Why Be Moral?

Huang Yong

Description

Yong Huang presents a new way of doing comparative philosophy as he demonstrates the resources for contemporary ethics offered by the Cheng brothers, Cheng Hao (1032–1085) and Cheng Yi (1033–1107), canonical neo-Confucian philosophers. Huang departs from the standard method of Chinese/Western comparison, which tends to interest those already interested in Chinese philosophy. While Western-oriented scholars may be excited to learn about Chinese philosophers who have said things similar to what they or their favored philosophers have to say, they hardly find anything philosophically new from such comparative work. Instead of comparing and contrasting philosophers, each chapter of this book discusses a significant topic in Western moral philosophy, examines the representative views on this topic in the Western tradition, identifies their respective difficulties, and discusses how the Cheng brothers have better things to say on the subject. Topics discussed include why one should be moral, how weakness of will is not possible, whether virtue ethics is self-centered, in what sense the political is also personal, how a moral theory can be of an antitheoretical nature, and whether moral metaphysics is still possible in this postmodern and postmetaphysical age.
Acknowledgments

Introduction

1. Introduction
2. Possiblity of Comparative Philosophy
3. How to Do Comparative Philosophy
4. The Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers
5. Looking Ahead
6. Conclusion

1. Joy (le 㦡): “Why Be Moral?”

1. Introduction
2. The Question of “Why Be Moral?”
3. Representative Answers in Western Philosophy and Their Inadequacies
4. The Chengs’ Neo-Confucian Answer: Joy in Being Moral
5. Joy and Knowledge
6. To Be Moral and to Be Human
7. Conclusion

2. Virtue (de 㥀): Is a Virtuous Person Self-Centered?

1. Introduction
2. Virtue Ethics and Confucian Ethics
3. The Self-Centeredness Objection: The First Level
4. Virtue and Human Nature
5. The Self-Centeredness Objection: The Second Level
6. The Self-Centeredness Objection: The Foundational Level
7. Conclusion

3. Knowledge (zhi 䓡) How Is Weakness of the Will (akrasia) Not Possible?

1. Introduction
2. The Problem of Weakness of the Will in Western Philosophy
3. Knowledge and Action: Why Is Weakness of the Will Not Possible?
4. Knowledge of/as virtue versus Knowledge from Hearing and Seeing: How Is Weakness of the Will Not Possible?
5. Cheng Brothers versus Socrates and Aristotle
6. Absence of Weakness of the Will and the Presence of Moral Responsibility
7. Conclusion

4. Love (ai 㤅) Ethics between Theory and Antitheory

1. Introduction
2. The Ethics of Commonality and Its Problem
3. Love with Distinction
4. Extension of Love
5. Training of Emotions
6. Conclusion

5. Propriety (li 禮): Why the Political Is Also Personal

1. Introduction
2. The Political/Personal Division in the Liberal Tradition and Its Problems
3. The Possibility of a Confucian Political Philosophy
4. Propriety as External Rules
5. Propriety as Inner Feelings
6. Propriety as Human Nature
7. Defending the Neo Confucian Conception of Propriety as a Political Philosophy
8. Conclusion

6. Creativity (li 理): The Metaphysics of Morals or Moral Metaphysics?

1. Introduction
2. Metaphysic of Morals, Moral Theology, and Moral Metaphysics
3. Li: Ontological Articulation of Confucian Morality
4. Sheng 生 (Life-Giving Activity): Dereification of the Ultimate Reality
5. Shen 神 (Divinity or God): Toward a Confucian Theology
6. Conclusion

7. Classics (Jing 經): Hermeneutics as a Practical Learning

1. Introduction
2. Classics as Carriers of Dao (Jing Yi Zai Dao 經以載道)
3. To Grasp Dao through Classics (You Jing Qiong Li 由經窮理)
4. Multiple Ways to Dao (Qiong Li Duo Duan 窮理多端)
5. Hermeneutics as a Practical Learning (Jingxue Shixue Ye 經學實學也)
6. Hermeneutic Circles (Jiao Xiang Yang Ye 交相養也)
7. Conclusion

Appendix: Neo-Confucian Hermeneutics at Work: CHENG Yi’s Philosophical Interpretation of Analects 8.9 and 17.3

1. Introduction
2. Conventional Interpretations of Analects 8.9
3. CHENG Yi’s Interpretation of Analects 8.9
4. Conventional Interpretation of Analects 17.3
5. CHENG Yi’s Interpretation of Analects 17.3
6. The Role of Sages: Education
7. Conclusion

