Blue Helmets and Black Markets

Peter Andreas

Description

The 1992-1995 battle for Sarajevo was the longest siege in modern history. It was also the most internationalized, attracting a vast contingent of aid workers, UN soldiers, journalists, smugglers, and embargo-busters. The city took center stage under an intense global media spotlight, becoming the most visible face of post-Cold War conflict and humanitarian intervention. However, some critical activities took place backstage, away from the cameras, including extensive clandestine trading across the siege lines, theft and diversion of aid, and complicity in the black market by peacekeeping forces.In Blue Helmets and Black Markets, Peter Andreas traces the interaction between these formal front-stage and informal backstage activities, arguing that this created and sustained a criminalized war economy and prolonged the conflict in a manner that served various interests on all sides. Although the vast majority of Sarajevans struggled for daily survival and lived in a state of terror, the siege was highly rewarding for some key local and international players. This situation also left a powerful legacy for postwar reconstruction: new elites emerged via war profiteering and an illicit economy flourished partly based on the smuggling networks built up during wartime. Andreas shows how and why the internationalization of the siege changed the repertoires of siege-craft and siege defenses and altered the strategic calculations of both the besiegers and the besieged. The Sarajevo experience dramatically illustrates that just as changes in weapons technologies transformed siege warfare through the ages, so too has the arrival of CNN, NGOs, satellite phones, UN peacekeepers, and aid convoys.Drawing on interviews, reportage, diaries, memoirs, and other sources, Andreas documents the business of survival in wartime Sarajevo and the limits, contradictions, and unintended consequences of international intervention. Concluding with a comparison of the battle for Sarajevo with the sieges of Leningrad, Grozny, and Srebrenica, and, more recently, Falluja, Blue Helmets and Black Markets is a major contribution to our understanding of contemporary urban warfare, war economies, and the political repercussions of humanitarian action.

Sujets

• Sociologie, société et politique
• Bosnia y Herzegovina
• Military history
• True crime
• Eastern Europe
• History of Europe
• Bosnia and Herzegovina
• Bosnie-Herzégovine

Informations

• Publié par: Cornell University Press
• Date de parution: 15 janvier 2011
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780801458286
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 2 Mo

Extrait

blue helmets and black markets

A l s o b y P e t e r A n d r e a s

Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in International Relations(co-author) The Rebordering of North America: Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context(co-editor) The Wall around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe(co-editor) Border Games: Policing the U.S.–Mexico Divide The Illicit Global Economy and State Power(co-editor) Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial(co-author)

blue helmets and black markets

the business of survival in the siege of sarajevo

Peter Andreas

C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s I t h a c a a n d L o n d o n

Copyright ©2008

by Cornell University

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House,512East State Street, Ithaca, New York14850.

First published2008

by Cornell University Press

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Andreas, Peter. Blue helmets and black markets : the business of survival in the siege of Sarajevo / Peter Andreas. p.cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8014-4355-8 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Sarajevo (Bosnia and Hercegovina)—History—Siege, 1992–1996. 2. Smuggling—Bosnia and Hercegovina—Sarajevo. 3. Black market—Bosnia and Hercegovina—Sarajevo. 4. United Nations—Bosnia and Hercegovina— Sarajevo. 5. Humanitarian assistance—Boania and Hercegovina—Sarajevo. I. Title. DR1313.32.S27A57 2008 949.703—dc22 2008013721

Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppli- ers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further information, visit our website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.

Cloth printing10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

contents

Preface

1. The Longest Siege

Sarajevo on Center Stage The Cast of Characters Front Stage and Backstage: Formal and Informal Roles Conflict Narratives Criminalized Conflict Narratives Preview

2. Imposing the Siege

The Road to Siege Warfare The Start of the Siege and the Criminally Aided Defense The International Response

3. Sustaining the Siege

Diverting and Manipulating Humanitarian Aid Exploiting the Privileges of Mobility and Access The UN-Controlled Airport as Smuggling Hub Tunneling under the Siege: Lifeline and Profit Center Trading with the Enemy The Media and Its Dependence on the Black Market The Money Letter Smuggling System The Smugglers’ Markets and Cigarettes as Currency

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43 45 50 58 64 71 79 82

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contents

4. The Siege Within

Criminal Defenders as Predators Political Corruption, Abuse, and Opportunism Obstructing Access to Water

5. Lifting the Siege

Front Stage: Triggering NATO Air Strikes Backstage: Shifting the Military Balance by Evading the UN Arms Embargo

6. Aftermath

The Criminalized Aftermath of War The Criminalized New Elite Sarajevo as Transit Point for Migrant Smuggling Sex Trafficking and Peacekeeping The Arizona Market: Peace through Illicit Trade?

