Illusionism

Keith Frankish

Description

Illusionism is the view that phenomenal consciousness (in the philosophers' sense) is an illusion. This book is a reprint of a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies devoted to this topic. It takes the form of a target paper by the editor, followed by commentaries from various thinkers, including leading defenders of the theory such as Daniel Dennett, Nicholas Humphrey, Derk Pereboom and Georges Rey. A number of disciplines are represented and different viewpoints are discussed and defended. The colleciton is tied together with a response to the commentaries from the editor.

Sujets

• Sciences et techniques
• Philosophy of mind
• Cognitivism
• Cognitive science

Informations

• Publié par: Andrews UK
• Date de parution: 14 novembre 2017
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781845409654
• Langue: English

Extrait

Illusionism
as a theory of consciousness
Edited by Keith Frankish
imprint-academic.com




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About Authors
Katalin Balog moved to the USA from Budapest to study philosophy at Rutgers University, where she got her PhD in 1998. She taught philosophy at Cornell University, and then Yale University from 1998–2010. In 2010 she moved to Rutgers University/Newark where she is an Associate Professor of Philosophy. Her primary areas of research are the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The problems that interest her most, the nature of consciousness, the self, and free will, lie at their intersection.
Susan Blackmore is Visiting Professor at the University of Plymouth and a freelance writer and lecturer. She blogs for the Guardian and Psychology Today , is a TED lecturer, and frequent contributor and presenter on radio and television. She has a BA in Physiology and Psychology from Oxford and a PhD in Parapsychology from Surrey University. Her books include Dying to Live (on NDEs, 1993), In Search of the Light (autobiography, 1996), The Meme Machine (1999), Conversations on Consciousness (2005), Zen and the Art of Consciousness (2011), and Consciousness: An Introduction (2011).
Daniel C. Dennett is University Professor and Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University, and Co-director of the Center for Cognitive Studies. He is the author of Consciousness Explained , Sweet Dreams , and many scholarly articles on the science of consciousness.
Keith Frankish is Visiting Research Fellow at The Open University UK, and Adjunct Professor with the Brain and Mind Programme in Neurosciences at the University of Crete, Greece. He is the author of Mind and Supermind (2004) and Consciousness (2005), as well as numerous articles and book chapters. He is co-editor of In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond (with Jonathan Evans, 2009), New Waves in Philosophy of Action (with Jesús Aguilar and Andrei Buckareff, 2010), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science (with William Ramsey, 2012), and The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence (with William Ramsey, 2014). His research interests include the nature of phenomenal consciousness, the psychology of belief, and dual-process theories of reasoning.
Jay L. Garfield is Doris Silbert Professor in the Humanities and Professor of Philosophy, Logic, and Buddhist Studies at Smith College, Visiting Professor of Buddhist Philosophy at Harvard Divinity School, Professor of Philosophy at Melbourne University, and Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at the Central University of Tibetan Studies. His research addresses topics in the foundations of cognitive science and the philosophy of mind; the history of Indian philosophy; topics in ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of logic; the philosophy of David Hume; methodology in cross-cultural interpretation; and topics in Buddhist philosophy. Recent books include Minds Without Fear: Philosophy in the Indian Renaissance (with Nalini Bhushan, 2017), Dignāga’s Investigation of the Percept: A Philosophical Legacy in India and Tibet (with Douglas Duckworth et al. , 2016), Engaging Buddhism: Why it Matters to Philosophy (2015).
Michael S. Gazzaniga is the director of the SAGE Center for the Study of the Mind and Professor in the Psychological & Brain Sciences department at UCSB. He is also the president of the Cognitive Neuroscience Institute and the founding director of the MacArthur Foundation’s Law and Neuroscience Project and the Summer Institute in Cognitive Neuroscience. Gazzaniga’s remarkable research on split-brain patients has expanded our understanding of interhemispheric communication and functional lateralization in the brain.
Philip Goff is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Central European University in Budapest. His research interests are in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, with a special emphasis on the mind–body problem. In his book Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (2017, OUP), Goff argues against physicalism, the view that fundamental reality is entirely physical, and in favour of panpsychism, the view that fundamental physical entities are conscious.