Notes
Bibliography
Index

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Éthique et morale
• Ethique et morale
• China
• Confucianism
• History of Asia
• Ethics in religion

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 07 octobre 2014
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781438452920
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 11 Mo

Extrait

Why Be Moral?
SUNY series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture
—————
Roger T. Ames, editor
Why Be Moral?
Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers
YONG HUANG
Cover Calligraphy: Peimin Ni
Published by State University of New York Press, Albany
© 2014 State University of New York
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.
For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY
www.sunypress.edu
Production by Diane Ganeles
Marketing by Michael Campochiaro
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Huang, Yong.
Why be moral? : learning from the neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers / Yong Huang.
pages cm. — (SUNY series in Chinese philosophy and culture)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4384-5291-3 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Ethics—China. 2. Neo-Confucianism. 3. Cheng, Yi, 1033–1107. 4. Cheng, Hao, 1032–1085. I. Title. BJ1185.C5H828 2014 170.951—dc23 2013040988
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To Qinfang
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. Introduction
2. Possibility of Comparative Philosophy
3. How to Do Comparative Philosophy
4. The Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers
5. Looking Ahead
6. Conclusion
Chapter 1 Joy ( le 樂 ): “Why Be Moral?”
1. Introduction
2. The Question of “Why Be Moral?”
3. Representative Answers in Western Philosophy and Their Inadequacies
4. The Chengs’ Neo-Confucian Answer: Joy in Being Moral
5. Joy and Knowledge
6. To Be Moral and to Be Human
7. Conclusion
Chapter 2 Virtue ( de 德 ): Is a Virtuous Person Self-Centered?
1. Introduction
2. Virtue Ethics and Confucian Ethics
3. The Self-Centeredness Objection: The First Level
4. Virtue and Human Nature
5. The Self-Centeredness Objection: The Second Level
6. The Self-Centeredness Objection: The Foundational Level
7. Conclusion
Chapter 3 Knowledge ( zhi 知 ): How Is Weakness of the Will ( akrasia ) Not Possible?
1. Introduction
2. The Problem of Weakness of the Will in Western Philosophy
3. Knowledge and Action: Why Is Weakness of the Will Not Possible?
4. Knowledge of/as Virtue versus Knowledge from Hearing and Seeing: How Is Weakness of the Will Not Possible?
5. Cheng Brothers versus Socrates and Aristotle
6. Absence of Weakness of the Will and the Presence of Moral Responsibility
7. Conclusion
Chapter 4 Love ( ai 愛 ): Ethics between Theory and Antitheory
1. Introduction
2. The Ethics of Commonality and Its Problem
3. Love with Distinction
4. Extension of Love
5. Training of Emotions
6. Conclusion
Chapter 5 Propriety ( li 禮 ): Why the Political Is Also Personal
1. Introduction
2. The Political/Personal Division in the Liberal Tradition and Its Problems
3. The Possibility of a Confucian Political Philosophy
4. Propriety as External Rules
5. Propriety as Inner Feelings
6. Propriety as Human Nature
7. Defending the Neo-Confucian Conception of Propriety as a Political Philosophy
8. Conclusion
Chapter 6 Creativity ( li 理 ): The Metaphysic of Morals or Moral Metaphysics?
1. Introduction
2. Metaphysic of Morals, Moral Theology, and Moral Metaphysics
3. Li : Ontological Articulation of Confucian Morality
4. Sheng 生 (Life-Giving Activity): Dereification of the Ultimate Reality
5. Shen 神 (Divinity or God): Toward a Confucian Theology
6. Conclusion
Chapter 7 Classics ( Jing 經 ): Hermeneutics as a Practical Learning
1. Introduction
2. Classics as Carriers of Dao ( Jing Yi Zai Dao 經以載道 )
3. To Grasp Dao through Classics ( You Jing Qiong Li 由經窮理 )
4. Multiple Ways to Dao ( Qiong Li Duo Duan 窮理多端 )
5. Hermeneutics as a Practical Learning ( Jingxue Shixue Ye 經學實學也 )
6. Hermeneutic Circles ( Jiao Xiang Yang Ye 交相養也 )
7. Conclusion
Appendix Neo-Confucian Hermeneutics at Work: C HENG Yi’s Philosophical Interpretation of Analects 8.9 and 17.3
1. Introduction
2. Conventional Interpretations of Analects 8.9
3. C HENG Yi’s Interpretation of Analects 8.9
4. Conventional Interpretation of Analects 17.3
5. C HENG Yi’s Interpretation of Analects 17.3
6. The Role of Sages: Education
7. Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Acknowledgments
