at a minimum, seek their 17 own preservation.” Offensive realist John Mearsheimer agrees that “the most basic 18 motive driving states is survival.” He explains that this, however, makes it necessar y for “states in the international system [to] aim to maximize their relative power posi 19 tions over other states.” This is why states “at a maximum, drive for universal dom 20 ination.” It appears thus that, even if a state possesses no desire to expand and no imperialistic ambitions—that is, even if it is motivated purely defensively, by a desire to survive as an independent nation—its rational strategy would be to attempt to be come as powerful as possible. This is how it becomes reasonable to view power not merely as a means to other ends but rather as the end itself and thus the most important motive driving state behavior. According to realists, this characterization of international relations as a con stant struggle for power is supported by the observation of political realit y. Its re liance on the rationalit y assumption allows realism to employ the socalled rational calculus to judge the preferences, or goals, of states based on their observed behav ior: Whatever interest a state appears to be maximizing must be identical to what it 21 has chosen as its goal. Thus, behavior such as the participation in an arms race or an attack on another state is easily interpreted by realists to support the belief that states tr y to maximize power. However, it is not logically necessar y to perceive such actions as part of a proactive strategy motivated by a lust for power and domination. It is, in fact, just as plausible to view them as part of a reactive strategy, as responses to a more basic motive, which is the emotion of fear. Whereas power, even if viewed as an end in itself, remains an attribute that is instrumental to the pursuit of other goals, the emotion of fear is the nat ural, perhaps inescapable response to threats to one’s survival. In other words, fear is what drives actors to attempt to protect them selves; to accomplish this they strive to become powerful. A complete account of the motivational assumptions of realism requires us to pay attention not only to the ra tionalit y assumption and the motives of survival and power but also to the role played by the motive of fear, which has been a cornerstone concept in the works of 22 important realist theorists such as Thomas Hobbes. This book will show that assumptions about the motives of political actors, which represent beliefs about individual psychology, form the ontological foundation of all realist theories, even those which, like the struct ural systemic realism of Waltz, attempt to avoid all concern with how individual actors come to make their policy 23 choices. The fact that realists have traditionally been primarily concerned with the behavior of nation–states rather than individual policy makers has served to obscure 24 the role these beliefs play in supporting realist arguments. In particular, the rela tionships bet ween the central motivating forces of fear, selfinterest, and the desire for