Insecurity in the supply of electrical energy

Simon Bennett

Description

This monograph evaluates the consequences for ICT users of failures in the supply of electricity. As demand for electricity grows it is vital that the electricity generating industry expands its capacity. It is also vital that the networks (grids) that deliver that electricity are up to the task. There is talk in Britain of an impending ‘energy gap’ and in the United States of a grid at breaking point. Case studies illustrate the consequences for advanced societies of power outages. It is suggested that even the most comprehensive business continuity plans may be overwhelmed. It is concluded that the best way to secure the ICT systems of both the private and public sectors (including risk, crisis and disaster management ICT) is to maintain a reliable supply of electrical energy. Security of supply would also reduce the burden on crisis management agencies.
The private and public sectors must ensure that governments address the energy security issue. Governments must fully meet their public safety responsibilities by investing in resilient power generation and distribution systems. As evidenced by the generally successful response to the world financial crisis of 2008–10, governments are still the prime movers in maintaining stability. Governments’ empowerment of producers and markets within a de-regulated, laissez-faire world economic system should not be seen as an opportunity to scale-down investment in infrastructure. If the private sector is preoccupied with short-term gain, it is up to governments to invest for the long term (provided, of course, the required legislation can be voted through – not easy in coalition governments where parties may hold different views). Reports of the death of the post-war settlement are premature. Keynes’s ideas are relevant still.

Sujets

• Techniques
• Electronique et Télécommunications
• Electronique et Télécommunications
• Energie & environnement
• Power Resources
• Electrical
• Sciences et techniques
• Technology
• Engineering
• Electronique & télécommunications

Informations

• Publié par: Libri Publishing Ltd
• Date de parution: 01 février 2011
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781907471247
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