This book is long in process. I began to have a serious interest in neo-Confucianism and a strong desire to write something about it following two graduate seminars I took, on Z HU Xi and L IU Zongzhou respectively, with Professor T U Weiming. It was at the time I was conceiving my dissertation topic on the debate between liberalism and communitarianism on which is prior: (religious and metaphysical conception of) the good or (political conception of) the right. I had a sense that something could be developed from neo-Confucianism, particularly Z HU Xi’s philosophy, to reconcile these two sides and thus had an itch to bring it into my dissertation. My dissertation committee, directed by Professor Francis Fiorenza and including Cornel West and the late Gordon Kaufman, wisely dissuaded me from doing it, not because they thought neo-Confucianism is unimportant or irrelevant to this topic, but because the project would grow too big to be manageable. They suggested that I focus on the liberal and communitarian debate in my dissertation and work on Z HU Xi afterward.
This proved to be one of the most prudent pieces of advice I have ever received and taken. I was able to finish my dissertation in a timely fashion, without losing my preliminary thoughts about the relevance of Z HU Xi’s philosophy to this debate, which is summarized in “Z HU Xi on Humanity and Love: A Neo-Confucian Solution to the Liberal-Communitarian Problematic” ( Journal of Chinese Philosophy , 23.2 [1996]: 213–235; it is among my earliest publications in English). Moreover, luckily, my dissertation became one of the two annually selected, out of about a dozen each year from Harvard’s two doctoral programs in religious studies, the Divinity School ThD and the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences PhD, for publication in Harvard Theological Studies , a book series that also includes faculty publications. It was eventually published a few years later, in 2001, entitled Religious Goodness and Political Rightness: Beyond the Liberal-Communitarian Debate . The most wonderful thing about inclusion in this series, at least for me and at least at that time, was that it would be published without a need for any revision, thus allowing me to immediately start my project on Z HU Xi.
So I began to read Z HU Xi right after I finished my dissertation. However, almost every time I was excited about a brilliant idea in the reading, Z HU Xi would quote the Cheng brothers, particularly C HENG Yi, attributing the idea to him. I guess that was the reason why “plagiarism” was not part of the ancient Chinese vocabulary; if anything, the problem back then was perhaps the reverse. Not only were people not in the habit of putting their names on their writings; there were people who put other people’s (Confucius’s, for example) names on what they wrote, so that we contemporary scholars, luckily, get a little extra job security: if we cannot, or do not want to, be philosophers ourselves, we can try to be appraisers or connoisseurs of the authenticity of some classical works.
In any case, that was the reason I shifted the focus of my project from Z HU Xi to the Cheng brothers. By 2008, I thought I was done with the book, as I had all chapters written, with a number of them already published or accepted for publication in various journals. However, since these different chapters were written over a long span of years, when I reread them for publication as a book, I was no longer satisfied with most of them, partly because by then I started to become self-conscious of the somewhat unique methodology I had so far only unconsciously employed. As I explain in more detail in the introduction of this book, all chapters are written with an eye to show how the Cheng brothers could help Western philosophers better answer their (the Western philosophers’) own questions or how Western philosophers could learn something from the Cheng brothers. Thus, I started to revise or, rather, rewrite most chapters, and it took me another four or five years to finish. As a result, the book in its current form is very different from what it looked like five years ago. For example, “Cheng Brothers’ Neo-Confucian Virtue Ethics: The Identity of Virtue and Nature” ( Journal of Chinese Philosophy 30 [2003]3–4: 451–467) was supposed to be chapter 2 of this book, but not a single paragraph from that paper can be found in this chapter now. For another example, “Confucian Love and Global Ethics: How Cheng Brothers Would Help Respond to Christian Criticism” ( Asian Philosophy 15 [2005] 1: 35–60) was originally written as chapter 4 of this book, but it is also hard to trace anything in the latter from the former. Still, I would like to thank the editors and the publishers of these two journals for providing me with the opportunities to try out these initial thoughts.
In addition to these two, part of the introduction is used in “How to Do Chinese Philosophy in a Western Philosophical Context: Introducing a Unique Approach to Chinese Philosophy” ( Chinese Studies 漢學研究 31 [2013] 2: 117–151); an earlier and much short version of chapter 1 is published as “Why be Moral? The Cheng Brothers’ Neo-Confucian Answer” ( Journal of Religious Ethics 36 [2008] 2: 321–353); an early version of chapter 2 is published as “The Cheng Brothers on Virtue: Is a Virtuous Person Self-Centered?” ( Journal of Sino-Western Communications 2 [2010] 2: 12–50); chapter 3 uses materials from both “How Is