Panpsychism and the Religious Attitude

D. S. Clarke

Description

Human beings have thoughts, sensations, and feelings and think that at least some of this mental life is shared with domestic and wild animals. But, are there reduced degrees of mentality found in mosquitoes, bacteria, and even more primitive natural bodies? Panpsychists think so and have defended this belief throughout the history of philosophy, beginning with the ancient Greeks and continuing into the present. In this bold, challenging book, D. S. Clarke outlines reasons for accepting panpsychism and defends the doctrine against its critics. He proposes it as an alternative to the mechanistic materialism and humanism that dominate present-day philosophy.

Preface

1. Introduction

What is Panpsychism?
Analogical Inferences
Epistemological Questions

2. Versions of Panpsychism

Greek Origins
Leibniz's Monadology
The Panpsychism of Whitehead's Process and Reality
Hartshorne's Reformulation
Nagel on Mentality in Wholes and Parts
The Analogical Reasoning of Fechner and Chalmers

3. Humanist and Mechanist Alternatives

Humanism and Naturalism
Behavioral and Functionalist Descriptions of Language Use
Some Criticisms of Functionalism
Self-Consciousness and Freedom
Intentionality

4. Mental Ascriptions

Ascribing Sensations
Social Aspects of Attitude Ascriptions
Mentality and Spontaneity in the Infrahuman

5. Mentality and Evolution

Mechanism and the Origination Argument
Does the Panpsychist Thesis Extend to Fundamental Particles?
Resultant and Emergent Properties
The Role of Spontaneity in Evolution

6. The Theistic Alternative

Universe-Wide Mentality
Locke's Argument for God's Existence
Swinburne's Argument from Consciousness

7. The Religious Attitude

The Religious Attitude and Theology
Linguistic Fideism
Practical Inferences and Moral Overrides
The Positive Drift for Panpsychism

Notes

References

Index

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Métaphysique
• Philosophie de la religion
• Philosophy of religion
• Metaphysics

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 01 février 2012
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780791487044
• Langue: English

Extrait

Panpsychism and the Religious Attitude

The Happiness of Fish

Chuang Tzu and Hui Tzu were taking a leisurely walk along the dam of the Hao River. Chuang Tzu said,

“The white fish are swimming at ease. This is the happiness of the fish.” “You are not fish,” said Hui Tzu. “How do you know its happiness?” “You are not I,” said Chuang Tzu. “How do you know that I do not know the happiness of the fish?” Hui Tzu said, “Of course I do not know, since I am not you. But you are not the fish, and it is perfectly clear that you do not know the happiness of the fish.” “Let us get at the bottom of the matter,” said Chuang Tzu. “When you asked how I knew the hap- piness of the fish, you already knew that I knew the happiness of the fish but asked how. I knew it along the river.” —The Chuang Tzu

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Library of Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Clarke, D. S. (David S.), 1936– Panpsychism and the religious attitude / D. S. Clarke. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7914-5685-4 (alk. paper)—ISBN 0-7914-5686-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Panpsychism. I. Title.

B823 .C55 141—dc21

2003

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2002070715

Panpsychism and the Religious Attitude

D. S. C LARKE

S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y o f N e w Yo r k P r e s s

Preface

Chapter 1 Introduction What is Panpsychism? Analogical Inferences Epistemological Questions

Contents

Chapter 2 Versions of Panpsychism Greek Origins Leibniz’sMonadology The Panpsychism of Whitehead’sProcess and Reality Hartshorne’s Reformulation Nagel on Mentality in Wholes and Parts The Analogical Reasoning of Fechner and Chalmers

Chapter 3 Humanist and Mechanist Alternatives Humanism and Naturalism Behavioral and Functionalist Descriptions of Language Use Some Criticisms of Functionalism Self-Consciousness and Freedom Intentionality

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1 1 7 13

19 19 24 30 37 42 46

55 55

60 69 72 76

v

vi

Contents

Chapter 4 Mental Ascriptions Ascribing Sensations Social Aspects of Attitude Ascriptions Mentality and Spontaneity in the Infrahuman

Chapter 5 Mentality and Evolution Mechanism and the Origination Argument Does the Panpsychist Thesis Extend to Fundamental Particles? Resultant and Emergent Properties The Role of Spontaneity in Evolution

Chapter 6 The Theistic Alternative Universe-Wide Mentality Locke’s Argument for God’s Existence Swinburne’s Argument from Consciousness

Chapter 7 The Religious Attitude The Religious Attitude and Theology Linguistic Fideism Practical Inferences and Moral Overrides The Positive Drift for Panpsychism