Michael S.A. Graziano is Professor of Psychology and Neuroscience at Princeton University. He has worked for thirty years studying sensory processing, multisensory integration, and movement control in the brain. More recently his scientific work has turned to the brain basis of conscious experience. He is an author of numerous books on neuroscience including Consciousness and the Social Brain . He has also published literary novels and children’s books.
Nicholas Humphrey is a theoretical psychologist who has migrated from neurophysiology, through animal behaviour, to evolutionary psychology and the study of consciousness. He did research on mountain gorillas with Dian Fossey in Rwanda, he was the first to demonstrate the existence of ‘blindsight’ after brain damage in monkeys, he proposed the celebrated theory of the ‘social function of intellect’, and he has recently explained the evolutionary basis of the placebo effect. He has held positions at the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and is now Emeritus Professor at the LSE. Honours include the Martin Luther King Memorial Prize, the Pufendorf medal, and the International Mind and Brain Prize.
François Kammerer is a PhD student in philosophy of mind at the Université Paris-Sorbonne. He is particularly interested in the metaphysics of conscious experience.
Pete Mandik is Professor of philosophy at William Paterson University and author of This is Philosophy of Mind (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).
Nicole L. Marinsek is a PhD student in Dynamical Neuroscience at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She uses behavioural and neuroimaging techniques to research the neural dynamics of inferential reasoning, explanation, and belief updating. She has received several fellowships and awards, including an NSF Graduate Research Fellowship, a SAGE Center Graduate Student Fellowship, and a Doctoral Scholars fellowship. She was also selected to present her research at the Nobel Laureate Meeting in Lindau, Germany.
Martine Nida-Rümelin is full professor for philosophy of mind, language, and the human sciences at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. Her research area is philosophy of mind with special focus on phenomenal consciousness, identity, and individuality of conscious beings, self-awareness, and agency. She is author of the book Der Blick von Innen (Suhrkamp, 2006), a translation of which with additional chapters will soon appear under the title The View from Inside .
Derk Pereboom is the Susan Linn Sage Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at Cornell University. His research areas are free will and moral responsibility, philosophy of mind, Kant, and philosophy of religion, and he is the author of Living without Free Will (CUP, 2001), Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism (OUP, 2011), and Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (OUP, 2014).
Jesse Prinz is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Director of Interdisciplinary Science Studies at the City University of New York, Graduate Center. His research focuses on the perceptual, emotional, and cultural foundations of human psychology. He is author of Furnishing the Mind (MIT, 2002), Gut Reactions (OUP, 2004), The Emotional Construction of Morals (OUP, 2007), Beyond Human Nature (Penguin, 2012), and The Conscious Brain (OUP, 2012).
Georges Rey is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland at College Park. He is the author of numerous articles in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and of Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach (Blackwell, 1997).
Amber Ross is currently a Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Philosophy Department at the University of Toronto and member of the Network for Sensory Research. Her research is concerned with issues in consciousness and the epistemology of perception, as well as mental states in non-human animals. Her previous position was as a Research Fellow at Tufts University Center for Cognitive Studies under the supervision of Daniel Dennett.
Eric Schwitzgebel is Professor of Philosophy at University of California at Riverside. He is author of Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic (with Russell T. Hurlburt) and Perplexities of Consciousness . Recent articles include ‘The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind’, ‘If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious’, and ‘1% Skepticism’. He also publishes on moral psychology, Chinese philosophy, and science fiction.
James Tartaglia is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Keele University, UK. He is the author of Rorty and the Mirror of Nature (2007) and Philosophy in a Meaningless Life (2016); editor of Richard Rorty: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers (2009); and co-editor (with Stephen Leach) of Mind, Language, and Metaphilosophy: Early Philosophical Papers (2014) and Consciousness and the Great Philosophers: What would they have said about our mind–body problem? (2016). He also leads the band Continuum of Selves; their debut album is entitled Jazz-Philosophy Fusion (2016).



Editorial Introduction
Keith Frankish
Correspondence: Keith Frankish, The Open University, UK. [e-mail]
The topic of this special issue is the view that phenomenal consciousness (in the philosophers’ sense) is an illusi