Insecurity in the supply of electrical energy
an emerging threat to information and communication technologies?
Simon Bennett
An e-monograph from Libri Publishing
Imprint
First published in 2010 by Libri Publishing
Copyright © Simon Bennett
ISBN 978-1-907471-24-7
The right of Simon Bennett to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in any retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder for which application should be addressed in the first instance to the publishers. No liability shall be attached to the author, the copyright holder or the publishers for loss or damage of any nature suffered as a result of reliance on the reproduction of any of the contents of this publication or any errors or omissions in its contents.
A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from The British Library
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Contents
ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
CASE STUDIES
The US Case Studies
The Great Northeast Blackout of 1965
The New York Blackout of 1977
The Northeast Blackout of 2003
The UK Case Study
The London and Kent Power Cut 2003
POWER CUTS: COST AND RESPONSE
ENERGY SECURITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A GLACIAL PROCESS?
PUBLIC INQUIRIES: PROS AND CONS
THE GREEN PERSPECTIVE
INTERNATIONAL THREATS TO ENERGY SECURITY
COPENHAGEN OUTCOMES
CONCLUSIONS
A PLAN OF ACTION
REFERENCES
ABSTRACT
This monograph evaluates the consequences for ICT users of failures in the supply of electricity. As demand for electricity grows it is vital that the electricity generating industry expands its capacity. It is also vital that the networks (grids) that deliver that electricity are up to the task. There is talk in Britain of an impending ‘energy gap’ and in the United States of a grid at breaking point. Case studies illustrate the consequences for advanced societies of power outages. It is suggested that even the most comprehensive business continuity plans may be overwhelmed. It is concluded that the best way to secure the ICT systems of both the private and public sectors (including risk, crisis and disaster management ICT) is to maintain a reliable supply of electrical energy. Security of supply would also reduce the burden on crisis management agencies. The private and public sectors must ensure that governments address the energy security issue. Governments must fully meet their public safety responsibilities by investing in resilient power generation and distribution systems. As evidenced by the generally successful response to the world financial crisis of 2008–10, governments are still the prime movers in maintaining stability. Governments’ empowerment of producers and markets within a de-regulated, laissez-faire world economic system should not be seen as an opportunity to scale-down investment in infrastructure. If the private sector is preoccupied with short-term gain, it is up to governments to invest for the long term (provided, of course, the required legislation can be voted through – not easy in coalition governments where parties may hold different views). Reports of the death of the post-war settlement are premature. Keynes’s ideas are relevant still.
INTRODUCTION
Information and communications technologies (ICTs) pervade the public and private sectors. Dependency puts a premium on ICT resilience (Dunn & Wigert, 2003; Rinaldi, 2004; Coleman, 2008; World Economic Forum, 2010). Risks to ICT systems include software errors, on-line theft (committed either by employees or the public), sabotage, security breaches, cyber attacks ( Business Information Review , 2003) and ‘physical damage caused by fires, floods, power failures, earthquakes...’ (Bartol & Martin, 1998: 627). Outsourcing, a common pattern within United Kingdom (UK) government departments, may increase vulnerability:
The majority of government departments and agencies now rely on third parties to handle most of their information and services. Services are often contracted out and increasingly outsourced and off-shored. The government now buys services from organisations located all around the world. Many assets are often no longer under British ownership, and delivery capability can be outside the legal jurisdiction of the UK. The different data protection laws outside the UK, the reliability of some overseas supply and the activities of foreign intelligence services are now presenting new challenges for the Government (Coleman, 2008: 11).
Loss of ICT is a significant concern to business leaders and civil servants (London First, 2003; Woodman & Kumar, 2009; Coleman, 2008). There is a strong economic case for business continuity planning: each year around one in five businesses experience a major disruption (London First, 2003); about 80% of disaster-hit businesses fail (Dillon, 2009). ‘Given the world’s heightened sensitivity to misfortune, it wouldn’t be unreasonable to predict that disaster recovery will be the business to be in before too long’ says Business Information Review (2003: 177). Loss of data or processing capability by businesses and government departments may undermine credibility and confidence (London First, 2003; Coleman, 2008). First responders (the fire and rescue services, for example) may have a statutory duty to maintain a business continuity plan (BCP) (Dillon, 2009). According to Elliott, Swartz and Herbane (2002) the business continuity industry is expanding.
This monograph has two objectives: First, to understand the consequences for advanced industrial societies (and their crisis management agencies) of major power failures. Secondly, to discuss how ICT users can reduce their vulnerability to power failures. The analysis is informed by actor-network theory (ANT). ANT posits that systems are composed of numerous, more-or-less-aligned, human and non-human actors (‘actants’) (Callon & Latour, 1981). Systems are the product of ‘heterogeneous engineering’ (Law, 1987: 113). ICT resilience has most often been viewed from a technical standpoint (Dunn, 2005). This monograph broadens the analysis to include a wider range of actants (activists, economists, bureaucrats, politicians, markets, ideology, topography, etc.). The analysis is holistic and inclusive.
As well as being one of the main pillars of economic growth, a secure electricity supply helps maintain public confidence in politicians, businesspeople, bureaucrats and other authority figures. Insecurity of supply breeds distrust in institutions and undermines prosperity (Brayley, Redfern & Bo, 2005). As evidenced by Edward Heath’s ejection from office in February 1974, black-outs can also undermine governments. In the winter of 1973, with industrial unrest spreading and energy supplies dwindling, the government was forced to act:
By 30 December [1973], the Government was forced to put industry on a 3-day week because of energy shortages, to reduce heating and lighting in offices and shops, introduce a 50-m.p.h. speed limit and force television to close down by 10.30 p.m. (Childs, 1995: 173–4)
The lesson is simple: if you want to stay in office you must keep the lights on. There are few more obvious signs of political failure than a blacked-out city. There is nothing more wasteful than an industrial base disabled by power cuts. There is no more disaffected a public than one that is deprived of heat, light and home entertainment. Blackouts give pause for thought. ‘Blackouts are considered to be quite unique in that they force society to look in on itself,’ claim Brayley, Redfern and Bo (2005: 4).

Doing homework during the rolling power cuts of the three-day week
As societies develop, their systems (of industrial production and distribution, power generation, finance, public administration, etc.) become more complex and tightly coupled. Systems are linked (often via ICT) to produce ‘systems of systems’ (mega-systems) (World Economic Forum, 2010). Although more efficient, mega-systems are vulnerable (Boin & McConnell, 2007). Systems can be undermined by ignorance or denial of vulnerabilities, less-than-optimal system redundancy, cost-cutting in the matter of system architecture and component quality, and ‘trans-boundary propagation of disturbances’ (Kröger, 2008). Mega-systems are also vulnerable to malfeasance and terrorism (Clark & Deininger, 2000; Motter & Lai, 2002; Simonoff, Restrepo & Zimmerman, 2007). Institutional responses have included government task-forces like the US President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection which, according to Dunn-Cavelty (2008: 10) ‘concluded that the security, the economy, the way of life, and perhaps even the survival of the industrialised world were dependent on the triad of electric power, communications, and computers’.
Complex systems fail for a number of reasons. Breakdown may result from either structural vulnerability (Toft & Reynolds, 1994; Perrow, 1999), a sequential process of failure (Turner, 1976, 1978), gradual degradation occasioned by reactive ‘patching’ (Weir, 1996), the emergence of local cultural norms (Vaughan, 1997; Snook, 2000; Dekker, 2005), a gradual and difficult-to-detect migration towards the boundary of safe operation (‘safety migration’) (Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 1997) or subordination of system safety and security to economic objectives – Hollnagel’s (2004) Efficiency-Thoroughness Trade-Off (ETTO). ETTO ‘may lead to... an incr