Notes

References

Index

85 85 89 94

101 102

111 114 120

129 130 133 139

145 146 154 161 169

177

189

195

Preface

This work is an essay in defense of panpsychism, the view affirming the presence throughout nature of mentality in the form of a quali- tative perspective on an environment. Panpsychism has had a long history marked by a variety of formulations and much controversy. It has had its advocates in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but weakness in certain formulations of the doctrine have left it vul- nerable to criticisms. Those by Paul Edwards and Karl Popper have been especially effective in discouraging its widespread acceptance and in promoting the view that panpsychism offers its advocates an emotionally satisfying view at the expense of sacrificing minimal 1 standards of rationality. It is this view that I want to challenge after outlining a defensible version. Panpsychism was extensively discussed at the end of the nine- teenth century under the influence of Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution. One of the most sensible discussions is provided by William James in chapter VI of hisPrinciples of Psychology.James thinks that panpsychism in the form of what he refers to as the “mind-stuff” theory can only be established for psychology if simple units of experiencing can be identified whose compounding results in the consciousness of which we are aware. Since there is no ex- perimental evidence for such compounding, panpsychism has no place in psychology. He does acknowledge, however, that evolution- ary theory provides grounds for the doctrine because the introduc- tion of mentality of consciousness from matter represents a radical discontinuity in evolution. We ought, he says, “sincerely to try every

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Preface

possible mode of conceiving the dawn of consciousness so that it may not appear equivalent to the irruption into the universe of a new nature, non-existent until then.” The most plausible solution, he indicates, is to conceive of consciousness as always being present:

If evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape must have been present at the very origin of things. Accordingly we find that the more clear-sighted evolutionary philosophers are begin- ning to posit it there. Each atom of the nebula, they suppose, must have had an aboriginal atom of consciousness linked with it. . . . Some such doctrine . . . is an indispensable part of a thorough- going philosophy of evolution. According to it there must be an in- finite number of degrees of consciousness, following the degrees of 2 complication and aggregation of the primordial mind-dust.

Our conceptions of cosmology and evolution have changed since the nineteenth century. The Big Bang theory has replaced the earlier view that stars and planets evolved from an original gaseous nebula. Also, we now recognize the discontinuities in evolution represented by such events as the relatively sudden extinction of the dinosaurs and the corresponding rapid development of land mammals. Never- theless, despite these changes in theory, the transition from bare matter to material systems with a mental perspective on things re- mains an unexplained puzzle, and panpsychism of a kind related to the speculations of the nineteenth century provides—so I will argue—a plausible alternative solution. To say it is plausible is not to claim either conclusive arguments in its favor or experimental confirmation. Panpsychism represents one of what James describes as those “great traditional objects of be- lief” which we “cannot afford to despise.” Whether we realize it or not,” he notes, “there is always a great drift of reasons, positive and 3 negative, towing us in their direction.” The chapters that follow are an extended argument that “the drift of reasons” favors the panpsy- chist alternative. Forced with a choice, this alternative should be preferred over its competitors, but we cannot expect the reasoning used to arrive at this conclusion to have the finality we find in some areas of philosophy. For many philosophers, this in itself is good reason to avoid discussing it, preferring to restrict themselves to more tractable questions about uses of language and areas where there seems to be realistic hope of eventual agreement on answers. Better to be cautious, they think, than to run the risk of repeating

Preface

ix

the frustrating failures of the past. I sympathize with this prefer- ence. But the effect of following it has not been to eliminate meta- physics from contemporary intellectual life. Instead, we find two competing metaphysical dogmas enshrined. One is that of universal mechanism whose proponents note continuity between infrahuman and human levels, and use this continuity to argue from what seems to be our ability to give mechanical explanations of infrahuman be- havior to the conclusion that human behavior can be similarly ex- plained. The other is a humanistic bias that elevates capacities specific to the human species into metaphysical differences between ourselves and other forms of life. Both deserve to be challenged, be- cause to sit back and refuse to accept the challenge is, in effect, to contribute to the continuance of their reign. This requires more than expressing biases and exchanging in- vectives with those of differing views, however. To be a responsi- ble participant in the debate over metaphysical alternatives is to be aware of epistemological issues of a sort that appear as early as Chuang Tzu’s discussion in the frontispiece of knowing about the happiness of fish. The methodological and linguistic considera- tions we are now able to bring to bear mark an advance over nine- teenth century discussions, and are a prerequisite to any decision by us in the twenty-first century whether to accept or reject the panpsychist thesis. This book consists of two parts. The first four chapters outline panpsychism as represented by some of its early and more recent advocates, and then redefine it and contrast it with the alternatives of humanism and universal mechanism. This survey is a highly se- lective one that seeks to isolate issues raised in more recent discus- sions of panpsychism. One of the central problems of this first part is the methodological one of extending the language with which we report and express sensations, feelings, and attitudes to organisms with which we have no social interactions. In the last three chapters, the focus shifts to larger questions as- sociated with the religious attitude. Daniel Dennett’s mechanistic view of evolution and the problem of the evolutionary origins of men- tality are the topics of chapter 5. Here we consider an “Origination Argument” derived from the earlier continuity argument outlined by James, and note the apparent conflict between this argument and the analogies initially used to justify panpsychism. Although the version of panpsychism I offer for considering here is atheistic, and disavows any relations to theology, it has religious aspects. Chapter 6 contrasts