Prejudicial Appearances

Post Robert C. Post, Appiah K. Anthony Appiah, Butler Judith Butler, Grey Thomas C. Grey, Siegel Reva B. Siegel

Description

In Prejudicial Appearances noted legal scholar Robert C. Post argues modern American antidiscrimination law should not be conceived as protecting the transcendental dignity of individual persons but instead as transforming social practices that define and sustain potentially oppressive categories like race or gender. Arguing that the prevailing logic of American antidiscrimination law is misleading, Post lobbies for deploying sociological understandings to reevaluate the antidiscrimination project in ways that would render the law more effective and just.Four distinguished commentators respond to Post's provocative essay. Each adopts a distinctive perspective. K. Anthony Appiah investigates the philosophical logic of stereotyping and of equality. Questioning whether the law ought to endorse any social practices that define persons, Judith Butler explores the tension between sociological and postmodern approaches to antidiscrimination law. Thomas C. Grey examines whether Post's proposal can be reconciled with the values of the rule of law. And Reva B. Siegel applies critical race theory to query whether antidiscrimination law's reshaping of race and gender should best be understood in terms of practices of subordination and stratification.By illuminating the consequential rhetorical maneuvers at the heart of contemporary U.S. antidiscrimination law, Prejudical Appearances forces readers to reappraise the relationship between courts of law and social behavior. As such, it will enrich scholars interested in the relationships between law, rhetoric, postmodernism, race, and gender.

Sujets

• Sociologie, société et politique
• USA
• Ethnic studies
• États-Unis
• Gender studies

Informations

• Publié par: Duke University Press
• Date de parution: 19 octobre 2001
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780822381136
• Langue: English

Extrait

Prejudicial Appearances

Prejudicial Appearances

The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law

Robert C. Post, with K. Anthony Appiah,

Judith Butler, Thomas C. Grey, and Reva B. Siegel

Duke University Press

Durham and London 

©  Duke University Press All of the essays in this book originally appeared in volume  of theCalifornia Law Review(January ),

and are © California Law Review, Inc. All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper  Typeset in Adobe Minion by Tseng Information Systems, Inc.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data appear on the last printed page of this book.

Contents

Robert C. Post Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law

K. Anthony Appiah



Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity

Judith Butler

‘‘Appearances Aside’’

Thomas C. Grey

Cover Blindness





Reva B. Siegel Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How ‘‘Color Blindness’’ Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification 

Robert C. Post

Response to Commentators

Contributors

Index









Prejudicial Appearances

Robert C. Post

Prejudicial Appearances:

The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law

There is a logic to the structure of American antidiscrimination law. This logic is apparent in the official opinions of judges and administra- tive agencies, in the expert commentary of scholars, and in the visions of the popular imagination. The influence of this logic extends from the drafting of the most modest city ordinances to the interpretation of the federal Constitution itself. It is a logic that expresses the essen- tial principles of post–World War II American liberalism, which stress both the inherent dignity of each individual and the need for a rational and efficient economy. To challenge this logic is to confront the pervasive and unconscious power of common sense. But it is nevertheless a challenge that I shall pursue in this essay. I shall argue that the sway of this logic has caused courts seriously to misapprehend the actual operation of American antidiscrimination law. It has led judges to craft legal rules as though antidiscrimination law could liberate individuals from the thrall of so- cial ‘‘stereotypes,’’ when in fact that law can intervene instead only to reshape the nature and content of social stereotypes. It has led judges to equate instrumentally rational employment rules with non- discriminatory employment rules, when in fact rationally functional