7. Extensions

Srebrenica Leningrad Grozny Falluja

Conclusions

Revisiting Sarajevo Lessons from Sarajevo

Notes Index

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91 95 100

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119 121 126 128 132

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139 145 148 152

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167 201

preface

Inside the UN-run airport in besieged Sarajevo hung a makeshift sign:Maybe Airlines.Along the edges of the sign, aid workers, journal- ists, and diplomats had posted stickers—CNN, ITN, CBS, RTL, MSF, VOX, UNICEF,the French flag, the Canadian flag, the Swedish flag, and so on. Above the sign was a piece of plywood with the worddes- tinationshandwritten at the top, with a changeable placard below (the placard choices includedNew York, Geneva, Rome, Berlin, Zagreb, Paris, andHeaven). “Maybe Airlines” was the nickname given to the unreliable UN flights in and out of wartime Sarajevo—the longest-lasting airlift ever attempted and the centerpiece of the international humanitarian 1 response to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Meanwhile, underneath the airport tarmac ran a narrow and damp 800-meter tunnel that by- passed both UN controls and the siege lines. Protected from Serb shelling and sniper fire, thousands of people and tons of food, arms, and other supplies moved through the underground passageway every day (which the UN pretended did not exist), providing both a vital lifeline for the city and an enormous opportunity for black mar- ket profiteering. While the UN airlift was part of the highly visible front stage of the siege, the tunnel was part of the much less visible but equally important backstage action. Together, they helped Sara- jevo survive for over three and a half years, setting a siege longevity 2 record. The 1992–95 battle for Sarajevo was not only the longest siege in modern history but also the most internationalized—an urban

A United Nations sign at the Sarajevo airport, 1994. Photo reproduced with permis- sion of Ron Haviv/VII.

The tunnel under the Sarajevo airport. Photo reproduced with permission of the Historical Museum of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

preface

magnet for aid workers, diplomats, UN “Blue Helmet” soldiers, jour- nalists, artists, celebrities, peace activists, adventure seekers, embargo busters, and black market traders. Sarajevo under siege became the most visible and recognizable face of post–Cold War “ethnic conflict” and humanitarian intervention. At the same time, the less visible and less recognized face of the siege included aid diversion, clandestine commerce, and peacekeeper corruption. As the Sarajevo experience powerfully illustrates, just as changes in fortifications and weapons technologies transformed siege warfare through the ages, so too has the arrival of CNN, NGOs, satellite phones, UN peacekeepers, aid convoys, and diaspora remittances. The internationalization of the siege changed the repertoires of siege-craft and siege defenses. It changed the strategic calculus and opportunities and constraints of both the besiegers and the besieged. Given the overwhelming military advantage of the Serb besiegers, many at first expected the poorly defended city and its government to fall quickly and easily. At the same time, because of the intensity of in- ternational political and media attention, many expected that the Serb leadership would back down and the siege would be short-lived. It did not turn out that way. Why not? What sustained the siege for such an unexpectedly long period of time? These questions are particularly puzzling because siege warfare in Europe was supposed to be obsolete—and in Sarajevo it not only returned with a vengeance, but contrary to all expectations stubbornly persisted. Moreover, it was being broadcast live across the globe. As one Western journalist de- scribed it: “A European city was being reduced to nothing; Carthage in slow motion, but this time with an audience and videotaped 3 record.” This book is about the imposition, maintenance, lifting, and after- math of the siege of Sarajevo. I focus on the Sarajevo case not simply be- cause it is a particularly fascinating and important historical story. The siege offers a powerful lens through which to scrutinize the relation- ship between the material and performative aspects of conflict, interna- tional intervention, and postwar reconstruction. In a highly confined and intensely contested geographic space, the siege provides a striking illustration of the interdependence between the upper-world and un- derworld, formal and informal, front stage and backstage in armed confrontations and external involvement. At the broadest level, this is a

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book about the dynamics of war economies, humanitarian and media access to conflict zones, and the political repercussions of relief aid told through the story of Sarajevo. More specifically, issues of aid diversion, embargo busting, trading with the enemy, war profiteering, and irregu- lar combatants all come together and crystallize in the Sarajevo case. In concentrated form, the siege illuminates important elements of the po- litical economy of contemporary conflict and the dilemmas, contradic- tions, and unintended consequences of humanitarian action. I examine the bottom-up, micro-dynamics of the siege in the con- text of top-down international conditions and developments. I show how and why the internationalization of the siege, which aimed to end the conflict, paradoxically helped to perpetuate it by becoming incorporated into the war economy. A peculiar and in many ways un- intended symbiosis developed on the ground between key actors among the besiegers, besieged, and external interveners. I explain the logic and trace the causal mechanisms of this siege symbiosis and show how it was finally broken. For comparative leverage, I briefly extend the analysis to other siege cases both within Bosnia (Srebrenica) and outside the region (Leningrad, Grozny, Falluja), helping to illumi- nate what is and is not distinctive about the Sarajevo experience. Pointing to the symbiotic aspects of the Sarajevo siege is not meant to suggest that the besieged and the international interveners did not want the siege lifted, that the besiegers would not have preferred a quick and decisive military victory, or that all sides benefited equally from the siege and were equally responsible for its continuation. However, it does draw attention to the ways in which moves on all sides often ended up being reinforcing, even if not necessarily inten- tionally. No elaborate conspiracy was required, making the siege symbiosis all the more durable. For many local and international actors, the partial and continu- ously negotiated permeability of the city made the siege politically tolerable, militarily acceptable, and economically profitable. Siege dy- namics were often more about controlling humanitarian supplies and smuggling routes in and out of the city than making the siege militar- ily succeed or fail. While the vast majority of the city’s inhabitants struggled for survival and lived in a state of terror, a semi-porous siege kept the city formally and informally supplied and served vari- ous local and international interests.