Punishment

Ted Honderich

Description

Ted Honderich's Punishment is the best-known book on the justifications put forward for state punishment.



This enlarged and developed edition brings his writing to a new audience. With new chapters on determinism and responsibility, plus a new conclusion, the book also remains true to its original realism about almost all talk of retribution and proportionality. Honderich investigates all the commonsensical notions of why and when punishment is morally necessary, engaging with the language of public debate by politicians and other public figures. Honderich then puts forward his own argument that punishment is legitimate when it is in accord with the principle of humanity.



Written in a clear, sharp style and seasoned with a dry wit, this is the most important work on the reasoning behind our penal systems. It is a pleasure to read for philosophers and non-philosophers alike.
Introduction

1 Problem

2 Backward-Looking Theories

3 Grievance-Satisfaction

4 Utilitarian Prevention Theory, Etc.

5. Reform, Rehabilitation, Treatment

6. Determinism

7 Compromise Theories of Punishment

8 Non-Problem, Other Conclusions

Acknowledgements

Notes

Index

Sujets

• Philosophie politique
• Politics
• Penology
• Sociologie, société et politique
• PHILOSOPHY
• Political
• Social Science

Informations

• Publié par: Pluto Press
• Date de parution: 20 décembre 2005
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781849644822
• Langue: English

Extrait

Punishment

Also available by Ted Honderich from Pluto Press

Conservatism: Burke, Nozick, Bush, Blair? (2005)

‘A tumultuous onslaught . . . a substantial piece of work.’ The Times

‘[A] powerful critique of the major beliefs of modern conservatism . . . [Honderich] shows how much a rigorous philosopher can contribute to understanding the fashionable but deeply ruinous absurdities of his times.’ New Statesman

‘Honderich’s polemic has considerable force.’ Financial Times

Terrorism For Humanity:

Inquiries in Political Philosophy (2004)

‘Masterful argument.’Times Literary Supplement

‘Clear, rational and continuously interesting.’New Statesman

‘Inherent interest and importance.’Times Higher Educational Supplement

‘[A] richly and densely argued set of essays.’Radical Philosophy

‘… rewarding, a set of tools for thinking with.’Guardian

Punishment The Supposed Justifications Revisited

Ted Honderich

● LONDON ANN ARBOR, MI

First published asPunishment: The Supposed Justificationsby Hutchinson, 1969, second and third editions published by Penguin, 1971 and 1976, and fourth edition published by Polity Press, 1989.

This revised edition published 2006 by Pluto Press 345 Archway Road, London N6 5AA and 839 Greene Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48106

www.plutobooks.com

© Ted Honderich 1969, 1971, 1976, 1989, 2006

The right of Ted Honderich to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 0 7453 2132 1 hardback ISBN 0 7453 2131 3 paperback

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data applied for

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Designed and produced for Pluto Press by Chase Publishing Services, Fortescue, Sidmouth, EX10 9QG, England Typeset from disk by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd, India Printed and bound in the European Union by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne, England

To Ingrid, John and Kiaran

Introduction 1

1

2

3

4

5

Contents

Problem and Definition

The Need to Justify Punishment The Definition of Punishment

BackwardLooking Theories

Retribution Theories in General Legal, Circular, and Intrinsic-Good Retributivism Distress–Culpability, Forfeited Rights, Indifference Innocence System Annulment, Offenders’ Rights Rational Contract Consent to Loss of Immunity Satisfactions-in-Acting 53

Grievance Satisfaction

An Actual Reason System 65 Defences and Criticisms

Utilitarian Prevention Theory, etc.

Questions of Fact about Prevention The Utilitarian Prevention Theory The Victimization Objection Utilitarians on Victimization Justified and Unjustified Victimizations Retrospect and Conclusion

Reform, Rehabilitation, Treatment

Punishment as Reformative Illness and Treatment Objections 125

vii

4

4 8

17

17 23 29 35 41 46 48

58

58

69

74

74 86 89 95 104 109

112

112 118

viii Contents

6

7

8

Determinism

Punishment, Freedom, Responsibility A Sketch of Determinism Determinism Despite Quantum Theory Compatibilism and Incompatibilism Attitudinism 145 Arguments for Compatibilism and Incompatibilism The Real Consequences of Determinism Punishment 158

Compromise Theories

Retrospect, Separate Questions Prevention and Retribution Correct-Values Retributivism Liberal-Community Retributivism

NonProblem, Other Conclusions

The End of All Retributivism The Decent Society The Principle of Humanity Our Societies Our Unjustified Punishments

Acknowledgements

Notes

Index

130

130 133 138 144

151 155

163

163 170 176 184

195

195 201 206 210 216

228

229

245

Introduction

This book is philosophical, which is to say that its ambition is logic about a subject – logic in the most general sense. So it consists in an attempt to achieve a clarity that is rightly called analysis, and then consistency and validity, and then a completeness. It is true that disciplines and lines of life other than philosophy have some aim of this kind, which does not exclude commitment, but they cannot be so single-minded in it. Physical science has other aims to which it attends, obviously, and so do the humanities, say history. Something the same is true, even, of the works of jurisprudents and lawyers on the subject of the justification of punishment. They rightly give attention to a lot more than what at bottom is a ques- tion of logic in morality and thus in moral philosophy. So too do sociologists, criminologists, penologists and other social theorists have other concerns. With punishment, then, there is a division of labour and has to be, a division according to the possession of different tools, ways of proceeding and the like. This is not at all peculiar. It is to be found with respect to other subjects, say the nature of consciousness, free will, time, reality in general, and terrorism. To think any of these can be treated wholly within science, for example, is inevitably to bungle them. Proofs surround us. The somewhat grand intention of the original book of which this is a revision was to consider everything clear and at all persuasive by way of arguments or justifications for the practice of punishment, and also to pay attention to the main obscurities. That is still your author’s intention. But it cannot now be carried forward by intro- ducing a reader to just about all of what accredited philosophers and the like have put into print on those arguments. As your search engine on the web will demonstrate to you, there is now too much print. There is only a sample of it here. A relief to both of us, maybe. You will gather that answers to the question of why we punish, the explanation, where that is not the question of what reasons

1