When Violence Works

Patrick Barron

Description

Why are some places successful in moving from war to consolidated peace while others continue to be troubled by violence? And why does postconflict violence take different forms and have different intensities? By developing a new theory of postconflict violence Patrick Barron's When Violence Works makes a significant contribution to our understanding. Barron picks out three postconflict regions in Indonesia in which to analyze what happens once the "official" fighting ends: North Maluku has seen peace consolidated; Maluku still witnesses large episodes of violence; and Aceh experiences continuing occurrences of violence but on a smaller scale than in Maluku. He argues that violence after war has ended (revenge killings, sexual violence, gang battles, and violent crime, in addition to overtly political conflict) is not the result of failed elite bargains or weak states, but occurs because the actors involved see it as beneficial and lowcost. His findings pertain directly to Indonesia, but the theory will have relevance far beyond as those studying countries such as Colombia, the Philippines, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria seek a framework in which to assess what happens after war ends. Barron's theory also provides practical guidance for policymakers and development practitioners. Ultimately, When Violence Works pushes forward our understanding of why postconflict violence occurs and takes the forms it does.

Sujets

• Sociologie, société et politique
• Indonesia
• History of Asia
• Indonésie

Informations

• Publié par: Cornell University Press
• Date de parution: 15 avril 2019
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781501735455
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 3 Mo

Extrait

WHEN VIOLENCE WORKS

WHEN VIOLENCE WORKS Postconflict Violence and Peace in Indonesia

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

Patrick Barron

ITHACA AND LONDON

Copyright © 2019 by Cornell University

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. Visit our website at cornellpress.cornell.edu.

First published 2019 by Cornell University Press

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data Names: Barron, Patrick, 1977– author. Title: When violence works : postconflict violence and peace in Indonesia / Patrick Barron. Description: Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018035597 (print) | LCCN 2018036920 (ebook) | ISBN 9781501735455 (pdf) | ISBN 9781501735455 (epub/mobi) | ISBN 9781501735448 | ISBN 9781501735448 (cloth: alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Violence—Indonesia. | Peacebuilding—Indonesia. | Conflict management—Indonesia. | Ethnic conflict—Indonesia. Classification: LCC HN710.Z9 (ebook) | LCC HN710.Z9 V534 2019 (print) | DDC 303.609598—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018035597

Cover illustration: Jehabdulloh Jehsorhoh,Tree in War. Acrylic on handmade paper. Private collection, used by permission.

Contents

List of Tables and Figures Preface

Introduction 1. Studying Postconflict Violence: Approaches and Methods 2. cn:eoieltcVfnilstcogPoininxplaE,seiTe,orheviEncde and Arguments 3. Violence and Indonesia’s Democratic Transition 4. Large Episodic Violence in Postconflict Maluku 5. North Maluku’s Peace 6. Small Episodic Violence in Postconflict Aceh 7. Why Has Extended Violent Conflict Not Recurred? Conclusions

Glossary Appendix. The National Violence Monitoring System Dataset Notes References Index

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Tables and Figures

Tables

1. Types of violence 2. Different forms of violence 3. A taxonomy of violence 4. Extended violence by province in transitioning Indonesia 5. Postconflict periods by province 6. Postconflict violence by province 7. Forms of postconflict violence by province 8. Levels of postconflict violence by form in selected provinces 9. Impacts of extended violence in the ten mostaffected districts 10. Impacts of postconflict violence in selected districts 11. Largescale postconflict violence in selected districts 12. Subnational revenues in Maluku and large episodic violence over time 13. Levels of smallscale postconflict violence in Aceh districts most affected by extended violence 14. Incentives for central state–based actors to support violence escalation over time 15. Incentives for local elites to support violence and the presence of large episodic violence 16. Incentives for local violence specialists to support violence and the presence of small episodic violence

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viiiTABLES AND FIGURES

Figures

1. Support for violence from different groups and types of postconflict violence 2. Forms of violence in early transition Indonesia 3. Deaths from violence in fifteen Indonesian provinces, 1998–2009 4. Large incidents of postconflict violence in Maluku over time 5. Provincial and district revenues in Aceh, 1999–2012 6. Mechanisms for preventing violence escalation 7. Incidents of mobilized violence, security force intervention, and successful intervention

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Preface

In 2006, I was living and working in Aceh, tasked with developing programs for the World Bank that would support a recent peace agreement in the Indo nesian province. After almost three decades of civil war, the first year of Aceh’s postconflict era had gone well. An international peacemonitoring mission had had relatively little to do and both the government and former rebel GAM lead ers appeared committed to making the peace accord work. There was talk that the Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, could be up for a Nobel Peace Prize. Analysts were already declaring Aceh a rare story of peacebuilding success. I was also optimistic and saw much progress, but it was also clear that violence had not completely ceased. The monthly conflict monitoring updates we produced were starting to pick up incidents of many types—land conflicts, vigilante attacks, and most noticeably, a worrying upsurge in violent crime. It did not seem likely to me or others that a return to civil war was in the cards. But nor did Aceh appear to be as peaceful as some made out. Trying to understand what was going on, I started to work my way through the academic and policy literature on why some peace settlements are successful while others are not. The books and papers I read sought to explain why civil wars often reoccurred after peace agreements or military victories had (temporarily) halted hostilities. But I found little that helped me understand why other forms of violence could emerge. The ideas in the literature on the sources of postconflict violence also did not seem to fit with what I saw. If violence was the result of failed elite bargains, as some proposed, why was it occurring so frequently in Aceh even as leaders from both the rebel movement and the Indonesian government seemed so commit ted to the peace accord? If postconflict violence was the result of societal factors such as tense intergroup relations, another major focus in the literature, why was violence occurring even as surveys I commissioned were showing high levels of social cohesion? How could I square arguments that postconflict violence was a result of weak state capacity with the observed reality that Aceh was governed by a strong, and strengthening, Indonesian state? Existing theories were ill equipped to provide an explanation of what was happening in Aceh. My interest in these questions strengthened as the first data came in from another project I was managing. Colleagues and I had been building a data base of incidents of violence reported in local newspapers across Indonesia.

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